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THE FORMULATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
ACT,1948-49.
JAMES IAN MC CABE
ABSTRACT
The thesis unravels the strands of the political and diplomatic 
pressures which led to Eire's departure from the British 
Commonwealth.
As a background, the thesis reviews Anglo-Irish
constitutional developments, from 1932 until 1948, with special 
reference to the introduction of the Executive Authority 
(External Relations) Act,1936. That statute sufficed as Eire's 
last tenuous constitutional link with the Commonwealth.
The contentious issue of why the Taoiseach, John Costello made 
the announcement of his government's intention to repeal the 
External Relations Act, without a cabinet decision is examined. 
The answer is found by differentiating between the Statute and 
the prescribed permissory procedures embodied therein.
Following chapters show how discussions among Commonwealth 
representatives, at Chequers and Paris, arrived at an agreement, 
whereby the Republic of Ireland, in an intermediary position 
between that of a foreign state and Commonwealth member, retained 
Most Favoured Nation Status for its trade and citizens.
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Two following chapters on NATO and on Partition ignore the above 
semantic analysis of Anglo-Irish relations and deal with the 
practical problems.
The thesis argues that the UK 'Ireland Act'/1949/ introduced 
ostensibly to recognise Eire's new status vis-a-vis the 
Commonwealth, incorporated a guarantee to the Unionists that 
Partition would not end without their consent (as opposed to 
with): That this "guarantee" was not divorced from the strategic
interests of the British Chiefs of Staffs, who wanted to 
maintain the reliable bases in Northern Ireland.
The Irish government's response to the British government's, 
Ireland Act, 1949 was rhetorical rather than practical. Protests 
turned to internecine political recriminations, and faded when 
it became obvious that continued criticism of Britain would 
encourage the unleashing of unconstitutional and uncontrollable 
elements .
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS. February 1948 - May 1949.
18 February. Fine Gael headed Coalition replaces Fianna Fail.
25 February. Communist 'coup d'etat' in Czechoslovakia.
17 March. Brussels Treaty signed .
17 March. President Truman declares support for Brussels Pact .
16 April. Organisation for European Economic Co-operation 
established .
11 June. Senate adopts "Vandenberg Resolution" 64 votes to 2.
16-22 June. Anglo -Irish Trade Negotiations.
23 June. Soviets blockade surface traffic into Berlin.
28 June. Eire first to sign U.S. bilateral agreement under the 
Economic Co-operation Act(Marshall plan).
21 July. Sean MacBride declares that Eire is not a member of the 
Commonwealth.
23 July. Taoiseach John Costello predicts possibility of 
progress on Partition
28 July. John Costello states that Eire has ceased to be a formal 
member of the Commonwealth.
30 July. Prime Minister Attlee arrives in Dublin to holiday 
and sign Anglo-Irish Trade Treaty.
6 August. Tanaiste and leader of the Labour Party William Norton 
favours abolishing the External Relations Act.
6 August. Eamon de Valera promises " no opposition from us."
10 August. Cabinet appoint 'Charge d'affaires' to Lisbon 
according to the procedures of the External Relations Act.
14 August. Sean MacBride discusses Partition over a picnic
lunch with Attlee in Mayo.
17 August. Sir Basil Brooke, announces the re-introduction of
the B-Specials.
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19 August. Cabinet discuss (a) attendance at Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers Meeting (b)Changing title of High 
Commissioners to Ambassadors (c)approve Costello's 
speech to the Canadian Bar Association.
24 August. John Costello leaves Cobh 'en route' for Canada.
August. Sir Norman Brook records a Commonwealth consensus that if 
Eire repeals the External Relations Act she ’’could no longer be 
regarded as a member of the Commonwealth.”
4 September .Governor General, Lord Alexander, insults John
Costello with "Roaring Meg" .
5 September. Sunday Independent headline : "EXTERNAL RELATIONS
ACT TO GO".
7 September. John Costello states that it is his government's
intention to "ditch" the External Relations Act.
8 September. Irish newspapers headline the "announcement".
9 September. Sean MacBride and William Norton hastily draw up
draft Bill to repeal the External Relations Act.
9 September. Washington Security Talks; First phase of British, 
Canadian and American conversations conclude.
10 September. British Cabinet withdraw invitation to Eire to 
attend Commonwealth Prime Minister's Meeting.
1 October. Costello arrives home and confirms intention to repeal 
the External Relations Act.
5 October. British cabinet decide to issue a warning that repeal 
of the External Relations Act could mean loss of Most 
Favoured Nation Status.
7 October. Lord Rugby conveys British Cabinet's warning to
Costello; "caucus" Cabinet meet in John Costello's
home and refuse his offer of resignation.
11 October. Irish Cabinet approve the "action" of John Costello 
in North America.
13 October. Canadians willing to participate in collective
defence arrangements for North Atlantic area.
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11-21 October. Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in London.
17 October. Irish-Commonwealth meeting in Chequers.
16-17 November . Irish Commonwealth meeting at Paris.
17 November. Republic of Ireland Bill, 1948 introduced in Dail.
10 December. Negotiations on drafting of NATO treaty begins
21 December. Republic of Ireland Act, 1948, signed by President.
7 February 1949. U.S. "approach" Eire about joining NATO.
8 February 1949. Irish government refuse to join NATO.
4 April 1949. North Atlantic treaty signed in Washington.
8 April. Sir Gilbert Laithwaite succeeds Lord Rugby as U.K.
Representative to Eire.
18 April 1949. Easter Monday, "Republic of Ireland Act,1949",
inaugurated.
3 May 1949. UK "Ireland Bill, 1949", introduced in House of
Commons. Contains a "guarantee" on Partition.
5 May 1949. Council for Europe established in Strasburg.
10 May 1949. Protest in Dail against UK "Ireland Bill,1949".
13 May 1949. O' Connell Street protest against UK "Ireland
Bill,1949".
23 May 1949. Soviet blockade of Berlin lifted after 321 days.
30 May 1949. V. Krishna Menon appointed India's Ambassador to 
Ireland.
2 June 1949. UK "Ireland Bill,1949" receives Royal assent.
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PREFACE
This thesis deals principally with Anglo-Irish relations from 
the election of the coalition government in Eire in February 
1948 through to their response to the introduction of the 
Ireland Act in May 1949. That short period also encompasses the 
Republic of Ireland Act,1949, and the formation of NATO. While 
the chapters are confined to specific themes in chronological 
order, the overall intention is to highlight the fact that Anglo- 
Irish relations, at that time, operated within a broader 
diplomatic and defence framework.
Some of the influential factors, important in their own right , 
have been omitted from the individual chapters, or have not been 
given due emphasis: for example, the influence of the formation
of NATO on the British government's decision to include the 
"guarantee" clause in the UK Ireland Act,1949, is
only referred to briefly. The sacrifice of "outside" 
information has been based on a subjective evaluation of its 
comparative importance to the central thesis. Where domestic and 
global influences have been omitted, it has been with an 
awareness that they might interfere with the flow and 
comprehensibility of the themes of the chapters. In 
acknowledgement of this deficiency, a separate chapter on the 
arguments for and against Partition, as presented by the British 
and Irish governments of the time, has been included. Similarly, 
and more relevant to the global view, is the inclusion of a 
separate chapter on the impact of the formation of Western 
European Union and NATO upon Eire .
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The chapter on NATO highlights the important fact, that while 
Eire was leaving the Commonwealth, Britain was busily involved in 
sensitive defence negotiations with America, Europe and the 
Commonwealth and that Britain's responses to Eire were affected 
by those ongoing negotiations. Similarly, India's declaration of 
a Republic paralleled Eire's. These influences, separate or 
combined, may have been only minor, but they do tend to show the 
interplay of global and domestic pressures which had an impact 
on the decision makers in the British government. For example, 
Eire announced her intention to repeal her remaining link with 
the Commonwealth and "refused" to join NATO during the period of 
the Berlin crisis, July 1948, to May, 1949.
Overall, when considering post-war Anglo-Irish relations it 
should be borne in mind that Britain had a weak economy, was 
uncertain of her position in Europe, was losing her role as a 
world power and had developed a dependence on America that looked 
like conflicting with her already uncertain leadership of the 
Commonwealth.
13
INTRODUCTION
14
The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921(1*) accepted the partitioning of 
Ireland into two states as provided for under the Government of 
Ireland Act,1920, and amended by the Irish Free State 
(Consequential Provisions )Act,1922. According to the terras of 
the "Treaty", the Irish Free State(2*) was a dominion member of 
the British Commonwealth.(1)(3*) Upon obtaining power in 1932, 
Eamon de Valera chipped away at this relationship until the Irish 
Free State claimed to enjoy through the Executive Authority 
(External Relations) Act,1936(4*), an "association" with the 
Commonwealth.(2)
(1) Pakenham,F. (Lord Longford): Peace bv Ordeal Pub. Sidgwick
& Jackson Lon.1972 p.288
(l*)See- Articles of Agreement for a Treaty Between Great Britain 
and Ireland, December 6, 1921; in Pakenham, F.: Peace bv Ordeal. 
pp. 288-292
(2) D.D. Vol. 107 Col. 92. 24.6.1947.
(2*) Irish Free State was the title of the twenty six counties 
from 1922 until the enactment of the 1937 Constitution, when 
Article four designated the official name of the state as Eire or 
in the English language "Ireland". In this thesis,"Eire" is used 
to describe the 26 counties from December,1937 to April 18, 1949; 
thereafter the term "Republic of Ireland", may be used 
specifically to differentiate it from the "North Eastern six 
counties of Ireland".
(3*) Interestingly, the term British Commonwealth as opposed to 
Empire was used in the 1921 Treaty. Reputedly this was the first 
time it had been used in a treaty by Britain. The first recorded 
use of the term appears in a Cabinet Paper prepared by the 
Colonial Office in March 1921. Reference Cab.32. E-6 quoted in
Mansergh,N.: The Commonwealth Experience. The Durham Report to
the Analo-Irish Treaty, pub. Macmillan.1982. p.30.
(4*)The machinery of the External Relations Act provided for the 
King to appoint Eire's "diplomatic and Consular Representatives 
and the conclusion of International agreements". In practice 
"appointing" also included receiving letters of credence.
See Appendix 1. Executive Authority (External Relations) 
Act, 1936. Number 58 of 1936.
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On September 7, 1948, the Taoiseach, John A. Costello, held a
press conference in the Railway Carriage Room(l*) of the 
Parliament Buildings in Ottawa. In reply to a reporter's 
question,(2*) John Costello stated that it was his government's 
"intention" to "ditch" the External Relations Act.(3) The Ottawa 
evening newspaper, 'The Journal', quoted John Costello as saying 
that "there was nothing to prevent Ireland continuing in 'even 
closer association' with the British Commonwealth, although not 
necessarily as a 'member' of it.1 (4) The place, timing , and 
above all the substance of this revelation surprised most of his 
Cabinet colleagues (5) and the British government.(6)
The reason for what became known popularly as the 
"announcement" and its repercussions, forms the core subject of 
this thesis. The title - "The Formulation and Consequences of 
the Republic of Ireland Act, 1948-49 "- encapsulates the scope 
of the thesis. "Formulation" deals with the principal political 
pressures which contributed toward the repeal of the Executive 
Authority(External Relations)Act, 1936. "Consequences" examines 
the results and repercussions of the Republic of Ireland 
Act,1949.
(3) Gazette Montreal 8.9.1948
(4) The Journal .Ottawa. 7.9.1948 five o'clock edition
(5) Browne,N. Against the Tide. Gill and Mac Millan ,Dublin
1987. p.129
(6)House of Commons Debates. Hansard. Attlee introducing the 
second reading of the 'Ireland Act,1949', Vol. 464. Col. 1854. 
11.5.1948
(1*)I am grateful to the Canadian based journalist,Charles Smith 
for assistance in identifying the room where the press
conference was held.
(2*)The wording of the question was not printed in the Ottawa
Gazette but was as a direct result of the Sunday Independent
question. See Michael Me Inerney Interviews John A. Costello, 
Irish Times 8.9.1967.
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The process which led to the repeal of the External Relations 
Act is confusing. Perhaps the most important contributory factor 
was the volatile domestic political situation that existed in 
Eire. By the summer of 1948, domestic political internecine 
tensions had begun to overspill into Anglo-Irish relations, and 
the political competition between the coalition government and 
the Fianna Fail opposition, converged on the sensitive issue of 
Eire's "membership” of the Commonwealth. As we shall see the 
"announcement" of the intention to repeal the External Relations 
Act was presented by John Costello as a 'fait accompli' to 
members of the Irish government. Further, the subsequent 
confusion that arose in the Irish government will be explained by 
the fact that its members were apparently in favour of amending 
the procedures and formalities attached to the External Relations 
Act, as opposed to repealing the Act itself.(7)
CONTINUED/
(7)NASP0 S 14333A and S.3597 contains Cabinet memoranda on the 
Irish government's attitude to Commonwealth formalities such as 
usage of titles of High Commissioners. Includes extracts from 
cabinet meeting CAB 2/10. G.C. 5/32. 19.8.1948.
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That difference is a fine one, but the explanation of the
distinction between the External Relations Act itself, and the 
machinery, procedures and formalities attached to it may
explain the resultant confusion among members of that coalition 
government and their civil servants as to whether there was an
"intention",(8) "consensus ", (9) "approval",(10) and even a
"decision"(11) by the Irish government to repeal the External 
Relations Act. This explanation also coincides with Fine Gael's 
traditionally evolutionary, as opposed to revolutionary, (12) 
attempts to alter Anglo-Irish constitutional relations.
The British government responded to Eire's departure from the 
British Commonwealth by introducing the "Ireland Act, 1949." 
That Act contained amending legislation which was necessary to 
recognise Eire's new status, but it also contained the so-called 
"guarantee" clause which granted the Parliament of Northern 
Ireland, in effect the Unionist majority, a veto against the 
political unity of Ireland. That response crushed the hope that 
the Irish government may have harboured that they might gain some 
favourable development on Partition in return for ending their 
policy of neutrality.
(8) Personal interview with Sean MacBride 6.1.1987
(9)Frederick Boland, Former Secretary of the Department of 
External Affairs in an interview with Bruce Arnold . Quoted with 
Mr. Arnold's kind permission
(10)Telephone interview with Brendan Corish, former 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Local Government and 
to the Minister for Defence. 20.12.1988.
(11)John Costello in personal memorandum kindly loaned by Hector 
Legge, former editor of the 'Sunday Independent'.Also Michael Me 
Inerney interview with John Costello, Irish Times 8.9.1967
(12) Harkness,D.: The Restless Dominion, p.238.
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Following the introduction, Chapter one gives general 
overall review of post-war ^ nglo-Irish relations. The thesis 
then ontinues with an examination of Anglo-Irish constitutional 
relations from 1932 until 1938. This includes the background to 
the Irish Free State government's reaction to the Abdication of 
King Edward Vlll. That event brought forward the External 
Relations Act. Although in theory a permissory statute 
implemented by the Irish government, the Act was apparently 
treated as sacrosanct by the British government, who considered 
it to represent Eire's last tenuous constitutional link with the 
Commonwealth.
The reactions of Irish political leaders to the introduction of 
the External Relations Act in 1936 will be referred to and 
contrasted with their reaction twelve years later. This will show 
the consistency of Fianna Fail and the Labour party and may 
explain why Fine Gael changed its pro-Commonwealth ethos in order 
to survive as a political force.
The following chapter deals with the formation of the pro- 
Commonwealth Fine Gael headed coalition which replaced the 
apparently entrenched Fianna Fail government. The ousting of 
Fianna Fail was achieved by the determination of all the other 
political parties and independents to combine to topple Fianna 
Fail and arguably this motive became the coalition's principal 
'raison d 'etre'.
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The "execution” of the External Relations Act took the form of 
John Costello's "announcement" in Ottawa. Although the 
"announcement" was initially ignored by the British government, 
it resulted in the Irish government following through on the 
publicly stated "intention" to repeal the External Relations Act 
and, as a consequence, to leave the Commonwealth. The thesis 
will examine the immediate reaction of the Minister for External 
Affairs, Sean MacBride, to the announcement and the Irish 
Cabinet's retroactive decision to approve the contents of that 
"announcement".
The circumstances surrounding John Costello's controversial 
"announcement" are examined including an examination of the 
momentum leading to the "announcement". A detailed examination of 
John Costello's part in the repeal of the External Relations Act 
reveals the importance of the idiosyncratic factor in the 
decision making process in Anglo-Irish Relations. Costello's 
relationship with his host in Canada, the Governor General, Lord 
Alexander, will be reconstructed so that a full understanding of 
the individual, national and international political 
circumstances surrounding the "announcement" may be taken into 
account .
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Two following chapters will cover the generally friendly 
reaction of other Commonwealth members as exemplified by Eire- 
British-Commonwealth discussions at Chequers and Paris in 
October and November 1948. Importantly, the Chequers meeting did 
serve as the preliminary negotiations between Eire and the 
Commonwealth and allowed good relations to be established, 
especially between Sean MacBride and the Prime Minister of New 
Zealand, Peter Fraser and deputy Prime Minister of Australia and 
Minister of External Affairs, Dr. Herbert Evatt.
An international dimension will be introduced in relation to 
the position of Eire vis-a-vis setting an example to India and 
Ceylon by "withdrawing" from the Commonwealth. Such a decision 
by India would have had implications for Australia and New 
Zealand vis-a-vis defence(1*) in South East Asia. In turn, the 
reaction of the British government in relation to the new 
evolving Commonwealth will be examined; in particular, Britain's 
dilemma and fear that as she grew closer to America, her 
leadership of the Commonwealth would weaken. Without being aware 
of it, Eire's decision to leave the Commonwealth in 1948 came at 
a crucial psychological time when Britain needed her confidence 
to maintain her leadership of the Commonwealth.
(l*)See "Strategic Importance of the Indian Continent to 
Commonwealth Defence " in Manserah N. (Ch.Ed.1: The Transfer of
Power. 1942-47. Vol Xll P.319. See also note by Field Marshal 
Auchinleck "Should India be unfriendly or liable to be influenced 
by a power, such as Russia, China or Japan, hostile to the 
British Commonwealth, our strategic position in the Indian Ocean 
would become intolerable and our communications with New Zealand 
and Australia most insecure.Ref:L/WS/1/1092/ Date 11.5.1946. 
p. 801
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Despite the possible damage to the unity of the Commonwealth, the 
1948 October Chequers and November Paris Anglo-Irish- 
Commonwealth meetings agreed to a working arrangement whereby 
Eire, despite being a Republic, could once again dilute the 
"Commonwealth relationship" by retaining Most Favoured Nation 
benefits, as an intermediary between Commonwealth member and 
foreign state.
Although the issue of defence was not raised at Chequers, or 
later at Paris, it was always an underlying consideration with 
the British Chiefs of Staff who, it can be assumed, were at the 
least consulted, if not acting as advisers on Anglo-Irish 
relations. Accordingly, a separate chapter is devoted to an 
examination of the repeal of the External Relations Act in 1948- 
1949, within the context of Western defence and the Cold War, 
more especially with respect to the formation of NATO. While the 
western powers were prepared to accept Eire's excuse about 
Partition for "breaking ranks", they were not prepared to 
tolerate any attempt by Eire to divide the Atlantic alliance. 
Partition was, as is explained in the following chapter, Eire's 
principal reason for "refusing" to join NATO. This "refusal" 
compounded the reaction of the British government to Eire's 
leaving the Commonwealth. The chapter argues that while it 
appears that the government of Northern Ireland was responsible 
for the "guarantee " on partition, a contributory factor was the 
input of the British Chiefs of Staff ( supported passively by the 
US State Department) who wanted to maintain their reliable bases 
in Northern Ireland.
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Since a thesis on the Republic of Ireland Act, 1949, without a 
chapter on the festivities inaugurating the Republic would be 
inadequate, the thesis will refer briefly to the celebrations on 
that Easter Monday in 1949. More practically, the chapter on the 
inauguration of the Republic will concentrate on the diplomatic 
impact and accomplishments that the change in the international 
status of the state necessitated and eventually achieved .
Following the chapter on the inauguration of the Republic the
thesis offers as background material the Irish and British
government's period arguments for and against Partition. 
The British government responded to the inauguration of the 
Republic of Ireland Act, 1949, with the Ireland Act,1949. That 
Act contained the "guarantee" to the Parliament of Northern
Ireland that Partition would not end without their consent. That 
was in turn followed by an Irish response which was mainly 
rhetorical in effect and was deliberately played down and 
effectively ignored by the U.K. Representative to the Republic of 
Ireland, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite. By August 1949 the Irish 
government capitulated, knowing that if they persisted in their 
officially inspired anti-partition campaign, they would unleash 
extremists who would use violence as part of an unofficial anti­
partition campaign.
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Overall, this thesis will locate Anglo-Irish relations within the 
broader pattern of American-British-Commonwealth system of 
relations. Within the framework of Anglo-Irish relations there 
is the overlapping triangle of Eire, British and Northern Irish 
relations. From within that relationship, Eire and Northern 
Ireland compete to influence the British government, America and 
the Commonwealth members. It will be shown that Anglo- American 
relations were strong and united and that America's minor 
relationship with Eire could be sacrificed by the State 
Department if it appeared to upset or threaten the "special 
relationship" with Britain.
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CHAPTER 1
POST-WAR ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS, 1945-1947
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In 1948 Anglo-Irish and American-Irish relations had not 
recovered fully from Eire's policy of "benevolent” neutrality 
during World War 11. Partition still remained as the principal 
source of conflict in Anglo-Irish relations.
On a functional level the post-war British Labour government 
maintained friendly relations with Eire. On September 18, 1945,
the Cabinet(1) approved a proposal from the Secretary of State 
for Dominion Affairs,(1*) Lord Addison, that "our general policy 
towards Eire should be quickly and unobtrusively to restore 
friendly relations by losing no opportunity of promoting 
intercourse and co-operation in practical matters."(2) In 
October 1946 mutual Anglo-Irish interest meant that Lord Addison 
hoped that "the Ministry of Agriculture would be ready to give 
any advice or assistance in their power to representatives of the 
Eire Government who might visit this country."(3)
(l*)In July, 1947, the Dominions Office merged with the Indian 
Office and was renamed the Commonwealth Relations Office
(1)PRO PREM 8/ 1222 Pt.l. contains extract of CM(46)92 29.10.1946 
with reference to CM(45)33 minute 5. 18.9.1945
(2)PRO PREM 8/ 1222 Pt.l contains extract of CP(45)152
(3)PRO PREM 8/ 1222Pt.1. contains extract of CM(46)92 
29.10.1946. Minute 4
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On a personal level it is possible that some British ministers 
who had spent part of the war in the claustrophobic underground 
cabinet offices(1*) where a map of neutral Eire was prominent 
may have harboured some resentment. It would only be human that 
such resentment surfaced during such critical times as the 
Dunkirk evacuation or upon hearing of de Valera's visit to the
j
German minister in Dublin, Eduard Hempel, to offer his condolence 
on the death of Hitler.(4) That gesture upset the Allies and was 
interpreted as symbolising a pro-axis stance.
The U.K. Representative to Eire, Sir John Maffey,(2*) commented 
in a post-war report to the Commonwealth Relations Office: "And
there is always the comfortable reflection that they suffered 
less in the war than any other European people, a reward 
specially reserved for saints, and not vouchsafed to sinners"(5); 
according to Maffey, there was "lively resentment on the British 
side" to acknowledging, at least, publicly, the assistance from 
Eire.(6)
(4) Fisk,R.: In Time of War, p.535.
(5)FO 371 54722 .(W8739/1350/G) Note by Sir John Maffey, United 
Kingdom Representative to Eire. 3.8.1946
(6)Ibid
(1*) Now a museum open to public at Grt. Charles St.London S.W.l. 
(2*)Sir John Maffey, (created Lord Rugby in 1947) wanted to be 
recalled from Dublin in 1945 and according to a letter from 
Secretary for Commonwealth Relations Philip Noel-Baker, to 
Attlee was persuaded to remain on "only by bribing him with a 
peerage."(7)
(7) Attlee papers ,Bodlein Library,Oxford. MSC. 73. (p.1-17)
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In fact, as early as February 1945 the extent of Eire's co­
operation with Britain during the war was highlighted in a report
to the British War Cabinet by former Dominions Secretary,
Viscount Cranbourne. (8) However, in order to maintain her post­
war policy of neutrality, the Irish government did not publicise 
the extent of her co-operation with the Allies. The British 
government acknowledged that 40,000 men from Eire were known to 
have joined the British forces, but a report admitted that the 
figures were not "water tight".(9) A reluctance to admit
assistance from Eire is understandable especially when contrasted 
with the provision by Northern Ireland of air and naval bases. 
(That help was remembered in Britain as having saved Atlantic 
convoys from the worst of German submarine attacks).
On a social level, friendly neighbourly relations resumed. This 
was shown by the amount of British tourists (including
government ministers) to Eire who came in search of scarce post­
war luxuries not available in Britain where rationing still
remained.
CONTINUED/
(8) PRO Cab 66/62 Memorandum by Viscount Cranbourne, Dominion 
Secretary, 1940-42, dated February 1945 quoted in Fanning, R. 
Independent Ireland, pp.124-125
(9)PRO DO 35 1228 WX101/1/69 "Note On Principal Eire Propaganda 
Claims With Answers Thereto." p.3.
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On a diplomatic level Eire extended her post-war diplomatic 
relations by appointing her first ambassador to the Vatican and 
establishing diplomatic contacts with Sweden and Australia.(10) 
Eire, who as late as July 1945 voted £8,764 towards the expenses 
of the dying League of Nations, hoped to build on her 
?contribution to the League of Nations and increase her 
"international prestige by joining the United Nations.(11) When in 
March 1946, British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, expressed 
;the fear that, if Britain sponsored Eire's application for 
membership as twenty-six counties then, "the Soviet government 
would have an opening to say that membership could only be 
considered on the basis of the whole of Ireland"(12), Lord 
Addison replied that "Mr. de Valera was unlikely to put forward 
his application on the basis of the whole 32 counties."(13) In 
April 1946, Lord Addison advised the Cabinet that the attitude 
towards Eire's application for membership of the UN should be 
that, "The United Kingdom representative on the Security Council 
should adopt a favourable attitude towards Eire's claim to 
membership, although without going out of his way to champion 
her, if Eire's case came up in the course of any review of 
potential candidates by the Security Council."(14)
(10)PRO FO 371. 54722. Maffey to Dominions Office Telegram
No.13. 4.2.1946
(11)D.D. Vol. 97. Col 2784. 19.7.1945.
(12)PRO PREM 8/258 .Minutes of discussion 21.3.1946 See also 
PM/46/53. Report to Attlee from Ernest Bevin. 'Question of 
Admission of Eire to United Nations'.
(13)Ibid
(14)PRO PREM 8/1465 extract from CP((46)164 .17.4.1946
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In July 1946, despite Bevin's earlier reservations, the Cabinet 
authorised Lord Addison to inform the Irish government that "if 
they applied for membership of the United Nations, His Majesty's 
Government would support their application."(15) However, in 
August 1946, the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations 
telegrammed the Foreign Office informing them that "Question of 
use of word 'Ireland' was raised during discussion (by the) 
Committee on the admission of new members and United Kingdom 
representative who used word 'Eire' throughout, took appropriate 
occasion of stating that use of word 'Ireland' in discussion or 
report would be regarded by His Majesty's Government in the 
United Kingdom as denoting territory formerly known as Irish Free 
State and not including that part of island of Ireland forming 
part of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland."(16)
The semantics about the use of the title, "Ireland" proved to be 
academic when in September 1946 Eire suffered a diplomatic rebuff 
and had her application for membership of the UN rejected by the 
Security Council veto of the Soviet Union. The official reason 
given by the USSR was that the Soviet Union did not maintain
diplomatic relations with Ireland.(17) The following year the
Russian delegate, Mr. Krasilnikov, opposing Eire's application, 
stated in the membership committee that Russia "cannot overlook
the fact that Eire did not help to lay the foundations of the
organisation she is now trying to join."(18)
(15)PRO PREM 8/258. extract from CM(46)65 5.7.1946
(16)FO 371. 59732. UN 1539 Telegram No 824. Des.3.26 p.m.
Rec.8.45 p.m.
(171Year Book of the U.N.. 1946 Dept.of Public information U.N.
Lake Success N.Y. 1947
(18) Keesinas Contemporary Archives. September. 6-13, 1947
30
In the economic sphere Eire was in a strong position having saved 
most of her sterling earnings. Eire held £400 million in sterling 
assets. A report from Sir John Maffey/ to Prime Minister Attlee 
noted that £100-£150 million of that amount was accumulated since 
1940.(19) Given the resentment towards Eire's policy of
neutrality, this could be interpreted as implying an accusation 
of profiteering. The Irish government, in a twenty- page report 
on the economy for 1948, submitted to the Organisation for 
European and Economic Co-operation, claimed that her economy,j:
despite being dislocated, particularly with regard to heavy 
industry, was in a strong position to join in post-war
recovery.(20)That Eire fared comparatively poorly in the 
Marshall aid plan may have been due the reliability of her anti­
communist stance. The US National Advisory Council advised 
President Harry Truman that, with regard to Marshall Aid, aid
to Eire "should be in the form of a loan only."(21)
(19)PRO FO 371 54722 .(W8739/1350/G) Note by Maffey, 3.8.1946
(20) PRO FO 371. 62599. Committee of European Economic Co­
operation. 6.8.1947
(21)National Research Centre, Suiteland, Maryland (NRC) RG.84 Box 
No.18. File No. 350. House document No. 737 dated, 4.8.1948.
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By 1948, there was a possibility that the threat of Soviet 
expansionism might give Eire the impetus to change her policy of 
neutrality, particularly because the new ideological enemy was 
Communism. Logically it looked as though Eire under a new 
government, might decide to attempt to benefit from a joint 
western ideological approach and enter a new era of co-operation 
towards solving Western European problems. But Partition 
remained the stumbling block and the reason why Eire was unable 
; to accept a role in Western European defence or openly 
acknowledge "membership” of the Commonwealth. Allowing for 
Partition, Britain's defence policy in 1947 was still to 
"strengthen the links with the Dominions, including Eire."(22)
For practical purposes Eire remained a member of the Commonwealth 
after the introduction of the External Relations Act. This is 
evidenced by her contributions to Commonwealth Committees, 
acceptance of Most Favoured Nation Status and by Eamon de 
Valera's own reasons for introducing the External Relations 
Act: "It does enable an association to be maintained which I
think, is valuable both materially and from the point of view of 
the ending of partition."(23)
(22) Davis, J.: Changing Directions .British Military Planning 
for Post War Strategic Defence. 1942-47. Sherwood Press, 1988. 
(Quoting COS(47)102 (O).and DO(47)44. ) pp.370-386.
(23) D.D. Vol.107. Col.95. 24.6.1947
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Professor Nicholas Mansergh outlined Eire's post 1937
relationship with the Commonwealth states as follows: "Irish
government had, however, repudiated allegiance and the Irish
ON
.view, as expressed by de ValeraJ^many occasions, was that Eire
i
jcould not, for that reason, be a member, but she was, after 1937, 
ja state outside the Commonwealth, associated externally with it, 
'not owing allegiance to the Crown, and a republic in fact even
si
jthough not specifically so described in the constitution."(24)
I
|
?Some Irish nationalists apparently saw Eire's membership of the
^British Commonwealth as deferring to the authority of the
Crown that supported the separation of the country. There is an 
impression that the maxim, "England's difficulty is Ireland's 
opportunity" was extended to include being contrary with regard 
to membership of the Commonwealth. Indeed, according to the 
Canadian High Commissioner in London, it had been suggested in
1945 by one astute advisor that members of the Commonwealth
should challenge Eire, saying "that as far as they were concerned 
she could leave if she wished." Such a tactic, it was thought, 
would have the two fold effect of reaffirming their wish to 
remain within the "orbit" but not a member of the Commonwealth 
and also show that the Commonwealth was not held together by 
British coercion.(25)
(24) Mansergh,N. The Commonwealth Experience, pub. Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson. 1969. p. 322
(25)Canadian Department of External Affairs:(CDEA) Main file 
50021-40 report A. 305 dated 27.7.1945
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In August 1948, the Secretary of State for the Commonwealth 
Relations Office, Philip Noel-Baker, in a cabinet paper reported 
that Anglo-Irish relations were "friendlier than ever",(26) Yet 
by May 1949, John Costello was threatening publicly to "hit the 
British Government in their prestige and in their pride and in
r
their pocket".(27) This thesis will examine the reasons for this 
reverse in Anglo-Irish relations during that nine month period.
(26)PRO Cab 129/29. P.97. CP(48)205 Dated 17.8.1948
(27)D .D . Vol. 115. Col 807. 10.5.1949
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Ch: 11
ANGLO-IRISH CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1932-38
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Prior to 1927, Fianna Fail deputies were abstentionist, refusing 
to take their seats in Dail Eireann because they would have to 
swear an oath of allegiance to the British monarch. Eventually, 
in 1927, alarmed by the assassination of the Vice President of 
the Executive Council, Kevin (VHiggins, Eamon de Valera agreed to 
take the "empty oath" and led the majority of his party into 
constitutional politics. By 1932, Fianna Fail won 72 seats 
compared to 56 for Cumann-na-nGaedheal (the main forerunner of 
Fine Gael).(1)
The coming to power of Fianna Fail heralded the beginning of a 
contentious period in Anglo-Irish constitutional relations. The 
"co-operative" policies of the pro-treaty Cumann-na-nGaedheal 
government were reversed by de Valera. Perhaps the problems were 
exacerbated because Fianna Fail's advent to power coincided with 
the beginning of the tenure of the Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs, J.H. Thomas (1932-1935).(2) An interesting 
point about this period is the benevolent change brought about in 
Anglo-Irish relations with the replacement of J.H. Thomas, by 
Malcolm Mac Donald. This change in personalities highlights the 
importance of the role of the idiosyncratic factor in Anglo-Irish 
diplomatic relations.
(1) O'Learv.____C . :____ Irish Elections 1918-1977. Gill and
Macmillan,1979. p.102
(2)See Mac Mahon, D.: Republicanism and Imperialism, for J.H.
Thomas's role in Anglo-Irish relations 1932-35. See also Mac 
Mahon,D.: Malcolm Mac Donald and Anglo-Irish Relations 1935-38
unpublished M.A. Thesis 1975 in U.C.D. Library
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From 1932 to 1936 Eamon de Valera challenged the terms of the 
1921 Treaty and effected constitutional changes in relation to 
abolishing the oath of allegiance to the Crown required of Dail 
Deputies and Senators, ending the right of appeal from the Irish 
Free State Supreme Court to the Privy Council and reducing the 
constitutional role of the Governor General. While constitutional 
change through co-operation with Britain was part of Cumann-na- 
nGaedheal 's policy, the proposed changes of de Valera were 
opposed more forcefully by the British government, probably 
because they were public challenges from the anti-treaty party, 
Fianna Fail. This constitutional conflict was fought on the issue 
of economic independence and resulted in the "economic war", 
which on a practical level lasted from 1932 to 1936, ending 
officially in April 1938 with the Anglo-Irish Agreements on 
Trade, Finance and Defence.(3) It is worth noting that Eamon de 
Valera, although reputedly referred to in Britain as a "half- 
Irish Kerensky",(4) still adhered to the established rules of 
diplomacy, even during the lowest ebb of post-treaty Anglo-Irish 
relations, i.e., during the period of 1932-1936.
(3) The Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1938. Agreements between the 
Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Eire, 25 
April 1938. CMND. 5728 .Text of Agreements in Mansergh, N. (Ed.): 
Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs 1931-52. 
Vol 1. p.367
(4) D.Ryan. Unique Dictator. Pub. A.Baker, p.242
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Shortly after taking Office in 1932, de Valera, acting in his 
dual capacity as President of the Executive Council and Minister 
for External Affairs, wrote to J.H. Thomas outlining the 
intention of the Executive Council (government) of the Irish Free 
State to remove the required oath of allegiance. Thomas's blunt 
response was that the removal of the oath of allegiance would be 
"nothing less than a repudiation of the settlement of 1921 as a 
whole."(5) Despite this threat, de Valera went ahead and enacted 
the Constitution (Removal of Oath) Act, which abolished the oath 
of allegiance in May,1933. His next public target was the 
removal of the Right of Appeal from the Irish Supreme Court to 
His Majesty in Council (the Privy Council).
Previous to de Valera's rise to power, in June 1926 the British 
government had decided that if the Irish Free State Vice- 
President and Minister for Justice, Kevin O'Higgins, passed a 
Bill, the effect of which would be to abolish the right of appeal 
to the Privy Council, then the Governor General should be 
instructed to "reserve the Royal Assent".(6) Four years later, at 
the Imperial Conference, the "Pro-Commonwealth" party, Cumann-na- 
nGhaedheal informed the U.K. representatives of their/
(5) PRO DO 35 3990.X2639/22 Note on Constitutional Position of 
Eire in the British Commonwealth . Legal Status of the 1921 
Treaty. See Text of notes exchanged between the Irish Free State 
government and the British government relating to to the Oath of 
Allegiance and the Land Purchase Annuities. pub. Dublin 
Stationary Office,1932. reprinted in Mitchell.A. & 0 Snodaigh P. 
(Eds.) Irish Political Documents, pp.194-201. See also Me Mahon, 
D.: Republicanism and Imperialism. Analo- Irish Relations in the 
Z SLIs .pp. 28-55 .
(6) PRO DO 117. 3 .Contains an advance copy of the draft of the 
Cabinet minutes for 29.1.1926.
their intention to abolish the right of appeal. The British 
government's response was that they were prepared to consider 
some way out of the Privy Council difficulty "provided the 
Protestant minority were content and did not oppose". (7) That 
amicable response may have been intended to thwart the ascent of 
de Valera's anti-treaty party. Interestingly in 1948 John 
Costello told the Prime Minister of Canada, William Lyon 
Mackenzie King, that he blamed the British Government's refusal 
to allow modifications to the treaty, as contributing to his 
party's defeat in the general election of 1932, and the accession 
to power of Eamon de Valera. According to John Costello: "Once in 
power de Valera proceeded to accomplish by independent action 
almost all the things which Cosgrave had tried to do by friendly 
negotiation."(8)
(7)PR0 D.O. 25.3990. P.22. Note on Legal Status of the 1921 
Treaty.
(8)Canadian Department of External Relations(CDEA)Main File 
Reference 50021-40. 199/5. Notes of conversation between the
Prime Minister of Canada and the Prime Minister of Ireland, at 
Kingsmere, Thursday, September 9th, 1948.Also present were the 
Irish High Commissioner in Canada John Hearne, Canadian Minister 
of External Affairs Lester Pearson and the Canadian High 
Commissioner in London, Norman Robertson.
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In August 1933# the Executive Council of the Irish Free State 
published a Bill proposing to abolish the right of appeal to the 
Privy Council. The response of the Dominion's Office was more 
forceful than before and they declared their opposition to the 
action, regarding it as against the spirit of the agreement of 
1921.(9) The different responses to Fianna Fail and to Cumann-na- 
nGaedheal over this same issue, illustrates the British 
government's reaction to the "Pro-Treaty" party.
In July 1933, a judicial decision in the Irish Supreme Court 
case allowed an appeal to the Privy Council. The Bill, abolishing 
this right of appeal was then passed in November 1933 with an 
amendment making it applicable to pending proceedings.(10) Two 
years later a Privy Council decision refused the above Petition 
for special leave to appeal and thus recognised the legality 
under the Statute of Westminster of the Irish Free State's 
action.(11)
(9)PRO DO 35 3990. Note on Legal Status of the Treaty.
(10) Irish Free State Constitution Amendment No.22 1933
abolished the right of appeal from the Supreme Court to the Privy 
Council
(11)Judgement of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council.Moore and Others versus the Attorney-General for the
Irish Free State,1935, reproduced in Mansergh,N. (Ed.): Documents 
and Speeches in British Commonwealth Affairs.1931-52 Vol 1. 2nd 
ed. pub. Oxford University Press,1953. pp.305-14
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The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council concluded that, "the 
effect of the Statute of Westminster was to remove the fetter 
which lay upon the Irish Free State legislature by reason of the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act." (12) Their Lordships stated that 
"the simplest way of stating the situation is to say that the 
Statute of Westminster gave the Irish Free State a power under 
which they could abrogate the treaty and that is a matter of law, 
they have availed themselves of that power."(13) In spite of this 
judicial opinion, the British government noted that the Lord 
Chancellor in his judgement stated that while the Irish Free 
State had the legal right to "disregard their obligations under 
the treaty" he expressed no opinion upon the morality of such a 
course.(14) According to Nicholas Mansergh, "it was J.H. Thomas 
who at this point had had the ground cut from under his
feet."(15)
In June 1936, the Executive Council of the Irish Free State 
informed the British government of their intention to introduce 
legislation to replace the 1922 constitution.(16) The new 
constitution was to be submitted to the electorate for approval 
at a referendum to prove that power was derived from the people. 
The most controversial aspects of the proposed constitution were 
the intention to abolish the office of Governor-General and
the claim for jurisdiction over the whole/
(12)Mansergh, N. (Ed.): Documents and Speeches on British
Commonwealth Affairs. 1931-52. Vol 1.. p.313
(13)Ibid
(14)PR0 D.O.35.3990.Note on the Legal Status of the Treaty.P.22.
(15)Mansergh,N.: The Commonwealth Experience .From British to 
Multiracial Commonwealth. Vol 2, pub. Macmillan, p.36
(16)PRO D.O.35.3990. See Chapter "The New Constitution" in Me 
Mahon.P.: Republicanism and Imperialism, pp.214-218
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whole of the thirty-two counties of Ireland. The Dominion 
I Office's immediate response was to protest that the contents 
j should have been "the subject of prior consultation" but accepted
k
i
; that the new Constitution did not effect a "fundamental 
alteration in the position of the Irish Free State." (17)
Six months later# on December 10 1936. a Commonwealth
\
|
I constitutional crisis arose when Edward Vlll abdicated. A signed
s
} copy of the instrument of abdication (*1) and a message 
I communicating the King's decision were dispatched that same day 
■; by the King's private secretary to Eamon de Valera. (18)
In common only with those other member states of the 
Commonwealth which had signed the Statute of
Westminster,(19)the Executive Council of the Irish Free State 
needed to implement legislation recognising the abdication and 
the accession of George VI. (Members of the Commonwealth such as 
Australia who had not signed the Statute of Westminster were 
still covered by the Act passed by the Imperial Parliament 
entitled "His Majesty's Declaration of Abdication Act,1936".)(20)
(17)PRO DO 35 3990.p.20. Note on the Legal Status of the Treaty.
(18)D .D . Vol. 64. Col. 1231. 12.12.1936.
(19)Mansergh, N.: The Commonwealth Experience, pub. Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1969. p.241
(20)NASPO S.9430 This file contains material dealing with 
Constitution (Amendment no.27)Act,1936, and contains a copy of 
the wording of King Edward Vlll's resignation.
(*l)The document of abdication stated:
"I,Edward the Eighth, of Great Britain,Ireland, and the British 
Dominions beyond the seas, King Emperor of India, do hereby 
declare My irrevocable determination to renounce the throne for 
Myself and for My descendants, and my desire that effect should 
be given to this Instrument of Abdication immediately.(21)
(21) D.D. Vol. 64. Col 1509. 12.12.1936
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Accordingly, a morning meeting of the Executive Council on 
December 10 decided to recognise the Abdication by deleting "from 
the constitution all mention of the King and of the 
representative of the Crown."(22) That night, a meeting of the 
Executive Council decided to appoint the King's Successor only 
in the limited area of "certain functions in external 
matters"(23) and approved the text the Constitution ( Amendment 
No 27) Bill, 1936 and the Executive Authority (External 
Relations) Bill.(24) The removal and reinstatement of the King's 
Successor, could be seen as ironic, even though de Valera made 
this appointment applicable only to external functions of the 
state.
These changes were not particularly revolutionary and were 
already contained in the draft of Eamon de Valera's proposed new 
constitution. Interestingly, the relevant article of the draft 
of the constitution, entitled, "Organic Law on Foreign 
Relations," (dated August,31, 1936 ) contains a reference to
"Poblacht na h-Eireann", (Irish Republic).(25) Subsequently, the 
description of the State as a "Republic" did not appear in the 
1937 constitution. This may have been primarily because de Valera 
feared that such a contentious move might have resulted in the 
constitution being rejected by the electorate.
(22)NASPO S.9429A extract from Cabinet meeting G.C. 
7/377.10.12.1936 This File contains material dealing with the 
Executive Authority( External Relations) Act, 1936
(23)NASPO S.9429A extract from Cabinet meeting G.C. 7/378. 
10.12.1936.
(24)Ibid
(25)Private Papers of Eamon de Valera, Dun Mhuire, Franciscan 
Library archives. Reference 1029/5 .See also Irish Times 
2.7.1987 which contains a special feature on the Irish 
Constitution.
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Eire's Attorney General, James Geoghegan, (1*) advised the 
Executive Council in December 1936 that the External Relations 
Act was essential because it would show that a law of the Irish 
Free State was necessary to authorise the perfgrmance of any 
Royal functions in relation to the Irish Free State.(26) 
Additionally, the Attorney General pointed out, that the new 
constitutional position of the Monarch in relation to the Irish 
Free State was nowhere else defined and that difficulties could 
arise if legislation were not enacted. He cited the scenario 
that the Supreme Court might hold that King Edward Vlll was still 
on the throne as far as the Irish Free State was concerned, or 
that there was no successor to him under the law of the Irish 
Free State to perform His functions. He argued that perhaps 
potentially most damaging to the sovereignty of the state was the 
possibility that the British Act alone might be deemed effective 
enough to set up a new King for the Irish Free State.(27) Less 
pedantically, the former Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 
Malcolm Mac Donald, related the anecdote that Eamon de Valera was 
prompted to introduce legislation in order to avoid the 
possibility of having the former Mrs Simpson, as Queen of 
Ireland.(28) Such perceptive humour no doubt contributed to his 
diplomatic success in Anglo-Irish relations.
(1*)NASP0 S.9461A James Geoghegan,K.C. was appointed Attorney
General 2.11.1936 and formally resigned the same month. Patrick 
Lynch K.C. did not succeed him until 22.12.1936.
(26) NASPO S 9429A Note by the Attorney General on the legal 
considerations making the External Relations Act requisite.
(27)Ibid
(28)Mac Donald. Malcolm: Titan and Others.pub. Collins,1972. p.69
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The procedure in relation to the passing of the two Acts was as 
follows: on Thursday December 10,1936, the Ceann Comhairle
(Speaker or Chairman of Dail Eireann), Proinnsias O'Fathaigh 
(Francis Fahy), at the request of Eamon de Valera, as authorised 
by the Cabinet, summoned the Dail members back from the Christmas 
recess to attend the Dail at three o'clock the following 
afternoon. The purpose for reconvening was to consider proposals 
for the amendment of the constitution and "other 
legislation".(29) More specifically it was to implement the 
Cabinet's decision of that day (30) that legislation should be 
introduced to give effect to the abdication as far as the 
internal affairs of the Irish Free State were concerned and to 
approve of the exercise by the King's successor of certain 
functions in external matters as and when so advised by the 
Executive Council.
CONTINUED/
(29) D.D. Vol. 64. Col. 1230. 10.12.36
(30) NASPO S. 9429A extract of meetings a.m. G.C. 7/377 & p.m. 
G.C.7/378. 10.12.1936
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On Friday December 11, the Dail authorised de Valera, who as 
usual was acting as his own Minister of External Affairs, 
to introduce the necessary Bills to recognise the abdication by 
amending the constitution and then introducing the Executive 
Authority (External Relations) Bill, 1936 .(31) The Amendment (No 
27) Bill,1936, removed all references to the Crown and the 
Governor General from the internal affairs of the state.(32) In 
fact, the office of Governor General, which was held by a small 
country grocer (or in the diplomatic parlance of the times 
"merchant"), appointed by de Valera to hold the office and 
exercise only nominal functions, was not officially abolished 
until June 1937.(33)
(31)D .D . Vol. 64. Col 1235 . 11. 12. 1936.
(32)Constitution (Amendment No.27) Act 1936. (A) Act of the
Oireachtas of Saorstat Eireann to amend the Constitution in 
relation to the Executive authority and power and the performance 
of certain Executive functions. Quoted in Mansergh,N.: Documents 
and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs 1931-52 Vol 1. 
p.321. _  7
(33) NASPO S 9457 Executive Powers(Consequential Provision) Bill, 
1937. See also,Mac Mahon, D.: Republicanism and Imperialism.p.200
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| When moving the second reading of the Constitution (Amendment No 
27) Bill, de Valera explained the purpose of the two Bills and 
their relationship : "I would not ask the members of our party
nor would I myself take the responsibility for the introduction 
of a measure such as the second one here [Repeal of the External 
Relations Act] unless it was made clear, side by side with it, 
what the true situation was". He went on to explain that, "what 
is happening then is that from the King are being taken away any 
functions internal, either direct or indirect, in the
administration of the government and in the internal executive of 
the country, and we are retaining the King for those purposes for
which he was used hitherto. He is being retained for these
purposes because he is recognised as the symbol of this
P
If
particular co-operation with the states of the Commonwealth."(34)
By the use of the guillotine procedure, the Amendment (No 27) 
Bill 1936, was passed by 79 votes to 54 in the committee stage, 
being supported by the five parliamentary members of the Labour 
Party and opposed by Fine Gael and the independent members (35) 
and similarly passed without amendment in the final stage(36)
(34) D.D. Vol. 64. Col.1280. 11.12.1936
(35) D.D. Vol. 64. Col.1379-82. 11.12.1936
(36) D.D. Vol. 64. Col.1382. 11.12.1936
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The combined articles of the constitution affected by the
Constitution (Amendment No. 27) Act, 1936, which removed the
already nominal position of the Fianna Fail appointed Governor 
General, from the internal affairs of the State, were as follows: 
Article 4; members of tribunals would now be appointed by the 
Executive Council (government) instead of the Governor General. 
Article 12; whereby the Senate was abolished and the Legislature 
was then to consist of one House ( the Dail).(37) The King was 
omitted from Article 24 which meant that the Oireachtas was to be 
summoned and dissolved by the Chairman of Dail Eireann on the
direction of the Executive Council instead of as previously by 
the representative of the Crown in the name of the King.(38) 
Article 51 was affected so that the Executive Authority was to 
be exercised by the Executive Council, whereas before, the
executive authority of the state was vested in the King. However, 
Article 51 of the 1922 constitution still provided for the 
delegation of this power in external relations, as did Article 29 
of the 1937 constitution.(39)
Article 53, which allowed for the President of the Executive 
Council and the members thereof to be appointed by the 
representative of the Crown was amended so that the President of 
the Executive Council was to be elected by the Dail.The President 
would in turn appoint members of the Executive Council including 
the Minister of External Affairs.(40)
(37) NASPO S 9430
(38) Ibid
(39) Ibid
(40)Ibid
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Article 60, which dealt with the appointment, salary and 
establishment of the representative of the Crown was deleted. 
Article 68 was amended so that judges would henceforth be 
appointed be the Executive Council instead of by the 
lRepresentative of the Crown.
Ii
jFinally, Article 41 was amended so that Bills were in future to 
jbe signed by the Chairman of Dail Eireann instead of the 
[representative of the Crown.(42) It is of historical interest 
that on December 11,1936 the Private Secretary to the Minister of 
'Finance, Mr. M. O' Muimhneachin, informed the Secretary of the 
Department of External Affairs that the King's assent had been 
given to the Constitution (Amendment No. 27) Act, 1936.(43) This 
was in fact the last Act of the Irish Free State which needed the 
King's assent. The Governor General had effectively abolished his 
own office. All regal trappings were effectively removed by the 
Constitution (Amendment No.27)Act,1936, from the internal 
constitutional machinery of the Irish Free State.(41)(1*)
(41)Ibid
(l*)The crude process by which the 1922 constitution was 
'’amended" took the form of simply ruling out the relevant 
articles and parts thereof. This is graphically illustrated in 
the private papers of Eamon de Valera in his private papers in 
the Archives of the Franciscan Library, Dun Mhuire, Killiney, 
Co. Dublin.
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The following morning de Valera acting in his capacity as 
Minister for External Affairs, moved the second reading of the 
Executive Authority (External Relations) Bill, 1936.(44) This 
sBill appointed Edward's successor, King George VI, to have 
jauthority to act on behalf of the Irish Free State on the advice
;of the Executive Council only on matters relating to the external
j
jrelations of the state. Although the act only related to the 
‘appointment of diplomats, in practice this included the Crown 
'overseeing the reception of and recall of diplomatic and consular 
: representatives. The Act also provided for the Crown, again on 
the advice and authority of the Executive Council, to ratify the 
Irish Free State's international treaties. Hence the self- 
explanatory name of the Act.
A reading of the Act, especially section 3.1 (1*) gives the 
impression that it was aimed as a gesture of solidarity with the 
members of the Commonwealth. It recognised the Crown as the
symbol and head of the Commonwealth .
(42)Ibid
(43)Ibid
(44)D .D . Vol. 64. Col. 1385. 12.12.1936.
(1*) Section 3, subsection (1) stated that 'so long as Saorstat 
Eireann is associated with the following nations, that is to say, 
Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, and South Africa, 
and so long as the King recognised by those nations (on the 
advice of the several governments thereof) for the purposes of 
the appointment of Diplomatic and Consular Representatives and
the conclusion of International agreements, the King so
recognised may, and is hereby authorised to, as and when advised, 
act on behalf of Saorstat Eireann for the like purposes by the 
Executive Council so to do. See appendix 1.
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i In practice, it could be used as a face-saving device whereby
j
; different interpretations could apply in both the Irish Free
i
I State and Britain. This "Irish solution to an Irish problem"
[suited de Valera, since he subsequently claimed, that he
!
believed that the retention of this tenuous link with the Crown, 
"might go towards meeting the sentiment of the people of the six 
counties.1 (45)
I It is worth noting that the future Taoiseach, Fine Gael deputy,
\
t John A. Costello, speaking on the Second Stage of the 
Constitution (Amendment No. 27) Bill, but with relevance to the 
following Executive Authority (External Relations) Bill 1936, 
declared that the Bill would create "a political monstrosity, the 
like of which is unknown to political legal theory".(46) He 
argue'f that the Crown alone "stood as the symbol of our freedom, 
our free association. That is now taken away by these Bills."(47) 
Costello continued to state what was interpreted as his 
consistent attitude towards the constitutional position of the 
twenty six county state, 'vis-a-vis' the Commonwealth: "I can
understand a decent declaration of a republic but I cannot 
understand the indecency which is being perpetrated on this 
country by this Bill." He pleaded that something "definite"(48) 
should be implemented, fearing that the legislation was not 
effective in law, and therefore could result in consequent 
problems for the Executive Council in enforcing its legislation.
CONTINUED/
(45)D.D. Vol. 107. Col. 91 24.6.1947
(46)D.D. Vol. 64. Col. 1293 11.12.1936
(47)D .D . Vol. 64. Col. 1297 11.12.1936
(48)D.D. Vol. 64. Col. 1303 11.12.1936
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Costello gave as an example the possibility of future 
difficulties in legally collecting taxes. He claimed that "a 
whole vista of litigation and subsequent legislation spreads 
.itself out before anybody who thinks, and who must become 
appalled at the possibilities which are inherent in this 
Bill."(49) It is possible that John Costello, in line with his
party, voted against the removal of the Crown from the internal
affairs of the Constitution and accepted the External Relations 
Act as better than nothing.
The External Relations Act was passed in the Committee stage by 
69 to 25 including Fine Gael,(50) and in its final stage the 
Labour party with five parliamentary members, led by William 
Norton, was the only political party to oppose the passing of the 
External Relations Act. It was passed on December 12, 1936, one 
day after Edward Vlll's abdication. (51)
Despite legalistic prognostications, Eamon de Valera, exercising 
the new power bestowed by Article 41 of the constitution, as 
amended by the Constitution (Amendment No 27)Act,1936, wrote to 
the Chairman of the Dail directing him to sign the Executive 
Authority (External Relations) Act 1936.(52) The Act was the 
first one to be signed by the Chairman of the Dail.(53)
(49)D.D. Vol. 64. Col. 1303-4 11.12.1936
(50)D .D . Vol. 64. Col. 1498-1500 12.12.1936
(51)D.D. Vol. 64. Col. 1511-1512 12.12.1936
(52)NASPO S 14387C Official report dated 15.12.1936
(53)NASPO S. 9429A
52
Following the passing of the External Relations Act, 'The Irish 
Times' considered that de Valera had achieved the aims of his 
Document Number two , (54) "plus the advantages secured by his 
o p p o n e n t s (55) De Valera's policy then was for a settlement 
which would reconcile England's fears with the claims of the
Irish people to maintain their sovereign independence. Document
Number two agreed, "That, for purposes of common concern, Ireland 
shall be associated with the States of the British Commonwealth." 
("Purposes of common concern" included "Defence, Peace and War, 
and Political Treaties,") and, "That , for purposes of the 
Association, Ireland shall recognise His Britannic Majesty as 
head of the Association."(56)
In 1948, the leader of the Labour Party, William Norton, 
described the combined process of the enactment of the 
Constitution (Amendment No.27) Act, and the External Relations
Act, as the King being "put out at the front door and the back
window was left open to bring him in again." (57)
(54) De Valera's alternative to the Treaty; a draft of 'document 
Number two' presented to Dail Eireann on December 
15,1921.reproduced in, Irish Political Documents 1916-1949
(Eds.) Mitchell,A. and 0 Snodaigh.P.: pp.123-24
(55) Irish Times 14.12.1936
(56)as 54
(57)D .D . Vol. 113. Col. 958. 2.12. 1948
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For the next twelve years nobody challenged or even insisted 
on a definition of the External Relations Act. During one debate 
in * 1945, de Valera answered a question on the the status of 
Eire by quoting definitions of a Republic from Encylopaedia 
Britannife, Encylopaedia Americana, Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary, Websters International Dictionary, the New Standard 
Dictionary of the English Language and Chamber/s Dictionary.(58) 
Even de Valera's interesting if nonchalant version of the 
background to the introduction of the Act as related to his party 
followers at the Fianna Fail Ard Fheis in November 1945 was, as
!
iusual, tactfully ignored by the Dominions Office: he said "We
sdid not ask the British to accept it as constituting membershipI
; of the state of the British Commonwealth. I was asked another 
, question at the same time as I was asked if we were a Republic. I 
was asked were we or are we not a member of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations. I said that what was fully implemented 
in the constitution has been known since the 1936 constitution 
came into effect some eight years ago. On the day on which it 
came into effect, without asking from us, the British government 
and other states of the British Commonwealth agreed that our new 
constitution and our new position had not changed us. In other 
words, they regarded us as a member."(59) De Valera stated that 
he replied to the British government by explaining the 
impossibility of any government in Saorstat Eireann to express an 
unqualified desire to remain a/
(58) D.D. Vol. 97. Col. 2570-72 . 17.7. 1945
(59)See D.D. Vol. 97. Col. 2573. 17.7.1945
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a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations whilst Ireland 
remained partitioned. He once again declared: "We are an
I
I independent Republic associated for foreign policy with the 
states of the British Commonwealth." De Valera further underlined 
the expandability of the External Relations Act by declaring at
an Ard Fheis in 1945: " The day that either party finds it
inconvenient, we can simply get rid of it without repealing the 
External Relations Act at all by arranging for other methods of 
accrediting our representatives abroad." (60)
It is possible that in the summer of 1948 the Taoiseach, John 
Costello, had a similar hope that the External Relations Act 
might be allowed quietly to become defunct.(61) Eamon de
Valera's understanding of the External Relations Act described 
both the actual limited operative functioning of the Act and the 
fact that it could even be ignored while remaining on the statute 
books. Such a solution might have sufficed as an acceptable 
tenuous link by which membership of the Commonwealth could have 
been retained.
(60)Ard Fheis(Party Conference) speech reported in Irish Press 
November 7, 1945
(61)NASPO S 14387A see John Costello's 24 page speech to the 
Canadian Bar Association delivered on 1.9.1948
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Fine Gael deputies were, perhaps surprisingly, more likely to 
highlight the embarrassing issue of Eire's anomalous membership 
of the Commonwealth when Fianna Fail were in power, rather than 
'vice versa'. For example, during the debate on the External 
Affairs Estimates in 1947, Patrick McGilligan, a prominent Fine 
Gael deputy and a professor of constitutional law, asked 
rhetorically, "if we have a head of the state in this country-".
(1) De Valera interjected, "We have." Mr. McGilligan retorted "I 
say no." De Valera then claimed; "The President is the head of 
the State."(2) McGilligan disagreed, pointing out that the head 
of a state normally had an internal and external role, whilst 
"the President of this country does not have any relations 
internationally vis-a-vis other countries."(3) Deputy Domimick 
Cafferky disagreed jocularly reminding the Dail that "The 
President attends football matches."(4)
CONTINUED/
(1) D.D. Vol. 106. Col. 2323. 20.6.1947
(2) Ibid
(3) Ibid
(4) Ibid
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During this debate, McGilligan quoted a story from the 'Sunday 
Independent' critical of the pretence that Eire had republican 
institutions at home while accrediting envoys abroad with letters 
signed by the King of England.(5) McGilligan offered the analogy 
that a body "carrying both an internal growth and a foreign body 
would be sent off for an operation at once to remove one, if not 
both of them."(6) He also claimed that that the High 
Commissioners in Canada and Australia were not "diplomats" since 
the King cannot appoint a minister to himself, hence the title of 
Representative or High Commissioner.(7) His point was that the 
status of Ambassador was superior to Minister or High 
Commissioner since an Ambassador has direct access to the head 
of the country to which he is accredited and he represents 
personally the person who accredits him.
CONTINUED/
(5) D.D. Vol. 106. Col. 2321. 20.6.1947
(6) D.D. Vol. 106. Col. 2324. 20.6.1947
(7) D.D. Vol. 106. Col. 2303. 20.6.1947
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Patrick McGilligan further pointed out that His Majesty the King 
would receive the diplomatic courtesy of a note of thanks for 
appointing the Irish envoy to the Vatican. The letters of Credence 
of the Irish Ambassador to the Vatican were written in Irish and 
signed by King George VI, who incidentally dropped that part of 
his title describing him as the "Defender of the Faith". 
McGilligan claimed that the pride of Catholic Ireland was being 
damaged because Mr. Joseph Walshe (former Secretary of the 
Department of External Affairs) would be "the representative of
s
[the King at the Vatican."(8) McGilligan continued in this vein, 
referring to the embarrassment that would be caused in explaining 
to the Argentinian Republic why the Irish Representative from
the Republic of Eire to the Republic of Argentina will carry
letters of credence signed by the King of England.(9)
The content of the above contribution is noteworthy, because it
came from a leading and experienced constitutional legal expert 
and encapsulated the criticisms which were prominent after the 
intention to repeal the External Relations Act was eventually 
announced by John Costello in Ottawa. Indeed, the above features 
would have provided a plausible explanation for the need to 
repeal the External Relations Act.
(8) D.D. Vol. 106. Col. 2303. 20.6.1947
(9) D.D. Vol. 106. Col. 2304. 20.6.1947
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During that 1947 Dail debate, when dealing with provocative 
questions from prominent Fine Gael Deputy, Daniel Morrissey, and 
the "pro-British" independent Deputy James Dillon, about the 
status of Eire, vis-a-vis the Commonwealth, de Valera gave a 
mercurial answer which highlighted the general unspoken agreement 
that the nebulous relationship should not be defined: "Our
position in relation to the Commonwealth is accepted and 
understood by the people who are immediately concerned with 
Britain, and it is understood by everybody who wants to 
understand it-the only people who do not want to understand it 
are the people who want to create political confusion."(10) The 
vagueness of this anomalous relationship, at that time, appeared 
to suit both the British and Irish governments since they could 
offer their own interpretations to their respective questioners. 
Up to 1947 de Valera was prepared at least publicly to accept 
the link which the External Relations Act entailed, because it 
provided a possible bridge for the unification of the country 
and not least because of the "material advantage in maintaining 
an association" which the Commonwealth bestowed.(11) In 1947 de 
Valera was complaining privately to Lord Rugby that the External 
Relations Act had involved him in "constant criticism and 
humiliation" and had not acted as the intended bridge which would 
help to solve Anglo-Irish difficulties. In particular, it had not 
brought Northern Ireland "into association with Eire."(12)
(10) D.D. Vol. 107. Col. 87. 20.6.1947
(11) D.D. Vol. 107. Col. 92. 20.6.1947
(12)PRO DO 35 3955. Rugby, Report to C.R.O. dated 27.10.1947 p.l
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In March and November 1947, de Valera used the threat of 
repealing the External Relations Act as a lever to obtain some 
.movement on Partition. According to Sean T. O' Kelly, in March 
1947 de Valera desisted when "begged" by the British government 
not to repeal the Act,(13) but by November 1947 de Valera 
apparently was resolute in his decision to repeal the External 
Relations Act. Following the Anglo-Irish trade talks in October 
;i947, de Valera instructed the Secretary of the Department of 
External Affairs, Frederick Boland, to prepare the necessary 
legislation. In turn, Frederick Boland instructed Michael Rynne 
of the Legal section, whom he found had in fact already begun 
the preparatory work. (14) This resulted in the Attorney General, 
Cearbhall O'Dalaigh, preparing a short Bill to repeal the 
External Relations Act. Interestingly,the draft of de Valera's 
November 1947 Bill, did not refer to the status of the state as a 
Republic.(15)
(13)National Library of Ireland, Manuscript room, private papers 
of Sean T. O'Kelly. MS.22848
(14) Bruce Arnold interview with Frederick Boland. J U re. op //vtcAV'eh
(15)Private Papers of Cearbhall O'Dalaigh, Department of 
Archives, U.C.D. Reference P51/2A
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By January 1948, Lord Rugby in a note to the Commonwealth 
Relations Office about the forthcoming elections in Eire, 
suspected that de Valera might use the repeal of the External 
Relations Act as a demonstration to the left that though he had 
not solved partition, he had at least cut the last link with the 
United Kingdom.(16) Indeed, by January 1948, de Valera had 
already prepared the draft of such a Bill. This draft referred 
to the state as a Republic.(17) Perhaps coincidentally, the draft 
of this Bill was similar to the one adopted by the Coalition. 
Although de Valera warned Rugby about his intentions, (18) he did 
not publicise them during the election of 1948, possibly because 
he may have feared as with the 1937 Constitition, that seeking a 
mandate for a Republic might be rejected or at least cost him 
support.
As early as November 1947, Rugby had warned the Commonwealth 
Relations Office that if de Valera were to meet Prime Minister 
Attlee, then he should be "warned of a change which may be more 
temporary and may find expression in the near future." Rugby 
believed that Britain's economic difficulty provided de Valera 
with the opportunity "to act in the political field without fear 
of economic damage."(17) This statement shows that such a tit for 
tat response, i.e., bilateral economic sanctions by Britain 
against Eire through the withdrawal of Most Favoured Nation 
Status was even in 1947, a possibility.
(16) PRO Cab 134/118 Telegram dated 7.2.1948
(17)Private Papers of Cearbhall O' Dalaigh, Department of 
Archives U.C.D. Reference P51/2A
(18)Private Papers Sean T. O'Kelly Ms.No.22848.
(19)PRO DO 35 3955. Telegram No.71. Rugby to C.R.O. 1.11.1947.
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(B) FEBRUARY 1948, GENERAL ELECTION CALLED
63
In 1948 the principal difference between the two main political 
parties in Ireland, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael was the stances 
they took following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 
December 1921. Eamon De Valera refused to accept the Dail vote 
(which accepted the provisions of the treaty primarily because it 
; required all Dail Deputies to swear an oath of allegiance to the 
: Crown. He refused to accept the result of the Dail Treaty debate 
and went on to support the anti-treatites in the civil war (1921- 
23), against the "pro-treatites". That latter group then became 
in April 1923, the Cumann- na-nGaedheal party, which was the 
forerunner of Fine Gael, and was headed by the President of the 
Executive Council, William T. Cosgrave.
In 1945, Eire's Presidential elections brought forward a new 
post-war voter with secular class sympathies and values similar 
to the British Labour Party.( 1) This "modernist” vote presented 
an opportunity for a newly established party, Clann-na-Poblachta* 
The main impetus for the formation of Clann-na-Poblachta can be 
attributed largely to the death by hunger and thirst strike of 
an I.R.A. internee, Sean Me Caughey, in May 1946. Constitutional 
republicans led by Sean MacBride in July 1946 formed Clann-na- 
Poblachta (People of the Republic) in order to have a "platform, 
a programme and a party".(2) The party caused a break in the 
conventional mould of the treaty-based pattern of voting .
(1) See Garvin,T.: The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics.
(2) Bowyer Bell.J.: The Secret Armv .p.253
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The ethos of the I.R.A. continued to dominate the party: 
several former I.R.A. members or active sympathisers became 
parliamentary members of Clann-na-Poblachta.(3) Its rank and file
.members and supporters was composed of the radical wing of
Fianna Fail, IRA veterans of the 1930s, urban liberal reformers
and anti-clericals. The party had two distinct elements: one
Jadopted the post-war British Labour policies on welfare and 
health, while the other was Republican and directed its energy 
| towards the problem of Partition. Reporting in November 1947,
iLord Rugby predicted that the leader of Clann-na-Poblachta,
; former Chief of Staff of the Irish Republican Army(l*), Sean 
MacBride, would eventually head an Irish Government.(4) Fianna 
Fail feared that Clann-na-Poblachta might capture its Republican 
mantle. This threat increased when on October 29, 1947, Clann-
na-Poblachta won two (Dublin and Tipperary) of three by- 
elections. (5) In spite of the new 1937 constitution, Sean 
MacBride believed that de Valera was too conservative in his 
relations with Britain, particularly concerning Partition. During 
the Second World War, de Valera rejected innovative ideas and an 
offer from Sean MacBride of his services.(6) That rejection in 
addition to de Valera's conservatism may have spurred MacBride to 
form his own alternative party in 1946.
(3)PRO DO.35 3995 Telegram No.71. Rugby to C.R.O. 1.11.1947
(4)Personal Interview with former Clann-na-Poblachta deputy, 
Jack Me Quillan 24.1.1989.
(5) O'Leary,C. Irish Elections. 1918-1977. p.38
(6)NASPO S 13450. quoted in Fisk,R.: In Time of War, p.533 
(l*)The I.R.A. had been declared an illegal organisation in 1936. 
MacBride resigned from the I.R.A. in 1937 because he considered 
that de Valera had provided the constitutional means to end 
Partition with the new constitution.(7)
(7) Personal Interview with Sean MacBride. 6.1.1987.
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Despite Clann-na-Poblachta's gains, Lord Rugby a the time 
described Fianna Fail as "the party of stability in Irish 
p o l i t i c s (8) He saw the threat from Clann -na- Poblachta as no 
more than indicating "a strong gesture of disgust with the de 
Valera Government for the usual economic grievances of failing to 
satisfy popular demand to keep prices down." He predicted that a 
general election was imminent. Rugby thought that, despite the 
mounting criticism of de Valera's Government, that votes which 
normally went to Fine Gael would instead go to Fianna Fail 
because the electorate would not waste their vote on an 
organisation which the results of three recent by-elections had 
shown "to be moribund".(9)
Fianna Fail was being accused of administering the policies 
advocated by Fine Gael while not admitting it. Republicans 
criticised the failure to achieve nationalist aims. Indeed, 
Fianna Fail's conservatism was reputedly rewarded by 
contributions from wealthy landowners and industrialists, the 
traditional supporters of Fine Gael. When this rumour spread it 
caused the party extensive embarrassment and loss of support 
amongst the urban population in Dublin, who changed allegiance 
mainly to Clann-na-Poblachta.(10) There is an impression that 
Clann-na-Poblachta highlighted their platform of social issues 
but that these were subsidiary and designed to broaden the 
Republican appeal of the Party.
(8)PRO DO 35 3955. p.3. Telegram No. 71. 1.11.1947.Rugby to CRO
(9)Ibid
(10)Garvin,T.: The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics. 
p.175
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jAt the end of 1947, the position for the Fianna Fail government 
[was that they were faced with a teachers' strike over the issue
i
j of grading according to efficiency. They "mishandled” the strike 
which had the support of the Catholic Hierarchy and alienated 
teachers, many of whom formed an important part of Fianna Fail's 
local political organisation.(1*)
In addition to the teacher's strike, the State experienced the 
largest adverse monthly trade balance on record. On a more 
personal level, rumours abounded that de Valera's Ministers ( in 
particular Sean Lemass) had benefited from using their influence 
in the sale of a distillery on favourable terms. Fianna Fail 
could have weathered these political troubles since there was one
;
! and a half years left to run of their five- year term. On the 
| plus side, de Valera had at the end of November 1947 completed a 
■ successful Anglo-Irish trade agreement. Anglo-Irish relations, in 
; particular economic relations, were excellent and de Valera even 
suggested a "dovetailing of the two economies" during the trade 
negotiations.(11) De Valera was worried by the advance of Clann- 
na-Poblachta and apparently believed that an early election 
would at least have the advantage of preventing the new party 
from consolidating its gains.(12) Accordingly, on December 21, 
1947, he announced that a general election was to be held in the 
first week of February, 1948.
(1*) I am grateful to Dr.Greagor 0' Duill for this point.
(11) PRO DO 130/ 88 p.l.
(12) O'Leary,C. Irish Elections 1918-1977. p.38
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| The emergence of the "red scare" serves to illustrate the lack
1
| of serious ideological debate in Irish politics and also speaks
;
for the climate of the times with regard to the later formation 
of WEU and NATO.
At the beginning of the 1948 general election Sean MacEntee 
claimed that, among others, Sean Dunne (Irish Labour Party), 
George Pollock (Irish Labour Party), Robbie,J. Connolly (Irish 
Labour Party), and Con Lehane (a member of Clann-Na-Poblachta) 
were loyal to the Communist cause.(13) In particular, MacEntee 
attempted to taint the Clann-na-Poblachta members with 
association with the Communist Party. According to Sean Mac
{
Bride, the spectre of Communism was also raised against Clann- 
| Na-Poblachta by the clergy.(14)
CONTINUED/
(13) National Research Centre,Suiteland,Maryland(NRC) Record 
Group(RG)84 Box 364 report No.800. Reference file Ireland, Irish 
Political Parties .
(14) Personal Interview with Sean MacBride, 6.1. 1987.
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I During the 1948 general election, de Valera, who had once been a
\
i
| victim of similar taunts,(15) was now warning that "the road to 
j a slave state and serfdom is broad and easy." There were some 
protests at these tactics. The President of Cork University, Dr. 
Alfred O'Rahilly, who had during the 1932 elections defended de 
Valera against similar slanders, (16) now wrote an article in the 
'Catholic Standard' denouncing de Valera's innuendoes that the 
opposition was tainted with Communists.(17)
Even the Labour Party took the opportunity to condemn "the 
pernicious doctrine of Communism , the relentless enemy of the 
Labour movement."(18) William Norton, together with Sean 
MacBride, counteracted these scares by incorporating frequent 
protestations of loyalty to the Catholic church together with 
denunciations of Communism in their election speeches.
(15) See Fanning,R.: Independent Ireland. quotes one
advertisement in the 1932 election which asked " How will you 
vote tomorrow? The gunmen are voting for Fianna Fail. The 
Communists are voting for Fianna Fail.P.105 Source; Banta.M.:The 
Red Scare in the Irish Free State 1929-37 (Unpublished M.A. 
thesis) UCD Library 1982. & Kelly,P.: Convincing the
VotersrThe Electoral Appeal of Cumann na nGheadheal.1923-32. 
Unpublished M.A. thesis, UCD Library.1981
(16)Fanning, R.: Independent Ireland, p.107 quotes Banta,M.: 
The Red Scare in the Irish Free State .unpublished M.A. Thesis 
UCD 1982. pp.34-35.
(17^ Catholic Standard. 16.1.1948
(18)Irish Times. 23.1.1948
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On the eve of the 1948 general election, the "red scare" was 
again raised . Three days before polling day, the " Standard", 
published the answers of an open question to Sean Dunne, Peader 
Cowan, James Larkin, Robbie Connolly and George Pollock about 
their Communist sympathies.(19) This was a deliberate smear 
tactic, based on the allegations made by Sean MacEntee.
The questionaire, similar in format to later used by the 
infamous U.S. Senator Joe Me Carthy's committee, were:
1 . Were you at any time prior to its dispersal a member of the
Communist Party of Ireland ?
2. Did you at any time hold office in the Communist Party of 
Ireland ? (The honest answer to either of these questions is a 
simple "yes" or "no".)
3. If the answer to either of these questions (1 or 2) is in the 
affirmative will you here and now issue a statement repudiating 
Communism? (20)
An additional question as to current membership was put to 
Connolly and Pollock. Though regarded as "known members" of the 
Communist Party Connolly and Pollock were in fact former 
members of the party. Both Connolly and Pollock had resigned from 
small local groups, in Pollocks case almost twenty years earlier. 
Cowan and Dunne denied any association.(21) In spite of the 
Communist smear, "left-wingers" Connolly, Cowan, Dunne, Larkin 
and Lehane were duly elected.
(19)Catholic Standard. 30.1.1948.
(20)Ibid
(21)Ibid
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Jin contrast the 'Irish Times' in a magnanimous editorial 
I defended MacBride against taunts from MacEntee, declaring 
"what Sean MacBride did or said in 1931 is just as irrelevant to 
actual issues as the physical or spiritual whereabouts of any 
given politician on the morning of Easter Monday 1916. "(22)
The manifestos of the two main parties contained catchall 
policies promising improvements in agriculture, industry, 
education, housing, health, increases in the standards of living, 
lower taxes, and increased welfare* benefits. Fine Gael, aiming a 
blow at Fianna Fail, promised to reduce emigration. More 
provocatively, Fine Gael hinted at the alleged Fianna Fail 
ministerial financial scandals by promising "fair play all 
I round."(23)
I Clann-na-Poblachta besides calling for "Freedom and independence 
for all Ireland as a democratic Republic"(24) also wanted to 
break Eire's currency link with sterling. They claimed it would 
increase Eire's independence from British economic policies.
(22) Irish Times 31.1.48
(23) Fine Gael Manifesto 1948 General Election as published in 
Irish newspapers in January/February 1948.
(24) 0 Snodaigh, P. and Mitchell, A.,(Eds) : Irish Political 
Documents 1916-1949. pub.Irish Academic Press , Dublin 1985 p.247
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However, the reality of Eire's economic relationship with Britian 
was exemplified in 1949 when the coalition were considering using 
the sterling assets to finance a development programme. The 
Treasury recommended that sanctions be imposed on Eire if she 
tried to draw too much on its sterling reserves in the form of 
imports from Britain reasoning, ’Financially Eire is not really 
an independent country. Her holdings in London do not differ in 
kind e.g. from Scotland's holdings. They are the accounts of
corporations and individual Irishmen with banks which keep their 
reserves in London." (25)
Given the above example of the practicalities of Anglo-Irish
relations, Sean MacBride, perhaps naively, believed in 1948 that
repealing the External Relations Act "would create no
difficulty."(26) It should be noted that an 'Irish Times' 
editorial commented that Sean MacBride "hints darkly at the 
repeal of the External Relations Act; but he and his associates 
have been careful to keep the constitutional problem well in the 
background, concentrating their attention on domestic 
problems."(27) Indeed, Clann-na-Poblachta, in line with other 
parties, avoided contentious issues and concentrated on gaining 
electoral support.
The U.S. Minister to Ireland, George Garrett, believed if Clann- 
na-Poblachta were elected it would attempt to escape from the 
financial dependence upon Britain by orientating the economy in 
the direction of America " by attracting American capital to 
develop local resources".(28)
(25) PRO T. 236/2839 report "Eire Sterling Balances." 5.12.1949
(26) Quoted in Irish Times. 27.1.48
(27)Ibid
(28)NA 841 D 00 /3-848
| In Ireland, the parties could not offer any real variation in
i
f
! their material political philosophies. John Horgan, a prominent
|
Cork solicitor and contributor to the journal 'Round Table', 
wrote that there was essentially no difference between the 
programmes of the parties, all being in favour of developing 
agriculture, industry and welfare. Horgan believed that it was 
the personal animosity of the leaders of the two main parties, 
caused mainly by the civil war, that kept the two main parties 
from forming a coalition.(29)
Horgan's view of the lack of ideological difference between the 
parties was later echoed by John Costello in January 1950, when, 
while speaking to a gathering of diplomats at the 'Circolo di 
Roma' about the nature of the difference between the parties in 
his coalition and Fianna Fail; "there were really no essential 
differences between the two. Those differences which existed were 
based on personalities, on memories of a comparatively recent
past, and on doubts whether agriculture or industry would form
the most appropriate basis for the Irish economy of the
future."(30)
The Labour Party too had broad policies, additionally advocating 
I nationalisation of transport and the flour industry. Labour's 
^offshoot, the National Labour Party's policies were similar to 
those of the main parties but overall the Labour Party was
divided without a coherent policy.
(29)NRC RG 84 Box 364 File reference ;Ireland 800 Preview of an 
article intended for submission to the 'Round Table' journal.
(30)PRO FO 371 89823.Report from the British Legation to the Holy 
See, to Foreign Office official, P.M. Johnson.24.1.1950
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|The farmers, dissatisfied with the representation of the two 
larger parties, formed their own party, the Clann- na- Talmhan 
Party.
Overall, all the party's policies were similar particularly in 
that they were careful not to alienate any possible support. 
Noteworthy, as an exception to proposing populist national aims, 
was Fine Gael's refusal to support the teaching of subjects 
through the medium of Irish.
Lord Rugby considered that "the platform which won most applause 
was the one which put out the most violent anti-British 
|ranting" and that Fianna Fail were the most adept at playing 
• the anti-British card.(31) Despite such expectations, John 
; Horgan, in the draft of an article on the results of the 
; election, wrote that the election was unique in that no party 
| appealed to "entangled sentiments" and that the issue of 
-Partition was kept in the background. In the field of Anglo- 
Irish relations, Horgan commented that the main parties 
programme, "as regards our external relations, was identical." 
Horgan noted that on "foreign policy" the leader of Fine Gael, 
Richard Mulcahy, accepted Eire's constitutional position with 
Britain, and quoted him as stating that there would be "no going 
back." (32)
(31)PRO copy in Commonwealth Liaison file FO. 371. 70175 report
on "General Election in Eire."
(32)NRC RG 84 Box 364 file reference 800
(1*)Submitted to U.S. Minister to Ireland, George Garrett
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Although de Valera had prepared in January 1948 the draft of a 
Bill(l*) to repeal the External Relations Act,(33) Fianna Fail
did not try to win or, perhaps as important, alienate votes by
promising to repeal the Act. During the elections, Fianna Fail
maintained a silence on the issue of the Commonwealth connection
and this was taken to mean support for the status quo.
Costello's election address stated that "Fine Gael, if it is 
elected to power, will not propose any alteration in the present 
constitution in relation to external affairs.” (34) This was in 
line with leader of the Fine Gael party, Richard Mulcahy, who 
on succeeding W.T. Cosgrave as leader in 1944 declared that Fine 
Gael "stood unequivocally for membership of the British 
Commonwealth." (35)
Despite Fine Gael's public adherence to retaining the External 
Relations Act and Fianna Fail's reticence on the matter, Rugby 
reported that "It is quite plain that the annulment of the
External Relations Act will not be long delayed. No party has
left the door open for any other course. All we can do is to give 
consideration to our line of action. Personally I should not be 
sorry to see this strange device removed. The Irish have handled
it in such a way as to discredit it.Furthermore, it is now clear
that it will not provide the bridge to closer association, as was 
once hoped."(36)
(33)Cearbhall O'Dalaigh Papers, P51/2A U.C.D. Archives Department.
(34)NRC, RG 84 Box 364 file 800 U.S. legation report on Eire 
Elections
(35)Ibid
(36)PRO CAB 134/118. Rugby Letter to Machtig 27.1.1948. pp.55-56 
(l*)See Appendix 11.
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The following day Rugby added a postscript: "It is indicative of
the way in which the Fine Gael party mismanage their affairs that
General Mulcahy the Fine Gael leader should now come out with the
firm pronouncement contained in the enclosed cutting in favour of 
not altering the present constitution in relation to external
affairs, while one of his leading henchmen has taken the contrary
line."(37) Interestingly, the "henchman" Rugby referred to 
(Dr.Tom O'Higgins) was only the day before described by Rugby as 
one of the outstanding figures of the Fine Gael Party. (38)
Approaching the elections Fianna Fail had lost some of its 
momentum; Fine Gael, according to commentators, was moribund and 
Labour was divided. Clann- na-Talmhan was really a pressure group 
for small farmers mainly from the province of Connacht. Clann- 
na- Poblachta, as the new catchall party, picked up dissatisfied
voters and was the only party to gain from the apathy .
The 'Irish Times' counted 404 candidates represented in the 
political arena as follows (39) : Fianna Fail, 118; Clann-na-
Poblachta, 92 (final figure 93); Fine Gael, 82; Labour, 43;
IClann-na-Talmhan,17; Farmers, 14; National Labour,14; 
[Independents, 24.(40)
(37)PRO CAB 134/118 Rugby Letter to Machtig. 28.1.1948. P.56
(38)PRO CAB 134/118 Rugby Letter to Machtig. 27.1.1948. P.55-56
(39 ^ Irish Times. 19.1.1948
(40) O'Leary, C.: Irish Elections 1918-1977. Cornelius O'Leary
reckoned there were 405 candidates, see p.39
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Immediately before the election, Rugby reported that
"something more responsible than a by-election spirit would 
possess the country when brought up against the prospect of a
I
S'
plunge into the unknown in such difficult times." He believed
I
.that Fianna Fail would be returned to power because, "the 
jopposition is in splinters. No rival Party is equipped with the 
.prestige, programme or personalities necessary for forming a 
jGovernment."(41) It was accepted that none of the opposition 
parties alone could hope to oust Fianna Fail. Still, the parties 
:did not agree to combine to present a united front before the 
election in the hope of achieving an overall majority.
(41)PRO F.O. 371. 70175 PRO copy in Commonwealth Liaison file
report on "General Election in Eire."
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(C)
ELECTION RESULTS AND THE FORMATION OF THE COALITION
78
The general election was held on February 4, 1948, the turn-out
being similar to the 1943 election with 73.5% of the electorate 
casting thier votes. That was nearly a five per cent increase on 
the previous election in 1944.(1)
The general result was that Fianna Fail, with 743,235 first 
preferences votes failed to obtain an overall majority. Clann- 
na-Poblachta polled approximately 175,000 first preferences. The 
147 seats were distributed as follows: Fianna Fail, 67; Fine
Gael, 30; Labour, 14; Clann -na -Poblachta, 10; Clann- na- 
Talmhan, 7 ; National Labour, 5; Independents and others 14. (2)
Although Clann-na-Poblachta won only 10 seats, it was recognised 
that this belied the support of the 13.2% of the overall vote it 
received. Indeed it has been calculated that they received 9 
seats less than their proportional due. This showed their 
electoral inexperience and lack of strategy. For example, Fianna 
Fail with 41.9% of the votes secured sixty-seven seats, while 
Fine Gael, which reduced its share of the votes, receiving less 
than twenty per cent, actually gained one seat more than in the 
previous election.(3)
As in the by-elections in October 1947, Fianna Fail secured the 
most first preferences overall, but the proportional 
representation system of transfers allowed the opposition to 
advance when second and third preference votes were allocated.(4)
(1) O'Leary.C.: Irish Elections 1918-1977. p.103
(2) Ibid
(3)Ibid
(4)NA 841D.00/11-347 Report on the outcome of the elections from 
the U.S. Legation in Dublin to the State Department
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The results of the election seemed at first to verify de Valera's 
i warning that the choice was between stable government or 
| political anarchy. Before and to a lesser extent after the 
election there was an element of panic and desperation among some 
of the pro-Commonwealth Fine Gael supporters. They publicly 
declared their view that a change of government was essential in 
order for democracy to survive.(5) This idea was prompted by the 
fact that de Valera would have maintained power easily under the 
single non-transferable "first past the post" voting system. 
Prior to the elections, de Valera refused to commit himself to 
| agreeing not to attempt to amend the voting system.
Following the results, all the political parties except Fianna 
Fail held a series of meetings. By February 17, the eve of the 
commencement of the new Dail session, the parties had formulated 
1 the basis of a coalition party. De Valera was recorded as being 
iopposed to coalition. However, the National Labour Party which 
! had split from the official Labour Party was the political arm of 
! the Congress of Irish Unions which had been founded by Fianna 
Fail Minister, Sean Lemass. Consequently the National Labour 
party, in particular its leader, Jim Everett, was under great 
pressure to support Fianna Fail.(6)
(5) see Letters to the ed. Irish Times .10.9.1967
(6)Garvin,T. The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics. P.175
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Given the diversity of the parties,it was remarkable that a 
coalition was achieved. For example, Sean MacBride refused to 
serve under the leader of Fine Gael, Richard Mulcahy. According 
to Sean MacBride, Mulcahy himself agreed that this was a correct 
move.(7) Mulcahy had been Chief of Staff during the Civil War 
when Liam Mellows, who shared a prison cell with Sean MacBride 
(on the recommendation of the Army Command and in accordance with 
a decision of the Irish cabinet), was one of four men selected to 
be shot summarily as a reprisal for the shootings of elected Dail 
members. Mulcahy might equally have criticised Sean MacBride for 
being a member of the irregular force, a section of whom shot the 
President of the Irish Free State, Michael CollinSjin 1922 and 
later a member of the IRA, a section of whom in 1927 assassinated 
the Irish Free State Vice- President, Kevin O' Higgins.(8) That 
agreement was achieved showed a political maturity that 
acknowledged that the events of the Civil War were, for practical 
purposes, ended.
(7^Irish Times. Sean MacBride Interview with James Downey
1.1.1979
(8)de Vere White,Terence. Kevin Q'Hiqqins.
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John Costello, an eminent and successful lawyer, emerged as Prime 
.Minister. Initially, his main qualifying point was that he was 
|not involved in the civil war. According to Sean MacBride, there 
were "sighs of relief from leaders of the other parties when 
Clann-na-Poblachta did not make the repeal of the External 
Relations Act or the release of political prisoners the 
conditions of their participation in the first inter-party 
government."(9) Instead, according to Sean MacBride, he put 
forward Clann-na-Poblachta policies and the leader of the Labour 
Party, William Norton put forward his party's policy on 
transport and these policies became the coalition's main 
I programme, and that was the "the sum total of the discussion on 
policy."(10) Thus, the "inter party" Government was formed. 
?MacBride claimed the credit for coining the phrase "inter-party 
|government".(11) This phrase was adopted to try and highlight the 
!independence of the parties and to placate those members of the 
;Clann-na-Poblachta party who were against entering a coalition 
! government.
(91Irish Times. Sean MacBride Interview with James Downey
1.1.1979
(10)Ibid
(11)Ibid
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John Whyte records in his book 'Church and State in Modern 
Ireland', that "as Dr Browne recalls it, Clann-na-Poblachta 
agreed to join the Government only to show that it could
i
! administer, and intended soon to leave. He recalls Mr. MacBride 
telling him at the time to build hospitals, and saying that when 
they were 'that high' (pointing about three feet off the ground)
! they would get out. But, he adds, when the hospitals were 'that 
I high', Mr Mac Bride did not wish to get out."(12) Dr Noel
; Browne's interpretation of that quote was that, once the Clann 
had proven their abilities, they should return to the polls for a 
mandate to govern.(13)
I The coalition was composed of a diverse group of interests and 
personalities.(14) Even among the small parties there was 
competition over policies , for example, Clann-na-Talmhan and 
Clann-na-Poblachta both claimed afforestation as their 
policy.(15) Perhaps the most outstanding point about the 
[formation of the coalition is that the parties, which were 
themselves coalitions of divergent interests, joined together
I rather than allow Fianna Fail form a minority Government. A
| couple of days after the formation of the government ,as their
[first gesture of reconciliation,the government agreed with Sean 
jMacBride's proposal that political prisoners should be 
^released.(16)
(12) Whyte ,J.: Church and State in Ireland. p. 210
(13)Personal Interview Dr. Noel Browne. 28.12.1988
(14)0'Leary, C.: Irish Elections 1918-1977. p.38-40
(15)Personal interview with former Clann-na-Poblachta 
Parliamentary deputy, Jack Me Quillan .24 .1.1989
(16) Irish Times .1.1. 1979
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!At the beginning of the new Dail on February 18, 1948, John
Costello was nominated for the post of Taoiseach by the leader of 
Fine Gael, Richard Mulcahy.(17) Mulcahy's address emphasised the 
new spirit of harmony.(18) William Norton seconded Costello's 
nomination.(19) Costello's nomination was also supported by Sean 
MacBride. In his address MacBride agreed that his party could not 
claim a mandate for the repeal of the External Relations Act "and 
such other measures as are inconsistent with our status as an 
independent republic. These, therefore, have to remain in 
abeyance for the time being."(20) It should not be overlooked 
that Sean MacBride made no secret of his ultimate aim and 
added that "We as a party do not abandon, waive, mitigate or 
abate in any respect any portion of our policy."(21) However, 
MacBride agreed that while awaiting a mandate from the people 
his party would co-operate with the other parties in implementing 
policies.(22) Immediately prior to the election, Rugby expected 
that if the procedures associated with accrediting 
representatives were not reformed, "We must be prepared to be 
confronted with a 'fait accompli'"(23) whereas, upon hearing Mac 
Bride's statement he expressed his relief that the External 
iRelations Act would not be repealed. (24)
(17 D.D.Vol. 110. Col. 20 18.2.48
(18 D.D.Vol. 110. Col. 20-•22 18.2.48
(19 D.D.Vol. 110. Col. 22 18.2.48
(20 D.D.Vol. 110. Col. 25 18.2.48
(21 Ibid
(22 D.D.Vol. 110 . Col. 25-•26 18.2.48.
(23 PRO Cab 134/118 Rugby to Eric Machtig report 9.2.1948
(24 PRO Cab 134/118 Rugby to Eric Machtig report 18.2.1948
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John Costello's nomination was also supported by Clann-na-Talmhan 
leader, Joseph Blowick, who declaed that his vote against Fianna 
Fail was a vote of censure by the farmers. James Everett, the 
leader of National Labour, spoke in favour of the inter-party 
government while James Dillon, former deputy leader of Fine Gael, 
voted for Costello "because I believe he is a man eminently 
suitable for the highest compliment that can be paid in this 
country: he is a decent man and he comes of decent people." (25) 
That evening Costello nominated his cabinet and assigned the 
Ministries.(1*) In fact, the Cabinet spoils had already been 
decided by the party leaders prior to Costello's nomination.(26) 
That process undermined his control of the Cabinet which was 
composed as follows; William Norton, leader of the Labour Party, 
became deputy Prime Minister(Tanaiste), and Minister for Social 
Welfare; General Richard Mulcahy, (leader of Fine Gael) became
Minister for Education; Sean MacBride, Minister for External
Affairs; Joseph Blowick (leader of Clann-na-Talmhan), Minister
for Lands; James Everett (leader of the National Labour Party), 
Minister for Department for Posts and Telegraphs; James Dillon 
(Independent deputy and former leader of Fine Gael), Minister for 
Agriculture; Patrick McGilligan (Fine Gael), Minister for 
Finance; General Sean Mac Eoin (Fine Gael), Minister for Justice; 
Dr. Thomas F.O'Higgins (Fine Gael) Minister for Defence; Daniel 
Morrissey (Fine Gael), Minister for Industry and Commerce; 
Timothy Murphy (Labour), Minister for Local Government and Dr.
Noel Browne (Clann-na-Poblachta), became Minister for Health.(27)
(25) D.D.Vol. 110 . Col. 27. 18.2.48.
(26)Fanning, R.: Independent Ireland, p. 185 
(l*)See appendix Vll for biographical details
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The Senate was used to divide the lesser political spoils. 
According to George Garrett, the Irish Senate held a "rather
^unimportant position".(28) This was attributed by Garrett to the
:
fact that it was not selected by democratic franchise and hence 
comparatively little interest was taken of the chamber. He 
considered the appointments to the Senate significant, only 
because the Prime Minister's appointees reflected the state of 
|political bargaining within the Coalition government. Of the 
ieleven such appointments Fine Gael had four, Clann-na-Poblachta 
and Labour had two each, National Labour had one, Clann-na- 
iTalmhan one, and Independents one.(29)
| CONTINUED/
(27) D.D. Vol. 110. Col 49. 18.2.1948
(28)NRC RG 84 Box 364 File 800 air gram A-102 . 16.4. 1948
(29)Ibid
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In line with its nationalist philosophy, Clann-na-Poblachta 
raised the question of the right for elected officials in 
Northern Ireland to be allowed to take their seats in the Dail.
i
; Fianna Fail was open to this idea while in opposition; however, 
while in power they cited the principle of representation without 
taxation and that Northern members might side with political 
parties. This would have disrupted the bipartisan policy towards 
the North. Additionally, there were, constitutional difficulties. 
In 1949, the Attorney General, Cecil Lavery, advised that the 
admittance of Northern members to the Oireachtas would require an 
"amendment of the constitution".(30) Lip service was paid to the 
; Clann-na-Poblachta demand to include in the Oireachtas members 
from the six counties, by appointing Denis Ireland, a Protestant 
and anti-partitionist, to the Senate. (31)
The Second Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in London, W. S. 
lAnderson, Jr., reported to the State Department that while the 
British press in general considered the Coalition to be unstable, 
they did however, report favourably on John Costello as a source 
of stability.(32) Professor Michael Hayes, former Ceann
Comhairle, believed that this reaction as due to the fact that 
coalition was a departure from conventional British politics. (33)
(30)Quoted in Bowman, J.: De Valera and the Ulster Question.
P.284. 10.3.49 in Cabinet memorandum by Cecil Lavery in Me
Gilligan paper's p35b/146.
(31) NRC RG 84 Box 364 File 800 air gram A-102 April. 16 1948
(32)NA 841D.00/3-348.
(33)Private Papers of Patrick McGilligan contains a copy of a 
letter from Professor Michael Hayes to Reginald Jebb.
29.7.1948.UCD Department of Archives. Reference P53/370.
87
The British press highlighted Costello's personal qualities, 
^describing him as "safe, sane, a man of integrity, moderate, 
^sincere, hard working”, but also mentioned was ” his lack of 
flair”. Anderson reported that the fact that Costello was not a 
veteran of 1916, the war of independence, or the civil war was, 
as far as the British government was concerned, a welcome break 
|With tradition. Overall, the British press reported that Costello 
broke the potential for autocratic rule by de Valera and noted 
jthe new Taoiseach's comments of continuing the economic co­
operation with Britain which they considered augured well for 
Anglo-Irish relations.(34)
(34)NA 841D.00/3-348.
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(D)
SURVEY OF COALITION'S PERFORMANCE
89
The coalition was not expected to survive more than a few 
months. Their policies and possible disagreements seemed
irreconcilable. Clann-na-Poblachta and Labour demanded an
.increase in pensions. That policy appeared to be at variance with
!
^the Fine Gael policy of not increasing taxation. How these
apparently irreconcilable aims could be managed, i.e. increased
!
welfare spending with reduced taxation, was indicative of the
i
6
balancing act and compromise needed to maintain the "unity in 
.diversity" of this coalition government.(1) Despite the potential 
for friction the inter-party government settled in and issued the 
features of their policy. All the parties claimed that this 
coalition policy incorporated their own policies. Again, it was a 
"catchall", promising improvements in industry, agriculture, 
housing, health, (specifying the eradication of tuberculosis)
education, and the increase in welfare payments.(2)
CONTINUED/
(1) Irish Times. 20.2.1948
(2) NRC RG 84 Box 364 File 800.
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On the evening of February 24 the Taoiseach, John Costello, 
in a radio broadcast to the nation outlined his Government's 
main challenges as being of a socio-economic nature rather than 
political or constitutional, and gave a broad outline of his 
government's policy. While promising to continue to support the
I
policy of rejuvenating the economy it should be noted that he 
also claimed, "as a priority" the reunification of the 
island.(3) This represented a departure from the traditional 
^ode of Fine Gael's policy of quiet diplomacy. In retrospect it 
;was ominous. That republican pronouncement was aimed at 
jdisproving the Fianna Fail taunt of being pro-British. Still, 
this was in line with keeping to a palatable path rather than 
entering into contentious areas especially on the constitutional 
'link with Britain .
The coalition settled into its honeymoon period and set about 
;governing the state. One of its immediate tasks was to solve the 
jteacher's dispute. It did so by increasing wages and abolishing 
[the grading system. The package included a promise to establish a 
jcouncil of education to deal with educational problems, 
particularly in popularising the Irish language.
|(3) Irish Times 25.2.1948
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After just one month in power the new Minister for Finance, 
Patrick McGilligan, formulated a plan on how the Coalition 
Government could reconcile the wish of the Labour Party and 
Clann-na-Poblachta to increase social spending with the Fine Gael 
promise to reduce taxation. His solution was to reduce the 
proposed budget expenditure by Fianna Fail of £761111., most 
publicly, by cancelling the extension of air services between 
Ireland and the U.S. and by issuing a bond for £12ml., repayable 
in 1965 and 1970, at 3% (4) Additionally McGilligan cut the
military budget, in particular, funds to the Air Corps and Naval 
Service. These already had only a skeleton force; the army 
containing 9,000 men out of the target of 12,500. (5)
Vinton Chapin, ,Consular at the U.S. legation in Dublin, reported 
that the new government after only one month in power showed its 
political astuteness by promising a popular budget by reducing
the recent taxation on tobacco, beer and cinema seats. The only
mention of increased taxation was the promise that there would be 
increased taxation on " unreasonable profits".(6) In accordance 
with the coalition's policy of inter-party co-operation, Patrick 
McGilligan was prepared to investigate the advantages of 
breaking the link with sterling but admitted his fear of
undermining confidence in the Irish currency.
(4)NRC File; Ireland. Report on Coalition. 8.4. 1948: RG 84 Box 
364 File 800.
(5)Ibid
(6)Ibid
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Chapin's report also noted that the new government was anxious 
to co-operate with the European nations and "feels keenly aware 
of the danger to Irish security inherent in the Russian march 
across Europe." (7) In fact, Sean MacBride was preparing to use 
every available international forum to highlight Partition. Mac 
Bride had indicated his government's intention of co-operating 
with the 16 nations assembled in Paris. He was to argue that the 
Irish government would not look with enthusiasm on any economic 
recovery programme which does not envisage Ireland as an economic 
entity. Possibly to the confusion of the other representatives, 
Mac Bride used this International audience of the O.E.E.C. to air 
the Irish Government's grievance on Partition.(8)
De Valera's anti-partition speeches , which began in Liverpool 
in March 1948, gained momentum and status. His itinerary was 
being described as an anti-partition world tour and eventually 
covered America, India, and Australia. The attendant publicity 
put Clann-na-Poblachta and the coalition government under 
pressure to prove their republicanism. In March 1948 Anglo-Irish 
relations had improved to the extent that even George Garrett 
believed that the British government were prepared to co-operate 
with the coalition in order to counteract the publicity generated 
by de Valera's anti-partition world tour.(9) This may have been a 
reference to the release of IRA prisoners,in Britain and later 
arranging a "successful" Anglo-Irish trade agreement in June 
1948.
(7)Ibid
(8)see Keatinge, P.: A Place Among the Nations, pub. IPA, Dublin, 
p.113
(9)NA 841D.00/3-2448
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As early as April 1948, Vinton Chapin reported that the 
coalition would hold together because such parties as the Labour 
Party benefited from being in Government. The chance that the 
Labour party might put its social programmes into practice made 
it more attractive to voters. This applied equally to all the 
parties who recognised that without coalition they could not hope 
to have their policies implemented. Referring to the smaller 
parties, Chapin considered "that a coalition such as now obtains 
is as close as they will get to power for a considerable 
period." (10) This report, while noting that Fianna Fail were 
still the largest party in the Dail, considered that despite the 
efforts of the deputy leader, Sean Lemass, and the former 
Minister for Defence, Frank Aiken, the party was impaired in its 
| performance because the older members of the party held a tight 
?control. There were rumours that the Fianna Fail heir in waiting 
to the leadership^Sean Lemass, in the absence of de Valera who 
was on his anti-partition world tour, went on his own speaking 
tour of the constituencies, in order to gain control of the party 
machine. The report surmised that the coalition had provided no 
opportunity for the opposition to launch a large-scale 
| attack.(11)
(10) NRC RG 84 Box 364 File 800 report dated 8.4.48
(11) Ibid
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In July 1948 there was a rumour that if the coalition survived 
; then there might emerge an alignment of parties according to the 
European tradition, of liberals, conservatives and radicals, 
rather than on "the past system of personal feuds".(12)
Interestingly, a report from the U.S. Legation in Dublin in July
1948 contains the speculation that "lawyers" Sean MacBride, James
Dillon, John Costello, and Patrick McGilligan might form a party
i
to the left of Fine Gael and right of Labour and Clann-na-
Poblachta .(13) These rumours may have come from Fianna Fail who 
wanted to split the coalition. This legal cabal or inner cabinet 
was concerned with Anglo-Irish relations and apparently held 
some evening meetings, probably to discuss the Commonwealth link 
'vis a vis' Partition. It may have been these meeting which gave 
Fianna Fail the ammunition to hint at a political amalgamation, 
in order to upset and split the coalition. Similarly, the rumours 
that Sean Lemass was attempting to oust de Valera when he 
I returned from America may have been stirred up by members of the
I coalition.
(
CONTINUED/
(12)NA 841.00/9-1648. report dated 16.8.48
(13) NRC RG 84 Box 384 file 800. Report, 15.7 1948
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Several months after the election, George Garrett wrote a brief 
review of the position of the main coalition parties. According 
to the report, Fine Gael who were "considered by many observers 
to be dying on its feet prior to the February elections" had made 
a "resurgent comeback". This was attributed to the personality of 
John Costello ,primarily because his popularity was not based on 
the "bonhomie" but rather that because he gave "the impression 
of integrity, intelligence, and self disinterest in the discharge 
of his responsibilities". The report mentioned how John 
Costello's image had increased in stature and the report 
associated him with the "vigorous young wing which is diluting 
the conservatism of many of the older men."(14)
CONTINUED/
(14) NA 84ID.00/9-1548 Report dated September 15, 1948, Despatch
No. 285.
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Interestingly, Garrett considered that the Clann-na-Poblachta 
party had weakened, attributing this firstly to the 
"resignation" of Captain Peadar Cowan over his refusal to accept 
the terms of Marshall Aid under the European Recovery Programme 
and secondly, because there was internal party criticism that 
their leader Sean MacBride was too preoccupied in his role as 
Minister for External Affairs, and not devoting enough time to 
party matters. The report suggested that "consequently according 
to this reasoning, MacBride is attempting to make himself into 
such an important figure that he would automatically be included 
in any coalition regardless of the relative importance of his 
party at the polls." The Clann-na-Poblachta party, was, 
according to the U.S. legation report, "insolvent" and was being 
subsidised by MacBride. The report predicted that the base of 
Clann-na-Poblachta rested on "die-hard republican elements which 
become impatient of moderation in dealing with political 
matters." It was thought that MacBride in time might revive the 
party's fortunes by gaining support based on the success of the 
party in having its policies implemented.(15) Since this report 
was apparently compiled on the eve of John Costello's 
"announcement" it highlights the political urgency for Clann-na- 
Poblachta and by extension the coalition to produce some result 
on "Partition".
(15)Ibid
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Incongruously, Garrett's report dated September 15, casually 
drew attention to Costello's "announcement" and quoted an 
assurance from Sean MacBride that the repeal of the External 
Relations Act "does not represent a major change in policy but 
merely admits of present realities.”(16)
In a separate report dated September 16, 1948, Vinton
Chapin, Consular at the U.S. legation in Dublin commented on the 
performance of Government Ministers and their Departments.(17) 
The report commented favourably on the success of the Minister of 
Health in his battle against TB noting his "new vigour "and sense 
of urgency." Chapin reported that the Fianna Fail government "had 
received much criticism for the lackadaisical attitude displayed 
by former Minister James Ryan" towards the problem of TB.(18) 
Chapin noted that while the Department of Defence had decreased 
the size of the forces, Ministers had indicated both to himself 
and the legation's air attache,(1*) "Ireland will actively 
support the western powers against a Communist attack providing 
some prior arrangement can be made regarding the six-
Counties."(19)
Chapin's report noted that the Labour Party and in particular 
their leader, Minister for Social Welfare and Tanaiste, William 
Norton was given credit for increasing the amount and
availability of widow's pensions. This was part of the manifesto
of the Labour Party and Clann- na- Poblachta.(20)
(16)Ibid
(17)NA 841.00/9-1648. report dated 16.8. 48.
(18)Ibid
(19)Ibid
(20)Ibid
(l*)The air attache may have been a euphemism for a CIA agent 
because the Air Attache's reports concentrate on suspected
Communist activity in Ireland.
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According to Chapin's report, the Department of Agriculture had 
become one of the most important departments under the leadership 
of the ’’flamboyant " independent deputy and Minister, James 
Dillon. He attributed this importance to the Anglo-Irish trade 
negotiations of June 1948, and the new possibilities of obtaining 
ECA funds to expand the Irish livestock industry.(21) The report 
noted the demotion of the role of the Department of Industry and 
Commerce . (22)
More surprisingly Chapin noted that the Department of Finance 
similarly ’has not been particularly prominent" though he 
mentioned that McGilligan had from the beginning set forth a 
"program of retrenchment in Government expenditure." (23)
The report praised the work of the Department of Local Government 
which had an active policy in producing low cost housing 
successfully under the Minister, Tim Murphy.(24)
Chapin noted that the Department of External Affairs had been 
"exceedingly active". He credited the activity to the personality 
of Sean MacBride and the separation of that office from that of 
the Office of the Taoiseach.(25) This was a reference to the fact 
that de Valera often held the two offices.
(21)Ibid
(22)Ibid
(23)Ibid
(24)Ibid
(25)Ibid
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The Department of External Affairs had been involved in the trade 
agreements with Britain, Belgium and Holland and also an 
important bilateral loan agreement with the United States under 
the European Recovery Plan.(26) Sean MacBride enhanced the power 
of the Department of External Affairs by ensuring that 
the negotiations were held within its sphere of influence .(27)
John Horgan commented in an article submitted to the US Legation 
in Dublin that power in Ireland lay in the hands of "a few silent 
but efficient senior civil servants exercising the real power 
without responsibility for policy. "(28) This is a valid point, 
but one suspects there was surprise among the "mandarins" when 
confronted with some of the strong Ministerial personalities that 
formed the inter-party government, especially Sean MacBride. 
Indeed, one Canadian diplomat commented that after taking advice 
I from his Secretary of the Department in the early stages, Sean 
MacBride then ran the Department on "his own bat".(29)
(26)NASPO S14574 :Economic Co-operation Agreement between Ireland 
and the United States of America. signed June 28.1948. Published 
by Stationary Office. P. 8942.
(27) See Fanning,R.: Chapter ten,' The department of Finance and 
the first inter-Party government,' in:The Department of Finance. 
Pub. IPA . p.406
(28) NRC RG 84 Box 364 File 800
(29)Canadian Department of External Relations.(CDEA)Main File 
50021-40
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Chapin's report further confirms the surprise of Costello's
I "announcement". The session of the Dail due to begin on November
I
| 17, 1948, was not then expected to last more than two to three
| weeks. Because of the previous long session of the Dail, Chapin 
thought it unlikely that any proposed Bills had left the planning 
stage.(30)
He commented with regard to press speculation that the External 
Relations Act would be repealed, that Sean Mac Bride "has
confided that no Bill has actually been drawn up."(31) Similarly 
three weeks before the "announcement" the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, Philip Noel-Baker, presumably based on 
information from Lord Rugby, reported to the Cabinet there would 
be no developments before the Dail resumed in November.(32) 
Chapin's report, dated September 16,1948, was correct in
predicting that the coalition would remain by deliberately
I continuing its policy of only proposing legislation which was
*
j "palatable" to all the parties of the coalition. (33) This report 
about the Costello "announcement" and its "palatability" perhaps 
places the "announcement" in perspective, at least from a non- 
Commonwealth view. Interestingly, neither Garrett nor Chapin's 
reports (dated respectively seven and eight days after Costello's 
announcement) commented on the possible British reaction or the 
consequences of the intended repeal of the External Relations
Act.
(30)NA 841.00/9-1648. report dated 16.9.48
(31) Ibid
(32)Cab 129/29 CP(48)205 Report to cabinet dated 17.8. 1948
(33)NA 841.00/9-1648. report dated 16/f. 48
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(E)
THE ANGLO-IRISH TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE APPOINTMENT OF THE
MINISTER FROM THE ARGENTINE
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On the eve of the June 1948 Anglo-Irish trade talks, Lord Rugby 
acknowledged "the heckling" which the coalition government were 
receiving over the External Relations Act. Sean MacBride spoke 
to Rugby of "the irritation caused by the use of the term High
Commissioner for Irish diplomats abroad and for the Commonwealth
diplomats in Ireland"(1) and in reply Rugby reminded him that
"the forms of Commonwealth relations were likely to be reshaped" 
and that it "would perhaps be as well to wait on events". It was 
unlikely that Rugby considered that "reshaping" would 
accommodate two-tier Commonwealth membership, or as MacBride 
referred to it, "association" with the Commonwealth. Rugby 
thought that the nebulous term "association"..."looked too thin 
to be a satisfactory formula".(2) This was a reference to the 
academic debate and to the Committee on Commonwealth Relations 
who were examining the practical problems of redefining the 
Commonwealth relationship "in such a way as to meet he
difficulties of peoples who might be reluctant to accept it in 
its present form." (3) During the course of his meeting with 
Rugby, MacBride explained his government's difficulty and 
apprehension exasperated by Eamon de Valera who was expected to 
return the following week from what was being portrayed in 
Ireland as a highly successful "anti-partition" world tour. (2)
(1)PR0 DO 35 3958 . Record of a conversation between Sean Mac 
Bride and Lord Rugby 16.6.1948.
(2)Ibid
(3)Cab 134/118 CR(48) 2. Third Report by Official Committee on 
Commonwealth Relations . 21.5.1948. p.23.
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De Valera's world tour covered America,(4) Australia, (5) New 
Zealand,(6) India(7) and Pakistan,(8) and was intended ostensibly 
to highlight Partition abroad and cause Britain international 
embarrassment. Rugby reporting to Machtig about the American tour 
commented, "There is the smell of a Fianna Fail party stunt about 
this American trip. Mr.de Valera is battling for his Club, not 
for All Ireland."(9)
Following the successful Anglo-Irish trade negotiations in 
London, the 'Irish Times' headlined the triumphant return of the 
Irish trade delegates (10) and gave second position to de 
Valera's opening speech at his party's Ard Fheis (Party 
conference) about the injustice of Partition.(11) In contrast the 
Fianna Fail paper, the 'Irish Press' headlined the opening of the 
Fianna Fail Ard Fheis.(12) Rugby reported to the Commonwealth 
Relations Office about this disparity specifically referring to 
the "lack of reportage " by the 'Irish Press' about the Anglo- 
Irish Trade Agreement.(13)
(4)PRO DO 35 3928. Mr De Valera's Visit to the United States. 
Report by Lord Inverchapel to Mr. Bevin. 16.4.1948. F.O. EF/ A 
1611/120/45
(5)PRO DO 35 3828. letter from the Office of the High 
Commissioner in Australia to Machtig CRO Des.11.6.1948.Rec
19.6.1948
(6)PRO DO 35 3931. report from High Commissioner in New Zealand 
to CRO 1.6.1948
(7)PRO DO 35 3930. Report from U.K. High Commissioner in India 
17. 6.1948.Teegram No. 1927.See also Irish Press :De Valera in 
Delhi 26.6.1948
(8)PRO DO 35 3939. Telegram from CRO to High Commissioner in 
Pakistan No. 93. 2.6.1948
(9)PR0 DO 35 3928. Letter dated 30.3.1948 Rec. 3.4.1948 
(10^Irish Times 23.6.1948
(11)Ibid
(12)Irish Press 23.6.1948
(13)PRO DO 35 4000. Report dated 24.6.1948.
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MacBride, possibly prompted by the publicity de Valera's world 
tour had attracted, began the process of undermining and 
dismantling the External Relations Act. During the course of the 
appointment of the Argentinian Minister to Ireland in July, 1948, 
the procedures of the External Relations Act were ignored 
deliberately by MacBride in his capacity as Minister of External 
Affairs.(14) At that time, the Argentinian Government was in 
dispute with the British government over the sovereignty of the 
Falkland Islands. President Peron agreed to MacBride's request 
to re-address his letter of credence appointing Senor Don Jose 
Bessone as Minister to Ireland, to the President of Ireland 
instead of to King George VI, thereby by-passing the procedure 
of the External Relations Act.(15)
jMacBride noted that the 'Irish Press' was the only paper to
i
ireport on the elaborate and meticulously planned welcoming 
ceremony whereby Senor Bessone presented his credentials 
addressed to the President of Ireland to John Costello, at Iveagh 
House, (the headquarters of the Department of External Affairs), 
and later lunched with the President at Aras an Uachtarain.(16)
(14) NASPO S 14210 B
(15)1 am indebted to Senor Juan Pana Counsellor at the Argentine 
Embassy, Dublin for confirming that the Department of External 
Affairs asked for the letter of Credence to be re-addressed to 
the President of Ireland, Sean T. O' Kelly. L.D. 30.1.1987
(16)Personal interview with Sean MacBride 6.1.1987. The 
importance Sean MacBride attached to the Irish Press report of
2.8.1948, is illustrated by the fact that he had the report 
retyped. Typewritten copy of the report of the Irish Press
2.8.1948 kindly supplied by Sean MacBride
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The 'Irish Press' report appears to be based on a Department of 
External Affairs press hand-out of Senor Bessone's speech and 
John Costello's reply. No mention was made about the breach of 
protocol. There is no record of a response from Rugby to the 
deliberate by-passing of the diplomatic procedures established 
under the aegis of the External Relations Act. Incredibly, 
MacBride believed that Rugby was not aware that the procedures of 
the External Relations Act had been by-passed in relation to the 
appointment of Senor Bessone.(17) In fact, the British Foreign 
Office was aware of Bessone's appointment. In April 1948, the 
British Ambassador in Copenhagen reported to the British Foreign 
Secretary, Ernest Bevin, that the Argentine Legation had announced 
that Senor Bessone, the Argentine Minister had been appointed 
Minister in Dublin. The letter reported that towards the end of 
1947, the Argentine Legation in Denmark, was involved in 
organising the illegal movement of Germans from the British zone 
of Germany via Denmark to the Argentine. However, the report 
added that "although it was not proved that Senor Bessone was 
personally involved the Danish police have said confidentially 
that they have no doubt that he was fully aware of what was going 
on."(18)
(17)Ibid
(18)FO 371. 70175. Commonwealth Liaison File.Letter from the
British Embassy in Copenhagen to Ernest Bevin 16.4.1948 No. 140 
C84/3/43
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There was a double-edged insult to the affair. On July 30, 1948,
Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, suffering from stomach trouble
and a skin rash, arrived in Dublin to begin a recuperative 
holiday.(19) The following day Attlee visited Iveagh House where 
he signed the Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement,(20) which contained a 
secret "gentleman’s agreement" . (21) That afternoon Attlee visited 
President Sean T.O'Kelly at Aras An Uachtarain. In both visits 
Attlee was following in the footsteps of the Minister from the
Argentine, who on the morning of July 31, presented his letter of
credence to John Costello at Iveagh House, who in turn delivered 
it that afternoon to the President.(22)
The Commonwealth Relations Office decided deliberately to ignore 
the method of appointing Senor Bessone. This was the established 
procedure regarding any adverse public reference by the Irish 
government to the External Relations Act. For example, a report 
from the British Ambassador in Spain, Viscount Hood, pointed out 
that the Spanish Foreign Office had announced in their 1945 
official bulletin that a new Minister had been appointed to the 
President of the Free State of Ireland. The new minister's letter
of credence was subsequently addressed to the King and Viscount
Hood was advised to "let sleeping dogs lie".(23)
(19) Harris, K.: Attlee, p.423
(20)NASPO S14042: Trade Agreement between the Government of 
Ireland and the Government of the U.K. dated 31.7.1948 .Came into 
operation 12.8.1948. pub. Stationary Office P.No. 8983
(21)PRO PREM 8.824 also referred to in DO 35 3955.The secret 
agreement was an "accompaniment"to the agreement in the form of 
an exchange of letters regarding obligations under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Referred to a meeting of 
Commonwealth members in Geneva on 10 .10.1947. GATT was designed 
to liberalise international trade by restricting preferential 
bilateral agreements amongst member states.
(22)Irish press 2.8.1948
(23)PRO FO 371. 70175. Commonwealth Liaison File. Memo. 7.1.1948
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As with the Spanish case the Commonwealth Relations Office 
apparently decided in the Bessone case to take " no action with 
regard to the established procedure" .(24)
Significantly, the Irish Cabinet were presented with a 'fait-
accompli' by Sean MacBride regarding the procedural change in
appointing Senor Bessone. They were only presented with the
memorandum regarding his appointment five days before the
official presentation.(25) Two weeks later, as if to emphasise 
the return to the established procedure of the External Relations 
Act, the Irish cabinet formally recorded that authority was
granted to the Minister of External Relations for the appointment
of a Charge d'Affaires to Lisbon "subject to section 1(1) of the 
External Relations Act".(26) There may have been some quiet
agreement among the Cabinet to rectify Sean MacBride's "try-on".
Interestingly, when the Irish legation in Lisbon was established 
in neutral Portugal in 1941 with Mr Colm O'Donovan appointed as a
; 'Charge d'Affaires', the External Relations Act was ignored and
the British government was not informed. The Foreign Office 
considered sending a "word of remonstration" to John Dulanty
for not informing the King of the proposal to establish a
legation at Lisbon. (27)
(24) Ibid
(25) NASPO Cab 2/10. 27.7.1948 G.C. 5/27
(26) NASPO Cab 2/10 . 10.8.1948 G.C. 5/30
(27) PRO FO 371. 26883 . C12328/367/ 7.11.1941
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Similarly, an appointment of the rank of Charge d'Affaires, to 
Germany in 1942 was not deemed to need accreditation within the 
procedural framework of the External Relations Act. The reasons 
in this case were accepted by the Foreign Office because they 
were practical rather than constitutional.(28)
(28) PRO FO 371. 23904. Report on Dominion Neutrality in the
Event of War. 27.8.1939. W12505/G. p.268.
CH:IV EXTERNAL RELATIONS ACT AND PARTITION
(A)
FURTHER CRITICISMS OF THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS ACT, 
JULY 1948 - AUGUST 1948
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During the July debate on the annual vote of estimates for the 
Department of External Affairs, £115,860 was allocated to cover 
the salaries and expenses of the Office of the Department, 
including officials in Dublin and diplomatic and consular 
representatives abroad. (1) According to Sean Mac Bride, that
amount was less than that allocated to maintain the staff in 
British Embassy in Cairo or indeed in Bagdad,Ankara or 
Teheran.(2) During that two-day debate, Captain Peadar
Cowan, who had recently "resigned” from Clann-na-Poblachta, 
elicited from MacBride the answer that "we are certainly not a 
member of the British Commonwealth of Nations."(3) This answer 
was heeded by Lord Rugby and also the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, Philip J. Noel-Baker who asked for a
copy of the text of Sean MacBride's speech,(4) presumably to 
understand the context in which the above answer was given.
That same day, Frederick Boland, had a meeting with the Principal 
Secretary of the United Kingdom's representative in Dublin, Neil 
Pritchard. Boland told Pritchard, that, although MacBride's
answer was "unpremeditated".... "the Government will however have 
to stand by it."(5)
(1) D.D.Vol. 112. Col. 900 .20.7.1948
(2) D.D.Vol. 112 .Col. 912 .20.7.1948
(3) D.D.Vol. 112 .Col. 988 .21.7.1948
(4)PRO D.O. 35 3934. Neil Pritchard to Norman Archer. 22.7.1948
(5)Ibid
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Peadar Cowan persisted in this embarrassing line of questioning 
regarding the status of Eire's membership of the Commonwealth. On 
July 28, he asked John Costello "when and under what 
circumstances Ireland ceased to be a member of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations.” Costello replied: "The constitutional
position is that Ireland is a sovereign, independent democratic 
state associated with the members of the British Commonwealth." 
He continued and stated explicitly, "the process by which Ireland 
ceased formally to be a member of that Commonwealth has been one 
of gradual development".(6) In reply to a similar supplementary 
question Costello echoed de Valera by answering "it has ceased to 
be formally a member but is associated with the other members in 
accordance with articles 5 and 29 of the constitution."(7) Up ta 
that time Costello was content to retain "membership" of the 
Commonwealth, as did de Valera, by being vague about the 
definitions of " formal" and "associate" membership of the 
Commonwealth, even though such categories of membership of the 
Commonwealth were not acknowledged.
(6)D .D . Vol. 112. Col. 1555. 28.7.1948
(7)D.D. Vol. 112. Col. 1555-56. 28.7.1948
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On August 5, 1948, the day preceding the debate which ratified
the Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement ( because of its associations the 
term "treaty" is no longer used to describe Anglo-Irish 
agreements), Cowan elicited from John Costello a statement on 
what was in practice the actual relationship; "the factual 
relationship, upon which our association is based, depends on the 
reciprocal exchange of concrete benefits in such matters as trade 
and citizenship-rights, the principal of consultation and co­
operation in matters of concern and on the many ties of blood and 
friendship that exist between us and these other great nations 
whose populations(1*) include so many of our own people."(8)
The above statement contains the substance of the arguments 
advanced by Sean MacBride and supported by the other 
Commonwealth representatives during the discussions in October 
at Chequers and in November in Paris about Eire's departure from 
the British Commonwealth.(9)
(8) D.D.Vol. 112. Col. 2106. 5.8.1948
(9) See O'Brien,J.: Ireland's Departure from the British 
Commonwealth. Round Table, 1988 pp.179-194
(l*)Up to 1914 between one quarter and one third of the 
population of Australia were of Irish descent. Evening Herald 
(Dublin) report on a lecture in University College Dublin. 
22.4.1987
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During the debate on the Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement on August 6, 
1948, Costello attempted to make the Dail aware of the 
consequences of "leaving" the Commonwealth, He referred
to the trade preferences such as mutual free entry for certain 
produce between Eire and Britain under the Most Favoured Nation 
clause of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, reminding 
the Dail that, "The right of preferential treatment in the matter 
of trade with Great Britain and the other nations of the 
Commonwealth is one which we enjoy, so long as we are associated 
with the League of Nations known as the British Commonwealth of 
Nations", adding that "it is a valuable right from the point of 
view of our people." (10)
Despite this plea to stop and think before stepping over the 
abyss, the Tanaiste and Labour Party leader, William Norton, 
stated that same day during the adjournment debate, "I think it 
would do our national self-respect good both at home and abroad 
if we were to proceed without delay to abolish the External 
Relations Act."(11) Referring to the the possible repeal of the 
Act, de Valera replied with the taunt "go ahead", following with 
"you will get no opposition from us." (12)
(10)D.D.Vol. 112. Col. 2382. 6.8.1948
(11)D.D.Vol. 112. Col. 2440-41. 6.8.1948
(12)D.D.Vol. 112. Col. 2441. 6.8.1948
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These combined statements by the hierarchy of the coalition 
government went further than anything that de Valera or members 
of his party had ever implied in public about the possibility of 
repealing the External Relations Act.
That exchange between de Valera and Norton is referred to in 
Costello's explanatory memorandum (13)and reiterated in an 
interview in the 'Irish Times' in 1967.(14) In his memorandum 
John Costello refers to de Valera's promptings: "these matters
so raised on the adjournment appeared to me to make it a matter 
of urgency for the government to make up its mind as to its 
attitude on the External Relations Act 1936." ... "An express 
decision was taken by the Government that the External Relations 
Act should be repealed and the necessary legislation introduced 
immediately the Dail re-assembled."(15)
(13) John Costello's memorandum, p.2 Para 5
(14) Irish Times. 8.9.1967.John Costello Interviewed by 
political correspondent, Michael Me Inerney
(15) John Costello's memorandum of his trip to Canada and the 
events surrounding the "announcement" p.3. Para 6
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When the Dail adjourned, John Costello may have accepted the 
relentless forces demanding the repeal of the External Relations 
Act. Such action need not have entailed declaring a Republic, let 
alone leaving the Commonwealth. Possibly Costello, and 
MacBride hoped that diplomatic negotiations could retain the 
status quo, provided there was a will for such a nebulous 
relationship to continue. The probing questions of Peadar Cowan 
and their connotations were discussed during informal evening 
meetings following the adjournment debate on August 6 1948.(16)
Arguably, it is probable that the options of either repealing, or 
more likely allowing the machinery, procedures and formalities 
attached to the External Relations Act to become defunct. It 
would seem logical that it was at these meetings that a decision 
or consensus was arrived at that the External Relations Act 
should be repealed or even that such a formal decision to repeal 
the Act was unnecessary and did not need enunciation because of 
its obviousness. However, as late as August 1948, there is no 
evidence that plans to repeal the Act had been formulated. The 
neat conclusion that an informal decision was made by the inner 
cabinet at the evening meetings to repeal the Act is contradicted 
by the fact that the cabinet appointed a Charge d'Affaires to 
Lisbon (arguably because of the rank, without need) under section 
3 of the External Relations Act.(17)
(16)Personal interview with the former Private Secretary to John 
Costello, Professor Patrick Lynch 20.12. 1988
(17) NASPO Cab 2/10. G.C. 5/30. 10.8.1948
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In August 1948, pressure from Earaon de Valera's anti-partition 
campaign and the Republicans in Clann-na-Poblachta made it
politically imperative that some adjustment be seen to be made to 
Partition, or, as a substitute, to the External Relations Act. 
There was a fear that Independent Deputy, Captain Peadar Cowan 
might introduce a private member's Bill. Indeed the fastidious 
independent Minister of Agriculture, James Dillon believed that 
because of the of the External Relations Act Eire was
living a lie and there was a possibility that he too might have
introduced a private member's Bill to repeal the Act.(18) John
Costello had spoken of such a worrying dilemma, as for example to 
the Prime Minister of Canada, William Mac Kenzie King (19) and 
repeated in his interview with the 'Irish Times' in
September,1967.(20)
It would have been unwise to signify an intention to repeal the 
External Relations Act at a time when the Anglo-Irish Trade 
Agreement was safely ratified by the Oireachtas,(21) and accepted 
by the British government.(22) The adjournment of the Dail for 
the summer recess on August 6, 1948, should have allowed John
Costello a respite from the challenges to clarify the issue of 
Eire's membership of the Commonwealth, and the opportunity to 
bargain retaining the External Relations Act for some favourable 
movement by the British government on Partition
(18) Personal interview with Sean MacBride 6.1.1948. At the 
October 1948, meeting which approved the repeal of the External 
relations Act, Dillon joked to MacBride to the effect, that it 
saved him the trouble of introducing a private members Bill.
(19)Pickersgill and Forster: Mackenzie King Record. Vol. IV. p.387
(20)Irish Times 8.9.1967
(21)D.D.Vol 112. Col. 2403. 6.8.1948
(22)A debate to approve the Trade Agreement was according to 
Herbert Morrison, unnecessary because an order paper put before 
the House would suffice.See- H.C. Vol. 452. Col.2374-6. 1.7.1948
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Peadar Cowan's questions about Eire's membership of the 
Commonwealth may have been prompted by a wish to embarrass Sean 
MacBride.(23) Speaking in the Senate in a private capacity in 
favour of a United Europe, MacBride exclaimed, "I was very 
grateful indeed for the solicitude shown by members of the House 
as to whether this would embarrass me. I wish some of the T.D.s 
who put down questions would exercise 1 per cent, of that 
solicitude at times.”(24) It is probable that this publicity 
forced the coalition inner "legal" cabinet of MacBride, Costello, 
McGilligan and possibly Dillon in the summer of 1948 to 
acknowledge that they would have to "modify" the External 
Relations Act or alternatively get some action on Partition that 
would prove their Republicanism. For example, in Dail Eireann, on 
July 23, 1948, John Costello confidently predicted "this Cabinet
will, by its policy and its actions, give some hope of bringing 
back to this country the six north-eastern counties of Ulster." 
He added : "I make that assertion with all the confidence I have
within me. To say anymore would be to damage the advances that 
already have been made."(25) The only source for a basis for this 
optimistic speech, other than the fact that a tense international 
situation was developing, is a reference by Frederick Boland to 
the fact that Costello was informed by Attlee that "Generals" 
would have discussions with him in Canada.(26) No such 
discussions materialised.
(23)Personal interview with Jack Me Quillan 24.1. 1989 
(24iseanad Eireann Debates Vol.35 Col. 805. 5.8.1948. Motion in
favour of a United Europe
(25) D.D. Vol. 112. Col. 1520. 23.7.1948
(26) Bruce Arnold interview with Frederick Boland. Permission to 
quote from this private tape gratefully acknowledged
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(B)
"MAYO" TALKS ON PARTITION, AUGUST, 1948
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George Garrett, reporting to the State Department on Costello's 
Dail statement of July 23, was apparently beguiled to the extent 
that he believed "certain progress may have been made in recent 
discussions with the British particularly since Mr Costello is 
inclined to be a prudent conservative lawyer not given to 
irresponsible s t a t e m e n t s (1) Garrett was "pro-Irish"; towards 
the end of March 1948, he reported that "the time would seem to 
be propitious to suggest to Westminster to carry forward an 
enlightened policy such as has been manifested in India, Burma, 
Ceylon and other parts of the Empire. It would also appear in 
England's interest to take a look at its own front door with a 
view to collecting such goodwill as remains before the ultimate 
and presumably one-day inevitable solution of partition is 
resolved despite England's resistance to it."(2) John Hickerson, 
.Director of European Affairs at the U.S. State Department, 
replied to Garrett, reminding him of Northern Ireland's 
"dependable assistance" during the war, authoritatively asserting 
"I am sure you will agree that this is a powerful argument for 
this government's favo ring the continued control of Northern 
Ireland by the United Kingdom."(3) Garrett may well have been 
over optimistic in hoping for movement on Partition as no doubt 
were the Irish government.
(1)NA 841 D. 00/7 -2948
(2)NA 841 D. 00/4 -1548 .( 22.3.1948, airgram)
(3)NA 841 D. 00 /3 -2448 See United States Policy on the Irish 
Partition question. Research Project No. 73. July 1948. prepared 
by the Division of Historical Policy research Department of 
State. NRC RG 59. NND 812036
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The U.S. Consul in Belfast, William Smale, reported that the 
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Basil Brooke, in response to 
Costello's Dail statement, issued a rebuke to Costello on July 
30, 1948 ( the day Attlee arrived in Dublin). It ended with a
line obviously directed at Attlee : "Ulster is not for sale." (4) 
It is possible that John Costello was hoping that a statement on 
Partition might be made by Attlee during his impending visit to 
Eire.
On August 14, 1948, Sean MacBride joined Attlee in the west of
Ireland for a quiet picnic. George Garrett assumed the purpose 
was "to sell Attlee on his point of view." Garret reported that 
the 'Observer' on Sunday, August 15, had speculated that 
Attlee's visit to the west of Ireland was to discuss the ending 
of partition necessitated by the British need for the strategic 
ports. Garrett attributed the speculation to Costello's 
assurances that Ireland would assume "necessary obligations".(5)
|In fact, on August 3, 1948, Lord Rugby wrote to former U.S.
Minister in Ireland, David Gray, informing him that that Attlee, 
had stayed with him in Dublin, and "is quite sound on the 
Partition question".(6)
(4)NA 841 E 00 3-2248
(5)NA 841 D. 00/7 -2948
(6)Personal handwritten letter from Lord Rugby to David Gray, 
dated 3.8.1948. David Gray papers Box 4. Roosevelt Library, 
N.Y.S. See- Bowman, J. De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917-73. 
Note 4 p.267
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On August 14, in what can be described as the " Mayo talks", 
Attlee told Sean MacBride that there would be no movement on 
Partition. Dr. Noel Browne remembers a meeting held in August 
1948 in a holiday house in Mayo, where he was staying. At that 
meeting Philip Noel- Baker (possibly days after the Attlee visit) 
"vehemently” told the Clann-na-Poblachta deputy that there could 
be no end to Partition.(7)
According to a report from the U.S. consul in Belfast, the 
government of Northern Ireland was "privately fearful that the 
British may be forced to abandon their case in the light of world 
considerations."(8) The presence at that time of senior British 
government figures such as Lord Pakenham, Lord Jowitt, and Philip 
Noel-Baker in Ireland, ostensibly on holiday, fuelled the fears 
of the Northern Ireland government.
CONTINUED/
(7) Personal interview Phyllis and Dr. Noel Browne 28.12.1988.
(8)NA 841 E 00/ 3-2248.
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By the summer of 1948, it looked as though the Irish government 
was adjusting its stance and moving to an acceptance of the 
'real-politik' understanding that there would be no movement on 
Partition unless they made the first move by surrendering their 
stance on neutrality. Costello's statement delivered upon landingj
in New York at the end of August, lends evidence to this 
conclusion. There he declared that it was a safe assumption that 
Eire would be willing to enter into agreement with the United 
States and Britain for "strategic purposes to maintain peace”. 
However, it was noted, that he added, that "we will not consider 
such an agreement as long as there is partition of Ireland."(9) 
This statement followed the pattern established by Sean MacBride 
when he stated in the Dail on July 20, 1948, that "our sympathies 
therefore, lie clearly with Western Europe."(10)
*Any intention by the Attlee Government to dilute Partition was 
forestalled by the government of Northern Ireland, when on August 
18, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Sir Basil Brooke 
announced a new recruitment campaign for the semi-political 
paramilitary part-time constabulary popularly known as the B- 
Specials. The American Consul in Belfast reported on August,30 
1948: "Our source comments that the move may be indicative that
the Orange faction in Northern Ireland is preparing to resist by 
force, if necessary, any attempt to end the border."(11) This 
source may have read in the 'Irish Independent' of August 19, an 
article which referred to a speech/
(9)Quoted in CDEA 50021-40
(10)D.D. Vol. 112. Col 994. 20.7.1948
(11)NA 841 E 00/8-3048
speech by Lieut. Col. C. Cage, a Unionist M.P., who reportedly 
said that "the Socialist Government at Westminster would be 
perfectly ready to sell the North down the river", adding "those 
who threaten our position must reckon that they will have to use 
force if they wish to take our constitutional position from us, 
and thrust us away from the Crown."(12)
On August 24, 1948, the US Consul in Belfast, reported the
significant fact that the representatives of the Irish government 
and the the opposition spoke from a shared platform with 
unanimity against Partition.(13)
The Irish government, disappointed that there was no movement on 
Partition, now arguably saw the repeal of, or an amendment to 
the External Relations Act as a remaining option, if not a 
beckoning one, which would allow the fragile coalition Government 
to strengthen its overall position 'vis-a-vis' the Republican 
crusade from de Valera.
Interviewed in 1987, Sean MacBride suggested that the summer of 
1948 was an opportune time to repeal the External elations At. He 
[based this principally (1*) on the fact that the Anglo-Irish 
trade agreement was operative and the British Nationality Act was 
approved by the British Parliament,both of which contained 
benefits for Eire independent of membership of the 
Commonwealth.(14) Accordingly, the issue of "membership" of the 
Commonwealth could at last be clarified, apparently free from 
the threat of any major socio-economic reprisals from Britain.
(12) Irish Independent 19.8.1948
(13)NA 841 E 00/9-1548
(14)Interview with Sean MacBride, 6.1.1987
(l*)In June 1948, Ireland had been the first to obtain a bi­
lateral loan under the European Reconstruction program.
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At the end of July 1948, The External Relations Act had become a 
"political football", for example, a prominent opposition Fianna 
Fail deputy, Dr. James Ryan, addressing a party meeting, stated 
that in relation to repealing the Act, "if the government takes 
action now, they will have our full support against any die-hard 
opposition, either here or abroad. They will have a united Dail 
-the support that we did not get when we moved to remove the Oath 
or when we proposed to retain the Land Annuities."(15)
Such were the political and diplomatic circumstances in Ireland 
at the end of July 1948. The dilemma for the coalition government 
was that if they acquiesced to the logical demand to repeal the 
External Relations Act, it would jeopardise any hoped-for 
movement or negotiations with the British government on 
i Partition.
(15) Irish Press 31.7.1948
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(C)
IRISH CABINET DISCUSS THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS ACT, AUGUST, 1948
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In his interview with the 'Irish Times' in 1967, John Costello, 
speaking about the repeal of the External Relations Act, admitted 
that he "was not absolutely certain whether the decision was 
entered in the Cabinet minutes," but remembers that, "all the 
Government members were present except Dr. Noel Browne."(1) 
Allowing for the absence of Browne there is no record of a full 
cabinet attendance at any cabinet meeting in August 1948. 
However, this may refer to a meeting in late July 1948, which 
approved the appointment of the Minister to the Argentine and 
thus accepted the by-passing of the procedures of the External 
Relations Act in that particular instance.(2)
A few weeks later, on August 19, the outcome of a Cabinet meeting
concerning the External Relations Act added to the Government's
confusion over their attitude to the Act. Although laborious, it
is worth dissecting the memoranda and minutes of that meeting of
19 August 1948, (3) because they provide the clue about the Irish
Cabinet's attitude to the External Relations Act. The first
pertinent question about that meeting is: was there an assumption
by the Cabinet of an intention to repeal the Act or simply
confusion between the Act and the related machinery, procedures
and formalities attached it? For example, it was this Cabinet
meeting on August 19,1948, which considered three inter-related
issues relating to the repeal of the Act. Firstly , the meeting
vetted Costello's speech to the Canadian Bar Association.(4)
flMrish Times 8. 9 .1967 . John Costello interviewed by Michael Me 
Inerney
(2)NASPO Cab 2/10 G.C. 5/27 26.7.1948
(3) NASPO NASPO Cab 2/10. G.C. 5/32. 19.8.1948 S 14333A file 
contains Memoranda on Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting.
(4)NASPO S.14387A contains copy "Ireland in International 
Affairs" Speech to the Canadian Bar Association. 1.9.1948
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Secondly, the meeting approved the sending of an 'aide memoire' 
to the British government about changing the title of envoys 
from Eire to Commonwealth countries, from that of High 
Commissioner to Ambassador.(5) Thirdly, the meeting decided that 
’Eire should not be represented as a member of the Commonwealth 
at the proposed meeting" of Commonwealth Prime Ministers,(6) 
while a decision to attend, "otherwise than as a member of the 
Commonwealth" was postponed.(7) It could be argued that there was 
an implicit understanding by the Irish cabinet of the realisation 
of the need to repeal the Act. Support for that line of argument 
comes from Sean MacBride's first memorandum which contains the 
statement, "we are not members of the Commonwealth."(8) This 
statement was apparently accepted unequivocally. Similarly 
MacBride's second memorandum contained the nearest official 
statement regarding Eire's diplomatic and constitutional 
relationship with the Commonwealth; "that in the Irish 
Government's view the title High Commissioner is obsolete and 
anomalous. It suggests executive rather than representative 
functions. It harks back to the era of colonialism and suggests 
undesirable and misleading implications as to the nature of the 
relation between Ireland and the States of the Commonwealth."(9) 
Those points, taken together,i.e ., acceptance of the Minister of 
External Affair's memoranda, the Cabinet decisions/
(5)NASPO Cab 2/10 G.C. 5/32. 19.8.1948
(6)Ibid
(7)Ibid
(8)NASPO Cab 2/10 G.C. 5/32. 19.8.1948. Memorandum in S.14333A
(9)Ibid
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decisions of August 19, dealing with the Constitutional 
relationship of Eire and the Commonwealth, and the consideration 
of Costello's speech pertaining to the historical and
constitutional development of Eire vis-a-vis Britain, could 
imply, that there was an acceptance by the cabinet members that 
Eire was not a "member" of the Commonwealth. Looking at both 
the memoranda(10) and minutes (11) of that 90 minute cabinet
meeting of August 19, 1948, and setting them against the
background of the earlier Dail statements by Costello, MacBride 
and Norton who stated that Eire was not a member of the
Commonwealth, it would seem a fair deduction that this Cabinet
meeting validated those statements and the perception, that Eire 
was indeed not a "member" of the Commonwealth. But, still there 
was no decision to repeal the External Relations Act.
However, it should be remembered that, in an interview with the 
magazine 'Picture Post',in November 1948, Sean MacBride stated 
that he at least never discussed the repeal of the External 
Relations Act at any Cabinet meeting.(12) In response to being 
reminded of that statement, Sean MacBride made the point that 
the decision to repeal the External Relations Act, as with such
other national policies as Neutrality, was assumed, and the issue
of a decision did not need discussion in the Cabinet.(13)
(10) NASPO Cab 2/10 G.C. 5/32. 19.8.1948. Memorandum in S.14333A
(11) NASPO Cab 2/10 G.C. 5/32. 19.8.1948
(12)NASPO S. 14387C
(13)Personal interview with Sean MacBride. 6.1.1987
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Such a casual attitude to Eire's relationship with Britain and 
the Commonwealth seems unlikely. Indeed, it is surprising that 
| there are no records by an interdepartmental committee which 
| might have considered the consequences for Eire for leaving the 
Commonwealth. To repeat;- there is no record of a formal decision 
to repeal the External Relations Act in any of the Cabinet 
minutes prior to John Costello's "announcement" in Ottawa on 
September 7, 1948.
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(D)
BRITISH GOVERNMENT DISCUSS THE 
RELATIONS ACT
POSSIBLE REPEAL OF THE EXTERNAL
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Immediately prior to John Costello's "announcement", Anglo-Irish 
diplomatic relations were amicable. In a report dated August 
17, 1948, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr.
Philip Noel-Baker, circulated a memorandum to the Cabinet 
entitled "Eire and the British Commonwealth."(1) This memorandum 
would have been based mainly on reports and information received 
from Lord Rugby. It dealt with the statements made by the three 
Irish Ministers in the Dail and their relevance to continued 
membership of the Commonwealth. Philip Noel-Baker brought his 
British cabinet colleagues attention to the three main points 
that the Irish Government spokesmen had made: " (1) That Eire is
no longer a member of the Commonwealth "... (2) is however
associated (in a manner which is left undefined)" and "(3) appear 
to be contemplating the repeal of the Eire Executive Authority 
(External Relations) Act 1936."(2)
CONTINUED/
(1) PRO Cab 129/29 p.97. CP(48)205
(2) Ibid
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Philip Noel-Baker's Cabinet Paper showed no signs of urgency but 
simply asked the Cabinet to consider "in due course" whether the 
consequences of repealing the Act should be brought to the 
attention of the Irish government. Referring to John Costello's 
statement that Eire is no longer a member of the Commonwealth, 
the memorandum asked whether the invitation to Eire to attend the 
forthcoming meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers should be 
renewed. The memorandum ended with the recommendation that the 
contents should only be considered and that a decision should be 
deferred. This was presumably because Rugby was to discuss the 
issue further with MacBride. Philip Noel-Baker's confidence in 
advising postponing any decisions was because he expected that no 
announcement would be made until the Dail resumed in November and 
as reported in his memorandum, because Anglo-Irish relations were 
" friendlier than ever".(3) It is possible he hoped that the 
expected "announcement" in November might be deflected by 
forewarning Irish Ministers of the consequences. He may have 
intended having a warning supported by a statement from the 
forthcoming October meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. It 
was highly unlikely that there would be any "announcement" until 
after Rugby met with Mac Bride to discuss Eire's attendance at 
the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting.(4)
(3)Ibid
(4) NASPO S. 14333A. Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting.
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Similarly on August 19, the Irish Cabinet postponed a decision 
on whether Eire should be represented at the Commonwealth Prime 
Minister's Conference other "than as a member of the 
Commonwealth" until after the Rugby - MacBride meeting of 
September 7.(5) Rugby's meeting with MacBride was first arranged 
for September 4 1948, and subsequently postponed until
September 7, i.e. the day that John Costello made the 
"announcement". (6)
(5) NASPO CAB 2/10 G.C. 5/32. See also File S 14333A
(6) NASPO S. 14387A
CHAPTER:V 
JOHN COSTELLO AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT
(A)
THE TAOISEACH, JOHN COSTELLO, LEAVES 'EN ROUTE' FOR CANADA
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The answer to the question as to whether the Irish cabinet or 
even John Costello had premeditated the "announcement” 
especially for his Canadian tripes: unlikely. Indeed, the
spontaneity is particularly emphasised in a subsequent 
explanatory letter to his Tanaiste, William Norton, when in a 
reference to the situation of the "announcement", he referred to 
"Ottawa of all places".(1) However, that John Costello had 
prepared a reasoned case to defend the contention that the Most 
Favoured Nation trade advantages between Britain and Eire might 
no longer apply (as discussed with the Canadian Prime Minister, 
William Lyon Mackenzie King),(2) and that during the course of 
the parliamentary news conference, he stated that the term High 
Commissioner would be changed to Ambassador through the repeal of 
the External Relations Act (and effectively reiterated the 
overall outcome of the Cabinet meeting of August 19,1948). This 
suggests that some of the possible obvious repercussions of the 
repeal of the External Relations Act, had at least by September 
1948, been examined by John Costello.
(1) Irish Times. 1.1.1978
(2)Pickersgill and Forster.Mackenzie King Record. Vol IV. p.388
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Several of John Costello's ministers gathered at Cobh to wish 
him 'bon voyage'. Inclement weather prevented the tender carrying 
John Costello's party from leaving Cobh harbour to board the 
ship, 'The Mauretania' and the ship's departure was delayed by 
one day so that it was August 24, 1948 when John Costello finally 
left Cobh 'en route' for Canada.(3)
It is possible that John Costello hoped that the procedures of 
the External Relations Act might be quietly by-passed or ignored. 
This would have allowed Eire to achieve a 'de facto' Republican 
status whilst, as mentioned in his speech to the Canadian Bar 
Association, maintaining "an association with the group of states
comprising, on the one hand, the country which is at once our
next door neighbour and our most important market and, on the
other, those great new countries overseas in which people of our 
;own race constitute a large part of the population."(4) 
"Associate” membership of the Commonwealth combined with
Republican status (as was eventually accorded to India) would 
have been exemplified by such symbolic gestures as a toast to the 
President of Ireland being offered at official Anglo-Irish and 
Irish-Commonwealth gatherings. Such a separate toast would have 
recognised the sovereign independence of Eire outside of the 
Commonwealth.
(3) See Lynch,P. (Joint Ed.): Essavs in Memory of Alexis 
Fitzgerald. 1987 pub. Irish Law Society
(4) NASPO S 14387A
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A first tentative exploration of the decision - making process 
in relation to Costello's announcement of his government's 
decision of the intention to repeal the External Relations Act 
results in a need to understand the personalities involved. This 
may serve as a general illustration of the importance of the 
idiosyncratic factor on Anglo-Irish relations.
Even before John Costello began his trip to Canada, a problem of 
protocol arose. Apparently John Costello decided against 
staying in the Governor General's (Lord Alexander of Tunis) 
residence, possibly, according to the Private Secretary to the 
Taoiseach, Patrick Lynch, because he assumed that his proposed 
speech to the Canadian Bar Association might upset the Governor 
General. (5) In turn the Governor General let it be known that 
when John Costello would be in Ottawa, he would soon afterwards 
be away in the West of Canada. (6)
Of interest is the point that the invitation to honour John 
Costello with an honorary degree by Me Gill University was 
originally made to him for the attainments he had achieved in his 
profession rather than as the Prime Minister. It is possible that 
as Prime Minister he expected more than that of a mere 
"commoner".
(5)Interview with Patrick Lynch,20.12.1988
(6)CDEA 50021-40
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According to the file from the Taoiseach's office, the visit was 
an "official" visit.(7) Indeed, shortly before he left for 
Canada, the Prime Minister of Canada, William Mackenzie King, 
extended him an official invitation.(8) Because of petty 
political bickering over the expense of the trip, the status of
the trip was never clarified satisfactorily.(1*) However, if
official, it would have been the established protocol for Prime
Ministers of Commonwealth countries to be invited and to accept
an invitation to stay in the Governor General's residence. 
Instead, John Costello stayed in the home of Eire's High 
Commissioner in Canada, John Hearne. That was a symbolic
!
i
|gesture, almost implying that Eire did not wish to stay in either 
I the Governor General's residence or the Commonwealth.
£7) MA S p ° * 5 <4351
(&*) JcAw CosreLU's . p. 1.
(l*)The trip undertaken in a personal capacity, was formally 
sanctioned by his Department on June 2 , 1948, and required a
departmental supplementary estimate.That file shows that the 
amount of expenses £305-10-0 was not included in an answer give 
by the Minister for Finance, Patrick McGilligan, to the Dail on 
February 22,1950 .The assiduous Assistant Secretary of the 
Department of the Taoiseach, Brendan Foley received an assurance 
from the Department of Finance that the ’misunderstanding" 
although "too late to make the corrections for the purposes of 
the daily volumes of Dail Debates but that the correction would 
be made in respect of the large bound volumes." (9)
(9)NASPO. S 14331
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In order to understand the basis of the possible antagonism that 
existed between Costello and his host in Ottawa, it is worth 
mentioning some of the salient characteristics of the Governor 
General of Canada, Viscount Alexander of Tunis (created in 1946) . 
According to Lord Rugby, Attlee while on holiday in Ireland (10) 
had told Costello that he would find Viscount Alexander (whom he 
had met in London in April) "sympathetic on the partition issue 
and a charming host." In the same report, Lord Rugby cautioned 
that Viscount Alexander was known to be "reserved".(11) It is 
worth noting that in April 1948, Lord Alexander was made a 
freeman of the city of Londonderry,(12) that he was reputed only 
to employ ex-servicemen who had fought in the war and (13) 
offered to resign from the British army in 1914 rather than move 
against his fellow Ulster Unionists. (14) The Irish High 
Commissioner in Canada, John Hearne, in a report in 1946, 
referred to the fact that, "It is exactly two hundred and 
eighty years since his ancestor got that 'grant' of land at 
jBallyclose, near Newtown, Limavaddy, in the County of Derry."(15)
(10)See Harris,K.: Attlee. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1982. p.423
(11)DO 35 3969. Rugby to Machtig .C.R.O. 21.12.1948.
(12)The Times 20.4.1948
(13)Pickersgill and Forster: Mackenzie King Record. Vol 111.
; pp.145-6
(14)Cronin, S. Washington's Irish Policy 1916-1986. Anvil books, 
1987. p.206 quotes from :Alex /vf. Ai,J^London 1973,pf. 41-2.
(15)Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (IDFA) 313/3A From John 
Hearne to Secretary of the Department of External Affairs ,Dublin
1.5.1946
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John Hearne made a further mention of the Governor General's 
Irish association by mentioning that his wife, Viscountess 
Alexander was a Bingham, which is part of the family of the Earls 
Lucan of Castlebar. John Hearne considered that these 
associations were responsible for the tendency of "the press and 
radio of recent months to glorify Northern Ireland at the 
expense of the remainder of the country."
On September 1, 1948, John Costello delivered his speech to the
Canadian Bar Association in Montreal. It lasted a tedious one and 
a half hours and some members of the audience, of over one 
thousand, walked out.(16) This speech concentrated on the 
historical and constitutional development of Eire. It had been 
vetted and approved in advance by his cabinet colleagues.(17) 
The speech referred to the External Relations Act's provisions as 
having "inaccuracies and infirmities". However, much as Costello 
had balanced his earlier remarks on the day the Dail went into 
Summer recess, (18) he had arguably neutralised his comments about 
"the inaccuracies and infirmities" of the External Relations Act, 
by asking :"Is it fruitful,with the mentality of the person who 
$would peep and botanise upon his mother's grave, to inquire too 
legalistically into the nature of that association?"(19) That 
latter phrase had been carefully rechecked in/
(16) Interview with Patrick Lynch 20.12.1988
(17) Interview with Sean MacBride. 6.1.1987
(18) D.D.Vol. 112. Col. 2382. 5.8.1948. "The right of 
preferential treatment in the matter of trade with Great Britain 
and other nations of the Commonwealth is one which we enjoy, so 
long as we are associated with that league of nations known as 
the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is a valuable right from 
the point of view of our people."
(19) NASPO S 14387A contains a copy of the speech
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in the National Library of Ireland by Patrick Lynch who, in 
addition to being private secretary, acted as occasional 
speechwriter for John Costello.(20) That phrase is important in 
that it can be interpreted as a counterbalancing statement to the 
effect that the External Relations Act would not be repealed. 
Reporting on that speech, which outlined developments in Anglo- 
Irish constitutional relations, the Irish newspapers highlighted 
the part of Costello's speech which referred to the "inaccuracies 
and infirmities" of the External Relations Act but ignored the 
counterbalancing adage to the effect of not enquiring too 
legalistically into the nature of the "association" with the 
Commonwealth.
John Costello, in an interview with the 'Irish Times', in 
September 1967, recollected how on September 2, 1948, at an
afternoon tea party in the grounds of Me Gill University, 
Montreal, he and his wife were "quite naturally " expecting to be 
introduced to Viscount Alexander and his wife. (21) However, as 
later related to the President of Ireland Sean T. O'Kelly, and 
reported by Lord Rugby to the Commonwealth Relations Office, (22) 
Costello was to complain that Viscount Alexander "cold shouldered
us in the most obvious way  my wife and I could not fail to
notice how the Alexanders ignored us". (23) Mr. and Mrs. 
Costello, who were described by Lord Rugby in his report as 
"uneasy socialites", were sensitive to what they interpreted as a 
slight.
(20) Personal Interview with Patrick Lynch, 20.12.1988 
(21^Irish Times. 8.9.1967 Interview with political correspondent 
Michael Me Inerney
(22)PRO DO 35 3969 Rugby to Machtig. 21.12.1948
(23)Ibid
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Two days later John Costello attended a formal dinner in his 
honour hosted by Governor General, Lord Alexander. Costello took 
the precaution of confirming with John Hearne, that the toast to 
"the President of Ireland" would be proposed in response to the 
Royal Toast. The response was not made. (24) According to John 
Costello's recollections, this was the second time the expected 
response was not made. Earlier at the annual dinner of the Bar 
Association on September 1, the official program stated that 
there would be two toasts; first to the King and then to the 
heads of the other sovereign states such as the U.S.A. and 
France. Ireland was not mentioned in the latter toast. John 
Costello informed the Canadian Minister for Justice, Louis. St. 
Laurent that the King's toast did not cover Ireland and he "felt 
bound" to make that point clear.(25) Such incidents further 
confirmed Costello's "views we held as to the confusion and 
difficulty created in our international relations by the External 
Relations Act of 1936."(26) It was rumoured that a silver replica 
of the "walls of Derry" was placed on Costello's dining 
table.(27) Costello confirmed the incident of an ornament being 
placed on his table to President Sean T.O'Kelly.(28) That episode 
is the one which appears to have offended Costello most. Nineteen 
years later, Costello, described the ornament as the "guns used 
against our people".(29) The "guns" referred to was the cannon 
"Roaring Meg", used in the seige of Derry against the army of
King James in 1689.
(24)Ibid
(25) Irish Times. 8.9.1967
(26) Ibid
(27) Ibid
(28) PRO DO 35 3969 Rugby to Machtig 21.12.1948
(29) Irish Times. 8.9.1967
For fear of repetition it is worth pointing that this this 
recollection supports Lord Rugby's account of Costello's talk 
with Sean T.O'Kelly in October 1948. During their talk, Costello 
told the President: "Having had John Hearne confirm that a
separate toast would take place - When the dinner took place the 
only toast given was that of the 'the King' and this upset me." 
Costello mentioned the matter of the toast to Mr Mackenzie King 
and he replied that the Royal toast "surely covered" Eire. 
According to Rugby's report this signified to Costello that 
"there seemed to me to be no proper appreciation of our status. I 
was getting sore about things. I did not like the very pointed 
way in which a model trophy of one of the Derry guns was put on 
the table in front of me at the Government House dinner. The 
attitude of the Alexanders towards us both was indeed most 
marked. I made the decision to cut through all this and I made 
the statement which brought on the repeal of the External 
Relations Act." (30) In an interview nineteen years later with 
the 'Irish Times', John Costello protested emphatically that 
what he interpreted as ill-befitting behaviour from his host had 
no influence on his decision to make his announcement. (31)
(30)PRO DO 35 3969 Rugby to Machtig L.D. 21.12.1948
(31) Irish Times. 8.9.1967
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By coincidence, during the course of that dinner, the 'Sunday 
Independent' was preparing to print the front page headline with 
the legendary rhetorical headline " EXTERNAL RELATIONS ACT TO 
GO11. (32) The headline covered the story prepared that Saturday 
afternoon in the study of his home by the editor of the 'Sunday 
Independent', Hector Legge.(33) That headline left no room for a 
question mark and served to further steamroll John Costello into 
making "the announcement". According to John Costello, (34) and 
confirmed by Patrick Lynch (35), Sean MacBride telegrammed him 
with the advice to make no comment if asked to verify the 
speculation. (36) Thirty nine years later Sean MacBride did not 
recollect dispatching such advice by telegram, but did recollect 
that during Costello's visit to Canada the telephone was his 
normal channel of regular communication to the office of the High 
Commissioner in Canada. (37) Costello recalled that after hearing 
of the 'Sunday Independent' headline, he was then faced with 
three " choices (1): to say no comment. (2); to deny the
truth of the report (3); to admit its accuracy (4); to say the
^matter would be dealt with on the re-assembly of the Dail."(38) 
iOn Tuesday September 7, ( three days after the infamous dinner)
i »
the 'Gazette Montreal' reported that John Costello stated at a 
news conference in the Parliamentary Buildings in Ottawa that the
External Relations Act was going to be "ditched".(39)
(32) Sunday Independent 5.9.1948.
(33) Personal interview with Hector Legge 31.1.1989
(34) Irish Times 8.9.1967
(35) Personal Interview with Patrick Lynch 20.12.1988
(36) Irish Times 8.9.1967
(37) Personal interview with Sean MacBride 6.1.1987
(38) John Costello's Memorandum p.7. para 21
(39) Gazette Montreal 8.9.1948
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That Costello should deem his Minister for External Affair's 
advice only worthy of partial consideration, even upon 
recollection, could be interpreted as a significant comment on 
the authority of Costello as Prime Minister or as a tribute to 
Sean MacBride's adherence to the principle of collective 
responsibility. In fact, Sean MacBride's acquiescence suited his 
own stance, since repealing the External Relations Act was his 
party's policy.
The Irish newspapers made Costello's answer front page news. They 
based their reports principally on a Reuters correspondent who 
in turn appears to have been familiar with the contents of the 
'Sunday Independent' story.
Following the "announcement” on September 7, 1948, the Prime
Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, hosted a dinner that 
evening for John Costello (40). The menu provided for a toast to 
jthe King and to the President of Ireland.(41) Mackenzie King was 
.very embarrassed by the inclusion of this toast and Costello
I
agreed to Mackenzie King's suggestion that the word Eire should 
replace the word Ireland.(42) Mackenzie King later wrote " I 
can only pray that these particular menus, though they will be 
kept by those who were present at the dinner,(1*) do not become 
the subject of controversy in Parliament."(43)
(40)Pickersgill & Forster.: Mackenzie Kina Record. Vol IV.p.386 
(41JCDEA 500021-41 .A copy of the Menu is in this file.
(42)Pickersgill & Forster.: Mackenzie King Record. Vol IV.p.386
(43)Ibid
(1*) Copy of Menu in Appendix Vlll
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Mackenzie King, writing about his reaction to the "announcement” 
stated that he "had not anticipated anything of the kind would be 
announced in Ottawa and certainly not on the day of the 
Government giving the Prime Minister a dinner."(44) At that 
dinner, Costello by way of explanation if not apology, to Mac 
Kenzie King referring to the Press's reaction, "regretted they 
always make heavy headlines." (45) According to the academic and 
journalist, Sean Cronin, John Costello " did not understand the 
press of North America, which wants clear statements on important 
questions." (46) He cites the example of John Costello denying 
having made a statement that Eire would come to the assistance of 
Canada in the event of an attack specifically from a communist 
country.(47)
Two days after that dinner party, Mackenzie King invited John 
Costello to speak his full mind about the position of Ireland and 
its relationship to the other countries of the Commonwealth.(48)
CONTINUED/
(44)Pickersgill & Forster: Mackenzie King Record .Vol IV. p. 385
(45)Pickersgill & Forster: Mackenzie King Record. Vol IV.p.386
(46)Cronin,S. Washington's Irish Policy 1916-1986. p.209
(47) Ibid
(48)CDEA 50021-40 / sub reference 199/5.Notes of conversation
between the Prime Minister of Canada and the Prime Minister of 
Ireland, at Kingsmere, Thursday, September 9th, 1948. Also 
present were John Hearne,Canadian Minister of External Affairs, 
Lester Pearson and the Canadian High Commissioner in London, 
Norman Robertson.
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During the course of a three hour meeting, Costello explained
"why he and his colleagues had come to the conclusion that they
must repeal the External Relations Act,1936.” While referring to
taking the gunman out of Irish politics, the first three pages 
of this four page memorandum imply that John Costello was 
stealing a march on the opposition party Fianna Fail. Of interest 
is the final paragraph where he makes a somewhat grandiose plea 
that shows that he did overestimate the strategic value of
Ireland and also the influence of Irish Nationalist folklore 
upon the American-Irish and their interest and concern about 
Ireland. He is quoted in the final chapter as saying, ”It was 
true that hostile outside pressures, first from the Nazis, now 
from the Communists, were forcing the United Kingdom and the 
United States to work together in many political fields, but this 
co-operation was, he thought, seriously limited by the mistrust 
of England which so many Americans inherited from their Irish 
forebears. If Anglo-Irish relations were finally cleared up, 
Ireland could not only make her own contribution to a North 
Atlantic Defence Pact and Western Union through her resources,s
! geographical position and population, but could make a much 
greater indirect (contribution) through people of Irish 
extraction, who, as citizens of other countries all over the 
world, but of course principally the United States, would then 
feel free to put their hearts and minds into unreserved support 
of the closest military and political co-operation between the 
United States and the countries of the Commonwealth."(49)
(49)Ibid
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According to Mackenzie King (but not mentioned in the Canadian 
memorandum,(50) or Costello's own account of this meeting in his 
personal memorandum (51), Costello when speaking about the 
coalition parties stated that he "believed by a certain amount of 
talk, he would be able to get them welded into one party." (52) 
Costello appears to have persuaded Mackenzie King that repealing 
the External Relations Act need not entail ceasing the existing 
"association" with the Commonwealth. The following day in
Cabinet Mackenzie King in turn managed to similarly persuade his 
heir in waiting, Louis St Laurent, who was against the idea of 
"members" severing allegiance to the Crown.(53) Mackenzie King 
now believed he had a mission,(54) "to save the commonwealth in 
jspite of the Tories who will put all their emphasis on the Crown
*and symbols and be prepared to let the nations that will not
!
Ligive allegiance to the Crown cease to be members of the
Commonwealth. My own feeling is that reality is more important
than the appearance.” (55) This was a reference to the
conservative element who were more rigid in wanting to define 
the criteria for membership.
The following chapter will examine the reaction of the Irish 
newspapers to John Costello's announcement.
(50)Ibid
(51)John Costello's memorandum on his visit and events in Ottawa.
(52)Pickersgill & Forster.:Mackenzie King Records. Vol IV. p. 387
(53)Ibid
(54) Pickersgill & Forster.j_Mackenzie King Records. Vol IV.p . 386
(55)Ibid
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(B)
PRESS REACTION IN IRELAND TO JOHN COSTELLO'S 'ANNOUNCEMENT'
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Sean MacBride, when asked in 1987 why the Ottawa announcement, 
like the speech to the Bar Association (excepting the 'Sunday 
Independent'), could not or was not tactfully treated or ignored, 
answered because the newspapers created such a furore.(1) It
would appear that the normally staid Irish national dailies, 
still influenced by largely self-imposed war-time censorship 
restrictions, added yet another 'fait-accompli' to the forces 
intent on making the public repeal of the whole of the External 
Relations Act inevitable.
The day following what became known as the "announcement" the 
three Irish national morning dailies, the 'Irish Independent',(2) 
'Irish Press'(3) and 'The Irish Times'(4) repeated the story,
about John Costello reiterating his statement made earlier to 
the Canadian Bar Association, that the External Relations Act 
had "infirmities and inaccuracies". In unison, the papers
continued to quote Costello as saying that, "the only thing to do 
was to scrap it." This phrase "scrap it" , was again attributed 
by the newspapers to his speech to the Canadian Bar Association. 
No such term nor inference appears in Costello's twenty-six A4 
sized pages approved by the Cabinet on August 19,1948 and now 
in the Cabinet papers in the National Archives, State Paper
Office, Dublin. (5)
(1)Personal Interview with Sean MacBride 6.1.1987
(2)Irish Independent. 8.9.1948 
f3ilrish Press. 8.9.1948 
M i lrish Times. 8.9.1948
(5)NASPO S 14387A
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The Irish newspapers reported tactfully the appointment of the 
Argentine Minister to Eire, the three Ministerial statements 
about Eire's relationship with the Commonwealth, and what was in 
effect a guarantee to Canada of a bilateral defence pact in the 
event of Canada being attacked by a Communist country.(6) There 
is a suspicion that Sean MacBride gave Costello's speech to the 
Canadian Bar Association his imprimatur because he
mistakenly believed that it heralded the official "announcement" 
of the repeal of the External Relations Act,(7) and then prompted 
the Irish newspapers with an advance release of the speech 
through the Department of External Affairs.
Because there was no correspondent from an Irish newspaper,(8) 
the newspapers in Ireland relied for their reports about the
announcement on the United Press and Reuters correspondents.(1*)
The agency's reports from Canada on the
"announcement", particularly Reuters, depended on the 'Sunday j/ I
' fa i*
Independent' claim that the External Relations Act was to be 
"scrapped" as part of the speech made earlier to the Canadian Bar 
Association on September 1. The Irish newspapers, by emphasising 
that the Act was to be "scrapped" instead of the "intention"(9) 
to repeal the Act, effectively made it impossible for the Irish 
government to backtrack and survive. If it were once John 
Costello's intention to allow only the procedures of the External 
Relations Act to become defunct, that course was no longer
politically possible.
(6) Irish Times. 11.9. 1948
(7) Personal Interview with, Sean MacBride 6.1.1987
(8) Cronin,S.: Washington's Irish Policy 1916-1986. p.208
(9) Gazette Montreal 8.9.1948
(1*)These records were destroyed in a fire at Reuter's head 
office
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If the whole of Costello's speech to the Canadian Bar 
Association, which contained a balancing phrase to the effect 
that the External Relations Act should not be put under the 
microscope, had been reported (i.e. that in fact it might be 
interpreted that Costello was asking that he procedures of the 
Act be allowed to quietly become defunct rather than force the 
Irish government to publicly repeal the Act), then arguably the 
speech might not have been given such coverage by the Irish 
newspapers. According to the editor of the 'Irish Times' Conor 
Brady, it was Costello's visit to Canada, that was responsible 
for his paper initiating a policy whereby one of their own 
correspondents always cover visits of the Taoiseach abroad.(10) 
Notably the 'London Times' did not carry any mention of the so- 
called "announcement", only referring to the Unionist reaction to 
it a couple of days later.(11)
(10) Telephone interview with Conor Brady, 21.6.1987, 
111)The Times 9.9.1948
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(C)
THE "ANNOUNCEMENT" AND THE COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS MEETING
154
The immediate responses of the Irish cabinet and of the British 
government to John Costello's "announcement" show that neither 
were prepared for the suddenness of the announcement. First, the 
British government's immediate response to the "announcement" 
will be examined in the context of their informal invitation at 
the beginning of September 1948, to Eire, to attend the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting.
It will be necessary to recapitulate on the circumstances 
surrounding the British government's invitation to the Irish 
government, to attend the October 1948, meeting of the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting: The Irish cabinet on
August 19, 1948 (1) read a memorandum(2) from Sean MacBride
which included the sentence, "In view of the fact that we are not 
members of the Commonwealth, should our representation at this 
jmeeting be contemplated, it would be necessary to make it clear ,
|by an agreed exchange of correspondence in advance that we were 
:attending, not as members of the Commonwealth, but because of our
r
desire to co-operate in matters of mutual interest." Sean Mac 
Bride concluded that memorandum by recommending that Ireland 
should not be represented at the meeting of the Commonwealth 
representatives.(3) In fact, the Irish cabinet deferred a 
decision on attending the meeting "otherwise than as a member of 
the Commonwealth" pending Sean MacBride having further 
discussions on the agenda of the meeting with Lord Rugby.(4)
(1)NASPO Cab 2/10 G.C. 5/32 19.8.1948
(2)NASPO S14333A contains Memorandum on Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers Meeting
(3)Ibid
(4)NASPO Cab 2/10 G.C. 5/32 19.8.1948
Sean MacBride, in accordance with the Cabinet decision of August 
19, 1948,(5) met with Lord Rugby on the morning of September 7, 
1948. Because of the time factor (a press communique was to be 
released by the British government on September 11), Lord Rugby 
was anxious to obtain a decision from the Irish government as to 
whether Ireland would be represented and by whom.(6) MacBride was 
to discuss the possible attendance of Irish observers at the 
forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Minister's Meeting and to ask 
Rugby for further information about the agenda of the meeting. 
Perhaps confusingly to Rugby, MacBride explained that the 
"reference made in London had not been interpreted as a definite 
invitation by the Taoiseach.1 (7) Rugby showed MacBride the 
conference agenda which was primarily concerned with defence, 
especially the envisaged threat from the Soviet Union and also 
;the Program for European Recovery. As bait to attract Eire's 
attendance, Rugby, knowing that MacBride would at least have 
liked the Partition issue to be included in the agenda, asked if 
there were any items which he wished added, reminding him of the 
"opportunity to have less formal gatherings and informal 
discussions between individuals".(8)
(5) NASPO CAB 2./10 G.C. 5/32 19.8.1948
(6) PRO PREM 8/1464 Rugby to Machtig. L.D. 7.9.1948
(7) NASPO S14333A Memorandum on Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Meeting.
(8) PRO PREM 8/1464 Rugby to Machtig. L.D. 7.9.1948.
156
From the British government's point of view the inclusion of the 
issue of the "Partition of Ireland" on an agenda which was 
concerned with aspects of Commonwealth relations on the world 
stage, such as post-war economic recovery and the Soviet threat, 
might have appeared parochial. However, to the Irish government 
it would have appeared that the proposed agenda illustrated the 
lack of priority which the British government were then prepared 
to give to the problem of Partition, even among the 
"Commonwealth family".
Apparently, MacBride and Rugby were interrupted during their 
luncheon meeting on September 7, by Frederick Boland, who brought 
them the first news of Costello's "announcement".(9) According 
to Rugby, at a morning meeting on September 7, Sean MacBride 
"stated specifically that the Eire government intended to do away
\
with the External Relations Act. He said that no definite time 
had been finalised for this step."(10) In this letter Rugby 
predicted that the External Relations Act would be abolished 
"when the Dail resumed in November."(11)
(9) Browne,N.: Against The Tide, p.132
(10)PRO PREM 8/1464 Rugby to Machtig. L.D. 7.9.1948
(11)Ibid
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Despite this possible upset to the meeting and to Anglo-Irish 
relations, the MacBride-Rugby meeting on September 7, ended with 
MacBride promising that he would raise the question of Eire's 
attendance at the Commonwealth meeting immediately at Cabinet and 
let Rugby have a decision as soon as possible. In fact MacBride 
later wrote to Rugby promising to let him have the names of those 
who would be attending the Commonwealth Prime Minister's meeting, 
(presumably in an observer capacity).(12)
Lord Rugby,in his report on his meeting with Sean MacBride on 
September 7, did not mention anything about the 'Sunday 
Independent' headline. (Interestingly, he did comment that he 
"would not be sorry to see the Act go).(13) Sean MacBride 
jsubsequently claimed to believe that no mention was made about
I
:the 'Sunday Independent' headline because Lord Rugby was
I
restricted in his choice of newspapers.(14) It is more probable
that Rugby chose to believe that attacks on the External
Relations Act were for home consumption and, that any
acknowledgement might precipitate the actual event.
(12)NASPO S. 14333A
(13)PRO PREM 8/1464 Rugby to Machtig. L.D. 7.9.1948
(14)Personal Interview with Sean MacBride 6 .1. 1987
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Givers the British government's annoyance with Costello's 
"announcement", Mac Bride was optimistic in recommending that, 
"subject to Ireland's position in relation to the British 
Commonwealth of Nations being made clear, a representative of 
Ireland should attend for the purpose of taking part in the 
discussion of certain items."(15)
On September 9, the Irish cabinet, in line with MacBride's own 
recommendation, "decided" that MacBride should have further 
discussions about the question of Ireland being represented at 
the Prime Minister's Commonwealth Conference.(16) However, while 
the MacBride-Rugby meeting on September 7 ended on an open note, 
the "invitation" to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Meeting was soon afterwards withdrawn by the British government 
jwho considered a report from Philip Noel-Baker at a cabinet 
^meeting on September 10,1948.(17)
CONTINUED/
(15)NASPO S 14333A Memorandum in file
(16)NASPO Cab 2/10 G.C. 5/35 9.9.1948
(17)PRO Cab 128/13. CM(48)50 pp. 80-85
159
On the evening of September 10, Lord Rugby telegrammed the 
Commonwealth Relations Office with the information that on the 
morning of the Irish Cabinet meeting of September 9, he had met 
MacBride, to discuss the Irish cabinet's likely reply, to the 
invitation to attend the Commonwealth Prime Minister's 
Meeting.(18) Apparently the Australian Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister for External Affairs, Dr. Herbert Evatt (who was in 
Dublin to receive an honorary degree from Eamon de Valera in his 
capacity as Chancellor of the National University of Ireland) 
attended the meeting and urged the "desirability of Eire taking 
part in the conference discussions."(19) MacBride showed Rugby 
the draft of a letter addressed to him, "indicating an intention 
to be represented at the conference." Lord Rugby did refer to the
preservation of "certain announcements" meaning the publication of
I
\ letters dealing with the proposed discussion of Partition. Rugby 
explained to MacBride that his government, "rather than have any 
such letter on the record, whether to be published or not, might 
decide not to extend an invitation." As though dealing in 
riddles Rugby reported, "I made it plain to Mr.MacBride that 
whatever he or I might have said, no invitation had been issued 
and no acceptance had been tendered till the procedure had been 
agreed upon."(20)
(18) PRO PREM 8/1464 Telegram No. 90. 10.9.1948
(19)Ibid
(20)Ibid
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That Lord Rugby interpreted MacBride's proposed reply as 
"indicating an intention to be represented at the conference" 
without defining the status of attendance, i.e., as observers or 
associate or full members, shows that he too was possibly over- 
optimistic regarding the state of Anglo-Irish Relations within 
the Commonwealth setting. The important point about the
continuance of these discussions is that neither MacBride nor 
Rugby, the principal actors on the stage of Anglo-Irish
relations, considered that Costello's "announcement" would have 
any bearing on Eire's attendance at the Commonwealth Prime 
Minister's Meeting. Neither appears to have thought that the 
repeal of the Act need affect Eire's existing "association" with 
the Commonwealth. That too is likely to have been John Costello's 
interpretation.
The Irish cabinet's expression that attendance was dependent on 
Eire's status vis-a-vis the Commonwealth "being made clear" was
interpreted by Philip Noel-Baker and the British cabinet as
meaning that Eire would only agree to be represented at the 
meeting, "not as a member of the British Commonwealth but as a 
country associated with the Commonwealth."(21) His Cabinet paper 
stated that "the whole drift of his remarks at the conference
showed that what he has in mind is association with the
Commonwealth instead of formal membership of the 
Commonwealth."(22) That distinction is important, because it 
shows that the British government were aware that the Irish 
government still considered that they were "associated " with the 
Commonwealth.
(21)PRO Cab 128/13 CM(48) 50 10.9.1948 p.85 (p.12)
(22)PRO Cab 129/29 CP(48) 220 9.9.1948 p.201
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Philip Noel-Baker explained to the Cabinet that the Irish 
government would expect to discuss the question of Partition in 
an exchange of letters between the two governments which "might 
subsequently be published."(23) To the British cabinet meeting on 
September 10, now aware of John Costello's "announcement", it may 
have appeared that the Irish government were adding insult to 
injury. The Cabinet asked whether "it would be right to renew 
the invitation to Eire to attend the meeting of Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers." Philip Noel-Baker answered the question, 
pointing out that to accept Eire's attendance categorically as a 
non-member of the British Commonwealth would "inevitably raise 
difficulties with India and Pakistan."(24) He further pointed out 
the "obvious danger" in allowing a discussion on Partition 
reasoning that it would establish a precedent which would allow 
discussion of the question of partition at a full meeting of the
I
I Commonwealth Prime Ministers. There was the fear that discussion 
on partition would establish a precedent for the discussion of 
internecine disputes between members of the Commonwealth. The 
Cabinet noted that the South African Prime Minister, Dr. Malon, 
had made as a pre- condition of his country being represented, 
the demand that apartheid would not be discussed with India and 
Pakistan.(25)
(23) PRO Cab 128/13 CM(48)50 10.9.1948. pp.80-85
(24)Ibid
(25)Ibid
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This meeting of the Cabinet agreed that Sean MacBride should be 
told "orally" by Lord Rugby that, "in view of the attitude of 
the Eire government, the United Kingdom government considered 
that it would be embarrassing for Eire's Ministers to be invited 
to attend the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers."(26) This 
"invitation" appears to have been as ambiguous as Ireland's 
position vis-a-vis the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, on September 
14, the London 'Times' quoting an official communique, reported 
that Eire was "not invited to Commonwealth Prime Minister's 
Conference."(27) The 'Irish Times' reported similarly on the same 
same day.(28)
Immediately following the British cabinet's meeting on September 
10, a telegram of their decision was sent from the Commonwealth 
Relations Office to the Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, South Africa, India ,Pakistan, and Ceylon. The telegram 
contained a reminder about the possible economic effects of 
Eire's departure from the Commonwealth.(29) The telegrams to the 
Prime * Minister s of Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
additionally mentioned that discussions between the members of 
the Commonwealth would be necessary later and that the longer 
term aspects of the "Eire Pronouncements were being urgently 
examined."(30) That was a reference to the interdepartmental 
committee headed by Sir Norman Brook to report on the 
consequences of Eire's decision to repeal the External/
(26) PRO Cab 128/13 CM(48)50 10.9.1948 p.85.(p.12)
(27) The Times .14.9.1948
(28) Irish Times. 14.9.1948
(29) PRO DO '3979 p.3 x.2639/15
(30) Ibid
(31)PRO DO 35 3960 (X2638/28) "The Practical Consequences of the
Termination of Eire's Membership of the Commonwealth."
163
External Relations Act.(31) Norman Brook was already considering 
the question under the auspices of the Committee on Preparations 
for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, over which he 
presided. (32) Already, in August 1948, at the behest of the 
Committee on Commonwealth Relations, Sir Norman Brook had visited 
individually the Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand primarily for informal discussions on the constitutional 
future of India.(33) At these meetings, Sir Norman Brook referred 
to the recent statements made by John Costello and Sean MacBride 
in the Dail in late July 1948, and discussed the possibility of 
further constitutional changes in Eire. The Canadian 
representative (according to Norman Brook's report) had already 
reported to his own government that the Irish government was 
likely to repeal the External Relations Act; according to Sir 
Norman Brook, Mackenzie King had effectively rejected this report 
because he believed that a formal repeal of the External 
Relations Act was unlikely, because it could disrupt the Irish 
coalition government and it would be a set back to fulfilling the 
hope of ending Partition.(34)
(32)PRO Cab 134/118. CR(48)5 . 14.9.1948 Committee on
Commonwealth Relations . Commonwealth Relationship: Consultation 
With Canada, Australia and New Zealand
(33)Ibid
(34)Ibid
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The Prime Minister of Australia, Ben Chifley, and New Zealand's 
Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, took the same view. Sir Norman 
Brook had in late August taken the precaution of recording a 
general feeling that "All were agreed, however, that if Eire 
should repeal her External Relations Act she would thereby sever 
her last constitutional link with the Commonwealth and could no 
longer be regarded as a member of the Commonwealth." (35) Norman 
Brook intended drafting that "feeling" into a "statement of 
general principles to be approved by the forthcoming October 
meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers."(36) This is supported 
by Mackenzie King , who in his diary refers to the fact that he 
was aware that the question of the possible repeal of the 
External Relations Act "was coming up at the meeting of Prime 
Ministers."(37) Extracts from the proposed draft statement of 
general principles for discussion at October Meeting of 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers read :
"1. Commonwealth policy should be directed towards maintaining 
the existing membership of the Commonwealth, even though some 
Commonwealth countries(i.e . Eire, India, Pakistan, and possibly 
;South Africa) may be unable to accept the precise form of 
constitutional relationship which is preferred by the other 
members.(38)
(35) PRO Cab. 134/118. CR(48)5. 14.9.1948.p.31.(para 4. p.2)
(36) Ibid
(37)Pickersgill & Forster.: Mackenzie King Record.Vol IV. p.385
(38) PRO Cab 134/118. CR(48)5. 14.9.1948. Appendix, Commonwealth 
Relationship.Draft Statement of General Principles for Discussion 
at October Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. Subsequently 
published in October 1948.No. 35966 Prem 8/1464.
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7.This recognition of the Crown for external purposes only must 
be regarded as the minimum constitutional link; and it must be 
accepted that a country which cannot profess even this limited 
allegiance to the Crown cannot be treated as a member of the 
Commonwealth.
Thus, if the Government of Eire fulfil their declared intention 
to repeal the Eire Executive Authority (External relations)Act, 
1936, they must be regarded as having severed the last
constitutional link connecting Eire with the Commonwealth, and 
Eire must be treated as having ceased to be a member of the 
Commonwealth.
11.... Countries which cannot accept any form of constitutional 
link must be regarded as foreign states; and it would be 
inexpedient to attempt to define what is meant by their
"association” with the British Commonwealth. Some definable
aspects of that new "association" may emerge as time goes on; but
it will be preferable to wait and recognise subsequently links 
which have developed in practice rather than seek to devise in 
advance a formula of "association" with which such States would 
be required to comply."
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Interestingly, this proposal was most accommodating as far as 
India was concerned: Paragraph 9, stated; " If a Commonwealth
country should adopt a "republican " form of constitution, 
providing for a President as the Head of the State, this need not 
be regarded as inconsistent with continuing membership of the 
Commonwealth so long as it is accepted that the President will 
act as the King's representative, at least for purposes of 
external relations." adding a recommendation that the 
Commonwealth would "commonly be described as 'the Commonwealth 
of Nations', instead of 'the British Commonwealth of 
Nations.'"(39)
Given Sir Norman Brook's prior discussion with the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers it was possible that paragraph 7 of the above 
statement was intended originally to have the effect of warning 
Eire that if she repealed the External Relations Act, she would 
classified as a foreign country in the Commonwealth context and
;as a result would lose the trade and citizenship benefits
i
received under the Most Favoured Nation Status. Losing Most
Favoured Nation Status would mean that citizens of Eire resident
in Britain would be given the status of aliens.
(39) PRO PREM 8/1464 . Document No. 35966. COMMONWEALTH
RELATIONSHIP. Statement of General Principles. October 1948 Para 
12. Section (D).
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To Irish republicans a declaration from the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers Meeting threatening Eire with the loss of Most Favoured 
Nation Status would have been like showing a "red rag to a 
bull". Arguably, John Costello's premature announcement 
prevented the divisive consequence for Eire of such a
pronouncement by a perhaps unwitting Commonwealth Prime 
Minister-s' meeting. That adroit move alone would be argument
enough to justify John Costello in making his premature 
announcement. But it is perplexing that John Costello never gave 
that as a reason in subsequent and even irreconcilable 
explanations for the suddenness of his "announcement".(40) John 
Costello was aware that, since no concession was forthcoming for 
not repealing the External Relations Act, then some threat might 
be issued by the British government if given notice of the Irish 
government’s intention to repeal the External Relations Act. (41)
In fact a week after John Costello had made his 'fait accompli'
announcement Norman Brook reported that Mac Kenzie King
suggested that even if Eire repealed the External Relations Act
"she might still claim that she continued to be 'associated' with
the nations of the British Commonwealth", and pointed out that 
"certain countries which had been forirgAly members of the 
Commonwealth were still in a special 'association' with the
Commonwealth."(42) Norman Brook admitted that this suggestion won 
acceptance in Australia and New Zealand.(43)
(40)See John Costello's Personal Memorandum, Account to Mac 
Kenzie King(44fand President Sean T.O'Kelly's account.(45;
(41)Telephone Interview with Patrick Lynch. 26.3.1990
(42)PRO PREM 8/1464 CPM(48)5 . 14.9.1948
(43)Ibid
(44FCDEA 50021-40. 199/5. Memorandum 9.9.1948 
(45;Private Papers of Sean T.O'Kelly, N.L.I. MS.22848
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Despite the Commonwealth reaction Norman Brook still wrote to 
Attlee suggesting "it has now become more important to be sure 
that there is no doubt, in law, that, if this Act is repealed, 
Eire will become a Foreign State."(46)
Sir Norman Brook exemplified the British post-war Pro-
Commonwealth syndrome. Having "lost an Empire" he feared that a 
two tier membership would develop among Commonwealth members. 
Briefly, Brook may have feared that an active neutral such as 
Eire would lead the way towards associate members having their 
own policies on defence and foreign affairs, perhaps leading to 
the unthinkable - members taking opposite sides in a World War. 
Eire's example if followed would have prevented the hopes that 
Britain clung to (as expressed by the Committee on Commonwealth
Relations in July,1948) of forming a Union of Western Europe
"powerful enough to stand independent of both the Soviet and 
American blocs" provided she could secure "the support of 
countries outside Europe which are in a special association with 
its members; and this makes it the more necessary for us at the
present time to explore every means of securing that the
Commonwealth shall remain as large and as powerful as
possible."(47)
CONTINUED/
(46) PRO PREM 8/1464 G.R. p.8. (p.l)
(47) PRO Cab 134/118 CR(48)4. 21.7.1948. p.29
169
Herbert Evatt wrote to Attlee on October 12, 1948, " The
position of Eire, moreover,is already different from that of the 
rest of us. I do not think therefore, that we should hesitate to 
explore the possibilities of any newer modes, forms or symbols of 
association which may be suggested, even if they were to depart 
in some respects from what may be called the orthodoxy of the 
Balfour report."(48) This rebuff to Norman Brook's own personal 
fears about diluting the nature and quality of the Commonwealth 
relationship can probably be attributed to John Costello's timely 
intervention with Mackenzie King on September 9.(49) Norman Brook 
attributed the change in the Commonwealth attitude from the 
"consensus" he had obtained in August,(that Eire if she 
repealed the External Relations Act, would be considered a 
foreign state), to the fact that he was then "discussing a 
hypothetical situation".(50)
Given the possibility of such a threat, however innocently 
intended, from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting, 
[Professor Nicholas Mansergh is justified in his perceptive remark 
|that "Mr. Costello may have feared that if informed of Irish 
!intentions in advance the United Kingdom government would commit 
litself to a course of action from which, later, it might find it 
difficult to depart, even if so desired." (51)
(48)PRO PREM 8/1464. Paper Headed Commonwealth of Australia. 
L.D. 12.10.1948
(49)CDEA 50021-40 subsection 199
(50) PRO PREM 8/1464 CPM (48) 5. dated 14. 9. 1948
(51) Mansergh,N. Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, p.284. 
footnote 3.
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(D)
IRISH CABINETS' REACTION TO JOHN COSTELLO'S "ANNOUNCEMENT”
171
On Wednesday, September 8, 1948, Sean MacBride and William
Norton requested authority (as was the established procedure) 
from the Taoiseach's department to prepare the draft of a Bill 
entitled "Transfer of Certain Powers and Functions to the 
President", overwritten by hand to read "Powers and Functions of 
the President (External Relations) Bill, 1948."(1) This procedure 
was necessary in order to implement the necessary legislation to 
repeal the External Relations Act. The request was challenged by 
the Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Taoiseach, 
Brendan Foley. Such a response is normal whenever Cabinet 
procedures are infringed. On Thursday, September 9, Brendan 
Foley, formally returned the application form to the Department 
of External Affairs with a handwritten note asking if the 
Department of Finance had been consulted. Additionally, he 
pointed out that the application did not comply with cabinet 
procedure in the following two respects: "that the concurrence of 
no other Ministers had been sought and secondly that the decision 
requested is not in order because it should have been a request 
to the Government to have a Bill drafted on the lines of the 
general scheme."(2)
(1) NASPO Cab 2/10 GC 5/35 9.9.1948
(2) NASPO S 14387A
172
In response to this riposte, Sean MacBride replied the 
following day, certifying that the matter was urgent and must be 
considered by the cabinet that same day because ’government 
approval is required urgently in order to allow time for the 
drafting of the contemplated Bill." He further pointed out that 
the Department could not have taken steps to allow the usual 
period of notice being given for the reason that "recent 
developments had made it imperative that a decision should be 
arrived at i m m e d i a t e l y (3) The use of the word "developments", 
in conjunction with the haste, implies a degree of 
unpreparedness. Certainly, this brief exchange of minutes above 
all else in the records illustrates the lack of planning for the 
implementation of the supposed "decision" to repeal the External 
Relations Act.
On that same day (September 9), Sean MacBride received approval 
from the Cabinet to his proposal to have the "Repeal Bill"
entitled "Powers and Functions of the President (External
Relations) Bill, 1948 " drafted.(4) Accordingly, the Department 
of External Affairs "instructed" the Taoiseach's department that 
the present application should be "regarded as a request for 
authority to have a Bill drafted", adding that the opportunity 
"would arise to consult the Taoiseach about the question of the 
introduction of the proposal."(5) This departmental jockeying for 
control of the Bill is evidenced in the reply letter from the 
Department of the Taoiseach dated September 10, 1948. The reply
addressed to the Department of External Affairs requested, "when
the draft Bill is available you will arrange to consult this
department and the Department of Finance in accordance with the
cabinet procedure on instructions relating to legislation prior 
to submitting the draft to the government. In accordance with the 
established practice, this department will, on receipt of the 
draft, ascertain the views of the Secretary to the President in 
the matter."(6) It is possible that the Department of the 
Taoiseach and perhaps the Secretary of that Department, Maurice 
Moynihan, had become too accustomed to making major inputs into 
foreign affairs under the former Taoiseach, Eamon de Valera who
also normally acted as Minister of External Affairs.(1*)
(4) NASPO Cab 2/10 GC 5/35 9.9.1948
(5) NASPO S 14387A
(6) Ibid
(*)I am grateful to Dr. Greagor O'Duill,Archivist at the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, for this point.
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The debacle immediately following the announcement continued to 
a lesser degree through the several changes of the title of the 
proposed Bill.The initial title "Transfer of Certain Powers to
the President" was altered by hand to "Powers and functions of
the President (External Relations) Bill,1948" and approved by the
Cabinet on September 9. (7) The title was again changed to
"Executive Power of the State (External Relations) Bill, 1948 ", 
approved in Cabinet on November 9, (8) to finally on November 12,
"The Republic of Ireland Bill, 1948."(9) Furthermore, on the 
latter two occasions the contents of the proposed Bill were 
subject to amendment in Cabinet. Professor Ronan Fanning, in his 
book "Independent Ireland", referring to the mix up over the 
drafting of a Bill on the day following "the announcement", 
interprets this as confirming " the impression of confusion and 
.uncertainty within the government about what repeal meant."(10)
|
1(7)NASPO Cab 2/10 GC 5/35 9.9.1948
|(8)NASPO Cab 2/10 GC 5/46 9.11.1948
(9)NASPO Cab 2/10 GC 5/47 12.11.1948
(10)Fanning ,R.: Independent Ireland, p.174
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(E)
JOHN COSTELLO RETURNS TO IRELAND
176
At 7a.m., on Friday, October 1,1948, John Costello's ship,
'Britannic'(1*), entered Cobh Harbour, outside the city of Cork. 
The Minister for External Affairs, Sean MacBride, and the 
Minister for Defence, Dr.Tom O'Higgins, were among those who 
; ferried out specially to meet him on board. The 'Cork Examiner' 
reported that MacBride, Costello and O'Higgins engaged in an 
"earnest conversation" over breakfast.(1) Arguably, the 
significance of this traditional Prime Ministerial welcome meant 
that John Costello had the approval for his "announcement" from 
his powerful inner cabinet. Such a supportive gesture was in line 
with Sean MacBride's policy of showing a united front in 
international relations.
On October 5, 1948, Sir Norman Brook, in his capacity as chairman 
of the Committee on Preparations for the Meeting of Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers, reported to Cabinet Ministers that John 
Costello, upon arriving in Cork, stated publicly that the King 
was never the symbol of co-operation between the nations of the 
I British Commonwealth, but that the Statute of Westminster was 
the symbol of free association. Sir Norman Brook advised that it 
"seems unlikely that the Eire government have examined the 
problems that would follow" and "the despatch of a warning might 
least have the effect of discouraging Eire ministers from making 
any further public statements, or from taking the irreversible 
step of publishing a Bill until they had an opportunity to 
consider some of the practical consequences which would follow
by the repeal of that Act."(2)
(1) Cork Examiner. 2.10. 1948
(2) PREM 8/1464 CPM(48)11 5.10.1948
(1*)Newspaper shipping reports refer to "Britannia" Patrick Lynch 
has kindly drawn my attention to the correct name "Britannic".
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On October 4, Rugby advised the Permanent Head of the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, Eric Machtig, that the Costello
government aimed to secure the "support of Dominions to
acceptance of Eire as an associate under a formula and for
purposes not yet disclosed."(3) It was not that Rugby had at that
time misread the aims of the Irish government regarding their 
eventual decision to reject any type of membership. More simply, 
by October 4, 1948, the Irish government had not decided that
the corollary of the repeal of the External Relations Act should 
entail that the description of the state should be a Republic, or 
even if so, that Eire should formally depart from the 
Commonwealth. This conclusion is partially based on the fact that 
no coherent policy vis-a-vis Eire's relation to the Commonwealth 
had been properly examined by the Irish cabinet, as exemplified 
by John Costello's remarks on his return to Cobh on Friday, 
jOctober 1, 1948, about "associate membership" of the
Commonwealth.(4)
(3) PRO DO 35 3960 L.D. 4.10. 1948. Rugby to Machtig.
(4) Irish Independent. 2.10.1948
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CHAPTER: VI
EIRE'S CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION WITH THE COMMONWEALTH
179
This chapter will examine why "associate membership" or, in
Eire's case, "non- foreigness" was opposed initially by Britain
and eventually agreed upon by the representatives of Eire, 
Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.
On October 5, Attlee was advised by Norman Brook to seek "a firm 
legal opinion" in respect of the Most Favoured Nation clause and 
Eire's repeal of the External Relations Act.(1) Accordingly 
Attlee sent Lord Chancellor Jowitt a personal minute requesting 
his legal opinion.(2) Four days later, Jowitt in a brief opinion 
advised Attlee that the repeal unaccompanied by a declaration 
"putting some other complexion" on it would by itself be "a 
categoric renunciation by Eire of further membership of the 
Commonwealth." Jowitt thought that the Hague Court, for the 
purposes of the Most Favoured Nation Treaties, would regard Eire 
as a sovereign independent foreign state.(3)
lln 1948 there was no formal criterion for membership of the 
Commonwealth. A report from a Committee on Commonwealth 
Relations in May 1948, which was examining the practical problems 
involved in creating a new "Commonwealth of British and 
Associated Nations" considered that the existing Commonwealth 
relationship had five essential features: the position of the
Crown, common citizenship, economic co-operation, consultation on 
foreign policy, and collaboration in defence."(4) Eire fulfilled 
the first three and least important of the above criteria.
(1)PRO PREM 8/1464 CPM(48)11
(2)PRO PREM 8/1464 Memo 138/48 . 5.10.1948
(3)PRO. PREM 8/1464 Memo dated 9.10.1948
(4)PRO Cab /134/118 CR(48)2. 21.5. 1948 Third Report by Official 
Committee. 21.5.1948. p.23
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Significantly, Jowitt believed that citizenship was "safe" 
because the 1948 British Nationality Act provided that "Eire is 
not included in the expression 'foreign country' as used in that 
Act and the repeal would not affect that position." Jowitt had 
conferred with the Solicitor-General and the legal department of 
the Foreign Office, Home Office, and the Commonwealth Relations 
Office. They concurred with his opinion that "after repeal Eire 
will possess in international law all the attributes of a 
sovereign independent foreign state."(5) Overall, Jowitt's 
opinion was then that Eire's relationship to the United Kingdom 
would be regarded as that of a "foreign country" not included 
within the Commonwealth, but that this would only affect Most 
Favoured Nation Status in relation to trade.(6)
CONTINUED/
(5)PRO PREM 8/ 1464 Memo dated 9.10.1948
(6)Ibid
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Arguably, loss of Most Favoured Nation Status for Eire would 
apply to trade only because the British Nationality Act, 1948(7) 
recognised four different categories of persons in Britain: 
citizens of the United Kingdom, British subjects or Commonwealth 
citizens, Irish citizens and finally aliens. This Act meant that 
Irish citizens resident in Britain could, as a distinct category, 
retain their Irish nationality and would continue to receive the 
same rights and privileges as British subjects and citizens of 
Commonwealth countries. The practical reasoning was that it 
prevented the introduction of passports between Northern Ireland 
and Eire. Additionally, citizens of Eire, who were loyalists were 
safeguarded by being allowed to remain British subjects simply 
by claiming that status under such broad grounds as a close 
[association with the United Kingdom.
I
[Because Eire's exports to Commonwealth countries (other than the 
.United Kingdom) were so small,(three-and a-half million pounds 
■of which alcoholic products comprised two-and-three-quarter 
millions), (8) the withdrawal of Most Favoured Nation Status from
f
Eire would have had little short-term effect, especially since 
withdrawal could be counterbalanced by an increase in tariffs 
against exports to Eire from Commonwealth countries , including 
Britain which benefited from preferences. Even though the amount 
of exports was relatively small, because of the strong political 
influence of Irish industrialists, the repercussions of losing 
this trade would have had serious political consequences for the 
Irish coalition government.
(7) British Nationality Act,1948.(11 &12 Geo. 6. Ch. 56 )in , 
Mansergh,N.(Ed.):Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth 
Affairs. 1931-1952. Vol 11. pp.950-51(949-968)
(8)PRO DO 35 3961. Report on Trade Preferences and ERA.20.10.1948
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Even at this early stage it was recognised that there was room to
accommodate Eire. For example Lord Jowitt in a later opinion
included the proviso, "the position might well be different if 
there existed corresponding legislation in Ireland declaring that 
subjects of the United Kingdom were not to be treated as aliens 
in Ireland." (9) Jowitt, presumably to overcome Most Favoured 
Nation difficulties, suggested that in order that Eire might be 
accepted as a non-foreign state, " could the Irish say something 
like this: the Irish government have no wish to weaken the
association which has developed between Australia, Canada, Great 
Britain, New Zealand,the Union of South Africa, and the newer 
members of the Commonwealth, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. On the 
contrary they believe that by removing the unreal situation
brought about by the External Relations Act they will extend and 
improve the co-operation with those nations which has been 
developed. In particular they hope that citizens of Eire will not 
be treated as foreigners by the members of the Commonwealth and 
they on their part are not to treat as foreigners the citizens of 
other member states."(10)
(9)PRO DO 35 3962 / 115492
(10)Ibid
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A declaration of that nature would have entailed amending the 
Irish government's Nationality Act,1935, which confined Eire 
citizenship to Eire only. Jowitt's solution was one that Sean 
MacBride appeared to favour during the Chequers meeting in mid- 
October. However, he appears to have changed his mind when he 
realised that amending the legislation would require a divisive 
referendum.
From the British government's point of view, the continuation of 
the status quo vis-a-vis Eire and the Commonwealth in relation 
to trade and citizenship privileges was complicated by several 
factors. Prime amongst these was the fear that Argentina might 
challenge any new agreement by raising the argument that if Eire, 
as a foreign state, received Most Favoured Nation Status from 
jBritain, then under international treaties, Britain was obliged 
,to accord foreign states including Argentina, the same 
^treatment.(1*)
(1*)Article 4 of the Argentine treaty of Amity, Commerce and 
Navigation, 1825 states: "No higher or other duties shall be
imposed on the importation into the territories of His Britannic 
Majesty of any articles of the growth, produce or manufacture of 
the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata and no higher or other 
duties shall be imposed on the importation into the said United 
Provinces of any article of the growth, produce or manufacture of 
His Britannic Majesty's dominions, than are or shall be payable 
on the like articles, being the growth, produce or manufacture of 
anv other foreign country ..."(11)
(11) DO 35 3991
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On October 5, 1948, Sir Norman Brook submitted a report
concerning the practical consequences that would follow if Eire 
repealed the External Relations Act. The report concluded that 
once Eire had formally severed her connection with the 
Commonwealth, serious consequences would follow if any attempt 
were made to treat Eire otherwise than as a foreign country or to 
treat her citizens otherwise than as aliens.(12) On a practical 
level the report included the counter-argument that historically 
and geographically it would be absurd to regard Eire as a foreign 
country.(13) Brook's report concluded by reiterating that there 
would be "serious consequences" if Eire as a foreign state were 
allowed to retain benefits under the Most Favoured Nation clause 
in international treaties. In contrast to Jowitt's later 
recommendations, Norman Brook specified that Irish citizens would 
then have to be treated as aliens, but admitted that there would 
be administrative difficulties involved.
At this stage, Norman Brook had taken on the powerful position of 
departmental co-ordinator and specialist adviser to the British 
government on Eire's proposed repeal of the External Relations 
Act. He played a dominant role in directing the British 
government's immediate response and their ensuing stance in the 
negotiations dealing with the intention of the Irish government 
to repeal the External Relations Act.
(12)PRO Prem 8/ 1464 CPM(48)11 5.11.1948
(13)Ibid
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CH: Vll
BRITISH GOVERNMENT DESPATCH WARNING AND "INVITE” THE IRISH 
GOVERNMENT TO DISCUSSIONS
186
On October 5 1948, Norman Brook suggested that the "first move
I
should be oral discussions between Ministers".(1) Brook 
considered that, that would be more helpful in assisting the 
Irish government (in what he described as) "to find a way out of 
the difficulties in which they have placed themselves." (2) The 
following day, Attlee despatched a telegram to Lord Rugby for 
his own information.(3) Significantly it advised him to see Sean 
MacBride as opposed to John Costello and to explain to him the 
repercussions regarding most Favoured Nation Status for Eire.(4) 
This note set the tone and topic for the discussions by 
emphasising the envisaged difficulties over trade and 
nationality: Rugby was asked to convey that "In both of these
matters the United Kingdom have international treaty obligations 
under which they are bound to give Most Favoured Nation treatment 
to a number of foreign countries." Included was an invitation to 
the Irish government to discuss the questions that would arise 
before taking "a step which may bring these results." (5)
(1) PRO PREM 8/1464. CPM(48)11 5.11.1948
(2) Ibid
(3) PRO DO 35 3960. 6.10.19-48. Telegram No.263 X. Des. 4.53.p.m.
2638/28
(4)Ibid
(5)Ibid
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Rugby did not see Sean MacBride on the evening of October 6,
|
mistakenly believing that he would be in Paris until October
i
10.(6) The idea that Rugby should first see MacBride may have
i
been an attempt by the British government to encourage Mac Bride 
to challenge Costello's position as leader of the Coalition. In 
November 1947, following his party's electoral success, Rugby had 
reported that "Mr Sean MacBride looks like being the head of an 
Irish Government at some future date."(7) Again in 1948 Rugby 
reported that, "Mr. Sean MacBride is the man of the future in 
Irish politics."(8)
It is most unlikely that Sean MacBride would have availed of 
|the opportunity to challenge Costello's leadership especially 
since John Costello could depend on the collective support of his 
cabinet including such pro-Commonwealth Ministers as Richard
Mulcahy, Minister of Education and Leader of Fine Gael.(l*)
S(6) PRO DO 35 3960 Tel.X2364/5 7.10.1948
(7) PRO DO 35 3955 Telegram No. 71. 1.11.1947.
(8) PRO FO 371 70175. Commonwealth Liaison File. CRO. X.2647 
Rugby's Report on interview with Sean MacBride 23.2.1948
(1*) During the Second reading of the Republic of Ireland 
Bill,1948, the Leader of Fine Gael, Richard Mulcahy stated, "I do 
not think any member of the Fine Gael organisation or any leader 
of the Fine Gael organisation need explain in any way why he
supports the Bill that is before this House today."(9)^He went on
to state " The Treaty of 1921 was accepted with the Crown in the
belief that the Crown would operate to wipe out the blQf of 
Partition. The Crown has failed and the Crown has gone."(10r
(9)^D.D. Vol.113. Col.668. 26.11.1948 
(lofD.D. Vol.113. Col.672. 26.11.1948
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On October 7, Rugby reported to the Commonwealth Relations
Office, "As Mr.MacBride is not expected back from Paris till
10th. I communicated substance of your paragraph 4 to Mr Costello 
at one fifteen today."(11) Rugby had expected Costello to argue 
the case that Eire, like Burma, which had withdrawn from the
Commonwealth in 1947, should retain Most Favoured Nation Status.
Rugby had been briefed to point out that the reason for
continuing Most Favoured Nation Status on nationality and trade
to Burma was because , "few Burmese citizens come here, and
Burma's staple products have few foreign competitors in our
market". Following his visit to John Costello, Lord Rugby
reported that Costello assured him that the repeal of the
External Relations Act " would be a constructive move in the
field of friendly relationship". With professional and objective 
understanding, Rugby reported sympathetically on Costello's 
explanation about the domestic need for repeal: "Think what my
position would have been if a private member had brought in a 
motion for its repeal. I dreaded that."(12) There is an
impression that John Costello, was "distressed" by this first 
formal reaction of the British government to his
"announcement".(13) According to John Costello's Private 
Secretary, Patrick Lynch, after Rugby left the Taoiseach, 
Costello called in Patrick McGilligan and later, Sean MacBride
for a discussion.(14)
(11)PRO DO 35 3960 . Rugby addressed note to Norman Archer
CRO,X2364/5/ . 7.10.1948
(12)Ibid
(13) Browne,N.: Against the Tide, p.129
(14)Personal Interview with Professor Patrick Lynch. 20.12. 1988
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Later that day, John Costello held a meeting(1*) of colleagues in 
his home in Ballsbridge, Dublin. That meeting is remembered by 
former Minister of Health, Dr. Noel Browne(15) and verified by 
Costello's Parliamentary Secretary, Liam Cosgrave.(16) There is 
no record nor firm recollection of all the attendants. However, 
that meeting can be fairly described as a ’'caucus” meeting (1*) 
of the cabinet. As recollected by Dr. Noel Browne, John Costello 
was "distressed" and offered his resignation.(17) It is likely 
that the offer of resignation was an honourable effort by John 
Costello to offer himself as a scapegoat for his 
"unconstitutional action" which brought the "threats" from 
Britain. On the other hand, it may have been intended to 
consolidate the collective support of his cabinet and party for 
future negotiations with Britain and the Commonwealth; members 
of the Irish cabinet could not at that point have accepted
Costello's resignation without jeopardising their own positions.
(15)Browne, N.: Against the Tide, p. 129
(16)Letter to author from Liam Cosgrave 18.1.1989
(17)Browne, N.: Against the Tide, p.129
(l*)In 1984,Former editor of the 'Sunday Independent', Hector 
Legge,(author of the infamous 'Sunday Independent' headline 
["External Relations Act To Go"),in response to Dr.Noel Browne 
confirming his recollections of the meeting,(18) disputed that 
[the meeting took place. Four members of the coalition government; 
James Dillon, Daniel Morrissey, Sean MacBride and Patrick Me 
Gilligan, told Hector Legge in 1976, that they "had never heard 
of such a meeting." (19) According to the 'Irish Independent' of 
October 8 1948, on October 7 1948, there were local council
elections in Dublin. James Dillon was attending a function at an 
Agricultural College in Cavan , while Daniel Morrissey was 
attending two formal functions on the evening of October 7,1948 
and Sean MacBride who like Patrick McGilligan had already been 
consulted that morning by Costello, had a full diary which 
included a luncheon with the Belgian Prime Minister, Paul Henri 
Spaak and dinner with the Austrian Foreign Minister, 
Dr.Gruebar(20)
(18) Sunday Independent 15.1.1984
(19) Sunday Independent 5.2.1984
(20) Irish Independent 8.10.1948
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On Monday October 11, the Irish cabinet formally approved "the
i
action" taken by John Costello during his visit to Canada and the
|
U.S.A.(21) Interestingly, the draft of the minutes to this 
meeting ask if "the decisions are to be dated for Thursday,
October 7,"(22)(1*) i.e., the same day that John Costello
received the oral rebuke from the British government. The date of 
that warning further substantiates Noel Browne's recollection 
that there was a "caucus" meeting of the Cabinet shortly after 
Costello came back from North America.(23) In addition to the 
retroactive approval for the announcement the Cabinet meeting on 
October 11, 1948 approved of Sean MacBride's 'aide memoire'
which accepted the first tentative invitation to have discussions 
.with representatives of the British government.(24)
(21)NASPO Cab 2/10 G.C. 5/38 11.10.48
(22) NASPO S 14331
(23)Browne,N.: Against the Tide, p.129
(24) NASPO Cab 2/10 G.C. 5/38 11.10.48
(1*) In his autobiography Dr. Browne recollected that the 
meeting was held on a Sunday afternoon,(25) but attributes that 
to the fact that he was at home during working hours when he 
received the telephone call to attend the meeting.(26)
(25)Browne,N.: Against the Tide, p.130
(26)Personal Interview with Noel Browne 28.12.1988
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On October 8, Norman Brook reported to Attlee that he had met 
the Australian Minister of External Affairs, Dr. Herbert Evatt, 
in Paris.(27) Dr. Evatt was an independent personality and a 
"champion of small states", who hoped that Australia(1*) would 
become a leader of the smaller powers in world affairs.(28) 
Norman Brook explained to Evatt the views of the United Kingdom 
government on the general question of the constitutional 
relationship between Commonwealth countries "and the extent to 
which India or any other country" which could not accept the 
full doctrine of common allegiance to the Crown might be allowed 
to deviate from the normal form of constitutional relationship 
and still be regarded as remaining within the Commonwealth. Brook 
reported that Dr Evatt "feels strongly that strenous efforts 
should be made to find a basis on which Eire can be kept within 
the Commonwealth."(29)
(27) PRO FO 371. 70175. Letter signed by Norman Brook, dated
8.10.1948.
(28)Harry Truman Library. (HTL) Pres. Sec. Files. Biographical 
sketch; Box 256. SR 48.
(29)PRO FO 371. 70175. Letter signed by Norman Brook, dated
8.10.1948.
(l*)In 1948-49 the Chifley /Evatt Labour Party government of 
Australia was critical of American "imperialism" and in return 
the Australian government suffered a smear campaign orchestrated 
by the U.S. Embassy in Canberra.( John Pilger article in 
[EnalishlIndependent : "Australia that might have been."
26.1.1988.)
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Jorman Brook reported Evatt's suggestion that there should be 
Immediate discussions with Costello in which Attlee (and other 
jfnited Kingdom Ministers) would be "supported" by Mr. Mackenzie 
Cing, Mr. Fraser and himself. Brook reported that this was 
;>ecause Evatt "agrees that it would be better that these 
liscussions should not be handled between the United Kingdom and 
Sire alone; for, amongst other reasons, it is against the United 
kingdom that Eire's bitterness is mainly directed."(30)
following Cabinet approval on October 11, (31) Sean MacBride, on
;he afternoon of October 12, handed Lord Rugby the Irish 
fovernment's formal note of reply to Attlee's message.(32) This 
aide memoire' accepted Attlee's suggestion for discussions and 
isked that representatives of the Commonwealth governments be 
)resent because the repeal affected the relations of Ireland with 
:he countries of the Commonwealth.(33) This 'aide-memoire' again 
repeated that the Irish government did not wish to disrupt Anglo- 
Irish relations and were "anxious to continue the exchange ofi
:rade preferences and citizenship rights and feels that there 
should be no insuperable difficulties in doing this" and ended by 
stating: "In order to avoid any risk of misunderstanding, that
.ts decision to repeal the External Relations Act is not open to 
revision or modification."(34)
30)Ibid
31)NASPO Cab 2/10 G.C. 5/38 11.10.48
32)NASPO S.14387A
33)NASPO S.14387A
34)Ibid
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Clement Attlee, in a personal note to Norman Brook, dated 
October 13, 1948, suggested "that a possible line of approach to 
the Eire government might be to ask them whether some of their
Ministers would like to come over to discuss with some of the
Dominion Prime Ministers the practical difficulties which they 
apprehend will flow from the proposed repeal of the External 
Relations Act and to consider what steps could be taken to 
overcome them. This line of approach would have the advantage of 
accepting the fact that Eire has decided on this step, but 
recognises that Eire does not want to cut herself off and brings 
the question down to practical rather than theoretical 
considerations."(35) The conciliatory content of that letter 
indicates that Attlee was adopting a tolerant approach. More 
importantly, Attlee's letter highlights the nature of his own
:personal approach, which was similar to Lord Jowitt's and very
much in the same vein as Herbert Evatt's as evidenced in a letter 
to Attlee dated October 12. (36) Attlee's approach would have
been more welcome in Eire than the first response which which 
took the form of an admonishing verbal warning from Rugby. In 
reply to Attlee's letter, Norman Brook agreed, "It will be agreed 
that we shall not threaten them or seek directly to dissuade them 
from proceeding with their declared intent to repeal the External 
Relations Act." (37)
(35) PRO PREM 8/1464. Attlee to Norman Brook. L.D. 13.10.1948
(36) PRO PREM 8/1464. Evatt to Attlee. L.D. 12.10.1948
(37) PRO PREM 8/1464. Norman Brook to Attlee. L.D. 13.10.1948
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I
I
As a result of discussions on the afternoon of October 13,
i
between British and Commonwealth Ministers,(38) a telegram wasI
despatched from the Commonwealth Relations Office to Lord Rugby 
asking him to give a "top secret and personal message from Mr. 
Attlee to Mr. Costello."(39) It was an invitation to John 
Costello and "any cabinet colleagues he wished to bring along" to 
come to Chequers for discussions with ministers representing 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. (40)
Attlee agreed with Sean MacBride's suggestion about Commonwealth 
interests and had already consulted with the Canadian Minister 
for Justice and Attorney General and Prime Minister designate Mr. 
Louis St. Laurent, Dr. Herbert Evatt, and the New Zealand Prime 
,Minister, Peter Fraser, who were in London for the Prime 
.Minister's Commonwealth Meeting. They were to be consulted on the 
(basis that these countries, like the U.K., contained the largest 
"Irish" populations and were "most anxious" to discuss the 
position that coming weekend, as this was the only time they 
would be available together for such a meeting.(41)
(38) PRO DO 35 3979. Memorandum "Departure of Eire from British 
Commonwealth." p.4. Para. 10.
(39)PRO PREM 8/1464. Telegram dated 14.10.1948
(40)NASPO S14387A . 14.10.1948
(41)Ibid
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John Costello was among the Irish government's most experienced 
negotiators on Anglo-Irish affairs. Despite his experience, 
Costello replied to Attlee in a brief personal message, conveyed 
to Lord Rugby that same day, "I regret that I myself will not be 
able to take advantage of your invitation."(42) Costello's 
refusal may have been a tactic to ensure that the 
,f plenipotentiaries1 would have to refer back to the Irish 
cabinet.
That affront to what was a quasi-Commonwealth Prime Minister's 
meeting may have suited the British government since this 
appeared to verify Rugby's earlier report, as relayed by Norman 
Brook to Attlee: "My information is that Mr. Costello is very
emotional on this question and cannot easily be made to look at 
the facts."(43) In a candid telegram to the Commonwealth 
Relations Office dated October 15, 1948, Rugby stated that "Mr
Costello has conducted this business in a slapdash and amateur 
fashion. He and his fellow ministers seem to be very conscious of 
this, and their apologetic tone is not surprising in view of the 
fact that Downing Street has been consistently helpful and 
friendly to them."(44)
(42)NASPO 14387A
(43) PRO DO 35 3962. CRO to Attlee. 13.10.1948 quoted in: 0'
Brien,: Ireland's Departure from the British Commonwealth. Round
Table. 1988.306 p.182
(44) PRO DO 35 3962. Rugby to CRO 15.10.1948. Telegram No. 107. 
DES.12.40p.m. Rec. 12.50 p.m.
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The South African delegate to the Commonwealth Prime Minister's 
Meeting, Eric Luow, later wrote to Sean MacBride explaining that 
the reason he did not respond to the invitation to participate in 
the Chequers talks was that he wanted to avoid being a party to 
any Commonwealth pressure to persuade Eire to abandon its 
intention to repeal the External Relations Act: "I did not wish 
to be a party to any such manoeuvre - if actually
contemplated."(45) Apparently, Eric Luow was very interested in 
the outcome of Eire's decision to repeal the Act. Luow explained 
to a representative of the Commonwealth Relations Office that if 
South Africa did the same thing, "it would not mean breaking any 
political links with Britain on the contrary they would then be 
prepared to make military alliances in areas of common concern 
and in other ways to co-operate with us more fully and cordially 
than they do now."(46) Despite this interest, Luow is recorded as 
!deciding not to attend or send a High Commissioner, even as an 
observer, because there were very few Irish in the Union and 
"they had all virtually become "British" although they retained 
Irish names."(47) Attlee asked that the Prime Minister of India, 
Pandit Nehru, be informed that the reason why the Prime Ministers 
of Australia and New Zealand were asked was because of the Irish 
population within their states.(48)
(44) Ibid Telegram No. 107. 15.10.1948
(45)NASPO S 14387
(46)PRO DO 35 3962. Record of conversation with Mr. Louw.
15.10.1948. p.12
(47)Ibid
(48) PRO DO 35 3962. Letter dated 15.10.1948 from Mr. MacLennan 
to K.Younger, p.13.
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Despite the apparent urgency of the hurried formal invitations 
and replies, strict protocol was still observed by the
Commonwealth Relations Office as to the attendance and status of 
the representatives invited to attend. A further meeting of the 
Irish cabinet on October 15, 1948, agreed that Sean MacBride and 
the Minister for Finance, Patrick McGilligan, should attend the 
meeting.(49) McGilligan, a Professor of constitutional law, 
played an important role in forwarding Ireland's role within the 
constitutional development of the Commonwealth. The attendance 
of MacBride was a recognition of the role the Minister for 
External Affairs should play in Anglo-Irish relations. The copy
of the reply telegram to Attlee in the Taoiseach's file has
rwritten on it: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, U.K., India,
Pakistan, South Africa, and Rhodesia."(50)(1*) Possibly Sean 
.MacBride expected all the members of the Commonwealth to attend 
ithe meeting.
(49) NASPO Cab 2/10.G.C.5/39. 15.10.1948
(50) NASPO S 14387A
(l*)It was not customary to consult the Prime Minister of 
Southern Rhodesia about Commonwealth Affairs and the Governor 
General Godfrey Higgins, in relation to the External Relations 
Act, "has already accepted as inevitable".(51)
(51)PRO PREM 8/1464
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Attlee decided that the meeting should be confined to Ministers 
because the object of the meeting was to have an informal
discussion. Technical discussions were expected to follow on the 
outcome.(52) John Dulanty, according to Eric Machtig, hoped that 
he might join the Chequers discussions, and asked if it would be 
appropriate for Frederick Boland to participate in the
discussions. Dulanty also asked if the Irish Attorney General,
Cecil Lavery, could also be present especially since the Lord
Chancellor was joining in the discussions. This raised the 
question whether the Dominion Ministers should bring their 
officials. For example, Louis St. Laurent,(2*) had asked that the 
Canadian High Commissioner in London, Norman Robertson who was 
acting as his secretary, should be allowed to attend. Herbert 
Evatt wanted Professor Bailey to join him and Peter Fraser wanted 
Mr.Me Intosh to accompany him while Philip Noel-Baker wanted Eric 
Machtig to attend.(53)
CONTINUED/
(52)PRO DO 35 3962 L.D. 15.10.1948.
(53)PRO DO 35 3962 CRO to Mr. Helsby P.7A/7B
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Eventually, Louis St Laurent agreed to dispense with the presence 
of Norman Robertson for the occasion. A hand-written postscript 
on the file relating to these arrangements reads: "I have just
heard that Robertson is not coming, and the Prime Minister would 
like Dulanty to be stopped." Accordingly John Dulanty, did not 
attend. The postscript ended by stating that the Irish Attorney 
General, "Cecil Lavery is not a Cabinet Minister and therefore he 
should be discouraged too."(54) Attendance appears to have been 
amicably agreed showing that functional diplomacy was proceeding 
smoothly between the professional diplomats. That agreement was 
so easily forthcoming augured well, given the nature of the topic 
and sensitivity of the personnel involved.
,0n the morning of Friday October 15, 1948, Sir Eric Machtig,
received telephone calls from both Lord Rugby and Eire's High 
Commissioner in London, John Dulanty, informing him that Mac 
Bride and McGilligan would be coming to London.(55) On Friday 
afternoon, October 15, Attlee replied that he would be "glad" to 
see MacBride and McGilligan on Sunday October 17.(56)
(54) PRO DO 35 3962 L.D. 15.10.1948 CRO to F.E. Cumming-Bruce
p.11
(55)PRO DO 35 3962 Letter to Mr Helsby from CRO. 15.10.1948 
p .7A/7B
(56)PRO DO 35 3962 Letter to Mr Helsby from CRO. 15.10.1948 p.8
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Lord Rugby was asked by the Commonwealth Relations Office to
inform Mr. Costello that "we are definitely opposed to any
I
preliminary publicity about Sunday's proposed meeting, and do not 
agree to the suggested announcement tomorrow."(57) This is 
noteworthy in view of the decision of that Department to hold a 
press conference during the course of the Chequers meeting and 
before the agreement on the release of a press communique.
Before dealing with the Chequers meeting, the following chapter 
will attempt to clarify one of the major practical consequences 
that threatened to affect Eire after leaving the Commonwealth, 
namely, losing Most Favoured Nation Status as existed between 
members of the Commonwealth, particularly in relation to 
citizenship privileges that existed for Irish citizens residentI
;in Britain and to a lesser degree trade with Britain and other 
Commonwealth members.
(57)Ibid
CH: Vlll
THE PROBLEM OF COMMONWEALTH NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP
202
.Sir Norman Brook updated his first report dated October 5,
I
j1948, on the consequences of the termination of Eire's
membership of the Commonwealth ,(1) only completing it on the eve 
of the Chequers discussions. (2) This report, entitled ’The 
practical consequences of the repeal of the External Relations 
Act"(3) was issued to the British negotiators. Brook's report 
now incorporated extensive discussions that he and Philip Noel- 
Baker had had with official representatives of Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand about the new position of Eire. (4) 
jNorman Brook's report was sceptical of Lord Chancellor Jowitt's 
jrecommendations. He argued that if common citizenship sufficed
;as the link between members of the Commonwealth, then it might
replace allegiance to the Crown. Norman Brook's report was 
insistent that non-Commonwealth citizens should be treated as
aliens. His report saw the main problem as being "the maintenance 
of our alien's control."(5)
Norman Brook feared that common citizenship might become the
essential link, and resisted any compromise including the
conciliatory approach offered by Evatt. Brook noted that the
Australian delegates disagreed with him on his line of argument. 
Despite Evatt's objections, Brook claimed the support of the 
Commonwealth representatives, saying that "most of us" thought 
it would be unsatisfactory to aim at putting Eire in a/
(1)PRO PREM 8/1464 CPM (48)11
(2)PR0 PREM 8/1464 CPM (48)20 (updated). There is no reference
on the final report and it may have incorporated parts of
CPM(48)20 (Practical Consequences of Repeal of External Relations 
Act) and later report CPM(48)40 (Practical Consequences Which
Might Follow the Repeal of External Relations Act)
(3)Ibid
(4)Ibid
(5)Ibid
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a Constitutional position halfway between that of a member of 
the Commonwealth and a foreign country. He believed that the 
creation of a special position of "associated state" would 
involve Britain in great difficulties over the Most Favoured 
Nation clauses. He pointed out that if the precedent were 
established, then some other Commonwealth countries would 
probably copy Eire's action and this would lead to the "two tier 
Commonwealth which all agree would involve the Commonwealth in 
great difficulties."(6)
Arguably there already existed a two-tier system, particularly 
with regard to matters of defence consultation, where the new 
members(and Eire) were excluded from sensitive defence 
information. Authoritative articles(1*) about the apparent 
evolution of the Commonwealth towards "associate" membership, 
were brought to the attention of the Irish Cabinet by Sean Mac 
Bride. Appended to the articles was the statement,"The Minister 
has evidence that these excerpts reflect accurately a current 
trend of thought in British circles. (7) However, there was
some strong opinion against formalising that loose arrangement, 
for example the 'Manchester Guardian' also highlighted the danger 
of letting the link "become so loose and vague as to be
meaningless in practice." (10)
(6)Ibid
(7) NASPO S 14042
(1*)Perhaps the most authoritative was Nicholas Mansergh's
article (8)which cited Professor Berriedale Keith , "If no place 
can be found in a British Commonwealth for republics, "then the 
enduring character of the Commonwealth may well be doubted."(9) 
i (8)Mansergh, N. : "Eire's Relationship With The British
(Commonwealth." International Affairs.pub. R.I.I.A. January
jl948. p. 17.
- (9)Keith,B.:The Dominions as Sovereign States. London
Macmillan.1938 p.IX .
U 10)Manchester Guardian quoted in Irish Times 12.10. 1948
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To avoid diluting the Commonwealth link, Norman Brook advised 
"that a very firm line should be taken with Eire, and that it be 
made clear to Sean MacBride that the repeal of the Act would 
sever Eire's connection with the Commonwealth, and that trade 
preferences, special citizenship arrangements, and so on would 
disappear by virtue of this withdrawal."(11) By this, he meant, 
altering sections 2 and 3 of the British Nationality Act,1948, so 
as to subject Eire citizens to aliens control in Britain.
Immediately before the chequers meeting, Norman Brook had already 
.tempered his tough approach with the proviso, that it should be 
.suggested " at the appropriate moment", that if Eire repeals the 
Act she should replace it by some other link which would enable 
us to maintain(as against third parties) that she was not 
"foreign" in her relations with the Commonwealth 
countries."(12) This was in effect the Jowitt- MacBride-Evatt 
.solution which was to eventually win acceptance through the 
ers and Paris Commonwealth summits.
(11)PRO PREM 8/1464 CPM(48) % Q { updated)
(12)Ibid
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Norman Brook reported that "all were agreed" that the likely 
target for a challenge was the Most Favoured Nation clause as it 
applied to Anglo-Irish trade.(13) Interestingly, he reported that 
"after hearing the arguments" he believed that the danger of 
undermining the preference position on trade was in fact not "as 
sound as the Board of Trade thought."(14) Brook suggested that 
the Board of Trade's case might be "whittled down substantially" 
in discussions with the Eire Ministers and suggested a defensive 
position, advising that the British government, rather than prove 
that Most Favoured Nation Status was threatened, should instead 
ask Eire Ministers "how they would defend the challenge" to the 
continuance of their status as a Most Favoured Nation.(15) 
Unnecessarily, though not surprisingly, the Chequers discussions 
opened on a confrontational note.
i(13)D0 35 3960 Board of Trade memorandum: "Possible Treaty
^Consequences of Secession by Eire." Report dated 30.9.1948
(14) PRO PREM 8/1464. CPM(48)2 o (updated)
(15)Ibid
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CHAPTER IX. 
CHEQUERS
(A)
CHEQUERS MEETING.
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Once the time and venue were agreed, British, Irish and 
Commonwealth Ministers (1*) made their way to Chequers. Sean Mac 
Bride suffering from a mild cold, left Paris on Sunday morning 
aboard a British European Airways scheduled flight and arrived at 
Northolt at 10.22 a.m. (The previous day, MacBride had signed 
the multilateral agreement for Intra-European payments and 
compensations under the auspices of the O.E.E.C.) He was met at 
Northolt by Patrick McGilligan and John Dulanty. The trio had a 
quiet and private discussion. Admiral Bromley, was in charge of 
protocol and he advised the delegation to delay their arrival at 
Chequers from the planned 12.30p.m., so as to arrive shortly 
before lunch. This meant that there was no time for informal 
discussions before the representatives sat down to lunch.(1)
At the Chequers meeting the British government was represented by 
Prime Minister Attlee, Lord Chancellor Jowitt, and the Secretary 
of State at the Commonwealth Relations Office, Philip Noel-Baker. 
Australia was represented by the Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister for External Affairs, Dr.Herbert Evatt. Canada was 
represented by Louis St. Laurent, ( Prime Minister 
designate).(2*) New Zealand was represented by Peter Fraser. Also 
in attendance were Attlee's Principal Private Secretary, 
Lawrence Norman Helsby and Sir Norman Brook.(2)
(1)PRO DO 35 3962. dated 16.10.1948
(2)PR0 Cab 129/30 pp.147-149.(pp.1-5) "Account of the Meeting 
With Eire Ministers at Chequers from which references are drawn 
unless otherwise stated.
(1*) Prime Ministers Meeting London October,11-21, 1948 
(2*)Louis St.Laurent, appointed Prime Minister 15,11.1948
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An account of the Chequers meeting was afterwards recorded from 
memory, by Sir Norman Brook who was assisted by Lawrence Norman 
Helsby.(3) The meeting was described in the report as friendly 
and informal in character. Except for Louis St. Laurent and 
Peter Fraser, all the principal participants were already known 
to each other. Sean MacBride and Patrick McGilligan had met 
Attlee, Dr. Evatt and Lord Jowitt in Dublin during the summer. 
Peter Fraser was later to make a friendly comment to Sean 
MacBride to the effect that he used to listen to MacBride's 
mother, Maud Gonne making speeches for the suffragette movement 
in Glasgow.(4)
After lunch the discussions began formally. According to the 
official records, Mr. Attlee opened the discussion by explaining 
that he and the Commonwealth Ministers had some "informal talk 
together about the "declared intention" of the Eire government to 
repeal the External Relations Act.1 Attlee explained that the 
representatives of those four Commonwealth countries "whose 
^populations included a substantial number of people of Irish 
descent, thought it would be advantageous if they could together 
Jdiscuss the practical consequences which would follow upon the 
repeal of the External Relations Act." Attlee then said he was 
glad to welcome MacBride and McGilligan for this purpose.(5)He 
did not refer to John Costello"s absence.
(3)PRO Cab 129/30 pp.147-149 , (pp. l-5)From which all
references relating to the meeting are drawn unless otherwise 
stated. After reading the account of the meeting, Attlee sent 
Norman Brook a note commenting, "This is a remarkable achievement 
to make so full and accurate an account without written notes. I 
am very appreciative."( Note dated 5.11.1948 in PREM 8/1464)
M ^ Irish Times. 1.1.1979
(5) PRO Cab 129/30. pp. 147-49, (pp.1-5)
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To reassure the Irish Ministers, Attlee explained that the
purpose of the meeting was not to put pressure on the Irish
government to remain within the Commonwealth, but to examine how 
the repeal of the External Relations Act would affect the United 
Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries. Continuing, Attlee
stated in a factual manner that he "was advised that, once the
External Relations Act was repealed, Eire would become a foreign 
State in relation to the United Kingdom", and that, because of 
international commitments regarding relations with foreign 
states, it might be "impossible to refrain from treating Eire as 
ja foreign country and her citizens as aliens." Attlee qualified 
this point by explaining that, if such action had to be taken, 
;it "would not be out of hostility towards Eire", but because it 
'might be "forced upon" Commonwealth members because of treaty 
^obligations which they had undertaken in Most Favoured Nation 
,clauses in commercial treaties.
lAttlee then explained that Argentina would have a direct interest
r
*in challenging trade preferences between Eire and the U.K. and 
that if that challenge were made the U.K. government would either 
have to suspend the greater part of the U.K. tariff or to 
withdraw preferential treatment for Eire. Attlee based this 
statement on information given to Norman Brook by the Board of 
Trade. Attlee omitted to mention that Norman Brook in his final 
report had considered the view of the Board of Trade about the 
danger of undermining the preference position was "not as sound 
as the Board of Trade thought."(6) However, Attlee by then/
(6) PRO PREM 8/1464. CPM (48) 2o. (updated)
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jthen appears to have been following the tough approach suggested 
by Norman Brook. Attlee further stated that the advice received 
was to the effect that "the U.K. would also be taking a serious 
risk if she continued to exempt Eire citizens from aliens 
restrictions, after Eire had become a foreign state."
Attlee finished his introductory speech by urging that the
"practical difficulties" should be discussed in a friendly
manner. Despite the fact that the records show a reasonable and
mild introduction by Attlee, given his over-dramatisation of the
danger to the Most favoured Nation Status, it is not too
surprising that Sean MacBride almost thirty years later
recollected Attlee's opening speech as "aggressive". (7)
Sean MacBride had prepared his case in reply to Attlee's points.
Pirstly, he explained that the proposed repeal of the External
Relations Act, was not a hostile action, but was intended, as "a
■necessary preliminary to the restoration of friendly relations
between Eire and the U.K." MacBride explained that the
j"connection with the Crown" was seen as being perpetuated by the
External Relations Act, and that such "irritants" implied
s"subordination to the U.K.". According to MacBride it was this
problem which prevented the growth of friendly relations between
the two peoples and he claimed that the removal of the Act would
assist in removing an obstacle to friendly relations. MacBride
made the point that his government were most anxious to promote
friendly relations with all members of the Commonwealth. /
(7)Irish Times 1.1.1979. Sean Mac Bride interviewed by James 
Downey.
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Commonwealth. In order to prove his case that the repeal of the 
Act need not change the status quo and that therefore there was 
no need to remove Most Favoured Nation Status, MacBride argued 
that according to the opinion of his government, that was already 
the position, "probably since the enactment of her new 
constitution in 1937." Continuing, MacBride argued that a 
special kind of association could be established between Eire and 
the other countries of the Commonwealth based on the reciprocal 
exchange of trade preferences and citizenship rights. MacBride 
appears to have been prepared to accept the amicable arrangement 
which was evolving even at that early stage. He believed that 
"with goodwill between the governments, and by the exercise of 
.ingenuity, this special association could surely be expressed in 
:such a way as to enable Commonwealth governments to resist 
successfully any claim by third parties based on Most Favoured 
Nation clauses."
Peter Fraser, in support of the the Irish case, introduced a 
point about the embarrassment to those countries with large 
Irish populations of treating "Eire" as a foreign country. Fraser 
based his concern on the fact that he represented a large Irish 
population in New Zealand. Fraser was the first to hint at 
defence matters by bringing into the discussion "the disruption 
Eire would cause at this stage in the world's history." Peter 
Fraser expressed the view that it was the "duty" of Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers then meeting in London to "use all their 
ingenuity to find means of keeping Eire in close and friendly 
association with the Commonwealth group."
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Dr. Evatt, as expected, expressed similar views to Peter Fraser, 
adding that he would not regret the repeal of the External 
Relations Act, "because it was an unsatisfactory Act expressed in 
terms which could afford little gratification to the other 
Governments of the Commonwealth." Evatt further expressed his 
hope that "no effort would be spared in finding some other and 
more satisfactory means of keeping Eire within the Commonwealth." 
Louis St. Laurent then expanded on Peter Fraser's point by 
explaining the personal embarrassment facing him as he assumed 
leadership in Canada. He explained the domestic political 
situation that existed in Canada, in particular, the potentially 
divisive strong pluralist feeling towards the Commonwealth. He 
gave as an example the fact that French-Canadians did not share 
,the respect and affection toward the Commonwealth as did 
.Canadians of British descent and that those of British descent 
were "very jealous of the Commonwealth connection." Referring to 
jthe possibility of Eire leaving the Commonwealth, he thought that 
he "would be strongly pressed to say what he had done on Canada's 
behalf to prevent this development." Louis St. Laurent reinforced 
Dr Evatt and Peter Fraser's point by concluding his remarks with 
the plea that some means be found of enabling Eire to continue 
in friendly association with Commonwealth countries.
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There then followed a general discussion on the points made by 
the Commonwealth Ministers. During this discussion Lord Jowitt 
reiterated Attlee's opening remarks about the possible challenge 
under the Most Favoured Nation clause. Jowitt's view now 
deliberately emphasised the possible challenge. The tone was 
certainly different from that of his earlier private legal 
opinion he offered to Attlee, (8) and now at this meeting 
buttressed his revised opinion with the statement that "the 
responsible department of the U.K. government believed that there 
'was a grave risk, indeed almost a certainty, of such a challenge 
being made and a strong probability that it would succeed." The 
/'responsible Department" was probably a reference to the Board 
,of Trade report which Norman Brook in his final report had 
downgraded.(9)
CONTINUED/
(8)PRO PREM 8 1464 contains Jowitt's reply 9.10.1948 to Attlee's 
memo M.138/48 dated 5.10.1948.
(9) PRO PREM 8/1464. CPM (48)20 (updated)
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Sean MacBride countered this possibility by drawing on the 
remarks of the Commonwealth Ministers themselves and explaining 
that even after the External Relations Act had been repealed,
i
| "it would be possible to maintain that this was a special kind of
I
association between Eire and the Commonwealth countries which 
differentiated their relationship from that of foreign states." 
[MacBride believed that any challenge by a third party could be 
successfully resisted simply by basing the argument on the 
factual relationship between the two countries, for example the 
reciprocal exchange of trade preferences and citizenship rights. 
Lord Jowitt and "other Commonwealth Ministers", in an apparently 
agreeable manner, explained that, in order to support the claims 
of "non-foreignership", it might not be enough to point merely 
to the "de facto treatment and concessions granted to British 
subjects as a matter of contract or at the discretion of the Eire 
government." He suggested, that in order to establish a 
constitutional link, it would be necessary that British subjects 
should have as of right a status in Eire different from that of 
the nationals of foreign countries. Lord Jowitt asked if it would 
be possible for the Irish government to enact a new citizenship 
law providing that Eire citizens should be regarded as 
"Commonwealth citizens" within the scheme of the 1948 British 
Nationality Act. As an alternative Jowitt suggested, "if that 
[were not politically practicable, would it be possible for Eire 
'to pass a citizenship law giving to Commonwealth citizens in Eire 
the same rights and privileges as were accorded to Eire citizens 
in the U.K. by sections 2 and 3 of the British Nationality 
Act,1948 ?"
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Patrick McGilligan agreed that, "it was conceivable under 
existing legislation that some arrangement might be made which 
would have the effect of according some special privileges to 
British subjects in Eire as of right."
However, Sean MacBride repeated his opposition to re-establishing 
a link as a substitute for the External Relations Act. But, he 
did add, "if, therefore, there was any question of Eire's re­
entering the Commonwealth on some new basis not involving a link 
through the Crown, this could be only after an interval of, say, 
three to six months and, even then, would have to be almost 
incidental to a revision of the Eire citizenship law undertaken 
’not for this special purpose only but on its merits."
Evatt was pressing for re-entry of Eire into the Commonwealth. 
(Undoubtedly, he was not aware of Mac Bride's antagonism to this 
idea. Five days before in a personal letter to Attlee, Evatt 
,had asked whether, even after the External Relations Act had been 
xepealed, the Eire government might "continue to invite the King 
Ito accredit their diplomatic representatives in foreign 
jcountries. " (10)
j|
E
(10) PRO PREM 8/1464 . L.D. 12.10.1948
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Mr. Attlee then summarised the intended Eire-Commonwealth 
relationship by which Eire ’would be neither a member of the 
Commonwealth nor a foreign state, but would remain in some 
intermediate position between the two." Mr. Attlee explained that 
he would be asked to define the relationship as soon as the 
repeal of the External Relations Act was passed. He would have to 
answer that: "he was advised that, in law, Eire would then be in
the position of a foreign State in relation to the other 
Commonwealth countries; and, if he said so, questions would at 
once be raised about alien's restrictions, trade preferences, and 
all the other matters which involved the Most Favoured Nation 
position."
'According to the records, Sean MacBride suggested that "as Eire 
did not wish to treat Commonwealth countries on the same basis as 
foreign states, the Most Favoured Nation trade and citizenship 
!difficulties might be avoided by a public declaration that Eire 
land the governments of Commonwealth countries did not regard one 
another as 'foreign States' through an exchange of notes drafted 
with a view to publication." This indeed was the suggestion that 
Jowitt had offered eight days before,(11) and indeed was 
eventually to provide the solution which was converted into an 
acceptable Commonwealth formula at the following Paris 
negotiations.
(11)PREM 8/1464. L.D. 9.10.1948
217
According to the Helsby and Brook's unofficial records, at the 
close of the discussions, Sean MacBride made a disjointed and 
almost apologetic reference to Partition, explaining that he
"could not leave without referring to the question of Partition." 
He explained that he "had not come to Chequers to raise that 
issue and did not wish to invite discussion of it", saying he 
realised that "Mr. Attlee would not think it appropriate to have 
that matter discussed on the present occasion, U.K. governments 
had never found any occasion appropriate for discussing 
Partition". Continuing, MacBride said he thought "it would be 
jwrong for him to leave without saying that it was the earnest 
desire of his government to end Partition in Ireland and it was 
their view that some occasion would have to be found in the not 
too distant future, on which it would be thought appropriate to 
discuss it". Contradicting Norman Brook's record of the meeting, 
Sean MacBride remembers opening his first discourse with the
grievance on Partition.(12)
It is worth noting that the possible impact of the Irish ethnic 
vote in Britain was not considered to be of importance to the
British Labour government. This was probably because no serious 
jattempt was ever made by the Irish government to harness this 
sympathy . In contrast, the Labour governments in Australia, and 
[slew Zealand, possibly because of a more cohesive ethnic Irish 
vote, were reluctant to implement any Commonwealth measures 
depriving their Irish born residents of citizenship privileges.
(12) Personal with Interview Sean MacBride. 6.1.1987.
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.Mr. Maude, from the South African High Commission in London, told
i
an official from the U.S. Embassy in London that Evatt and 
Fraser were not primarily interested in Eire's status. He
|
believed that they were more concerned with the effect the 
|outcome of the talks might have on India. His reasoning was that 
if Eire were told that there was no provision for a Republic to 
have associate membership of the Commonwealth, then this could 
set a precedent for India. According to Maude, Evatt and Fraser 
were anxious, for strategic reasons, to work out some arrangement 
to retain India within the Commonwealth ’camp", even as a 
republic.(1*) Similarly according to Norman Robertson one of the 
reasons for Fraser's conciliatory attitude was, because, 
according to the Canadian High Commissioner in London, Norman 
Robertson : "Mr. Peter Fraser took exception to any course which 
might cast any reflection on the present Royal Family."(13)
jCommenting on the defence aspects of the October 1948 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting, Maude reported that 
although no formal commitments were being undertaken, "Russia was 
the reason for the reversal of disintegration of the 
Commonwealth."(14)
(13)Canadian D.E.A.(CDEA) 50021-40 Telegram dated October 21, 
1948
(14) NRC Suiteland, Maryland ref.RG 84. Box 18. file 350 
Intelligence Memo No. 139
(1*)Mansergh, N.(Chief Ed.): The Transfer of Power 1942-47.
Vol.Xll.Enclosure No.219. "British Defence Requirements in India. 
Strategic Importance of the Indian Continent to Commonwealth 
Defence." p.319
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Immediately following the Chequers discussions, Attlee asked 
jNorman Brook's Interdepartmental Committee on Commonwealth 
Relations to consider "quickly” (15) whether the grant of 
preference and citizenship privileges to Eire could be 
effectively defended against claims from other foreign states. 
In summary Attlee effectively wanted to know if the original 
opinion offered by by Lord Jowitt would be sufficient to deter an 
attack on the Most Favoured Nation Status. Attlee was aware that 
the Irish government would have to comply and he asked Norman 
jBrook to consider if those terms would be sufficient as a 
defence for continuing Most Favoured Nation Status:
"If the Eire government adopted simultaneously with their repeal 
of the External Relations Act (or possibly after an interval of 
six months), nationality arrangements equivalent to section 1 of 
the British Nationality Act 1948, and were to state that this 
meant return to the Commonwealth. Alternatively, if the Eire 
jGovernment were prepared simultaneously with the repeal of the
External Relations Act (or possibly after an interval of six
months) (1) to amend their laws so as to provide that British
subjects were not aliens in Eire, and (2) to avoid the loss to
Eire citizens of Eire citizenship on their acquiring citizenship 
of another Commonwealth country to say that this meant return to 
the Commonwealth."(16)
(15)PRO PREM 8/1464. p.9.
(16)Ibid
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Slorman Brook submitted a report dated October 18, 1948,
advising, ”if Eire accepted the common status of Commonwealth 
citizens and accepted the position of a member of the 
Commonwealth, then there would be an arguable case against claims 
under the Most Favoured Nation clauses concerned."(17) The report 
noted that Sean MacBride suggested that some of the difficulties 
foreseen might be avoided by a public declaration that Eire and 
the governments of the Commonwealth countries did not regard one 
another as foreign states.(18)
This report concluded that the Chequers meeting arrived at an 
understanding on two principal points. That Eire ministers would 
consider the practical difficulties put before them, the 
possibility that Eire might, after an interval, re-enter the
Commonwealth on some basis (e.g. common citizenship) not
involving any connection with the Crown, and the suggestion that 
there might be some public declaration that Eire and the
countries of the Commonwealth did not regard one another as 
foreign States. It was this last point which proved acceptable to 
all concerned as being sufficient to maintain the status quo by 
treating Eire as a non-foreign state despite her declared 'de 
jure' position of not being a member of the Commonwealth.(19)
(17)PRO PREM 8/1464. report 18.10.1948.
(18)Ibid
(19)Ibid
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Eleven days after the Chequers meeting, Attlee presented a 
pemorandum on the talks(20) to his Cabinet.(21) Attlee was 
concerned about retaining India within the Commonwealth and 
worried that a defection by Eire would weaken Britain's 
leadership of the Commonwealth States in the U.N.(22) He hoped to 
"devise a constitutional status for India which might also be
acceptable to Eire as the basis for her continued membership of
the Commonwealth".(23) Attlee's memorandum contained an 
uncharacteristically inaccurate assessment of the reason the Eire 
government would not delay introducing repeal legislation. He
believed that, "behind the immediate issue lay their government's 
determination to end partition, and there was little doubt that 
they recognised that they would be in a better position to put 
pressure on the UK government once Eire had become a foreign and 
neutral state."(24)
CONTINUED/
(20)PRO Cab 129/30. CP(48) 244
(21)PRO Cab 128/13. CM(48) 67 28.10.1948
(22)PRO Cab 129/30. CP(48) 244
(23)Ibid
(24)Ibid
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The British Cabinet feared that Russia would encourage Eire to 
raise the issue of Partition in the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. During the height of the Berlin crisis in October 
1948, the Cabinet made a decision of historical importance. They 
noted that while they always maintained that "partition was an 
issue for settlement by the Irish themselves", they now stated
"that for defence reasons it was not possible any longer to
maintain that position". (25)
Following the Chequers meeting, the Irish government sent the 
British government and the governments of those Commonwealth 
states which attended Chequers, an 'aide memoire' which asked 
that the status quo continue : "It is the view of the Irish
government that a relationship with the countries of the
Commonwealth firmly based on these factors, traditions, customs 
and common interest, rather than on forms implying dependence or 
limitation of sovereignty, offers the best assurance of those 
relations of understanding and fruitful collaboration which the 
Irish government, for its part, is anxious to bring 
about."(26) This request from the Irish government, which by 
implication valued the Commonwealth link, may have appeased the 
^British government.
(25)PRO Cab 128/13. CM (48) 67. 28.10.1948
(26)NASPO S 14387A
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The Chequers meeting had ended with an agreement that a press 
communique would be issued. This communique was issued from 10 
Downing Street, and only stated that there was a general exchange 
of views on matters of common interest arising out of the 
declared intention of the Eire government to repeal the External 
Relations Act. (27) The following chapter will show that the 
breach of protocol surrounding this relatively simple procedure 
illustrates the suppressed ill feeling some British government 
ministers and officials had towards the Irish government over its 
lack of advance consultation about the "intention" to repeal the 
External Relations Act.
(27)Irish Times 18.10 .1948.
(B)
POLITICAL AND PRESS REACTION TO CHEQUERS
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jAt 6.30 p.m., on the day of the Chequers meeting/ detailed points 
jof guidance on the outcome of the meeting were telegrammed by 
|the Commonwealth Relations Office to all Commonwealth 
(representatives abroad. The diplomats were advised not to 
encourage the local press to speculate on the position "more than 
is necessary", and that the material should only be used "if need 
arises". The guidance included an elaborate explanation of the 
function of the External Relations Act and the benefits Eire 
obtained from membership of the Commonwealth in relation to trade 
and the treatment of her citizens. There was reference to "a 
.danger that she might lose international acceptance of her 
.Commonwealth status" and there would be "grave consequences 
jespecially with regard to trade preferences and nationals". (1) 
iThis briefing emphasised that although Britain, the Commonwealth 
■and Eire might wish to retain the status quo, they were at the 
mercy of other foreign states and additionally any arrangements 
would have to be acceptable in international law.(2)
According to a report from the Canadian High Commissioner in 
Dublin, the Irish Cabinet met for six hours to hear a report 
about the Chequers meeting from Ministers Sean MacBride and 
Patrick McGilligan.(3)
1(1)PRO DO 35 3962. Telegram . Y.No 79 CRO to Representative i n  
jEire, U.K. High Commissioners in Canada, New Zealand,South 
^Africa, Ceylon and the Acting High Commissioners in 
Australia,India, Pakistan and Ceylon.
(2) Ibid
(3)CDEA 50021-40
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Despite the agreement of the Chequers meeting on the issue of a 
brief press communique, the London 'Times' still carried a full 
account of the Chequers meeting the following day. Although the 
Irish cabinet did not issue a statement, the London 'Times' 
carried a report stating that a Government spokesman hinted that 
it was one of the most important gatherings of Ministers for some 
time. The London ‘Times' further reported: "Contrary to a
suggestion in the British Press that Mr. Costello's Government 
decided to repeal the Act without considering its possible 
effect, it is pointed out in Dublin that the Cabinet had given 
much thought to the decision and its meaning."(4)
Indeed, most of the British press made the Chequers meeting 
front page news the day after the meeting. In unison, the press 
[asked, "if any country can enjoy the benefits of Commonwealth 
membership without allegiance to the Crown". The Press
Association's parliamentary lobby correspondent, asserted that 
because of the proposed repeal of the External Relations Act, the 
two million Irish people who were in Britain would become
foreigners. The 'Irish Press' reported that the London papers all 
jcarried comment similar in tone to that of the Press
[Association.(5)
(4) The Times. 18.10.1948
(5) Irish Press. 18.10.1948
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The reports of the Chequers meeting were authoritative and 
highlighted the main legal problem discussed at the meeting - how 
to continue the advantages of Commonwealth trading terms, and the 
special facilities for Irish citizens in the U.K. "once the only 
recognised link with the Commonwealth, loyalty to the Crown, had 
jbeen broken". The London'Times' raised the spectre about the
authority of the Irish government to take such an action, 
referring to "the general consensus amongst diplomats that there 
had been doubts whether the consequences of such an act have been 
fully realised in Eire."(6) One interpretation could be that the
Commonwealth Relations Office briefing was designed to send 
warning signals to India via the press. At worst, it was an 
attempt to orchestrate the British press to arouse opposition to 
the repeal among Irish citizens resident in Eire and Britain.
(6) The Times. 18.10.1948
The 'Irish Times' of October 19, 1948, was more circumspect,
carrying the headline, ’Act's Repeal Should Not Affect Trade And 
Citizen's Rights." The article stated authoritatively that the 
Government did not consider that the repeal of the External 
Relations Act could be a serious obstacle to the continued 
exchange of citizenship and preferential rights with Britain and 
the Commonwealth, "provided that the British and Commonwealth 
Government's desire to maintain them."(7) Given that the 
challenge to Eire 's Most Favoured Nation status was expected 
to come from Argentina, it is perhaps significant that the the 
'Irish Times' also carried a picture of Sean MacBride and the 
Argentine Minister in Dublin, Senor Bessone, chatting amicably at 
a reception.(8)
[ m  Irish Times. 19.10.1948 
I (8)Ibid
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Continuing its approach, the 'Irish Times', on October
20 , 1948, carried a report refuting the British newspaper's
comments that threats and warnings were made to the Eire
representatives at Chequers by British ministers . The 'Irish
Times', referring to "an authority close to the Government", had 
pointed out that the government was concerned about the 
"inaccuracies about certain speculations as to what occurred 
jduring the conference at Chequers" and dismissed such reports, 
pointing out that so far from there being "warnings" and"
.threats" to this country, the proceedings were completely
.friendly. According to the 'Irish Times' the reports submitted by 
the two Irish ministers stressed the friendliness and good 
feeling at Chequers.(9) Undoubtedly, it was Irish
representatives who were trying to use the Irish newspapers to 
put up a good diplomatic front on the Chequers meeting and the 
circumstances surrounding the repeal of the External Relations 
Act. This action was to benefit Eire in the eyes of the other 
Commonwealth members, who resented the wholesale release of 
information on the Chequers meeting to the press.
(9) Irish Times. 20.10.1948
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An official of the U.S. Embassy in London, Sratten Anderson, 
reported to the State Department that the Commonwealth Relations 
Office, organised a press conference, without the knowledge of 
the non-British Commonwealth representatives and that the 
conference was held by the Commonwealth Relations Office during 
the course of the Chequers meeting.(10) According to this report, 
the Irish government was annoyed and decided to issue an 'aide 
memoire'(in fact the Irish 'aide memoire' of October 20, did not 
mention the leakage to the press).(11) Norman Archer, the 
Assistant Under-Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, visited the 
U.S. Embassy in London to explain the press's reaction to the 
^meeting. He Apologetically explained that the press had ’badly 
jOverplayed" the Chequers meeting and he urged the embassy officer 
to ’’play the matter down" when reporting to his department. 
Archer denied that the press reaction was contrived and 
dismissed the suggestion that the meeting was held on a Sunday 
for maximum coverage for a "hungry Monday press" . Archer 
'explained that there was no need for Commonwealth mediation, 
because Anglo-Irish relations "have never been better" and that 
the U.K. Government was perfectly able to suggest discussions to 
the Eire Government. Archer also dismissed the suggestion that 
the meeting was timed to influence Nehru's thinking during the 
Commonwealth meeting by remarking jovially, "the British are not 
as Machiavellian as all that."(12)
(10) NA 841 D. 00/11-248.
(11) NASPO S 14387A
(12) NA 841 D. 00/11-248.
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Anderson reported that the British concern was that the repeal 
of the External Relations Act by Eire would set a bad example to 
jlndia and that there might be a review of the Most Favoured 
Nation clause by all" foreign countries". He concluded with the 
cynical suggestion that the U.S. should be non-committal on the 
question of British-Eire trade preferences so as to "reserve 
the right to question the position at some future time."(13) 
Anderson's advice was an example of the uncertainty the British 
■Government feared in relation to the calculated response of its 
major trading partners.
iOn October 19, Lord Rugby told Sean MacBride that he thought 
.the press release "seemed to carry an unfriendly nuance". His 
reaction may have been prompted by having heard that Fraser and 
Evatt had refuted it; indeed, Evatt had called on John Dulanty 
jto disassociate himself from it.(15) Rugby tried to excuse the 
press briefing by explaining that it was the fault of the 
presenation of the press rather than the content of the 
;briefing. The impression is that Sean MacBride was not too 
disturbed about this "tactic". Indeed, it helped towards 
nullifying the Irish government's own breach of protocol. 
MacBride continued to discuss the issues raised at Chequers and 
although he admitted there were "snags", he thought none of these 
presented "a difficulty which lawyers could not get round."(16) 
Overall, this case of an attempt at "news-management" by the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, under the probable guidance of
Under- Secretary of State, Patrick Gordon Walker, backfired.
(13) NA 841 D. 00/11-248
(14)Ibid
(15)PRO DO 35 3961. Rugby to Machtig.T.No.113. 19.10. 1948
(16)Ibid
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kn intelligence memorandum from the Office of Intelligence 
Research at the US Department of State mentioned the rumour that 
the Attlee Government had encouraged the press outcry as a 
earning to other Dominions, particularly India and the Union of 
South Africa, rather than to change the Irish decision, 
apparently Irish officials believed that the leak to the press 
was contrived by Philip Noel-Baker and that "Tory die-hards in 
the Commonwealth Relations Office leaked misinterpretations to 
the press to arouse opposition.” This report also mentioned that 
the Conservative Party was attempting to exploit this "most 
recent example of what they view as Labour's spineless Empire 
policy”. The report noted that the press allegations were counter 
productive because they "solidified Irish support of repeal 
iemands".(17) Furthermore the report predicted that "if the 
Irish are not permitted to repeal the Act except at the price of 
withdrawal from the Commonwealth, they will withdraw, and the 
Commonwealth will have begun at least a partial dissolution". 
More pragmatically, the report calculated that since Ireland
supplied exports to Britain mainly in the form of agricultural 
produce below world market prices, any trade sanctions would be 
counterproductive. On the political front there was an 
picknowledgement that any infringement on the citizenship rights 
bf Irish citizens resident in Britain would be damaging to the 
(electoral prospects of the Labour Government because as an ethnic 
group there was a tendency to vote Labour.
(17) NRC RG 84 Box 18. Intelligence File 350 Memorandum No 139, 
dated, 2.6. 1949
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The report concluded that there was no constitutional reason why 
Eire could not repeal the External Relations Act and continue as 
an associate member of the Commonwealth and recommended that
B
ritain should actively propose this solution since otherwise, if 
ire left the Commonwealth, then other Dominions, unable to 
|accept the criterion of allegiance to the Crown as the formula 
for membership, might also leave the Commonwealth.(18)
The Irish government was not privy to such a confident analysis, 
otherwise they might have realised that they had a much stronger 
hand and perhaps would have acted more confidently and arguably, 
more responsibly in their negotiations with Britain and the 
Commonwealth.
(18) Ibid
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(C)
IRISH GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO CHEQUERS
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Dn October 20, 1948, John Dulanty, handed Philip Noel-Baker an
'aide memoire', (1) a copy of which was supplied to the 
Commonwealth Ministers who had taken part in the Chequers 
neeting. The 'aide memoire' began by welcoming "the frank and 
friendly nature of the discussions at Chequers.” It then set out 
Sire's case for not being regarded as a foreign country, arguing 
that:
"this relationship can and should be maintained on the basis that 
the rights and privileges involved , in so far as they are not 
covered by international agreements, are dependent upon long 
established custom and tradition and will not therefore, involve 
the creation of new rights and privileges entitling other nations 
to raise objections under the Most-Favoured-Nation clause in any 
existing international agreement." Continuing, the 'aide memoire' 
stated:
i"It is the view of the Irish Government that a relationship with 
the countries of the Commonwealth, firmly based on these factors 
of tradition, custom and common interest, rather than on forms 
implying dependence or limitation of sovereignty, offers the best 
assurance of those relations of mutual understanding and fruitful 
collaboration which the Irish Government, for its part, is 
anxious to bring about."(2)
(1)NASPO 14387A . 20.10.1948
(2)Ibid
236
The Irish government was disturbed by the possible consequences 
of the British government's reaction to the prospective repeal of 
the External Relations Act. Even by the end of October there are 
no cabinet documents to show that the Irish government had 
formulated a definite policy position with regard to whether 
repeal should mean leaving the Commonwealth or even remaining an 
associate member of the Commonwealth or even a Republic. The 
uncertainty and vacillation of the Irish government is 
illustrated by John Costello who, on October 25, 1948, arranged a 
question-and-answer press interview on the issue of the repeal of 
the External Relations Act. According to a report in the 'Irish 
[Press', when the press representatives who, as instructed had 
already tabled their questions in advance, arrived at the 
;Taoiseach's Office, they were told by Costello, that he "was 
going to answer no questions, but would make a general 
statement". John Costello then attempted to re-assure the 
[journalists by explaining that while there were to be no 
questions: " I want you to understand that I am not afraid of any 
one of the questions. I have the answer to every single one of 
them." (3)
(3) Irish Press. 26.10. 48
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It is probable that the journalists wanted to ask questions about 
the Cabinet meeting that made the decision to repeal the 
External Relations Act; such questions would have touched on the 
fact that there was no Cabinet decision or consultations prior to 
the consequences of repealing the Act. Costello claimed that his 
Government had considered all the consequences that might flow 
jfrom the repeal of the Act, and were prepared for any such 
consequences.(4)
Lord Rugby commented that the Irish government was now advancing 
the arguments for maintaining the rights and privileges of 
jCommonwealth membership. The arguments were that the change to be 
effected by the Republic of Ireland Act was a change in the 
constitutional sphere and that in making that change, the Irish 
jgovernment had declared their intention of basing their future 
jrelationship with Britain on the factual continuance of the 
traditionally close social, economic and trade arrangements 
^etween the two countries. The Irish government argued that this 
jrelationship was 'sui generis' and without precedent. They cited 
as examples the freedom of movement of citizens between the two 
Countries, the employment of each other's nationals in public 
services, banking and currency, availability of social services, 
mutual registration of medical and dental practitioners, 
recognition of certificates of proficiency, apprehension of 
offenders, special inter post office arrangements, libraries and 
agency services and that administrative arrangements take the 
place of treaties.
(4) Irish Times. 26.10 1948
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iThe Irish government were now arguing that an assessment of the 
"foreigness" of the two countries to one another which had regard 
jonly to the constitutional aspects, to the exclusion of the other 
aspects of the relationship between them, would be theoretical 
and unreal.(5) Additionally, they argued that the exchange of 
rights between Ireland and members of the Commonwealth had been 
made in Ireland on a reciprocal basis and not by any reference to 
common allegiance.
iWithin a week of the ending of the Chequers meeting the 
situation was at least clarified to the extent that the British 
jgovernment knew that there was no direct hostile intent on the 
part of the Irish government towards Britain. The Chequers 
meeting may have assuaged the British government of their worry 
.that Eire intended leaving the Commonwealth so as to be in a 
better position as a foreign state to bring the issue of 
Partition onto the world forum before the U.N.
Following the Chequers meeting, the position of Anglo-Irish 
relations vis-a-vis the Commonwealth remained as before, so that 
.Eire continued to enjoy reciprocal Most Favoured Nation treatment 
accorded between members of the Commonwealth. In practical terms, 
Anglo-Irish trade was free from the normal restrictions on trade 
such as tariffs on most goods which applied to their dealings 
with other foreign states. Additionally, under the 1948 
Nationality Act citizens of Eire were accorded the same rights in 
the British mainland as citizens of the U.K.. For example, they 
were entitled to the franchise, could enter the professions, the 
forces and the civil service.
(5) PRO DO 35 3991. Report:"Further Arguments put forward by 
Eire."
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jAccording to a memorandum prepared by the Commonwealth Relations 
pffice, the attitude of the Irish government could be summarised 
as follows: the Irish Government "earnestly desire to continue
close relations with the Commonwealth" and that relations with 
jBritain and the Commonwealth "will be strengthened if based on 
.factors of tradition, custom, and common interest rather than on 
"out worn" constitutional forms". On the issues of trade and 
citizenship rights, the Irish government wanted to maintain the 
existing preferences, arguing that as no new rights were being 
.granted, foreign(l*) nations could not raise objections under the 
Favoured Nation clauses. Finally, the memorandum
^acknowledged that the Irish government had made known their 
^determination to repeal the External Relations Act regardless of 
±he reaction of the British Commonwealth.(6)
(6) PRO DO 35 3991
(l*)The term "Foreign" country was defined in an agreement 
between the U.K. and Poland in regard to trade and commerce in 
1935. Article 2 of the agreement stated : "It is understood that 
in this agreement the term "foreign country" in relation to the 
jU.K., or in relation to any territory referred to in article 
i9, means a country not being a territory under the sovereignty of 
.His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British 
jDominions beyond the seas, Emperor of India, or under His 
Majesty's sovereignty, protection or mandate; and the term: 
foreign imports "means imports from foreign countries so 
defined. " (7)^ r
(7pPR0 DO 35 3991 "Definition of Foreign Country."
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(D)
POST-CHEQUERS—PRE-PARIS DISCUSSIONS
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On October 26, 1948, Attlee, informed the House of Commons that 
there bad been no developments on Anglo-Irish relations since 
the Chequers talks ended nine days previously; he stated, "we
explored the matter and there it rests at present." (1)
j
Attlee was faced with a parallel constitutional difficulty within 
the Commonwealth. He circulated a memorandum(2) to the Cabinet 
meeting on October 28, (3) in which he informed them that the new 
constitution of India was to provide for the establishment of 
India as a "sovereign independent Republic". The memorandum 
stated, that India would not be willing to accept the King's 
jurisdiction "even for the purpose of her external relations". 
|Attlee explained that during the Commonwealth Prime Minister's
jineeting held earlier that month, he and some other Ministers had
been discussing with Pandit Nehru, the possibility of devising 
‘some satisfactory constitutional link, preferably through the 
Crown so that India could remain within the Commonwealth on a 
basis that would be acceptable to public opinion in India. More
optimistically, Attlee pointed out that Indian ministers were
"anxious" that India should remain within the Commonwealth, and 
were looking for a constitutional basis which will be acceptable 
to their constitutional assembly. This memorandum contains a 
reference to the hope that Eire too might, after an interval, re­
enter the Commonwealth on "some new basis not involving any 
relation to the Crown".(4)
CONTINUED/
(1)H.C. Vol 457. Col 31. 26.10. 1948
(2)PRO Cab 129/30. CP (48) 244. pp. 195-99
(3)PRO Cab 128/13. CM (48) 67. pp. 113-14 28.10.1948
(4)PRO Cab 129/30. CP (48) 244. pp. 195-99
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It was still possible, even perhaps as late as mid- November 1948 
that whatever solution was applied to Ireland or indeed India, 
could also serve as an example if not a precedent to other 
members of the Commonwealth, especially Ceylon.
\
The Cabinet meeting on October 28(1*) also reviewed the 
practical consequences that were likely to follow Eire's repeal 
‘of the External Relations Act.(5) This meeting asked Philip 
Noel-Baker, to prepare and submit a memorandum which would "set 
out the terms of a written communication which might be sent to 
the Eire Government" as a reply to their 'aide memoire' received 
the week before. It was proposed to base the reply on the 
practical consequences which would follow the repeal of the 
External Relations Act and also the measures which might be taken 
to mitigate the consequences of repeal in relation to the UK and 
other Commonwealth countries. The Cabinet also asked Lord 
Chancellor Jowitt in consultation with the Attorney-General and 
the SoLicitor General to investigate whether there might be a 
successful challenge on the Most Favoured Nation preferences on 
trade aad nationality.(6)
(5)PRO Cab 128/ 13. CM(48)67. pp.113-14 (pp.58-60) 28.10.1948
(6)Ibid
(1*) It is worth noting that on October 27, an understanding had 
been reached in Paris between the "foreign Ministers" of Britain, 
France and America that they would concert all their actions in 
regard zo any new developments in the Berlin situation. Referred 
to in Cab 128/13. CM (48) 73. p.l37(p.94)
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Pn November 5,1948, Philip Noel-Baker submitted the proposed 
£raft reply to the Irish government's 'aide memoire' of October 
|20 to the Lord Chancellor for his opinion. Aware that the 
jreply might be publicised, the content was brief, dealing only 
jwith the main issues of the difficulties that might be 
pncountered on the Most Favoured Nation clause in relation to 
trade and nationality.(7)
|Any hope that Eire might re-enter the Commonwealth were quashed 
when on November 9, 1948, the Irish Cabinet amended Sean Mac
Bride's Bill to repeal the External Relations Act with a new 
pection as follows: "The description of the State shall be the
Republic of Ireland."(8) Interestingly the title of the Bill was 
Still ’EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE STATE (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS) 
piLL, 1948." The Irish cabinet meeting of November 9, granted 
jauthority for the introduction of the Bill to Dail Eireann on 
jsiovember 17.(9)
py November 10, 1948, Philip Noel-Baker had prepared a
preliminary paper for the British cabinet about the possible 
jneasures to mitigate the practical disadvantages of Eire becoming 
a foreign country.(10)
(7)PRO DO 35 3964
(8)NASPO Cab 2/10 1948 G.C. 5/46
(9)Ibid
(10)PRO CAB 129/30. CP(48)263. (pp.214-216)
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His conclusions were, firstly, that on the issue of nationality 
jit would be possible to avoid infringing any treaty obligations 
jby making it possible for Eire citizens to be naturalised on easy 
terms. Additionally, Eire citizens could be given the option of 
retaining their British subject status on the lines of Section 2 
of the British Nationality Act. Philip Noel Baker's memorandum 
recognised that there would be difficulty with the naturalisation 
process because the Irish government would first have to amend 
her 1935 Nationality Act to allow for dual citizenship.(1*)
Philip Noel-Baker's memorandum was less accommodating on trade, 
atating : "The UK and Eire will have to discontinue the grant of
,trade preferences to each other." The memorandum acknowledged 
jthat this would have entailed "re-negotiating" the June 1948 
Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement, which was proving advantageous to 
Britain because of the agreed fixed price for cattle. Since the 
itrade treaty was signed, there had been an increase in world 
prices for cattle. Not surprisingly therefore, Philip Noel-Baker 
advised, "We should not press for this re-negotiation, but Eire 
might do so."(11)
(11)PRO CAB 129/30. CP(48) 263
(1*)Section 3 of the Irish 1935 Nationality Act did not allow 
Jrish citizens to have dual nationality, accordingly if they 
became citizens of another country, their Irish citizenship was 
forfeited. See - Mansergh N.(Ed.)Documents and Speeches on 
.British Commonwealth Affairs 1931-195? Vol. 1. contains Irish 
Nationality and Citizenship Act (No 13 of 1935). p .314
245
;0n November 11, 1948, Neil Pritchard, informed Sir Eric
Machtig, with the news that the 'Irish Independent' carried a
jreport that Irish constitutional lawyers have examined the 
position very fully and are satisfied that nothing can arise out 
of the repeal of the External Relations Act as it affects the 
"factual association".(12)That same day, Neil Pritchard wrote to 
Norman Archer advising him that the Eire ministers "pooh-poohed 
the reality" of the arguments advanced at Chequers claiming that 
as lawyers they "knew very well that there were ways round legal 
^difficulties". Pritchard's letter quoting Frederick Boland 
.claimed that the real difficulties raised at the Chequers 
discussion "has not penetrated into the minds of the Eire
Ministers, and reinforces what I said about the really great 
importance of letting the Eire Ministers have something pretty
plain in black and white."(13) Indeed, Patrick McGilligan,
writing about the Chequers and Paris negotiations some twenty
years later, confirms Neil Pritchard's deductions with his 
'reference to the Most Favoured Nation clause arguments as, the 
j"old bogey". (14)
(12)PFO DO 35 3964. p.14.
(13)PFO DO 35 3964. L.D. 11.11.1948.
(14^Sunday Independent. 26.6.1968, article in McGilligan Papers 
U.C.D. Archives Department.
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The British cabinet met at 10 a.m. on Friday, November 12, (15)I
and considered six memorandums relating to the effects of Eire's
\
proposed departure from the Commonwealth. These papers included 
the conclusions of Attlee, Philip Noel-Baker, Lord Jowitt, Sir
i
I
Hartley Shawcross, James Chuter-Ede and W.E. Furlonge of the 
Foreign Office. Item two on the agenda concerned the
constitutional developments in India and Eire.(16) The main point 
for discussion was that while Eire was determined to repeal the
External Relations Act she also wanted to continue the existing
relationship on nationality and trade with the Commonwealth.
^t this meeting, Jowitt and Sir Hartley Shawcross gave their
legal advice to the effect that there was no device by which 
Britain could hope to satisfy an international court that a 
country, which was not a member of the Commonwealth, was not a 
foreign state. Accordingly, they advised that the U.K. could not 
give Eire or her citizens any special privileges which were not 
given to other foreign countries under the Most Favoured Nation 
Status. This advice was based on the premise that because the 
Irish government were independent signatories to the General 
jAgreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Havana charter, their 
arguments about close ties to Britain would not be of any use as 
a defence or excuse.
(15)PRO CAB 128/13. CM(48)71. 12.11.1948. (pp.129-131)(pp.82-85)
(16)PRO CAB 129/30. CP(48)253,(Eire and the British 
jCommonwealth, Note by Philip Noel-Baker). CP (48)254,(India's 
Relations with the Commonwealth, Note by Attlee).
C P (48)258,(Eire's Relations with the Commonwealth, Note by 
Attlee). CP(48)262, (Draft of reply to Irish 'aide memoire' of 
October 20, by Philip Noel-Baker,). CP(48)263, (Note on
Mitigating Practical Disadvantages of the Repeal of the External 
Relations Act, by Philip Noel-Baker) and finally CP(48)264 which 
contained the legal opinion of Lord Jowitt on the draft reply.
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Jowitt and Shawcross cited the case of India and explained that 
from the legal point of view they considered that Eire's case was 
weaker than India's. This was because, in order to prove the 
argument that common citizenship provided a sufficient 
constitutional link on which to base a case against any challenge 
to the Most Favoured Nation Status of Eire, it would be necessary 
to prove that its citizens had a right to enter any part of the 
territory and most importantly have a "share in its government". 
Additionally, it was pointed out that, while India was prepared 
to declare that she remained a member of the Commonwealth, Eire 
was not. The legal conclusion consequently was pessimistic with 
regard to allowing Eire to continue trading with the
Commonwealth under the Most Favoured Nation clause. Overall the
conclusion was that "the United Kingdom Government would have no 
alternative but to treat her as a foreign state and her citizens 
as aliens."(17)
This Cabinet meeting of November 12 stressed the disadvantages
that would arise if Eire were treated as a foreign state. The
example cited was the administrative difficulties the Home Office 
would be confronted with if all Eire citizens had to be treated 
as aliens in the U.K. It was further pointed out that if Eire 
became a member of the U.N. and raised the Partition issue there, 
"the UK Government would find it highly embarrassing to be forced 
to give positive support for the continuance of Partition as they 
would probably find themselves compelled to do for strategic 
reasons alone, apart from any consideration for the feelings of 
the people of Northern Ireland."(18)
(17)PRO CAB 128/13 CM (48)71. 12.11.1948. (pp.129-131)(pp.82-85)
(18)Ibid
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The British Cabinet decided to prepare a reply to the Irish
Ei
^Government's 'aide memoire' of October 20. The objective of the
I
reply was to put on record the "difficulties to which this repeal
I
jwould give rise".(19) The Cabinet believed that it was important 
to point out to the Irish people that the proposed measures would 
not be due to the discretion of the UK Government or were 
retaliatory but "were the inevitable consequences of the action 
taken by their own Government which would inevitably flow as a 
consequence from international law." In order to highlight this 
point, the Cabinet agreed that a communication should be 
forwarded to the Irish Government pointing out the consequences 
jof the repeal. Significantly, the Cabinet agreed that the 'aide 
memoire' together with the Irish Government's 'aide memoire' 
should be "publicised at the earliest possible date".(20)
It is possible that the British cabinet hoped that the 
reasonableness of their case would indeed be publicised before 
the Irish government introduced the repeal legislation in the 
jDail, on November 18. A member of the Cabinet did point out that 
ithe publication of the Irish Government's 'aide memoire' and the 
|British note would not deter the introduction of the Bill. (21) It 
is likely that the publication was intended to do more than 
upstage the Irish government who may have had a similar 
jintent. (22) Indeed, the British Cabinet may have hoped to 
intercede with the Irish people directly hoping that/
(19) Ibid
(20) Ibid
(21) Ibid
(22) NASPO S.14387A see 'aide memoire' 20.10.1948
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jthat by publicising their 'aide memoire' , it might act as a
yarning and persuade the Irish government not to repeal the
I
jtat. (23)
The Cabinet agreed that a note, already prepared, though with 
minor revisions, should be sent to the Irish Government, as a 
reply to their 'aide memoire' of October 20. The note pointed out 
|that Eire would suffer exclusion from the benefits of 
pommonwealth membership with particular reference to trade and 
Rationality. Extracts from the note read as follows:
[’The repeal by the Eire Government of the Eire Executive 
Authority (External Relations ) Act, 1936, would have the result 
that Eire would become, for the purpose of :'Most-Favoured- 
tfations' treaties, a foreign country.
T h e United Kingdom would therefore either have to withdraw trade 
preference which she now accords to Eire; or, if she made no 
change in her treatment of Eire, the consequences would be that, 
except for a few protective and revenue duties, the United 
Kingdom Government could have virtually no tariff, because every 
Important country would have to be granted the almost universal 
free entry now enjoyed by Eire.
The United Kingdom government would therefore have no alternative 
Dut to bring Eire citizens under the ordinary aliens control 
applicable to foreign nationals.” The note concluded with an 
invitation to the Irish government to discuss the legal 
implications.(24)
(23) PRO Cab 128/13 CM(48)72. 13.11.1948
(24)PRO DO 35 3964. X2638/39 contains proof of 'aide memoire'
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Almost as an afterthought, the British cabinet meeting of 
|November 12 decided to ask Sir Hartley Shawcross who was due to 
fly to Paris that afternoon, to show the proposed draft of the 
'aide memoire' to Peter Fraser and the Canadian Minister for 
Justice and Attorney General, Louis St. Laurent and Herbert 
Evatt. Expecting that the draft would be approved, the Cabinet 
had already decided in advance that "subject to their comments 
the communication should be despatched to the Eire Government 
that evening", as soon as it and the Irish government's aide 
.memoire had been communicated to the press.(25) Given the rift 
I that followed, that polite assumptive nuance "subject to their 
comments" was indeed an understatement and showed the gulf 
developing between Commonwealth members and personalities, not 
just on Anglo-Irish relations, but more probably over the issue 
of criteria for membership of the Commonwealth particularly 
relating to defence.
(25)PRO CAB 128/13 CM(48)71. 12.11.1948 p.131 (p.85)
.
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CH: X
COMMONWEALTH DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS 
(A)
COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIVES CONSULTED IN PARIS
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On the evening of November 12, 1948, Sir Hartley Shawcross, began 
jconversations with Herbert Evatt and the Canadian Secretary of 
jState for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, in Paris. He had 
jhoped to meet Peter Fraser later on that evening. He telegrammed 
Attlee from Paris at 10p.m. ( French time) to report that Evatt
was "most difficult", being annoyed over the unauthorised press 
conference following the Chequers meeting. Additionally, Evatt 
felt thwarted because he was under the impression that Lord 
jjowitt was going to consult with him to find a solution following 
ithe Chequers talks and instead the form of the British reply was 
being presented to him as a 'fait accompli'.(1)
Evatt now held the same opinion as the Irish ministers and was 
astonished that the British government would contemplate 
rescinding the special provisions for Irish citizens resident in 
Britain as were contained in the British Nationality Act,1948. 
!He considered that there would be no difficulties over the Most 
favoured Nation clause and "airily dismissed" the possibility of 
ja challenge from foreign states. To substantiate his deductions 
Evatt cited the precedent of Burma, which left the Commonwealth 
jand now, even though a Republic, still retained Most Favoured 
Nation status among Commonwealth members.
(1) PRO DO 35 3964 Telegrams 390 from UKDEL Paris. 12.11.1948
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Evatt asked that any insinuation contained in the proposed 'aide 
memoire' that the Commonwealth representatives were in agreement 
tfith it should be deleted. He believed that even if the views 
were correct, that it was the wrong time to express them. Based 
on his conversation with Evatt, Shawcross reported that Pearson's 
jattitude was, "as one would expect, more reasonable." However, 
Pearson also wanted reference to the Chequers meeting and 
"Countries of the Commonwealth" removed from the proposed 'aide 
pemoire' because of the implication that the representatives of 
the Commonwealth agreed with the proposed note. (2) 
jShawcross, after speaking to Evatt and Pearson, recommended to 
jAttlee that there should be further consultations with 
Commonwealth representatives on the legal aspects and suggested: 
i"possibly not to send the note". After speaking to Evatt and 
Pearson, Shawcross expected that Fraser's view would have been 
awayed by Evatt and "will not be very different". At five minutes 
past midnight on November 13, (French time), Shawcross sent a 
telegram from the U.N. General Assembly office in Paris to Attlee 
reporting on his "long talk" with Fraser. The telegram (received 
at 11.59 p.m. GMT, November 12) was headed, "This telegram is of 
particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised 
recipient and not passed on." Surprisingly, this telegram 
described the atmosphere of the talks with Fraser as cordial 
and he "showed no sympathy whatever with Evatt's negative and 
unhelpful approach to the problem."(3)
.CONTINUED/
(2)Ibid
(3)PRO DO 35 3964. Telegram 391 from UKDEL Paris.
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His report continued to mention that Fraser did raise some 
objection to sending the note but overall felt this episode 
served to illustrate the lack of consultation and sharing of 
confidential matters by the British government with Commonwealth 
governments on other issues. Despite Fraser's comparatively co­
operative stance, Shawcross again advised that Prime Minister 
j” not to proceed with a unilateral demarche to the Eire
government." Instead he advised Attlee to resume consultations 
with the "four oldest Governments of the Commonwealth," arguing 
;that if a note were sent in spite of the views of Commonwealth 
representatives, "we shall risk impairing our relations with 
three Commonwealth countries that really count for the sake of 
making a demarche to Eire which no one really believes will
produce any practical result."(4)
The following day, Shawcross's report was discussed at the 
pabinet meeting. (5) The minutes, in an understatement, noted 
.that Evatt and Fraser expressed "concern" at the proposal to send 
ja note to the Irish Government based on those terms which 
^mphasised the consequences of repealing the External Relations
|Act.(6) Immediately prior to this meeting, the British government
believed that the Bill to repeal the Act would be introduced in 
pail Eireann on November 18 and commence upon enactment. However, 
bn November 13, they were relieved to hear that the Bill did not 
Contain a date for the commencement of the repeal legislation.(7)
CONTINUED/
(4)Ibid
(5)PRO CAB 128/13. CM(48)72. 13.11.1948 pp.133-34.
(6)Ibid
(7)PRO CAB 128/13. CM(48)72. 13.11.1948 pp.133-34. (p.89)
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Consequently, the Cabinet meeting of November 13 appears less
bellicose in its approach than the day before and agreed that
there was no longer the urgency to publish the intended 'aide 
memoire' since negotiations to ease the impact or the
consequences could now take place before the commencement of the 
.^ct. A conciliatory attitude emerged amongst some members of the 
British cabinet. This section accepted that the Commonwealth were 
interested because of their Irish populations and were concerned 
that Ireland should not secede from the Commonwealth in
Circumstances which left her with a sense of grievance against 
the UK, and possibly the other members of the Commonwealth.
following the rebuff from the backbone of the Commonwealth, the 
Cabinet re-appraised the proposal to send the note. Again the 
^iard-liners probably led by Norman Brook and composing of Foreign 
pecretary, Ernest Bevin, Lord President, Herbert Morrison, and 
possibly James Chuter-Ede, (acting on the advice of his permanent 
Secretary of the Home Office, Frank Newsam) repeated the earlier
warning that it was important that the Irish Government should be
sent a warning. These Cabinet ministers still interpreted Evatt's
and Fraser's response against the sending of the note as selfish,
accusing them of "looking at this problem from the point of view 
of their own countries, none of which had interests in world 
.trade comparable with those of the United Kingdom.”(8) These/
(8)PRO CAB 128/13. CM (48)72. 13.11.1948 pp.133-34. (p.88)
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These ministers argued that the publication by Britain of the
I
Irish 'aide memoire' and their reply which emphasised the Most
I
Favoured Nation difficulties in relation to trade and
nationality, would cause panic about the possible uprooting and 
displacement of Irish citizens and that that would make the Irish
Government think twice about their course of action. The
publication of the 'aide memoires' was, according to these 
Cabinet ministers, intended "to bring home to the people of Eire 
jthe practical consequences of the repeal and, if Eire Ministers 
jfelt less confident of public support, they might at least be 
prepared to adopt a more reasonable attitude in determining the 
date from which the new act would take effect."(9) This attitude 
may well have been voiced previously to John Costello by Rugby 
when he delivered the 'aide memoire' on October 7. (If so, that
would arguably account for Costello's offer of resignation that
afternoon to some members of his Cabinet and also for his 
refusal to attend the Chequers meeting.) The hard-line group in 
ithe Cabinet argued that if the note were not sent in reply, then 
the British government "might subsequently be criticised for 
having failed to warn Eire ministers in detail of what these 
consequences were likely to be."(10)
(9)Ibid
(10)PRO CAB 128/13. CM(48)72. 13.11.1948 ppl33-34. (p.89)
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tfhile the British government were strongly influenced by the 
Commonwealth Minister's adverse reaction to their proposed 'aide 
raemoire', the softening of reaction may have been encouraged by 
jthe Irish government postponing the commencement date. The 
British cabinet now agreed that "an interim reply" should instead 
be sent to the Irish government which would point out that 
careful consideration had been given to their 'aide memoire' but 
they were still unable to see any way of overcoming the 
difficulties and suggested that if it was impossible for the 
Irish government to postpone the introduction of the Bill, then 
the date for commencement should "provide a sufficient interval 
to enable the full implications to be further discussed."(11) 
This meant that the original reproachful reply was withdrawn 
and instead a new softer note was immediately despatched to 
Rugby to be handed to "Mr Costello or, in his absence, Mr. 
MacBride.(12) This revised 'aide memoire' explained that the 
(British government "were still unable to find any way of 
overcoming the difficulties" and simply asked for the 
postponement of the commencement of the Act. (13)
(11)Ibid
(12)PR0 DO 35 3964. CRO to Rugby. Telegram No. 285. Des.1.10p.m. 
13.11.1948. X.2638/39.
• ( 13) Ibid
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rhe British cabinet meeting of November 13 agreed that Lord 
Chancellor Jowitt and Philip Noel-Baker should go to Paris 
jLmmediately to see Peter Fraser, Herbert Evatt and Lester 
Pearson, all of whom were attending a meeting of the General 
\ssembly of the United Nations In Paris.(14) Jowitt and Noel- 
3aker's mission was to try to obtain a Commonwealth consensus on 
the legal issues involved and to ask for their agreement that the 
Irish representatives should be invited to join in further 
discussions. The Cabinet also instructed Lord Jowitt and Philip 
SToel-Baker to request the Commonwealth representatives to use
their good offices to ask the Irish Government to see "the 
advantages of allowing a reasonable interval to elapse before the 
the proposed legislation was brought into operation." Most 
importantly the Cabinet suggested that attention be drawn to the 
possible effects on India and other Commonwealth countries "of
the policy adopted in relation to Eire." Accordingly it was 
pgreed that the Commonwealth representatives should hold 
preliminary discussions about India's future relationship with 
the Commonwealth.(15)
Following the Cabinet decision of November 13, Jowitt and Philip 
tfoel-Baker met with Evatt, Fraser and Pearson at the British 
Smbassy in Paris on Sunday November 14 at 11 a.m.(16)
(14)Fanning, R. : The Response of the London and Belfast 
Sovernments.p.102
(15)PRO CAB 128/13. CM (48)72. 13.11.1948. ppl33-34. (p.89)
(16)PRO Cab 129/31. CP(48) 272. (pp.6-13) Report:"Eire's Future
Relations with the Commonwealth." 17.11.1948
Appendix to report, Annex A meeting on 14.11.1948 p.6
Appendix to report, Annex B meeting at 11.am. on 15.11.1948
Appendix to report, Annex C meeting at 5.pm. on 15.11.1948
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|A full list of the attendance at the meeting was as follows: the 
Prime Minister of New Zealand, Peter Fraser and his Secretary of
I
|State for External Affairs, A.D.Mc Intosh, Dr. Herbert Evatt and 
the Australian High Commissioner in London, J.A. Beasley. The 
Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. 
■Pearson and the High Commissioner for Canada in London, Norman 
,Robertson accompanied by Mr G. Riddell. The U.K. was represented 
by Lord Chancellor Jowitt, Sir Norman Brook, Philip Noel-Baker 
.and officials Sir Eric Machtig, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Mr. F.E. 
Cumming-Bruce and Mr. B.R. Curson. The Home Office was 
represented by Sir Frank Newsam and Mr. L.S. Brass. Representing 
the Board of Trade was Mr. S.L. Holmes and the Parliamentary 
Counsel Office was represented by S. Rowlatt. The name of Dr. A 
Carson was later pencilled in as having attended the meeting.(17)
.The purpose of the discussion was to find a method of continuing 
ithe existing Commonwealth status quo in relation to trade and 
nationality with Eire after the repeal of the External Relations 
jAct. At this preliminary meeting, Lord Jowitt highlighted the 
ifact that the External Relations Act involved the political issue 
of the future of the Commonwealth, particularly in relation to 
India. He then explained the legal difficulties which might be 
Challenged by an international court, especially the terms of the 
^4ost Favoured Nation clauses of commercial treaties between the 
various Commonwealth countries and foreign countries.
(17)PRO Cab 129/31. CP(48) 272. (pp.6-13)
Appendix to report, Annex A meeting on 14.11.1948 p.6
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Svatt countered Jowitt's pessimistic prognostications with his 
/iew that it would be possible to continue to retain the status 
juo 'vis-a-vis' Eire when she repealed the External Relations Act 
Dy advancing the possibility of creating a special link similar 
to the one as then existed between the U.S. and the Philippines 
and Cuba. Evatt, as though versed by Sean MacBride, put forward 
jthe theory that his government's action was largely impelled by 
iomestic considerations, in particular "to take the gunmen out of 
Irish politics".(18) This excuse was never discussed by the 
British government and can be assumed to have been dismissed by 
them. That meeting on the morning of November 14 agreed to send 
an invitation to John Costello or Sean MacBride, inviting them 
to continue the Chequers discussions at the earliest possible 
late and if possible before the introduction of the Bill 
repealing the External Relations Act. They left the venue open, 
nentioning Paris, London, or Dublin. An important point about 
jthe invitation was that it emanated from the Commonwealth as a 
rfhole instead of from the British government alone.
Shortly before midday on November 14, Sir Eric Machtig, having 
conferred with the Commonwealth representatives in Paris, 
telephoned Lord Rugby with the text of an agreed message from 
Paris.(19) This message stated that Lord Jowitt and Philip 
Noel-Baker had discussed the proposed repeal of the External 
Relations Act with Fraser, Evatt and Pearson that it "was the 
unanimous view of all those present that it would be most 
desirable if, in continuation of the talks at Chequers on 
October 17, further discussions either in Paris , London, or 
Dublin could be held with Eire Ministers at the earliest possible 
date and if possible, before the introduction of the Bill for the 
repeal of the External Relations Act."(20)
Sean MacBride remembered that immediately prior to the Paris 
talks, Dr Evatt phoned him to advise him to reject any efforts 
by the British government to continue* the Chequers talks without 
Evatt's conciliatory attendance.(21) This may have been a 
gesture of solidarity by Evatt to lessen MacBride's sense of 
being outside the inner Commonwealth discussions.
CONTINUED/
(19) PRO Cab 129/31. CP(48) 272. Appendix to Annex A (p.9.)
(20)Ibid
(21) Irish Times 1.1.1979 also Personal Interview Sean MacBride, 
6.1. 1987.
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In the early afternoon of Sunday, November 14, Lord Rugby 
telephoned the Commonwealth Relations Office , informing them 
that the initial reaction of Sean MacBride was to agree that he 
and Minister of Finance,Patrick McGilligan would fly to Paris the 
following day,(22) A specially convened meeting of the Irish 
Cabinet met at five o'clock on Sunday evening, November 14, to 
discuss the invitation. The Cabinet confirmed and sanctioned Mac 
Bride's earlier decision and now decided that MacBride ,Mc 
Gilligan and the Attorney General, Cecil Lavery, should go to 
Paris the following day, to meet with Commonwealth 
representatives.(23)
At 7p.m. that evening, Rugby telephoned the Commonwealth 
Relations Office to pass on the text of the Irish government's 
acceptance which was to be published in the Irish papers the next 
morning. Rugby mentioned that the Irish ministers were prepared, 
if necessary, to wait in Paris before the talks commenced. This 
was because the only available direct flight to Paris from 
Ireland was early on Monday morning. This message in turn was 
communicated to Paris.(24)
(22)PRO DO 35 3964. Note by duty officer addressed to
MacLennan. 14.11.1948 p.22
(23)NASPO CAB 2/10. G.C. 5/48 . 14.11.1948
(24)PRO DO 35 3964. Note by duty officer addressed to MacLennan. 
14.11.1948 p.22
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(B)
IRISH-COMMONWEALTH NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS NOVEMBER 15-16,1948
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Three sets of meetings were held in Paris between the Irish 
Ministers and the Commonwealth representatives. The purpose of 
the talks was to devise a means whereby it would be possible for 
Eire and the Commonwealth countries to continue to grant Most 
Favoured Nation privileges to each other without breaching 
existing Commonwealth agreements with foreign states.
Talks started with an informal discussion after dinner on Monday, 
|November 15, and continued with full and formal meetings in the 
morning and afternoon of November 16.(1) The meetings on November 
16 were held in the offices of Dr Evatt at the Palais de 
^Chaillot. Included in the attendance at both sessions were the 
representatives of the U.K., Lord Chancellor Jowitt, Philip Noel- 
|Baker, Sir Norman Brook, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, F.E. Cumming- 
jBruce and S.L. Holmes,( Board of Trade). Ministers Sean MacBride 
jand Patrick McGilligan and the Attorney General, Cecil Lavery 
represented Eire.(1*) Australia was represented by Dr. Herbert 
Evatt and the High Commissioner in London J.A. Beasley, New 
Zealand by Peter Fraser and the Secretary for External Affairs 
A.D. Me Intosh, Canada was represented by the Secretary of State 
for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson and the Canadian High 
Commissioner in London, Norman Robertson and Mr. G. Riddell (who 
was absent from the afternoon session.)(2)
(1)PRO Cab 129/31. CP(48) 272 (pp6-13) Report:"Eire's Future 
Relations with the Commonwealth." 17.11.1948 (pp.6-13)Annex B. 
All references from this file unless otherwise stated.
(2)PRO Cab 129/31. CP(48) 272. Appendix to report, Annex C
(1*)A Canadian report prepared from notes by F.E. Cumming -Bruce 
:and Mr. Riddell included Frederick Boland in the morning session 
|of November 16. (3)
(3) CDEA 50021-40 199(S)/29
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According to the minutes(1*) of the meeting held on the morning 
of November 16, Peter Fraser began by criticising the 
arrangements made for supplying information to the press about 
the Chequers meeting. It was agreed that no press conferences 
should be held following these meetings. (4) Sean MacBride's 
recollections of this are more graphic; he remembers Peter Fraser 
making the gesture of throwing loose change on the table asking 
whether the newspapers should be bought at the beginning of the 
meeting in order to read the outcome.(5) This was a reference to 
the press conference being held without agreement and before the 
end of the Chequers meeting and also that the press conference 
had given the impression that other Commonwealth government's 
were attempting to coerce the Irish Government into abandoning 
their intention to repeal the External Relations Act. Another 
criticism levelled at the unauthorised press conference was that 
it had effectively given notice to interested countries about the 
possibility of raising objections to Eire's claim to continue 
having Most Favoured Nation status after the External Relations 
Act was repealed.
(4)PRO Cab 129/31. CP(48) 272. Appendix to report, Annex B
(5) Irish Times 1.1.1979
(1*) Lester Pearson wrote to his Acting Under-Secretary of State 
and explained that Mr Beasley asked that no records should be
taken of the meeting in Paris because records of previous
Commonwealth discussions had fallen into the hands of members of 
the opposition of the Parliament in Australia and had been used 
in a manner which embarrassed the Government. "Since it was 
agreed by the meeting to concur in Mr. Beasley's request the 
attached account of what took place should not be regarded as the 
kind of record which Mr. Beasley did not wish to have made. This
proviso gives an appropriate Irish character to the status of
this record." (6)
(6) CDEA 50021-40 199 (S)/29. L.D. 23.11.1948
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Fraser made a strong appeal to the Irish Ministers that Eire 
should continue within the Commonwealth. That was supported by 
all the representatives present. He based his appeal on 
historical, domestic and international ties, pointing out that 
Eire was "one of the parent countries of the Commonwealth, and 
that cessation would be greeted by Irish people throughout the 
world with dismay." He explained that because of the large Irish 
elements in their populations, there would be domestic 
political difficulties for the governments of Britain, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Finally, he spoke of the 
"duty" of the Commonwealth countries "at this time" to stand 
together in resisting the threat of Communism and preserving 
world peace. He urged that there should be no apparent weakening 
of the Commonwealth group at this critical stage in international 
affairs, arguing that the termination of "Eire's special 
constitutional association with the Commonwealth would be seized 
on by our enemies and shake the confidence of our friends in the 
stability of the group."
(That day Peter Fraser, in a confidential and personal note, 
appealed to Costello to postpone the introduction of the repeal 
Bill so that there could be further discussions about allowing 
the continuation of Eire's close relationship with the 
Commonwealth.)(7)
(7) NASPO S. 14387
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Sean MacBride and Patrick McGilligan replied by reaffirming the 
Irish government's commitment to repeal the External Relations 
Act and again stated that Eire was not prepared to become a 
member of the Commonwealth. The Irish minister's stance was that 
:they too wished to continue to strengthen the close factual 
relationship between Eire and the countries of the Commonwealth 
but believed that this could be achieved through a reciprocal 
exchange of rights on trade and citizenship between free and 
independent peoples. The Irish Ministers believed that the 
Commonwealth countries could together find means of resisting any 
attempt by third parties to drive a wedge between them on the 
basis of the Most Favoured Nation rights.
Lord Chancellor Jowitt began by explaining that the British 
^Government wanted to know if the Irish Government were prepared 
jto assist in giving some explanation to any challenge under the 
jMost Favoured Nation clause by proposing some form of 
constitutional link which could be used in argument to justify 
.discrimination against such foreign countries as Denmark.
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Sean MacBride, in a lengthy reply, began by castigating the 
External Relations Act, explaining that the reason for repealing 
the Act was because "it was a flimsy, dishonest and, indeed, a 
derisory instrument which could not be defended on its merits." 
Secondly, that the Irish Government believed that relations 
would benefit with the removal of the link with the Crown, 
and he suggested "an entirely fresh start .... on a footing of 
frank independence." He explained that it was the Irish 
government's wish to maintain the existing relationship on trade 
and nationality and he believed that since Eire was outside the 
Commonwealth since 1937, it had therefore acquired a "strong 
prescriptive right to continuation of the present treatment" .
MacBride doubted whether in fact any such claims would be made 
and cited the fact that the Havana Charter and the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs adopted, in their classification 
of states, certain groupings referring to countries 
geographically, or alternatively used a principle of groupings 
not based exclusively on common sovereignty and also that the 
special position of Burma was already recognised in these 
instruments. Sean MacBride then asked that the existing trade 
and citizenship arrangements should be maintained to see if a 
claim arose.
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Dr. Evatt started by supporting Eire, saying that he thought "the 
term Eire was a mistake because in the English language the term 
Ireland should be used." Evatt reasoned that since MacBride did 
not regard the U.K., Australia, Canada and New Zealand as foreign
countries he proposed that they should make this clear in a
statement in the Dail which might then be referred to as support 
of any case made against claims by foreign states. Evatt, now 
circulated the draft of such a declaration.
That draft read as follows: "From the point of view of Ireland,
the factual relationship between it and the United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand is clear. Ireland does not,
and, when the External Relations Act, 1936, is repealed, will
not, regard the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia or New Zealand 
as "foreign" countries or treat their peoples as "foreigners". On 
the contrary, the fact is that the citizens of Ireland, while 
resident in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, or New
Zealand, are treated by law or practice not as "foreigners" or 
aliens but as entitled to the rights and privileges of nationals 
or citizens of those nations. Similarly, while in Ireland, the 
nationals or citizens of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia or 
New Zealand are treated not as foreigners or aliens, but as
entitled to the rights and privileges of citizens of Ireland.
These facts not only negative the view that Ireland and the
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are to be 
regarded as "foreign" countries; but they also evidence the fact 
of a special association which it is the firm desire and 
intention of Ireland to maintain and strengthen."
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Sean MacBride agreed with the content of the formula but 
explained that the Irish constitution limited voting in general 
elections to citizens of Eire. Lord Jowitt liked the idea of the 
draft statement but wanted something more substantial, suggesting 
"some legal facade in substitution for the External Relations Act 
to enable the U.K. Government to refrain from treating Eire 
citizens as aliens after repeal." He suggested that Eire should 
undertake to amend their nationality legislation so that British 
subjects should no longer be legally aliens in Eire.
Lester Pearson was optimistic believing friendly states and 
allies such as Denmark would refrain on the grounds of Western 
solidarity from making any challenge during the "present 
situation" and even that Argentina "would not in the light of 
her attitude to the G.A.T.T. take the initiative."
It emerged from the above talks that Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand were confident that the status quo regarding trade and 
nationality could be maintained. Britain was concerned about 
the vulnerability of her trade from a challenge under 
international law and believed that the other Commonwealth 
Labour leaders were adopting a selfish posture and were more 
.concerned with losing Irish ethnic votes.(8) The meeting agreed 
to continue the discussions later that afternoon at five o'clock.
(8)PRO DO 35 3964
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Patrick McGilligan/ recollecting these talks twenty years later, 
considered the possibility of an Argentinian challenge to be a 
"rather woolly and fumbling argument" advanced by the British 
representatives. McGilligan thought that this "bogey" had been 
disposed of at Chequers, and seems almost surprised "when at 
Paris, the Argentinian spectre was again raised." McGilligan 
gives the impish impression of turning the challenge to the Most 
Favoured Nation Status into a joke, by referring to Commonwealth 
representatives enquiring about the "mystical inquisitive 
Argentinian" lodging objections to the continuance of Most 
Favoured Nation status to Eire after adshe had left the 
Commonwealth. (9)
[
During the luncheon period, Lester Pearson told McGilligan that 
he thought the issue of the Most Favoured Nation clauses and 
citizenship was a last despairing effort on the part of the 
British. He reassured McGilligan that he would hear no more 
about it. McGilligan recollected that the point was not, in 
fact, ever again raised.(10) Indeed, these arguments were not 
raised at the following session but this may possibly have been 
because they had been sorted out through Evatt's suggestion that 
Eire should give a commitment to recognise mutual Commonwealth 
citizenship.
(9)Sunday Independent. 2.6.1968 extract in Patrick McGilligan 
Papers U.C.D. Archives Department.
(10) Ibid
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I At tlhis stage the Irish delegates were apparently willing to 
forego the Most Favoured Nation benefits in relation to trade. 
Eire's exports to Commonwealth countries other than the United 
Kingdom were so small that there would have been little affected 
by an increase in tariffs against the exports benefiting from 
preferences. Only 8% of annual exports from Eire to Britain, 
benefited from Most Favoured Nation status.(11) In fact Britain 
gained a larger benefit because the United Kingdom exports to 
Eire which were entitled to preferences exceeded the Irish. 
However, that advantage would have been offset if Britain's 
exports to Argentina and Arab countries were put at risk.(12) 
Eire's prime concern in relation to the Most Favoured Nation 
status was to retain the existing arrangements for the treatment 
of Irish nationals in Britain. In fact, all of the Commonwealth 
countries wanted to retain the status quo with regard to Irish 
nationals. Their reasons varied from, in the UK's case, the sheer 
administrative difficulties, to Australia and New Zealand's 
dependence on the Labour-orientated Irish vote. The Foreign 
Office noted that the continuation of the existing relationship 
regarding the treatment of citizens "would cause less 
complications since treaties incorporating the term foreign 
country were mostly concerned with trade and commerce and not 
with the treatment of nationals." (13)
(11)PRO DO 35 3961 . Draft memorandum prepared by I. MacLennon 
submitted to F.A. Vallat. 1.11.1948.
(12)Ibid
(13)PRO FO 371 70175 .Report:The Practical Consequences of the 
Termination of Eire's Membership of the Commonwealth."
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Given the practical factors involved, it is not surprising that 
at that meeting all of the particpants apparently agreed that it 
would be unreal to begin to start recognising Eire citizens 
resident in the respective Commonwealth countries as foreigners 
and similarly citizens of Commonwealth countries resident in 
Ireland.
After lunch, talks resumed at five o' clock. The composition of 
this meeting in regard to Commonwealth representatives was as 
^before except for the absence of Mr.G. Riddell. Lord Jowitt 
began by asking if Eire would be prepared to extend the content 
of the draft statement as an 'aide memoire' where it pertains to 
recognition of non-foreigness, not only to Australia, Canada, New 
I Zealand and Britain but also to other Commonwealth countries.
!Sean MacBride stated that this was the intention and that he 
intended to address a similar note to the "new” dominions, after 
agreement had been reached as a result of the current talks. The 
discussion then turned on whether Eire would amend her 
Citizenship Act, 1935, so as to grant reciprocal rights to all 
the members of the Commonwealth. Sean MacBride stated that he was 
personally in favour, but he could not commit his government, 
explaining that any such arrangement would have to be carefully 
timed "as it would be most harmful if the amendments were thought 
to be part of a bargain made with the Commonwealth governments." 
Peter Fraser requested that the intention to reciprocate 
citizenship rights should be made on/
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on the Second Reading of the Repeal Bill in the Dail. Jowitt 
again stated that other Commonwealth countries must be in a
position to state that their citizens were not aliens under Irish 
law: "it was not enough to say that they were not being treated
as aliens". Evatt also believed that a relationship based on the 
grant of reciprocal citizenship rights "would constitute in a
group relationship of a special and definite character of 
significance for international law."
It was Dr Evatt who produced the simple and effective solution 
which provided the formula for the continuation of Most 
Favoured Nation status for Eire after the repeal of the External 
1 Relations Act. He suggested that the Commonwealth and Eire would
agree not to regard each other's citizens as foreign after the
repeal of the External Relations Act. This would be evidenced by 
"the fact of a special association". Dr Evatt then proposed the 
clinching suggestion namely, that a statement to the above effect 
could be made during the course of the Second Reading of the Bill 
being introduced to repeal the External Relations Act. Sean 
MacBride immediately replied that if a solution on those lines 
ivas acceptable to the representatives of the other Commonwealth 
countries, he personally would be quite willing to make such a 
statement in the Dail.
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Lord Jowitt then attempted to clarify what was still an ill- 
defined commitment by specifying that it should include a 
reciprocal exchange of citizenship rights as opposed to 
concessions or rights made by favour. Jowitt asked for a direct 
statutory provision conferring positive rights of citizenship in 
terms comparable to those of section three of the British 
Nationality Act, 1948. (1*) MacBride and McGilligan, while 
agreeing to this, explained that for political reasons it would 
be necessary to introduce such legislation(2*) when "tidying up"
l
jtheir own Nationality Act and they would announce such an
^intention during the course of the "repeal Bill".
jThe following are the main points which were agreed
provisionally, at the Paris meetings but which still required
the approval of the respective Governments: Firstly "None would
make any comments that would increase or highlight political or
legal difficulties relating to the Most Favoured Nation status.
|A11 members of the Commonwealth and Eire would "collaborate" to
resist any claims which may be made by foreign countries under
:the Most Favoured Nation status. An announcement would be made in
[the Dail during the course of the Bill to repeal the External
Relations Act, to the effect that eventually reciprocal
citizenship would be given to peoples of all Commonwealth
countries, comparable with the rights conferred by section 3, of
the British Nationality Act, 1948. (14)
(14)As 1.
(l*)British Nationality Act, 1948. (11 & 12 Geo 6 CH.56.) In
|Mansergh, N. (Ed.): Documents and Speeches on British
.Commonwealth Affairs. 1931-52. Vol 11. pp..950-951.
I (2*)Eire, Citizens of United Kingdom and Colonies ( Irish 
.Citizenship Rights Order 1949. S.l. No. 1. 1949.)See Mansergh, N. 
|(Ed.): Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs.
'1931-52. Vol 11. p. 836.
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The meeting agreed that there should be no press announcements 
other than the agreed press communique and that the discussions 
should, be secret. It was agreed that the ministers involved in 
the discussions would seek the views of their various governments 
on the proposals made.
Lord Jowitt and Philip Noel-Baker submitted a memorandum(15) to 
the Cabinet meeting on November 18, (16) which dealt mainly with 
the Paris discussions. This memorandum conceded that during the 
discussion "it became evident that the representatives of Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand were keenly anxious to find a solution 
on the lines of maintaining that Eire and the Commonwealth 
countries were not 'foreign' to one another." As reported by 
Philip Noel-Baker, "it was at this point that the other members 
of the Commonwealth were keen to uphold the non foreigness of 
Eire, arguing that this simply reflected the facts of the 
situation." Similarly, Lord Jowitt stated, "if we persisted in 
the view that Eire must be regarded as a foreign country once the 
ERA was repealed, we should find ourselves alone in maintaining 
that view." He continued, "It was plain that Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand like Eire, wished to follow the contrary view; 
and they all felt so strongly on this point that it seemed likely 
that they might press it to the point of public disagreement with 
the United Kingdom government."(17)
(15)Cab 129/31 CP(48)272. (pp.6-8)
(16)Cab 128/13 CM(48)74. 18.11.1948. p.141
(17)Cab 129/31 CP(48)272. (p.7)
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It is worth noting that on November 17, Jowitt and Noel-Baker 
held further discussions with Fraser, Evatt and Pearson on 
constitutional proposals put forward by the Prime Minister of 
India, Pandit Nehru. (18) Following Attlee's permission, Noel- 
Baker then passed on to the Secretary-General of the Indian 
Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations,(Sir 
|3irja Bagpai), who was then in Paris, the Commonwealth member's 
proposal that a diluted version of Eire's External Relations Act 
be accepted by the Indian Government as constituting membership 
of the Commonwealth. This version was to be that India's 
authority to appoint diplomatic representatives abroad should 
derive from the Crown who would be the President of the Indian 
Republic acting, in effect, as the Governor General.(19)
The gap between an Irish solution and an Indian solution may not 
have been in terms of days or words but more influenced by the 
^republican purists in Ireland who would never accept the British 
^onarch as the symbol of co-operation between the Commonwealth 
countries and Commonwealth purists in Britain who would not 
tolerate the removal of the concept of the recognition of the 
Crown's position in the Commonwealth. The Labour party government 
were vulnerable on this point, already being criticised from all 
sides for their perceived policy on "the Empire".
:Two days after the Paris talks, Unionist M.P. Professor Savory 
jasked Philip Noel-Baker if he would "bear in mind the old English 
maxim - You cannot eat your cake and have it?"(20)
(18) PRO Cab 128/13 CM (48) 74. p.144 (ppl05-106)
(19) Ibid
(20)H .C . Vol. 458. Col 545. 18.11.1948
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CHAPTER: XI 
REPUBLIC OF IRELAND BILL,1948-49
(A)
COMMONWEALTH "FORMULA" INCORPORATED INTO PASSAGE OF 
REPUBLIC OF IRELAND BILL,1948
THE
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John Costello insisted that the evening newspapers should not 
publicise the Republic of Ireland Bill on the eve of its 
introduction in the Dail. The Secretary of his Department, 
Maurice Moynihan, suggested that a news release should be issued 
at six o'clock on the eve of the introduction "so that Radio 
Eireann would broadcast the news before the B.B.C."(1)
The Republic of Ireland Bill was published in the Dail on 
November 17,1948. Leave was granted to introduce a Bill 
entitled an Act to repeal the Executive Authority (External 
Relations) Act, 1936, to declare that the description of the 
state shall be the Republic of Ireland, and to enable he 
President to exercise the executive power or any executive 
function of the State in connection with its external 
relations.(2)(1*) It is interesting to note that even when the 
Irish cabinet finally approved the Repeal Bill on November 9, 
1948, no mention of a Republic was contained in the title. 
Indeed, the Title of the Bill at that stage, was still: 
"Executive Power of the State (International Relations) Bill, 
1948." (3)
(1) NASPO CAB 2/10 G.C. 5/46. 9.11.1948
(2) NASPO S 14387A
(3) D.D. Vol. 113. Col. 40. 17.11.1948 .
(1*) see Appendix 3.
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The question of whether a Republic was automatically the new 
status of the State was not arrived at until after the decision 
to repeal the External Relations Act had been formally granted by 
the Irish cabinet on October 11. The term Republic only applied 
to the status of the state/ since a constitutional Republic would 
have involved a referendum. That might have resulted in the 
rejection of a republican status, especially if it were 
conditional upon renouncing membership of the Commonwealth.
|Arguably, the decision that the repeal of the External Relations
|Act entailed secession from association with Commonwealth appears
!
to have been made not by the Irish government but by the action 
of the British Cabinet on September 10, 1948 when it withdrew the 
invitation to Eire to attend the following month's meeting of 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers.(4)
The Republic of Ireland Bill contained a suspension clause. This 
was believed to be a device to enhance the enactment of the 
Bill, by making the commencement, as recommended by Eamon de 
Valera, coincide with the anniversary of the the constitution of 
the first Dail in January 21, 1919 and the first declaration of
the Irish Republic. The anniversary eventually chosen, that of 
the Easter rebellion, proved to be very provocative to the 
British government.(5) The suspension clause provided the 
necessary time for the Commonwealth members to agree to implement 
the formula arrived at in Paris whereby Eire and members of the 
Commonwealth would announce that they would not regard each/
(4) Cab 128/13 CM (48) 59. 10.9.1948
(5) PRO PREM 8/1464 . Telegrams No. 52 CRO to Rugby and Rugby's 
reply to CRO No. 30 . 8.3.1949
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each other as "foreign", thus allowing Most Favoured Nation 
Status to continue. In Eire's case this entailed John Costello
making a placatory statement during the passage of the Bill, to 
the effect that Eire did not consider member states of the 
Commonwealth to be foreign and 'vice-versa'.
The British cabinet meeting on November 18(6) considered a
memorandum on "Eire's Future Relations With The Commonwealth"(7) 
and a summary of the morning (8) and afternoon (9) Paris talks 
prepared by Philip Noel-Baker and Lord Jowitt. This Cabinet
meeting agreed that the Paris formula would suffice to prevent an 
initial attack on the Most Favoured Nation clause. Additionally 
the Cabinet agreed with the recommendation to send a message to 
the Irish Government in advance of the second reading of the 
Repeal Bill reminding them to incorporate an announcement about 
future legislation, as required to comply with the arrangement
worked out at Paris. Jowitt and Noel- Baker advised the Cabinet 
to ask for an advance copy of the wording to be given in the 
Dail, so that they could answer any queries at Westminster.
CONTINUED/
(6)Cab 128/13 CM (48) 74. p.141-144
(7)Cab 129/30 CP (48) 272.
(8)Cab 129/30 CP (48) 272. Annex B
(9)Cab 129/30 CP (48) 272. Annex C
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The Cabinet authorised Philip Noel-Baker to consult the other 
members of the Commonwealth after the Dail statement was made on 
the wording of the declaration to the effect, "that despite the 
repeal of that Act Commonwealth Governments would not regard Eire 
as a foreign country." (10)
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, a senior Foreign Office official,
|considered that Cabinet approval was reluctant, primarily because 
jEire would still retain many of the advantages of Commonwealth
‘membership without any obligations. However, the Cabinet
!
considered that if they were to treat Eire as a foreign stateI
j
then, "the difficulties would be greater for the United Kingdom 
than for Eire".(11)
jTwo days after the publication of the Republic of Ireland Bill in 
the Dail, Rugby reported to Machtig about the talks he had had 
earlier that morning with the Secretary of the Department of 
External Affairs, Frederick Boland, and later with Sean Mac 
Bride. According to Rugby, Boland prepared the way by indicating 
that there would be difficulties about implementing the proposed 
formula agreed in Paris. Rugby dismissed this possibility, having 
already explained to MacBride that the proposed declaration "need 
not involve him in any special political difficulty, being merely 
part of a speech. But, if lifted from its context for use 
elsewhere, and established as a dictum, it could be most helpful 
to us and would pay Eire a dividend."(12)
(10)Cab 128/13 CM(48)74. p.141-144
(11) PRO FO 371. 70175 Reference W . 7203/ WCL 36 .24.11.1948
(12)PRO DO 35 3964. Telegram No.124.Rugby to Machtig 19.11.1948
283
Rugby had already explained to MacBride that from the British 
perspective such a declaration would be helpful with regard to 
the Indian situation "though the citizenship relation was 
different, the attitude of Eire in such matters set a certain 
standard." During this meeting, MacBride suggested to Rugby that 
because of the mutual interest in continuing Most Favoured 
Nation status and rebutting claims against the External Relations 
Act, perhaps they could agree "to give the same answer when 
jquestions on this subject are asked ". Sean MacBride remarked on
i
the "greater importance the British representative attached to 
the expected attack on any agreement by Winston Churchill".(13) 
That "expected attack" may have been prevented by the Labour 
Party government agreeing to Churchill's wishes regarding
I
protecting the government of Northern Ireland's link with the 
;u .k .
At five o'clock in the evening of November 19, 1948, Eric Machtig 
replied to Lord Rugby and he assured him that "we are in full 
agreement with what you said to MacBride."(14) Rugby's telegram 
had confirmed the lack of mutual understanding or uncertainty 
about the outcome of the Paris talks. Machtig asked that Sean 
MacBride be given a written summary so that ” there may be no 
misunderstanding about the proposals which the two governments 
are now considering." Machtig hoped to have a corroborative 
reply from the Irish government the following day.(15)
(13)Ibid
(14)PRO DO 35 3964. Telegram No.289. Machtig to Rugby 19.11.1948
(15)Ibid
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It was proposed to approach the Dominions separately for their 
consent following an affirmative reply from the Irish Government. 
The British government hoped to receive the Dominion's consent 
to the formula before the statement was made by Costello during 
the second reading of the Republic of Ireland Bill in the Dail on 
November 24. The Dail statement was to be followed by a statement 
to be made in the House of Commons on November 25. By November 
19 the draft of this statement apparently had still not been
considered by the British Cabinet.
At 8.30 p.m. on November 19, telegrams outlining the outcome of 
the Paris discussions and the arrangement arrived at to maintain 
jthe status quo were despatched from the Commonwealth Relations
^ffice to Lord Rugby and to the High Commissioners in Canada
j
.(acting), Australia, New Zealand (acting), South Africa, India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon.(16) The telegrams explained:
"(1) In speeches in the Dail on the Republic of Ireland Bill, the 
[spokesman of the Eire Government will be careful to avoid saying 
anything which would increase the legal and political 
difficulties which Commonwealth Governments will have in
explaining the position which will result from the legislation
(2) For their part Commonwealth Governments will refrain from 
public statements which will make it more difficult for them to 
[maintain that, despite the repeal of the External Relations Act, 
;Eire is not a foreign country.
CONTINUED/
(16)PRO DO 35 3964. Telegram No. 106. 19.11.1948.
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(3) When the British Nationality Act, 1948, comes into operation 
on 1st January, 1949, the Eire Government will make an order 
under section 23(2) of their Citizenship Act providing that, in 
view of section 3 of the United Kingdom Act, citizens of the 
United Kingdom and colonies shall enjoy comparable rights and 
jprivileges in Eire. As and when other Commonwealth countries 
jbring into effect legislation corresponding to section 3 of the 
British Nationality Act, 1948, the Eire Government will extend to 
them, by orders made under section 23(2) of their Citizenship 
Act, corresponding rights of citizenship.
(4) At a later stage, and possibly within the next six months or 
so, the Eire Government will undertake a comprehensive revision 
of their citizenship law; and they will then take the opportunity 
of making a direct statutory provision conferring citizenship 
rights comparable with those conferred by section 3 of the 
British Nationality Act, 1948, on the citizens of all such 
Commonwealth countries as have enacted legislation corresponding 
to that section.
(5) The intention to take the action summarised in sub-paragraphs
(3) and (4) above will be announced in the course of the debate 
on the Bill for the repeal of the External Relations Act.
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(6) The Eire Government will collaborate with the United Kingdom 
Government, and any other interested Commonwealth Governments, in 
resisting any claims which may be made by foreign countries, on 
Most-Favoured-Nation grounds, to share the special privileges 
jwhich Eire and those countries will continue to accord to one 
|another and to one another's citizens, whether in matters of 
trade or in the treatment o^ nationals.” (17)
On the evening of November 20, Rugby informed the Commonwealth 
Relations Office that Sean MacBride, whom he had met the previous 
[evening, had confirmed that the summary did ’coincide with the 
recollections of the Irish Ministers". Sean MacBride further 
mentioned that it was his government's intention to implement the 
changes mentioned in paragraphs three and four, regardless of the 
^repeal of the External Relations Act. Once again, MacBride 
[reminded the British government that ’nothing will be said by the 
Commonwealth governments which would tend to create controversy 
as to Ireland's position after the repeal of the act." He 
reminded the British Government that "there was a general 
[agreement that Ireland would not in future be described as a 
member of the Commonwealth." (18)
(17)Ihid
(18)PEO DO 35 3964. Rugby to CRO Telegram No. 125.6.50p.m.
20.11.1948.
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|Twenty minutes later, the Commonwealth Relations Office received 
|another telegram from Rugby to the effect that MacBride also 
told him that the franchise could not be extended to British 
citizens living in Eire without an amendment to the constitution, 
but that he believed that reciprocal treatment would be 
"comparable" in the broad sense. Rugby asked for guidance "if 
necessary by telephone" on any points he should raise at his 
jineetinig with MacBride the following morning, (November 21) when
jhe intended "to discuss language" that was to be used in the Dail
i
■i
|On November 24.(19)
jln the early afternoon of November 21, Rugby received a telegram
jfrom the Commonwealth Relations Office confirming that the
I
^understanding relating to the word "comparable" was acceptable as 
ja concession because of the Irish Government's inability to 
jautomatically extend 'per se', the franchise to British citizens. 
jThis telegram confirmed that the British government was still 
proceeding according to the understanding and arrangement arrived 
at in Paris. Rugby was to confirm that "understanding and 
arrangement" with the Irish government and inform them to expect 
to receive advance notice of the text of Attlee's statement to be 
given in the House of Commons on November 25. In advance of 
issuing that statement the British government asked to see the 
text of the proposed Eire statement which was due to be given by 
Costello as part of the second reading in the Dail on November 
24. "The understanding is that the final texts of both statements 
may require adjustment by mutual agreement when they have been 
studied together."(20)
(19)PRO DO 35 3964. Telegram No. 126. 20.11.1948.
(20)PRO DO 35 3964. Telegram No. 292. 21.11.1948.
;
288
It was with reference to these particular discussions that Rugby 
telegrammed Machtig with the warning that in his talks with 
Boland and MacBride on November 22, "it was clear that they had 
been listening very carefully to our telephone conversations with 
the Commonwealth Relations Office. Please warn all those likely 
to be speaking on telephone." Copies of this telegram were 
forwarded to the Home Office, Board of Trade, Parliamentary 
Council, and the Foreign Office.(21) Rugby may have had more 
experience of eavesdropping than MacBride, who even in later 
years never suspected that his meetings or phone calls might have 
been "bugged".(22)
At 4.05 p.m. on November 21, telegrams were despatched to the 
High Commissioners in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon. The telegrams instructed the 
High Commissioners to approach their respective Governments, 
asking them to acquiesce to the "decision of the British 
Government" which was that the, "essence of the policy is that we 
do not propose to regard Eire as 'foreign'." The British 
government expected the Commonwealth governments to agree to 
copy Attlee's proposed speech in the House of Commons on November 
26, and thereby similarly recognise Eire's non-foreigness to 
members of the Commonwealth.(23)
(21)PRO DO 35 3963. 22.11.1948
(22)Personal Interview with Sean MacBride 6.1.1987
(23)PRO DO 35 3964 Telegram No. 109. 21.11.1948
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The British cabinet meeting on the morning of November 22 
approved the draft statement of Attlee's speech concerning the 
British government' acceptance of Eire in an intermediate 
position between that of Commonwealth member and foreign 
state.(24) At that time they had not received, nor perhaps did 
they expect any amendments by Commonwealth members to the 
text.(25) Following a verbal report(26) by Attlee of his meeting 
jwith Basil Brooke(27) to the effect that the government of 
Northern Ireland had consented, the Cabinet minutes for November 
22 1948, record that "the way was now clear". The Cabinet
requested Philip Noel-Baker to prepare a detailed statement on 
the treaty provisions under which difficulties and challenges 
might still arise under the terms of the Most Favoured Nation 
clauses. At this stage acceptance of Eire as a non-foreign state 
was still only provisional. More importantly for long-term Anglo- 
Irish relations, the Cabinet instructed Norman Brook to convene 
a working party of officials to prepare a report for Ministers on 
" the consequential action which might be have to be taken by the 
United Kingdom Government" as a result of Eire no longer being 
considered a member of the Commonwealth.(28)
(24) PRO Cab 128/13. CM(48)75. 22.11.1948 pp.148-149
(25)Ibid
(26)Fanning,R.: The Response of the London and Belfast 
Governments to the Declaration of the Republic of Ireland, 1948- 
49. R.I.I .A. Winterl981-82. p. 104
(27)Cabinet approved Attlee-Brooke meeting PRO Cab 128/13 
CM(48)74. 18.11.1948. pp.141-144
(28) Cab 128/13 CM(48) 75. 22.11.1948 pp.148-149
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The Canadian government's first reaction was to be critical of 
the Irish government for not postponing the introduction of the 
Bill.(29) Following an urgent approach by U.K. High Commissioner 
in Canada to Louis St Laurent, the following was the final 
Canadian response as given to the U.K. High Commissioner in 
Canada, who telegrammed the Commonwealth Relations Office at 
12.18.a.m. on November 24, and received at 7.40. a.m. November 
|24; "the furthest that the Canadian Government could go would be 
to make a very brief statement on November 25 the effect of which 
would be to recognise the existence of a special association 
between Canada and Eire and to leave the implications of this to 
be examined and sorted out."(30)
Ceylon also refused to automatically acquiesce to the British 
government's request. On November 23, the government of Ceylon 
informed the U.K. High Commissioner that they could not reply in 
similar terms as the U.K. proposed statement, because they could 
not decide until they knew whether India was going to remain in 
the Commonwealth. Britain hoped to avoid a situation of forcing 
the issues with regard to Commonwealth allegiance. Indeed in 
this case it brought out regional rivalries. Ceylon broke ranks 
with the Commonwealth and asked that she should not be included 
amongst those agreeing to the proposed statement by Attlee. A 
further approach by the U.K. High Commissioner elicited from the 
Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mr. Senanayake, the excuse that there 
was not enough time to consider the legal and political
implications and then to arrive at a cabinet decision.(31)
(29)PRO Cab 129/31.P.76.T.No. 1022 . see also p.79 Telegram No. 
1024.Des.24.11.1948.12.01.a.m. Rec. 6.35a.m.
(30)PRO Cab 129/31. p.76. Telegram No.1022
(31)PRO Cab 129/31 .p.87. Telegram No. 609
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Additionally, from the British perspective the position of 
Ceylon was further complicated by defence considerations. On 
November 24, the British Cabinet were considering a 
memorandum(32) concerning supporting Ceylon's candidature for the 
U.N.. The Cabinet was worried that Ceylon might follow the 
example of Eire. A telegram from the British Office of the 
General Assembly at the U.N. reminded the Cabinet that membershipi
I
iOf the U.N. was seen as the hallmark of independence and that 
[Burma immediately joined the U.N. after leaving the 
Commonwealth.(33) The writer advised "If anything of this sort 
happened, our defence interests may be jeopardised. We could not 
have the defence arrangements now proposed if Ceylon became like 
Eire."(34)
iThe U.K. High Commissioner in India replied on November 23, that 
Nehru wanted to avoid prejudging India's future relationship with 
the Commonwealth. Given the volatility of the Indian political 
situation, it was accommodating of Nehru to provisionally agree 
to say in the Indian Assembly on November 26, that he was in 
jgeneral agreement with the outcome reached mentioning the 
statements of Costello and Attlee "and would fall into line if 
she decides to retain Commonwealth membership." This telegram 
emphasised that Nehru had not had time to think out the precise 
terms of his statement. (35)
(32)PRO Cab 129/31 CP(48)281
(33)PRO Cab 129/31 p.91. T.521 UNGA Paris. 24.11.1948
(34)Ibid
(35)PRO Cab 129/31 . p.85 Telegram No. 4063
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When Herbert Evatt was shown Attlee's proposed statement, he 
told Mr. Cumming-Bruce that the UK statement implied that it was 
through U.K. efforts that had led the discussions to a 
resolving conclusion whereas Evatt "felt that it was he who had 
carried the rest of the Commonwealth with him”.(36) The 
Australian Prime Minister and his Government's response was 
predictably the most positive. It was a brief concise affirmation 
"that the Australian Government agrees with the general approach 
to this problem and the procedure by which it is proposed that 
this policy should be pursued.”(37)
The New Zealand Government, replied on November 24 and as 
expected approved the statements to be made by the British 
Government. Surprisingly, they were sceptical that the formula 
for maintaining Most Favoured Nation clauses would succeed.(38) 
Apparently, Peter Fraser's view was at variance with the more 
conservative view of his Government. Indeed, the British cabinet 
on November 26, noted that "the Governments of Canada and New 
Zealand seemed to have received this policy with less enthusiasm 
than had been shown by their representatives in the discussions 
with Eire Ministers."(39)
(36)PRO DO 35 3965 CRO Report X2638/39. 23.11.1948.
(37)PRO Cab 129/31 p.81 Telegram Y. 772. Des. 10.25p.m.
23.11.1948. Rec. 11.25 a.m. 23.11.1948
(38)PRO Cab 129/31 p.82. Telegram No. 523. DES . 11.10. a.m.
24.11.1948. Rec.24.11.1948. 12.45. a.m.
(39) PRO Cab 128/13. CM(48)76. p. 153 (p.120)
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Ii
|The acting U.K. High Commissioner in South Africa telegrammed 
the Commonwealth Relations Office on the evening of November 23, 
po report that the South African Government agreed provisionally, 
^subject to parliamentary approval, of the agreement. They were 
prepared to extend reciprocal rights on trade and citizenship to 
pire, and insisted they were not "in any respect affording a 
precedent which can be invoked in the future in the case of any 
other nation outside the Commonwealth."(40) The Prime Minister of 
Pakistan and all of the Cabinet members were absent from Karachi 
(41) and consequently no reply was received from the Government 
of Pakistan.(42)
Overall, the impression is that the old Commonwealth member were 
more compliant than the new (mainly non-white) members, who 
perhaps because they had not attended the Chequers or Paris 
negotiations were not fully aware of the urgency involved or 
were just protective of their independence.
(40) PRO Cab 129/31. pp.83-84.Tel.404. Des. 7.28p.m. 23.11.1948. 
Rec. 23.11.1948. 8.05 p.m.
(41) CAB 129/31. p .83. Telegram No. 1419 Des 22.11.1948. 18.30 
Rec. 22.11.1948 15.02.
(42) PRO DO 35 3979. p. 9. Report on "Departure of Eire from 
British Commonwealth of Nations."
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(B)
REPUBLIC OF IRELAND BILL, 1948 SECOND READING
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On November 24, 1948, Rugby sat at the front of the Dail gallery
|
glistening intently"(1) to the second reading of the Republic of
.Ireland Bill. (2) Rugby reported that he detected uneasiness in
,the Department of External Affairs at Costello's "incautious
oratory".(3) He believed that Costello had to be "straitwaist-
coated", but had "made the agreed statement"(4) as follows: "the
position of the Irish Government is, that while Ireland is not a
member of the Commonwealth, it recognises and confirms the
existence of a specially close relationship arising not only from
ties of friendship and kinship but from traditional and long
established economic, social and trade relations based on common
interest with the nations that form the Commonwealth of Nations.
This exchange of rights and privileges, which it is our firm
desire and intention to maintain and strengthen, in our view
constitutes a special relationship which negatives the view that
other countries could raise valid objections on the ground that
Ireland should be treated as a 'foreign' country by Britain and
the Commonwealth countries, for the purpose of this exchange of
rights and privileges."(5) Rugby reported that Costello
announced that his government intended to introduce orders under
Section 23(2) of the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1935,
extending reciprocal citizenship rights (except the franchise in
general elections which was restricted in the 1937 constitution
to citizens of the thirty two counties of Ireland) to
Commonwealth countries.(6)
(1) Irish Press. 25.11.1948
j(2) D.D. Vol. 113. Col. 347-454. 24.11.1948
(3) PRO DO 35 3963. Telegrams. Rugby to Machtig, CRO. 132 and 134 
1(4) Ibid
(5) D.D. Vol. 113. Col. 383. 24.11.1948.
1(6)DO 35 3963.Tel. 132.see D.D. Vol.113. Col. 382. 24.11.1948
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Rugby did not report some of Costello's sanctimonious remarks 
which he made during the debate such as :"Our missionary priests, 
nuns and brothers have gone to England and have brought the faith 
.there, and are giving no inadequate contribution to the spiritual 
uplift which is so necessary in the atheistic atmosphere of the 
world today."(7)
During the debate, Eamon de Valera explained that he introduced 
the External Relations Act to serve as a bridge to end Partition
j
jbut now welcomed the repeal of the Act, claiming, "I had come to 
the conclusion myself that the External Relations Act would have 
!to be repealed because of the purely mischievous 
misrepresentation which surrounded it and because it was 
misunderstood accordingly."(8) De Valera suggested that the Bill 
be enacted on January 21, in commemoration of the proclamation of 
the Republic during the first Dail held in 1919.(9) If the
coalition had so intended that date, then the source of the
recommendation alone would have been sufficient to change their 
minds.
Speeches from representatives of all the other parties continued 
the theme that the repeal of the act would bring national unity 
in Eire and would isolate the problem of Partition which was the
next problem to resolve on the national agenda.
(7)D .D . Vol. 113. Col. 353-354. 24.11.1948
(8)D.D. Vol. 113. Col. 407. 24.11.1948
(9)D .D . Vol. 113. Col. 413. 24.11.1948
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Rugby reported that the twenty hour debate was occupied by forty 
"speechifiers" and except during the speeches of Costello and 
de Valera there was only one-third capacity at any one time. 
Rugby was cynical about the whole debate and felt that the 
members of the Dail were too. In support he quoted the 'Irish 
Times', which complained that, "there is something rather 
nauseating in the spectacle of so many otherwise decent men 
tumbling over one another in their haste to climb on the 
Republican bandwagon."(10) Rugby reported that at 9.50p.m. on 
November 24, there was only one member of the opposition present 
in the Dail. (11) At that time, a Fine Gael member (Maurice 
Dockrell, representing a large Unionist electorate in Dublin 
South Central) (12) and similarly, Independent member (William A. 
Sheldon) representing the constituency of Donegal East)(13) 
announced their intention to oppose the Bill on the basis that 
they thought that the Commonwealth was a good thing and reflected 
the wish of a substantial minority of Irish people. As reported 
by Rugby the motion was not taken to a division.(14)
(10)PRO DO 35 3963. Telegram No 134.
(11)Ibid
(12 D.D. Vol. 113. Col. 446. 24.11.1948
(13)D.D. Vol. 113. Col. 439. 24.11.1948
(14)PRO DO 35 3965 . Telegram No. 134 p.2
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Rugby considered that Costello was ungracious towards the the 
assistance the British government had given in accommodating the
new status of Eire and noted that he made a point of praising
the Commonwealth leaders, in particular, Mackenzie King. Rugby 
attributed Costello's new stance to the fact that he was "not 
being altogether happy in his own soul”. Rugby thought that 
Costello, as well as most of the Dail members, were aware that 
there was "a fundamental lack of honesty and sincerity in the way 
in which this serious constitutional step has been taken.” Rugby 
reported that, in contrast, (a draft of) MacBride's speech was 
generous in attributing commendations towards Britain.(15)
The British cabinet met on November 25 to discuss the response
of the Commonwealth Prime Minister's to Attlee's proposed
statement. They revised the text in line with the suggestions 
received from the members of the Commonwealth and it was now 
ready for publication having been cleared by several Commonwealth 
members, and the leader of the Opposition Winston Churchill. The 
Cabinet agreed that Attlee's statement of reply with the amended 
terms should be made that afternoon by the Prime Minister in the 
House of Commons and by the Lord Chancellor in the House of 
Lords. (16)
(15) Ibid
(16)PRO CAB 128/13. CM (48) 76. p.153.(p.120)
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jOn November 25 Attlee, speaking in the House of Commons, 
jreferred to Costello's Dail statement made the previous day, and 
in turn stated "The United Kingdom Government, for their part, 
also recognises the existence of these factual ties, and are at 
one with the Eire government in desiring that close and friendly 
relations should continue and be strengthened. Accordingly the 
United Kingdom Government will not regard the enactment of the 
legislation by Eire as placing Eire in the category of foreign 
countries or Eire citizens in the category of foreigners. The 
other governments of the Commonwealth will, we understand, take 
an early opportunity of stating, their policy in the matter."(17) 
In turn the other Commonwealth countries made their respective 
statements in accordance with the Paris formula. On November 26, 
a telegram was received in the Commonwealth Relations Office 
confirming that the Prime Minister of Australia had made a 
statement in the House of Representatives, "this morning", 
reaffirming loyalty to the Monarch and stated in the House of 
Representatives that morning, "the Australian Government is glad 
that the enactment of the new legislation will not place Eire in 
the category of a foreign country in relation to Australia or the 
citizens of Eire in the category of foreigners here." (18)
(17)H .C . Vol 458. Col. 1414. 25.11.1948
(18)PR0 in DO 35 3965. Telegram No. 783. Rec. 9.45. a.m.
26.11.1948
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Similarly, on November 26, the Prime Minister of India, Pandit 
Jawaharlal Nehru, stated in the constituent assembly, "I should 
like to associate the Government of India with statements made in 
Eire and United Kingdom Parliaments and to say we are perfectly 
prepared to continue on a reciprocal basis, the exchange of 
citizenship rights and privileges with E i r e 19)
The South Africa Government first informed the U.K. High 
Commissioner of their acceptance of the Paris formula, and then 
made the requisite announcement(20) which stated that ’the Union 
Government are prepared also for their part to recognise the 
Republic of Ireland as such when it came into being, and to make 
concessions in regard to rights of citizenship on a reciprocal 
basis, as may be mutually agreed,on the understanding that the 
existing position will be maintained in the meantime."(21)
The Canadian Government was less forthcoming; indeed, they were 
almost reactionary in that they resurrected the "old bogey" over 
the Most Favoured Nation clause. Prime Minister Louis St. 
Laurent replied "there is the concern here that if preferential 
tariffs are retained in the case of Eire other non-Commonwealth 
countries might demand similar treatment."(22)
I (19)DO 35 3965. proof telegram.
(20)Irish Independent 26.11.1948
(21)Ibid
(22)Ibid
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The most positive statement was made by Walter Nash, Acting Prime 
Minister of New Zealand and Minister of External Affairs who in 
an official press release from the Department of the High 
jCommissioner in London confirmed that "Irish citizens here will 
|enjoy the same status as previously".(23)
Following the acceptance of the statements Frederick Boland, told 
George Garrett that the success of the negotiations was due to 
t h e  "understanding shown by responsible British Ministers as well 
as The friendly position taken by the Commonwealth countries." 
Boland gave most credit to MacBride's "tact and personality" but 
conceded that the timing of the introduction of this action might 
have been regarded as "inappropriate and injudicious". He did 
make the pertinent point, that the results proved that the 
question at issue had been one "of form and not of 
substance."(24)
The State Department also showed their approval of the formula 
arrived at in Paris by agreeing discreetly in November 1948 to a 
clause(25) in a U.S.-Irish Treaty that recognised the existence 
and agreed to "the continuance of Commonwealth preferences 
accorded and received by the Irish Republic."(26)
1(23) PRO DO 35 3965. p.150
(24) NA 841 D. 00/11-3048)
(25) PRO FO 371. 84831. GC61/25 para. 7
(26) A Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
Republic of Ireland and the U.S. pub. by Stationery Office Dublin 
PR 9791. Treaty Series 1950 No.7 Signed June, 1950
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On November 26, the Unionist M.P. Professor Savory raised the 
issue in the House of Commons about the liability of citizens of 
the Republic of Ireland to military service.(27) These questions 
were a reminder that further amending legislation and 
clarification of the arrangements agreed at in Paris were 
required, particularly the "territorial definitions” in existing 
statutes involving financial obligations affecting individuals, 
customs duties, or powers of courts."(28) Accordingly, a 
^memorandum was despatched to Rugby asking him to suggest to Sean 
MacBride that there should be further discussions between the 
legal experts and officials of the two governments.(29) Anglo- 
Irish discussions followed in London on 6-7 January,1949, under 
the chairmanship of the legal adviser to the Foreign Office, Sir 
Eric Beckett.(30) The first of these discussions centred on the 
possibility of a challenge to the continuance of most Favoured 
Nation Status and the meetings ended with each side agreeing to 
co-operate against any challenger.(31)
(27)PRO DO 35 3979. p.11. See H.C.Vol.467 Col.1590. 26.11.1948
(28)PRO DO 35 3991. X 2639/24.Details of memorandum communicated 
by Rugby to Sean MacBride on 13.12.1948.
(29)Ibid.
(30) PRO DO 35 3991. p.9.
(31)PRO DO 35 3979. p .16 results of meeting embodied in a
memorandum entitled,"Most Favoured Nation Treaties and claims 
that may result from the Republic of Ireland Act." See- DO 35 
3991
303
Dn January 7, there were less formal discussions between 
Frederick Boland, Sir Percival Liesching, Sir Norman Brook, 
porman Archer and Neil Pritchard. These discussion centred on the 
appointment to the successor of Lord Rugby, whose resignation had 
been formally announced at the end of December 1948.(32) 
Intriguingly, it was Boland who suggested that "if the 
appointment could be made before the Act came into force, it 
would be possible to utilise the existing titles and not to raise 
any questions about letters of credence.” (33)
The way now looked clear for the inauguration of the Republic of 
Ireland Act,1948, and more importantly, that it would be accepted 
magnanimously by Britain and the Commonwealth.
1(32) PRO DO 35 3970. contains extract from Irish Times.
31.12.1948
(33) PRO DO 35 3903. Extract of meeting on 7.1.1948
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CHAPTER XI1.
REPUBLIC OF IRELAND ACT, 1949, INAUGURATED
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The Republic of Ireland Act,1948 (1*) was passed by the Dail on 
December 15(1) and signed by the President, Sean T. O'Kelly , on 
December 21, 1948 at Aras an Uachtarain. The brief ceremony was
attended by the Taoiseach, John A. Costello, and the Minister for 
pxternal Affairs, Sean MacBride.(2)
The Act(2*) was designed to remove all doubt about the status of 
the state and was intended to clarify Eire's status as a Republic 
and confirm that she had left the Commonwealth. Accordingly, the 
Act, containing less than a hundred words, formally described the 
status of the State as a Republic and repealed Eire's last 
constitutional link with the Commonwealth. The journal 'Irish 
Jurist' pointed out that neither of the above propositions "can 
be said to be self evident", since the Republic was still not 
mentioned in the Constitution and because there was no formal 
machinery for withdrawal from the Commonwealth.(3)
(1)D.D. Vol. 113. Col. 1659. 15.12.1948
(2)Irish Times. 22.12.1948
(3) Irish Jurist. Vol XIV ,Part L. 1948.: The Republic of Ireland 
Act,1948, Its effect on the Constitutional Position of the State.
(1*) The first reference to '1949 'occurs in STATUTORY 
INSTRUMENT NO.27 OF 1949, THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND ACT,1948, 
COMMENCEMENT ORDER, 1949. dated February 4, 1949 appointing
April 18 1949, as the day for the enactment of the Act. The
order was signed by John A. Costello ; see Volume 1, Statutory 
instruments . 1949 pub. Stationery Office, Dublin.
(2*)See appendix 111, Republic of Ireland Act, 1949
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On a functional level the change in status needed to be 
acknowledged by other states. Once the Republic of Ireland Act, 
1949, was enacted, treaties and the credentials of envoys to and 
from the State, were respectively addressed to and signed by the 
President of Ireland instead of the British Monarch.
Two days after the inauguration the new UK Representative to 
Eire, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite reported that President Sean 
T.O'Kelly, for the first time, signed the letters of credence of 
an Irish envoy, the Republic's new Minister to Spain, Mr.Leo Mac 
Cauley.(4) Diplomatic recognition of the new status of the 
state would have been achieved more publicly by a change in title 
of the Republic of Ireland's representatives in Commonwealth 
countries from High Commissioner to Ambassador. The Irish 
Department of External Affairs thought that the British Foreign 
Office would be first consulted by most Governments before they 
made a decision to upgrade their envoy's titles and the Irish 
government hoped therefore that the British government would make 
the path easy by establishing a precedent for the Commonwealth, 
by appointing their new representative to Ireland with the title 
of Ambassador.(5) In fact, as early as February 1949, the British 
government had asked their High Commissioners in Commonwealth 
countries to point out to the host governments that after the 
Republic of Ireland Act came into force the Irish government 
might wish to institute new letters of credence and ask for a 
change in the titles of diplomatic representatives.(6) They/
(4) PRO FO 371 74190.T. No.6. OPDOM No 5.P.4.Date 1.5.1949
(5) IDFA 305/83/7
(6) PRO DO 35 3979. p.18. para 39
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They were asked to point out that upgrading of titles might 
prejudice internationally the policy of treating Eire as non- 
foreign and they asked that Commonwealth governments should "not 
agree to any such change of practice in the immediate future."(7) 
The Irish government's hopes of an immediate change of title were 
further dashed when, in March 1949, the British Government 
announced, without consulting the Irish government, that the 
Clongowes educated, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite would succeed Lord 
Rugby as the new British Representative in Eire.(1*)
CONTINUED/
(7)Ibid
(l*)Mr Kirkpatrick of the Foreign office suggested that Rugby's 
successor should be "a man of sympathetic personality, 
Intellectual curiosity and a wide human tolerance; an extrovert ( 
with sporting tastes, if possible) capable of understanding and 
influencing these unpredictable and inconsequent people. 
Pedantry, a meticulous adherence to instructions, insistence on 
logic, small-minded emphasis on the merits of the case; all these 
may be admirable qualities in many situations, but they are 
llikely to be serious if not fatal disabilities in Dublin.(8)
1(8) FO 371. 76369
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In fact it was the Secretary to the Irish Government, Maurice 
Moynihan, who first noticed the announcement in the 
newspapers(9) of Laithwaite's proposed appointment. The 
appointment was subsequently approved by the Irish cabinet only 
three days before his official appointment as British 
Representative to Ireland on April 8,1949.(10) That was only ten 
days before the inauguration of the Republic, when the rank of 
Ambassador to the Republic of Ireland would have applied.
Interestingly, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite's letter of credence was 
signed by Attlee instead of King George VI. This was because of 
a recent development whereby, all appointments under the aegis 
of the Commonwealth Relations Office were signed by the Prime 
Minister.(11) This change was probably brought about in order to 
accommodate India within the Commonwealth. Immediately after the 
enactment of the Republic of Ireland Act, the British government 
changed the title from "UK representative to Eire", to "UK 
representative to the Republic of Ireland."(12) The British 
representative's title was eventually upgraded to Ambassador, 
fifteen months after the inauguration of the Republic.(13)
(9)NASPO S 11417A
(10) Cab 2/10 G.C. 5/81 5.4.1949
(11) FO 371 74190. OPDOM No.5 P.3 
! (12)Ibid
|(13) NASPO Cab 2/10 G.C. 5/195. 25.7.1950
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Throughout Ireland there were celebrations to welcome the 
inauguration of the Republic of Ireland Act,1949. In Dublin the 
birth of the new Republic was welcomed at one minute into the new 
morning of April 18,1949, with a 21-gun salute. The shots were 
fired from Dublin's O'Connell Bridge, by soldiers from the Irish 
Army's, 19th Field Battery. In the afternoon, the national flag 
was hoisted symbolically over the General Post Office. This 
ceremony was followed by a military march pass, at which the 
President of the Republic of Ireland took the salute.(14) Despite 
the bands, parades and celebrations, George Garrett noticed a 
lack of gaiety in the atmosphere and "the little warmth in the 
cheering". His report quoted the concise explanation of one wit 
who asked, "Who did you expect to do the cheering? Not Costello 
supporters after the way he went back on them over the 
Commonwealth link. Not de Valera after his refusal to support the 
celebration and not the Clann; they won't start cheering until we 
get back the other six counties. I don't know who you thought was 
going to cheer."(15) Diplomatic observers in general reported 
that despite the parades and military by-passes, there was a 
lack of genuine warmth among the crowds attending the 
celebrations.
(14^Irish Times. 18.4. 1949.
(15) NA 841D.00/3-2449
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j?or different reasons many people in Ireland felt they could not 
pelebrate Eire's departure from the Commonwealth. Sean MacBride 
was in America on several speaking engagements(16) but denied
i
phat he absented himself deliberately from the celebrations.(17) 
Perhaps surprisingly, another absentee was Eamon de Valera, who 
together with his Republican Fianna Fail party boycotted the 
nationwide celebrations. In January 1948, Eamonn de Valera had 
drafted a repeal Bill very similar to the coalition government's
i
which contained an assumptive reference to the Republic.(18)
i
Fifteen months later Eamon de Valera now refused to take part in 
the 1949 Easter Monday "Independence Day" celebrations. John 
Costello had written to Eamon de Valera inviting him to speak at 
the celebrations, concluding, "The proposal is that you should 
speak immediately after me."(19)
(16) Irish Times. April,15 & 16, 1949
(17) Personal interview with Sean MacBride. 6,1.1987
(18) Private Papers Cearbhall 0' Dalaigh,P51/2A. U.C.D. Archives
(19) NASPO S 14440. L.D. 6.4.1949
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De Valera's letter of reply began: "A Thaoisigh a chara, I have
jreceived your letter inviting me to participate in a series of 
jbroadcast addresses to be delivered on Easter Monday as part of 
the celebrations intended to mark the coming into operation of 
ithe Republic of Ireland Act...when the Constitution came into 
operation in 1937, we decided that celebrations such as those now 
proposed ought to be reserved until the national task which we 
have set ourselves is accomplished. We still believe that public 
demonstrations and rejoicings are out of place and are likely to 
be misunderstood so long as that task remains uncompleted and our 
country partitioned.I find myself therefore unable to accept your 
invitation, signed Eamon de Valera.”(20)
The U.S. air attache in Ireland reported to the U.S. State 
Department that disturbances were expected on both sides of the 
border . But, despite the risk of trouble he reported that the 
Chief of Staff of the Irish Army, Major General Liam Archer, "is 
more preoccupied in arranging parades for the celebrations". 
Archer, according to Garrett, believed that members of the IRA 
were "crackpots who, if they did not have the issue of partition 
to agitate, would find some other cause to give them the excuse 
to satisfy their natural tendency to resist discipline and 
order."(21)
(20)NASPO S 14440
(21)NA. 841D.00/3-2449
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Four days before the celebrations, all police leave in the six 
counties was cancelled. The banned tricolour flag was prominently 
jdisplayed throughout the Northern Ireland border town of Newry. 
jThe U.S. Consul-General in Belfast, William Smalie, spent the 
^period of the celebrations in the Nationalist town of Newry, 
because he expected it to be the centre of a "violent 
eruption".(22) As with the celebrations the expectation of 
violence was an anticlimax.
The Irish Government, on behalf of the President of Ireland, 
requested and received messages of goodwill from most of the 
leaders throughout the world. Reflecting Ireland's ideological 
stance in the cold war, no messages were requested, nor received 
from Communist states.(23) In March, 1949, Noel-Baker asked 
Rugby for his advice as to whether a goodwill message should be 
sent.(24) Rugby answered affirmatively , reasoning ,"It will show 
that we are not attaching any great significance to that
occasion. To hold back would suggest pique, and would give cause
to the unrighteous to rejoice at our discomfiture."(25)
Lord Rugby had hoped that the inauguration of the Republic would
be on January 21, 1949, which was the anniversary of the
establishment of the first Republican Dail. However, much to the
consternation of Attlee, the inauguration date eventually
decided upon by the Irish Government was the thirty-third
anniversary of the Easter uprising of 1916.(26)
(22)NA 841 E.00/4-2049 
f23ilrish Times. 19.4.1949
(24)PRO DO 35 3976. L.D. 21.3.1949
(25)PRO DO 35 3976.
(26)PRO PREM 8 /1464. Rugby to Commonwealth Relations Office
8.3.1948 Telegram No. 52 & 30. 8.3.1949
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.Lord Rugby, as one of his last official duties, drafted the 
King's congratulatory message of goodwill. Rugby included a 
.reference to Irish war service because he thought "such 
(references were immensely popular throughout the country". 
■Accordingly, the King's message included the reference : "I hold 
in most grateful memory the services and sacrifices of the Irish 
men and women who rendered gallant assistance to our cause in the 
recent war, and who therefore made a notable contribution to our 
victory".(27) Rugby's successor, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, 
reported that the message from the King "made a striking 
impression. Such a gesture had clearly been entirely unexpected 
in this country and it was most warmly received and very deeply 
and widely appreciated."(28)
A fortnight before the Easter Monday celebrations, George Garrett 
had written to the special Counsel to the U.S. President, asking 
him to arrange to send a goodwill message and added : "I know
that the Irish are in a dog-house of sorts over their attitude as 
recently disclosed by refusing to join the Atlantic Pact. At the 
same time the occasion of which I speak cannot be ignored and I 
wanted to be sure that you gave the matter your personal 
consideration."(29)
(27) PRO DO 35 3976
(28) PRO FO 371 74190. OPDOM No.4
(29) NA 841D.00/5-2449
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The goodwill message from the U.S. President, Harry Truman, 
became the reason for a diplomatic furore. MacBride told Garrett 
that while in London the British appeared to be "jubilant" that 
the U.S. had requested permission before sending a congratulatory 
telegram to the President of the Republic of Ireland. The 
implication taken by MacBride was that if the British had not 
|Sent a message, the U.S. might not have either. Garrett explained 
that the State Department after being asked orally by Ireland's 
Minister in the U.S., Sean Nunan, to forward a congratulatory 
message had merely approached the British to ascertain whether 
they too would be sending a message.(30) The State Department did 
forward the intended congratulations firstly for approval to 
their pro-British Commonwealth Desk and for onward clearance to 
the White House "and any other appropriate authorities", meaning 
the British Government. In fact, the message was cleared by the 
Commonwealth Desk at the State Department, primarily because 
President Truman had already established a precedent by 
forwarding a goodwill message to Burma on becoming a Republic in 
1947.(31)
(30) Ibid
(31) NA 841D.00/4-949
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|Soon after the inauguration, the Prime Minister of India, Pandit 
Nehru, the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mr. Senanayake, and the 
Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, visited Ireland 
^separately. These visits were seen as a gesture of support 
signifying a desire to continue friendly relations between the 
remaining members of the Commonwealth.
Pandit Nehru was positively helpful to Ireland and in recognition
i
of that was given the special honour of being received on the 
floor of Dail Eireann.(32) He was in 1916, reputedly impressed 
by the romanticism of the inevitable failure of the Easter 
uprising . Interestingly, Sean MacBride explained to Nehru, his 
fear that India, which became a Republic, and remained in the 
Commonwealth, was in a different position to Eire, because India 
was four thousand miles away and could not be "reconquered”.(33) 
Pandit Nehru showed further support when in January 1949, he 
sent his High Commissioner in London , Krishna Menon ,a telegram 
expressing sympathy for the Irish position advising Menon to tell 
John Dulanty, "to assure his Government that if there is any way 
in which we can be of help, we will be glad to consider any 
suggestion."(34) In fact, as early as February, 1949, Attlee 
intervened personally with Nehru to ask him to change the title 
of his proposed "Minister for India to Ireland". Nehru/
(32) D.D. Vol. 115. Col.163. 28.7.1949
(33)Personal interview with Sean MacBride. 6.1. 1987
(34)IDFA 305/14/36 secret report No. 11. 1.2.1949
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Nehru replied that while he could not withdraw or modify the 
proposal he would agree to postpone the appointment until after 
the Republic of Ireland Act was inaugurated.(35) At the end of 
July 1949 the Indian Government, without consulting their fellow 
members of the Commonwealth, appointed their Indian High 
Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Krishna Menon, as Ambassador 
jto Ireland. The Republic of India addressed their Ambassador's 
jcredentials to the President of the Republic of Ireland. Because 
of the importance of the precedent of accepting an Ambassador 
from a Commonwealth member, the Department of External Affairs in 
Dublin, issued a statement agreeing "to waive for the time being, 
their objections to a joint accreditation in this case."(36) The 
support that India provided may have been a show of strength to 
prove her independence as a Republic within the Commonwealth. 
Prior to the appointment of the Indian Ambassador, the only other 
representative in Dublin with the status of Ambassador was the 
Papal Nuncio.(37) According to William Smale, there was a rumour 
in Northern Ireland that would "spread through the Orange Halls 
at a great pace" to the effect that Pope Pius Xll believed that 
Italy would go "Communistic" and it would be intolerable for the 
Vatican to be situated in Rome. "Eire was about the only place 
where the Vatican could be re-established comfortably and hence 
the desire to have it a Republic where there would be no question 
of allegiance to the Crown."(38)
1(35)PRO DO 35 3979 .p.18. para 40
(36)IDFA 305/14/36
(37)CDEA 50021-40 file 1990/34/30 . Similarly, in 1946 Joeseph 
Walshe, ( Ambassador to the Vatican) was the first diplomat to be 
[appointed to such a rank from Eire. See Keogh,D.: Ireland and
Europe 1919-48. p. 200
(3«) NA 841JJ. 00/1-749 CS/B.
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A year later the battle on the diplomatic front was still 
continuing. On the first anniversary of the inauguration of the 
Republic, the pro-Irish U.S. Minister in Ireland, George Garrett, 
was raised in status to Ambassador. This gave the Irish 
Government the opportunity to incorporate his re-accreditation 
|Ceremony into the Easter republican anniversary celebrations. 
|This embarrassed the U.S. State Department, who informed the 
British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Oliver Franks, that Easter 
Monday was "the last day which they would wish to have had 
chosen." (39)
Eire's High Commissioner in Canada, John Hearne, decided not to 
invite his Irish -Canadian friends to a celebratory reception. He 
believed most of them would be embarrassed to celebrate what he 
described as, "Ireland's exit from the Commonwealth of Nations." 
Writing of that Easter Monday, on which Ireland was celebrating 
the inauguration of the Republic, John Hearne wrote: "No one
called at 450 Daly Avenue on April 18 to offer congratulations 
and good wishes. There were four telephone calls, one from the 
High Commissioner for Australia. One passer-by stopped his car 
outside the house to photograph the flag." (40)
(39) PRO FO 371 84833. Telegram No 250 Des. 27.4.1950. Rec .F.O. 
129.4.1950
(40) IDFA 305/83/2.
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[The appointment of a new "Ambassador" to Canada illustrates the 
■difficulties the Commonwealth Relations Office, which continued 
[to handle the "Irish desk", put in the way of the upgrading of 
Ireland's diplomats in Commonwealth member states such as Hong 
Kong(41) and in Australia. For example, in 1953 the Conservative 
government in Australia refused to appoint an Ambassador to 
[Ireland on the basis that they could not ask the Queen "to sign a 
document which could and would be interpreted as referring to 
Ireland as a single entity, including Northern Ireland."(42)
After the Second World War the Canadian Government was
established as a loyal member of the Commonwealth . Despite this
change in direction, the Canadian Government remained under
continuous pressure from the Irish Government and the Irish High 
Commissioner in Canada, John Hearne, to "upgrade" his title to 
Ambassador.(43)
John Hearne was a distinguished senior counsel, who, as head of 
the legal section in the Department of External Affairs, was 
responsible for drafting the 1937 Irish constitution. The 
Canadians only considered seriously the request to upgrade the 
title, after learning in confidence that the Americans intended 
exchanging Ambassadors with Ireland , "at a neutral time when it 
would be evident that the step had not been taken under pressure 
from the Irish ." The Canadians then passed on that/
| (41) PRO DO 35 3903 . Telegram dated 2.3.1951
(42) CDEA RG25 Volume 84-85 BOX 100 file 7545-B-40p-2.
! (43)Documents of Canadian External____ Relations.Vol.12,
11946..D,Page.(Ed.): University of Saskatchewan, p.1489 Regarding 
appointment of Mr.Turgeon to Dublin
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that information through the circuitous route of the British 
Embassy in Washington. When the British Government learned of 
that possibility, they suggested that, ’they very much hope that 
the Canadian Government, for their part, will see their way to 
postponing a decision to accept an Ambassador from the Republic 
of Ireland for the time being." (44)
In late 1949, the Canadian Department of External Affairs, 
through their office in Dublin, sent a reminder to the Department 
of External Affairs, about their wish to replace John Hearne as 
High Commissioner. Despite John Hearne's difficult position, 
Frederick Boland responded bluntly, "the Irish Government would 
replace Mr Hearne just as soon as it was satisfied that the 
Canadian Government would accept an Irish Ambassador."(45) 
Rejecting an earlier request from the the British Government, 
the Canadian Government decided to seek the King's approval for 
the acceptance of Mr. Murphy as Ambassador of the Republic of 
Ireland to Canada. This decision was partly motivated by the 
desire to remove John Hearne who had been in Canada according to 
the file in the Canadian Department of External Affairs "an 
abnormally long time and we would not wish to prevent his 
transfer."(46) This was no doubt a comment on their 
dissatisfaction with John Hearne's intrepid attempts to have Eire 
recognised as a sovereign state , independent of the formalities 
attached to membership of the Commonwealth.
(44)CDEA 50021-40
(45)CDEA 50021-40 Ref 10566-46/113/6
(46)CDEA 50021-40 file Ar 27/4/ AR/ 420/16
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I
1
In fact, John Hearne was personally popular in Canada. For
example, once he met Mackenzie King, who was taking a
i!
Recuperative walk and later wrote to him wishing him a speedy
I
recovery. He received a reply which read: "Next to the sunshine
and the glow of your countenance, it did more to raise my spiritsi
!
than much that has occurred for weeks past.” (47) Overall though,
I
John Hearne's government's policies with regard to defence and 
diplomacy and the Commonwealth were not popular in Canada.
Perhaps those who chose not to celebrate the inauguration of the 
Republic of Ireland might have agreed with Attlee's retort to
Eire's High Commissioner in London, John Dulanty, that the
historian, William Lecky's (1*) adage, " the Act of Union was not
a crime, it was worse - it was a blunder" described precisely 
the Republic of Ireland Act.(48) Or that the adage applied, at 
least, to what Anthony Eden described as the "peculiarly abrupt 
way" Eire's intention to leave the Commonwealth was
announced.(49)
(47)IDFA 313/3A
(48)IDFA 305/14/36 
|(49) Ibid
(l*)This adage has been attributed to several sources including 
the philosopher Edmund Burke.
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In January 1949 the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin,(1*) 
engaged in a heated exchange with John Dulanty, who said that it 
appeared to him that the Irish Government "felt free to throw a 
brick at the heads of the British Government any time they liked 
and feel bitter at even a mild reply for this."(50) The "mild 
reply" was the so-called "guarantee" on Partition contained in 
the UK Ireland Act,1949.
I
Before dealing with the UK "Ireland Act,1949", the following two 
chapters will examine two important inter-related issues in 
Anglo-Irish relations at this time. First the British and Irish 
government perspectives on Partition will be presented as 
objectively as is possible without comment. That chapter may 
contribute towards understanding Eire's "refusal" to join NATO 
or more so why the NATO powers, in particular Britain and 
America wanted to avoid becoming embroiled in the debate on 
partition especially under the auspices of the NATO charter.
(1*)Coincidentally , Ernest Bevin, as a union official, first 
encountered John Costello when he was cross-examined by him in 
his capacity as Ireland's leading barrister. Bevin's side 
lost!(51)
(50) Ibid
(51) IDFA 313/3A L.D. 5.10.1949
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CHAPTER XI11
CASE FOR AND AGAINST PARTITION
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On May 12 1949, the Canadian acting High Commissioner in Dublin, 
David Johnson, lunching with Sean MacBride asked him where he 
might find the best objective presentation of the Irish case 
against Partition. Johnson's report gives the impression that 
this innocent request "from the mouths of babes" caused MacBride 
some unease. At that time there was no policy document nor even 
an official statement of the Irish case against Partition. Mac 
Bride could only recommend Johnson to read a paper he had 
delivered to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 
February 1949. Johnson later asked Frederick Boland the same 
question. Such was the emphasis on the rhetorical approach to re­
unification, that Boland, like MacBride in response to Johnson's 
query, "had no suggestion to offer."(1) It is surprising that
there appears to have been neither interdepartmental
consideration nor planning given to the broad social, economic 
and political consequences of the re-unification of Ireland.
(1) CDEA 50021-40
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Johnson prepared his own synopsis of the Irish case for his 
Department of External Affairs . This was based mainly on the 
anti-partition speeches of John Costello, Sean MacBride, Eamon 
De Valera, and other Irish political leaders. He considered that 
"the Irish case is devastatingly simple". In his report Johnson 
quoted from MacBride's speech to the anti- partition meeting held 
in Dublin's O'Connell Street on May 13: " Our case is a simple
one which cannot be challenged. The essence of democratic rule 
lies in the right of the people of a nation to determine their 
own affairs democratically, by their own free will, without 
outside interference." Johnson noted, "Mr Costello and Mr 
MacBride firmly reject the theory that there are two nations in 
Ireland." Johnson then outlined "what Irish leaders overlook"; 
noting that there was never a reference to the Boundary 
Commission and that the Dail approved the treaty. Johnson then 
cited, Irish neutrality during the second World War, the repeal 
of the External Relations Act and the refusal to join NATO as 
obstacles to unity. (2)
(2) Ibid
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jPossibly prompted by Johnson's inquiry, the Irish Department of 
.External Affairs seconded staff from other civil service 
jdepartments to produce a pamphlet entitled "Ireland's Right to 
Unity."(3) This anti-partition pamphlet was prepared under the 
auspices of the All-Party Anti-Partition Conference and produced 
by the Department of External Affairs. (4)
Similarly, the British Foreign Office had received enquiries from 
their embassies about how to counteract the Irish Government's 
arguments about partition. In June 1950 Laithwaite prepared a 
lengthy memorandum, designed to counteract the arguments in the 
"anti-partition" pamphlet. That memorandum was updated towards 
the end of the year with additional information and was 
circulated to United Kingdom representatives in foreign and 
Commonwealth countries. Laithwaite in a letter to the 
Commonwealth Relations Office made the point that his memorandum 
was much lengthier than he had anticipated, adding, "I think it 
is objective - at any rate I tried hard to keep it so."(5)
(3)Telephone Interview with Professor Labhras O'Nualain 18.6.1988 
who was seconded to assist in preparing the pamphlet " Ireland's 
ricrty^_Jo__lJriit£", The case stated by the all- Party Anti-Partition 
Conference, Mansion House, Dublin, Ireland. Second edition, pub. 
Browne Sc Nolan Dublin, distributed by the Department of External 
Affairs, 1949, (from which the "anti-Partition" references are 
drawn).
(4)This pamphlet is in PRO PREM 8/1222 Pt.2
(5)PRO DO 35 3943. File from which all references are drawn on 
the pro-Partition arguments unless otherwise stated.
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Laithwaite complained of the difficulty in establishing the 
facts, attributing this to the "extreme apparent reluctance of 
anyone who writes a book on the Irish question, from whichever 
side he is writing, to commit himself to precise dates or to 
avoid slurring over inconvenient facts." His memorandum began 
defeatistly: "The United Kingdom Government has rarely made
official utterances on partition; it cannot, in fact, be said 
,that there is a 'United Kingdom case' to oppose the Irish 
republican case." He argued that Partition was a last resort and 
recognised and admitted the disadvantages of Partition. Having 
acknowledged this point, Laithwaite proceeded to forward a 
defence to all of the anti-partition pamphlet's claims.
The Irish anti-partition pamphlet highlighted ten main points: 
Firstly that the accepted unit for self-determination by which 
policies are decided and a government elected is the nation. 
Accordingly, that the natural and historical unit in Ireland was 
the whole nation. The credentials of the Irish nation were cited 
as the geographic unit, national language, separate culture and 
;laws, a homogeneous peoples, distinctive national tradition and 
Ireligiosity. That the "people in all parts of the country are, 
and speak of themselves as Irish", and that in a democracy it is 
the people who decide how they are to be governed and partition 
was a denial of the right of self-determination and denied the 
legitimacy of the unit and the majority.
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Laithwaite, commenting on these points, considered, "This is a 
very weak case, since in practice these supports can similarly be 
quoted, perhaps more forcefully, to support the loyalist case for
t
a separate state, albeit within the Nation." Laithwaite claimed
I
.that seventy per cent majority in Northern Ireland were different
I^
enough, through historical, racial, religious and political 
differences to constitute a separate political and homogeneous 
entity comparable in terms to the rest of the geographical islandf
!
and that Northern Ireland was "at least as homogeneous as 
geographical Ireland."
!
^Secondly, the anti-partition pamphlet claimed that "no group, 
party, or political organisation in Ireland sought for or desired
\
Partition, indeed that it had been imposed by the British
!
government against the will of the country as a whole. The 
pamphlet stated that "the fact that Ireland was a national unit 
was never questioned until a British government for its own 
purposes decided to cut the country into two parts - five-sixths 
and one six." The pamphlet argued that the Liberal Home Rule Bill 
of 1911 was used by the Tories to kill two birds with one stone: 
defeat Home Rule and as a corollary defeat the Liberals in 
Parliament. In order to secure this objective, the Tories were 
accused of rousing the Unionists in North East Ulster to protest 
against the Home Rule Bill. According to the pamphlet, "the 
Liberals, rather than leave office, solved the crisis by 
abandoning their pledges to Ireland and their own self-government 
Bill and adopted the expedient of partition."
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.Answering this Laithwaite agreed that Lloyd George's solution, 
the Government of Ireland Act,1920, was not satisfactory to Sinn 
Fein, " not chiefly because it partitioned the country but
because it did not give sufficient autonomy to satisfy Sinn 
Fein." He argued that the Government of Ireland Act 1920, made 
provision for the eventual re-unification of Ireland, but that 
opinion in Southern Ireland no longer found anything short of 
complete independence acceptable. According to Laithwaite, "the 
treaty of 1921 envisaged a Free State covering the whole of 
Ireland, but allowed the Six Counties to opt out; their decision 
to do so had since been affirmed at a series of elections, but 
even when that decision was formally recognised by all three 
governments in 1925 the way was explicitly left open for co­
operation between the two parts of Ireland."
The anti-partition pamphlet further argued that the British
government imposed Partition against the wishes of the majority
of the people of Ireland and that Partition was subsequently
maintained by undemocratic means through the use of force and 
gerrymandering.
CONTINUED/
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In response to the claim that Partition had been imposed against 
the will of the country as a whole, Laithwaite, based his 
argument on the case that the majority view of the population of 
Northern Ireland, was, as "expressed in the most vigorous way in 
the period immediately before the Home Rule Bill of 1912, to 
remain a part of the United Kingdom", further arguing that the 
1920 and 1921 Act only allowed for the six counties to opt out 
and put the onus upon the six counties to exercise that option.
In reply to the accusation that Partition has been maintained by 
undemocratic means, Laithwaite replied that "there is universal 
franchise in Northern Ireland and that there are regular 
elections. At every election since the Government of Northern 
Ireland was established as a separate entity in 1920 there has 
been an overwhelming majority of the electorate for the 
maintenance of partition." Laithwaite's conclusion in regard to 
the issue of gerrymandering was that "if there is any element of 
gerrymandering, it is of negligible importance in relation to the 
overall verdict and composition of the electorate."
Fourthly, the pamphlet argued that Partition was supposed to be a 
temporary expedient and would end "within a short specified 
period." In the same week of May 1916 that Lloyd George gave Mr. 
Redmond, the Nationalist leader, a pledge that there would be no 
permanent partition of Ireland, he reneged on that pledge by 
writing a letter to the Loyalists' leader, Sir Edward Carson 
assuring him, "We must make it clear that at the end of the 
provisional period, Ulster does not, whether she wills it or not, 
merge in the rest of Ireland."
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Laithwaite pointed out that the letter written by Lloyd George 
was written by him a month after the Easter Uprising and not as 
Prime Minister, but in his capacity as Minister of Munitions
According to Laithwaite, there was no question of Mr. Lloyd 
George being able to commit succeeding governments or 
Parliaments. Laithwaite argued that the letter of 1916, must be 
read with the terms which accompanied it. "It had reference to 
the implementation of the Home Rule Act of 1914, already on the 
statute book, but suspended its operation until the end of the 
war, under which effective control, save in respect of a local 
autonomy, would continue to rest with the United Kingdom
Parliament. The proposals for a term of exclusion which 
accompanied it provided for exclusion of the six counties for the
continuance of the war and for twelve months thereafter, or for
such time as might be necessary to enable parliament to make
further provision". There was also mention of an Imperial 
Conference at the close of the war at which "the permanent
settlement of Ireland should be considered." Laithwaite also 
included in his argument the point that "friendly reconciliation 
has been prevented by the aggressive tactics of the south and by 
southern threats (repeated so recently as 1950) to overcome and 
conquer the whole of Northern Ireland ." He argued that the 
United Kingdom government "far from wishing to perpetuate 
Partition, hoped it would be a temporary expedient.The United 
Kingdom Government has thus done everything to facilitate 
Irishmen coming together again." Offering evidence to support
this contention, Laithwaite cited the Government of Ireland Act,
1920, which provided for a Council of Ireland that would begin/
331
begin by concerning itself with minor matters but could lead to 
"greater co-operation until it should lead to a Government of all 
Ireland."
The anti-partition pamphlet argued that the revision of the 
boundaries allowed for in the 1922 treaty, was not honoured by 
the Boundary Commission of 1925, and pointed out that the 
unpublished report was against altering the "defects of the 
boundary".
Laithwaite, while admitting that the boundary is "unsatisfactory 
administratively", attributed this to the fact that it was 
"based on existing parliamentary divisions and its details were 
not scientifically worked out." He pointed out that if the 
Boundary Commission had made its report, it would have 
recommended the transfer to Northern Ireland of "a substantial 
area of Donegal in which non-Catholic elements predominated." 
Laithwaite pointed out that "the boundary as it stands, and 
without any adjustment, whether administrative or political, was 
affirmed by the agreement of the governments of Northern Ireland, 
the Irish Free State and the United Kingdom, an agreement 
ratified by the United Kingdom and Free State legislation in 
1925."
Sixthly, the anti-partition pamphlet argued that Northern 
Ireland is a police state, citing the Special Powers Act and the 
fact that the Tricolour flag was not allowed to be displayed 
there. Laithwaite referred to the religious tension and the 
threat from the South, "In such circumstances it is inevitable 
that the threatened government and population should take/
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take special measures for its own protection." Laithwaite argued 
that the reason for the restrictions on the flying of the 
Tricolour flag were because 1 it is the flag of the Sinn Fein 
movement, which in the North is associated with crimes of 
violence, so that the flying of this flag, though now recognised 
a^s the flag of an independent State, tends to produce violent 
feeling and to endanger the peace."
The seventh point that the anti-partition pamphlet again referred 
to was the issue of gerrymandering and it offered six examples 
of the voting pattern in five counties :
:(A) In the County of Fermanagh there were 30,196 Nationalists and 
24,375 Tories, yet the Tories managed to secure two of the three 
Parliamentary seats.(B) In the Borough Council of Enniskillen 
there were 2,780 nationalists and 2,100 Tories yet out of 21 
seats the Tories secured two-thirds while on the Fermanagh 
County Council the Tories have 19 seats as compared to the 
Nationalists 6.(C ) In the county of Tyrone there were 70,595 
Nationalists and 56,991 Unionists yet the Tory minority secured 
23 seats on the County Council while the Nationalist "majority" 
had 12. (D) That in Derry City Corporation, Nationalists totalled 
29,321, and obtained 8 seats, while the Tories with 18,492 
obtained 20 seats. (E) While in Omagh Urban District Council, 
there were 3,573 Nationalists and 2,168 Tories and this resulted 
in a ratio of 12 seats to the minority and nine to the 
majority.(F) Finally in Strabane Rural Council there were equal 
proportions of elecorate yet the pattern was 20 seats to 
Unionists and 8 to Nationalists.
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The anti-partition pamphlet pointed out that the situation was 
exacerbated in 1946, when a Bill was introduced to further limit 
the local voting power of Nationalists by giving those with 
^property several votes and depriving those with lower incomes of 
the single vote they held. Major Curran, a Unionist member of 
the Stormont parliament, is quoted as justifying this practice: 
"the best way to prevent the overthrow of the government by 
jpeople who had no stake in the country and had not the welfare of
| the people of Ulster at heart, was to disenfranchise them.”
I The Nationalists argued that the six counties were separated 
primarily because they formed a unit that would give the 
Loyalists a manageable majority. They pointed out that this was 
[achieved through manipulating electoral boundaries citing the 
example that even though there were 281,000 Nationalists and 
1268,000 Loyalists in four and a half counties only one and a half 
counties have a democratic case for excluding themselves from the 
[Nation State of Ireland." The pamphlet argued that in 30 of the 
!the 32 counties, there is a nationalist majority, and only 40 of
Ithe 199 Parliamentary representatives elected in Ireland as a
.whole, favour Northern Ireland as a separate state. Abraham 
[Lincoln was the quoted in the pamphlet: "On what rightful
[principle may a state, being not more than one -fifth part of the 
nation in soil and population, break up the nation and then 
coerce a proportionally larger sub-division of itself in the most 
arbitrary way?"
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In his memorandum, Laithwaite left the issue of gerrymandering 
until last. "Finally, one cannot escape some discussions of 
election statistics, however unprofitable it may be. One cannot 
prove that Northern Ireland constituencies are not (nor that they 
are) gerrymandered."
Against the nationalist argument that two nationalist members of 
the U.K. represent half a million nationalists and ten represent 
the Unionists, that as the Nationalists composed one third of the 
population they should have four of the twelve seats." Laithwaite 
claimed this apparent discrepancy "ignores the normal working of 
the electoral system." He cited the case in mainland Britain 
where the Liberal party obtained much fewer seats in relation to 
the strength of their numerical votes and argued that "the voting 
system does not claim to reflect the views of the electorate 
accurately."
Laithwaite believed the electoral figures for Northern Ireland 
were "suspect", specifically because there were not half a 
million Nationalists, but only 455,000. According to Laithwaite, 
"The argument that a third of the population was Nationalist, yet 
only a quarter of the votes cast were for Nationalist candidates 
was suspect because not all Catholics voted nationalist." 
Laithwaite argued that the assumption was that every Roman 
Catholic is a Nationalist. "Apart from the unreality of including 
non-adults, this assumption has no foundation."
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Laithwaite supported this reasoning by pointng out that in 
Fermanagh in 1949, the Nationalist vote was 52.86 per cent 
.although the percentage of Catholics in the population was 55.3 
jper cent. This gave Laithwaite room to comment that "There may 
well be a number of Catholics who have no desire to be reunited 
with Southern Ireland.” Laithwaite explained away the issue of 
the business vote by claiming, "The effect of the business vote 
is not calculable."
Overall, Laithwaite dismissed the charge of gerrymandering by 
claiming that, "the broad general conclusion that appears to 
emerge is that, if in fact, in the delimiting of the Northern 
Ireland constituencies the object of the delimiting authority was 
to ensure a Unionist majority without regard for the true facts 
of the local situation, the element of gerrymandering that can 
with any plausibility be suggested to exist is so small as to be 
negligible locally and certainly be negligible in relation to the 
general political attitude of the Six Northern Counties."
Point eight of the anti-partition pamphlet was that Northern 
Ireland was occupied by British forces. Laithwaite dismissed 
this accusation by quoting from the argument advanced by the 
staunch Unionist M.P. at Westminster, Professor D.L. Savory: "It 
was as very rare to have there any but Ulster regiments which 
were composed of their own people, brothers, and soldiers. We 
welcome them as friends, and any idea of British occupation is 
entirely repugnant."
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In reply to the Nationalist taunt that Stormont was subservient 
jto Westminster, Laithwaite relied that to have given more power 
jto Stormont would have been inconsistent with the British 
^government' s hope that an understanding might sooner or later 
jdevelop between the North and the South.
Finally, the anti-partition pamphlet argued that while Britain 
claims to be neutral, the undertaking contained in the 
government of Ireland Act, 1949, took away the decision from the 
people of Northern Ireland and left it to the Parliament of 
Jsiorthern Ireland. The Nationalists argued that the guarantee
given to Northern Ireland in the Ireland Act of 1949 was
i
i
junjustified and superfluous.
They claimed that such interference in the internal affairs of
i
Ireland by Britain "sets an example destructive of the rule of 
jlaw among the nations." The pamphlet challenged Britain with the 
taunt that her position on Northern Ireland cast doubt on 
Britain's claim to stand for democracy in Western Europe.
According to Laithwaite, the guarantee was " the direct result 
of the decision of Eire to separate itself from the Commonwealth 
and of the claim by which that intention was accompanied that 
Northern Ireland should be incorporated in the new Republic." 
Laithwaite argued that " with universal franchise and with no 
element of gerrymandering that can be regarded as of any 
importance, this is clearly the only democratic solution. A 
difference cannot be drawn between the people of a country and 
the Parliament." Laithwaite stated, "if and when agreement 
should be reached between Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland,/
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Ireland, His Majesty's Government have expressed their 
willingness to consider its results." Laithwaite stated that no 
pressure would be brought upon Northern Ireland because : "it
would be impossible politically for any government in the United 
Kingdom to urge any part of the Commonwealth to secede from the 
Commonwealth against its will and to join a state which does not 
recognise the King, and which, though it has close economic and 
racial ties with the United Kingdom , save in name, is completely 
foreign."
JLaithwaite suggested that Southern Ireland first endeavour to 
convert Northern Ireland to its view. He thought that " Southern 
Irish tactics have so far been calculated to achieve precisely 
the opposite results." This was a reference to "threats of 
forcible occupation of Northern Ireland, the establishment of a 
volunteer force in Southern Ireland designed to conquer Northern 
Ireland overnight and to occupy its principal points, with a 
distinctive uniform of their own, are the worst practical 
arguments that could be used to a proud and independent area with 
a long tradition of its own, religiously and politically 
separated from the Irish Republic."
Interestingly, in 1952 the Home Office, commenting on 
Laithwaite's report, agreed with the anti-partition pamphlet when 
it admitted that the memorandum "seems to be at variance with
government policy..... It is true that the Ireland Act 1949
provided that Northern Ireland may not cease to be part of His 
Majesty's Dominions and of the United Kingdom without the consent
!i
of Northern Ireland, but this is not the same as saying that
Northern Ireland is free to join the Republic at any time if she 
iso desires if she and the Republic can come to terms. In the 
.debates on the Bill, the Lord President was very careful not to 
go further than to say that if Irish men themselves came
together and made their own agreement, H.M. Government would 
willingly consider the results."(6)
The following chapter examines the Irish government's "refusal" 
to accept the "invitation" to join NATO.
CHAPTER XIV
NATO
A)COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE, EIRE, WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO
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This chapter examines the position of Eire vis-a-vis thes
Commonwealth and the emerging Cold War, Western European Union 
and NATO. Overall, emphasis will be placed on the American 
overview of British defence strategy in Europe and Commonwealth 
defence relations. Within the sub- framework of British - 
Commonwealth and British-European defence relations, Eire's
interlinked role will be examined.
^n appreciation of Britain's post-war global strategic role and 
her decline as a superpower contributes towards understanding 
the background to Anglo-Irish diplomatic relations, particularly 
the introduction by the British government of the "guarantee 
clause" in the Ireland Bill, in May 1949.
Of immediate concern to post- war Britain was the problem of
retaining her independent position alongside Europe. In 
particular Britain did not want to see a Europe dominated by a 
single hegemonic power, especially the Soviet Union. Britain 
still hoped that she might lead a united Europe with the
collaboration of a united Commonwealth,(1) i.e. Britain would be 
the third world power.
(1) PRO PREM 8/734. C.P.M.(48)5 5.10.1948. In October 1948 Sir 
Norman Brook prepared a report entitled, "Committee on the 
Preparations for the meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Commonwealth Interest in Collaboration with Western Europe."
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jThe Americans also considered that a Soviet dominated Europe 
|WOuld be a serious threat to their security. The State Department 
thought that in spite of Britain's efforts towards building her 
political, military and economic defences against Russia, the 
safe buffer between America and Russia was in danger of 
disappearing.(2) Not surprisingly, Britain and America's role in 
the formation of the Western European Union and NATO, shows an 
awareness by both powers of the "Soviet threat". In contrast the 
Irish government still concentrated first and foremost on the 
"domestic" issue of Partition.
In 1948 the defence of Britain, with regard to Eire, rested on 
two main concerns. Firstly, that the whole of the British Isles 
was a strategic unit and all parts should be in British control 
or, at a minimum, be controlled by a friendly and reliable power. 
Eire was by 1948 accepted in the latter category. Secondly, 
Britain's dependence on overseas food supplies made command of 
the sea lanes to the British Isles a necessity. Historically, 
British defence strategy tried to ensure that friendly powers 
controlled her western and southern flanks. In 1948, Britain 
viewed Eire's neutral position as tolerable so long as Northern 
Ireland could be counted as a loyal ally.
(2) NA 941 D. 00/12-2149
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At the beginning of 1948, the Foreign Office's attitude to Eamon 
,de Valera's Fianna Fail government was that as a long terra 
objective it would be useful to "bring Eire within the fold in 
.foreign affairs" but that in the short term she should be 
jexcluded from Commonwealth Councils on matters relating to 
defence, i.e. "Family Prayers". (3) This was based primarily on 
the strategic consideration of Eire's geographical position. 
Additionally the fact that Eire was still considered to be a 
member of the Commonwealth for external purposes made co­
operation desirable if only, as an example to other Commonwealth 
members. That point should be borne in mind with regard to the 
adverse affect on Commonwealth unity of Eire leaving the 
Commonwealth. In February 1948 the Foreign Office considered 
that Eire's membership of the OEEC made her inclusion in any 
Western European defence union "desirable".(4)
(3)PR0 FO 371 70175. Commonwealth Liaison File. W.988. J.P.Finch 
to Sir Noel Charles. L.D. 6.2.1948
(4) Ibid
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Even in the post-war era Irish neutrality was still a sensitive 
subject. For example, several British diplomatic missions 
including the Vatican, Washington and Stockholm had suggested 
that there should be closer co-operation with their Irish 
colleagues by allowing them to be privy to confidential 
documents.(5) These documents were discussed at meetings of 
Commonwealth members, which included Irish diplomats, and it was 
argued that otherwise, "the meetings would be much vitiated".(6) 
Lord Rugby's response was that de Valera might not welcome such a 
move and view it as an infringement on Eire's neutrality. The 
formal answer from the Commonwealth Relations Office was to 
refuse closer co-operation, "and to repeat this refusal to other 
missions where there are Eire Ministers."(7) In practice, the 
British government were reluctant to make any overt gestures on 
defence co-operation. Their principal reason, was their fear that 
such a move would give de Valera the opportunity to raise the 
embarrassing issue of Partition.
(5)Ibid
(6)Ibid
(7)Ibid
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British foreign policy from the end of the Second World War to 
the end of 1947 was based on the hope that Russia would be 
amenable to diplomatic solutions in Europe . That policy was 
abandoned after the breakdown of the Conference of Foreign 
Ministers held in Germany, in December 1947. For the previous 
two years, the parliamentary Labour party was divided on major 
foreign policy issues regarding the Soviet Union. According to 
one U.S. report, "such developments as the absorption of 
Czechoslovakia, the crushing of Socialism and democracy in 
Eastern Europe and Communist attempts to sabotage European 
recovery, through strikes in France and Italy, dissipated any 
lingering illusions about Russian motives.” (8)
The Foreign Office prepared a nine -page report for Attlee 
entitled, ’International Relations, with particular reference to 
the Soviet Union." Its opening sentence exemplifies the Cold War 
tone, " Experience shows that it is not possible to reach 
agreements on a basis of compromise with the Soviet Union and to 
be sure that those agreements will be kept." The third paragraph 
of this report began, " There is now no possible doubt the that 
the Soviets aim at the domination of Europe and of the world."(9)
(8) NA 741.00/12-2149
(9)PRO PREM 8/734. Extract from (Commonwealth) P.M.M.(48)9.
19.10.1948
345
In 1948-9, the American perspective on global affairs was that, 
"for the foreseeable future", the USSR was the only power which 
could pose a threat to the security of the United States.(10) A 
iCIA report in 1949 considered that "the Soviet regime, moreover, 
is essentially and implacably inimical towards the United 
States."(11) However, this CIA report was of the opinion that "as 
of March 1948, we estimated that the preponderance of available 
evidence and of considerations derived from the 'logic of the 
situation' supported the conclusion that the USSR would not 
resort to direct military action during 1948." This report 
concluded that, international tension would continue to increase 
further during 1949 and "in these circumstances, the danger of an 
unintended outbreak of hostilities through miscalculation on 
either side must be considered to have increased ."(12)
Even in the spring of 1948, the U.S. still thought that Bevin was 
vague about the form of Western European Union and that, "only 
the aim was clear to strengthen western Europe by closer 
association."(13) Indeed, the U.S. State Department believed 
that Britain was not prepared "psychologically for federation 
nor to jeopardise their relationship with the Commonwealth."(14)
(10)Harry Truman Library,(HTL) Presidents Secretary files 
(PSF).Ref; ORE 60-48
(11)HTL. PSF files. ORE 46-49, Published 3.5.1949
(12)Ibid
(13)NA 741.00/12-2149
(14)Ibid
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Post-war Britain still assumed it was the protector of all of the 
Commonwealth and was willing to aid any member who was attacked. 
In return it expected close co-operation from the Commonwealthi
t>ut was aware that the obligation was not necessarily reciprocal, 
pne aspect of the co-operation was exemplified by the fact that 
pmperial strategy was discussed at meetings of Commonwealth 
defence chiefs at Camberley each year.
prompted by the December 1947 deadlock of the meeting of Council 
of Foreign Ministers, Attlee decided to consult the Commonwealth 
ion his defence plans. (15) On January 10 1948, Attlee sent the
Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, South Africa and New
Zealand a personal message outlining Britain's response to 
Russia's expansionist policy.(16) Britain wanted to give a 
"moral lead to the friendly countries of Western Europe and take 
a more active line against Communism." Attlee thought that, 
;"Indeed if we are to stem further encroachment of the Soviet 
tide we should organise the ethical and spiritual forces of 
Western Europe, backed by the power and resources of the
Commonwealth and of the Americas, thus creating a solid 
foundation for the defence of western civilisation in the widest 
sense ." (17)
|(15)PRO FO 371 68013B.includes report entitled ; "The Present
Conception of Western European Unity." p.144.
(16) PRO PREM 8/987. Referred to in Telegram from the High 
Commissioner in Australia 22.1.1948 Telegram No. 39.Serial No. 
T.12/48. See also FO 371. 68013B for Attlee's proposals for the
Commonwealth and Europe
(17) Ibid
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This was a polite way of informing the Commonwealth members that 
Britain was joining a Western European Defence Pact and as the 
responses show, marked a break in the supposed unity of the 
Anglo-Commonwealth defence pact.
First to reply on January 22 1949, was the Prime Minister of 
Australia, Ben Chifley; he stated that Australia would need to 
be given "fullest prior consultation in advance before Britain 
could assume her support."(18) Chifley castigated the UK for 
citing moral and ethical forces while forming an alliance against 
the Soviet government which would "include such undemocratic 
governments as exist in Spain and Greece." He argued that such an 
alliance might provoke the Russian government to take measures 
which the alliance was intended to prevent. Referring to 
Palestine, Chifley quoted Herbert Evatt who said that in order to 
uphold the principles of the United Nations, " we consider that 
foreign policy based on strategy, and not permanent settlement of 
disputes, tends to become a policy of despair, bringing about 
just those situations it should be designed to avoid."(19) In a 
following telegram to Attlee's reply, Chifley repeated "I can 
understand your desire to discuss your proposed course with 
Cabinet before communicating with us: but I cannot emphasise too
much or too often the seriousness of taking decisions clearly 
involving us, or in expectation of our support, without the 
fullest prior consultation." (20) Chifley added that/
(18) PRO PRO PREM 8/987. Referred to in Telegram from the High 
Commissioner in Australia 22.1.1948 Telegram No. 39.Serial No. 
T.12/48 
1(19) Ibid
1(20)PRO PREM 8/987. From H.C. Australia to CRO.11.2.1948. 
jTelegram No. 88. Serial no T.37/48
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that his government "fully appreciate your great difficulties and 
the absolute need in your present economic and military position 
jto obtain and maintain the sympathy and support of the United 
States of America, but that support should not be obtained on the 
basis that war with the Soviets is inevitable. That view appears, 
on private advice we have received, as being fostered by certain 
^sections in the United States of America." (21)
In contrast, the South African government, replying on February
j
20, 1948, through their High Commissioner in London, reported to
the Secretary of State at the Commonwealth Relations Office 
that: "The Union government are in general agreement with the
approach of the United Kingdom government to the important
question of a Western union and consider it very advisable to
explore the whole subject more fully with France and the Benelux 
countries."(22)
Mackenzie King, while agreeing with Attlee's policy of a more 
active line against Communism, expressed concern that Attlee's 
use of the phrase, "backed by power and resources of the
Commonwealth and the Americas might imply an addition to economic 
assistance : But if 'military power' was intended or implied,
ithen this passage went further than he would feel able from 
Canadian standpoint to subscribe to."(23)
(21)Ibid
(22)PRO PREM 8/987. Series No.T.52/48. Letter from High 
Commissioner in South Africa to Secretary of State CRO
(23)PRO PREM 8/987. details of High Commissioner's conversation 
with Mac Kenzie King on 15.1.1949. Telegram No. 41. Des 7.35p.m. 
15.1.1949. Rec. 2.30 a.m. 16.1.1949
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jOverall, this Commonwealth reaction, particularly from 
Australian Labour Party government dashed Britain's hopes of 
.forming or activating the assumed Commonwealth consensus on 
defence. British Chiefs of Staff in March 1948, believed that 
the adverse response of the Commonwealth was because "defence 
collaboration between the UK and the Commonwealth countries was 
at present stultified by the lack of a common defence 
policy."(24) They recommended that because of "the present 
international situation, it was essential there should be
discussions on the highest level between the Commonwealth
countries on defence matters, and it seemed that the only 
satisfactory method of achieving that was by holding some form of 
Commonwealth conference in the very near future."(25)
Accordingly, the British Chiefs of Staff arranged for the agenda 
of the 1948 Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting to include 
discussions for a plan for the establishment of a system of 
Commonwealth Chiefs of Staff. While New Zealand supported the 
idea, Canada was the only Commonwealth member who was prepared to 
;enter such a co-ordinated defence pact. Other Commonwealth
members feared such a pact would limit their sovereignty.(26)
(24) PRO DEFE 4/11. COS(48)3. 9.3.1948
(25)Ibid
(26) PRO Cab 129/30. p. 98
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Prompted by the February 1948 Communist coup that took place in 
Czechoslovakia, Attlee, in the House of Commons on March 1, 1948, 
announced that the five nations would begin talks on Western 
European Union in Brussels.(27) Four days later it was announced 
jthat a draft treaty on Western Union proposed by Britain and 
jFrance would be placed before the five- power conference that day 
in Brussels.(28)
On March 9, 1948, the Commonwealth Relations Office asked the
High Commissioners of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, and Ceylon to supply the governments of the respective 
countries with details of the background to the situation in 
Europe currently being considered by the Cabinet. British foreign 
policy towards Europe was being re-examined because the : 
"expansion of Soviet influence, as manifested lately by events in 
Czechoslovakia, pressure on Finland and Greece and internally in 
Italy represents increasing threat to countries of Western Europe 
and the traditions of freedom democracy for which they stand. It 
has become necessary accordingly to re-examine our European
policy  Issue is that of parliamentary government and liberty
or establishment of dictatorship". (29)
(27)H .C . Vol. 448. Col. 163-64 1.3.1948
(28)The Irish Times . 5.3.1948
(29)PRO FO 371 70175. Telegram Z. No.45. 9.3.1948
351
At that point of time, the Foreign office was considering 
["enlightening MacBride about recent developments which have 
disclosed an imminent threat to Atlantic security." Sean Mac 
Bride, was given a copy of the above message about the 
development of Soviet aims. However, the Foreign Office decided 
not to reveal to him "the countermeasures now under 
consideration till they have won acceptance from those chiefly 
concerned."(30) This was a reference to extending WEU into the 
North Atlantic Alliance. The decision to inform Sean MacBride of 
the threat was probably due to increased fears of further Soviet 
expansionism at that time. An "aide memoire', from the Foreign 
Office to the State Department, dated March 11,1948, claimed that 
Russia was "offering" Norway a pact (1*) on the Soviet Finnish 
model.(31) While Bevin may have "depicted the threat in a most 
pessimistic way",(32) if successful, it would have allowed Russia 
submarines bases in Norway. The Following day, the U.S. Secretary 
of State notified British official, Lord Inverchapel that "we are 
prepared to proceed at once in the joint discussions on the 
establishment of an Atlantic security system."(33)
(30)PRO FO 371. 70175. Top Secret Report "Eire and the Paris
Conference." 12.3.1948 
(31JFRUS 111, 11.3.1948, p.346-7 quoted in Lundestad,G: America
Scandinavia and the Cold war. 1945-49.Columbia University 
Press, 1980. p. 179
(32)Lundestad,G.: America Scandinavia and the Cold War. 1945-49. 
p. 179
(33) Lundestad,G.: America Scandinavia and the Cold War. 1945- 
49. 1980. p. 178
(1*)I am indebted to Dr. Michael Dockrill, Department of War 
Studies, Kings College, London, for bringing my attention to this 
point.
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According to a Foreign Office report dated March 12,1948, the 
"Eire government had no illusions about Russian idealism".(34) 
The report believed that "Anglo-Irish politics influence Eire's 
approach to every problem." With regard to MacBride's arguments 
on Partition and Western European Union, the report recommended: 
"It would suffice to give him a sympathetic hearing, to say that 
any attempt of force or to expedite active measures against
!
ipartition would produce resentment and political crisis, but the 
United Kingdom are in no way opposed to the North and South 
coming together when they can agree to do so and that co­
operation on Western European affairs would seem to point in this 
direction." The report advised, "Mr. MacBride knows the truth, 
but it will make things easier for him to satisfy his left­
wingers if he is shown the red light by the foreign ministers of 
the smaller countries such as the Benelux. Generally speaking, 
Eire can move more easily in these matters when away from the 
British umbrella."(35)
On March 14, Ernest Bevin, opening the 16-power European Aid 
conference, stated: "We must co-operate or perish
! individually."(36) Sean MacBride speaking at the conference 
on Ireland's economic situation added a rider on Partition, to 
I the effect, that the co-operation on defence would be greatly 
!facilitated if there were economic unity.
j (34)PRO FO 371. 70175. Top Secret Report "Eire and the Paris
Conference." 12.3.1948 
(35)Ibid
f36i Irish Times. 15.3.48
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On the eve of signing the Brussels Treaty, Philip Noel-Baker 
asked Sean MacBride for his view on a regional defence pact 
that would include Great Britain and Eire . MacBride's response 
was that Eire "would always be in the front line."(37) Philip 
Noel-Baker pointed out that events meant that that was the 
position for Britain and that she must be in a position to defend 
herself: "Thus only could we give (a chance) to this new
democratic special effort (we were making) in Britain, a chance 
to survive, and this could only be if we were strong enough to 
avoid war." Noel-Baker recorded that MacBride did not comment on 
that proposition.(38)
That Sean MacBride was in Paris on the eve of the signing of the 
Brussels treaty was coincidental, in that there was also a 
meeting of the OEEC in Paris. The linking of the two meetings may 
have caused some confusion and given rise to a belief that 
joining the OEEC was dependent upon signing the Brussels Treaty. 
Foreign Office representative, Gladwyn Jebb,(later appointed 
Ambassador to the W.E.U.) claimed that while at a reception in 
the Canadian Embassy in Paris, in mid-November 1948, he "put 
Sean MacBride straight that he would not have to enter the 
Brussels pact before joining the Council of Europe."(1*).(39)It 
is unlikely that the astute Sean MacBride, a founder member of 
the Council of Europe, needed to have the distinction clarified.
(37)PRO FO 371. 70175 Commonwealth Liaison File.
WCL/W1986."Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State 
and the Foreign Minister of Eire, held in Paris on 16.3.1948
(38) Ibid
(39) PRO FO 371 73111. Report 9435. dated 17.11.1948
(1*) Interestingly by 1951 the US floated the idea of merging 
the economic functions of the OEEC , NATO and the Council of 
Europe.(40)
(40)PRO PREM 8/1434. F.O.to Washington. Tel.No 10164. 25.10.1949
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According to a report from the U.S. Legation in Dublin to the 
Office of European Affairs at the Department of State, the 
Belgian Prime Minister and Statesman, . Paul-Henri Spaak, had said 
that Sean MacBride had intimated to him that Ireland's adhesion 
to any pact including the UK would be conditional on Northern 
Ireland being united to Eire. According to the report, when Spaak 
was asked about his own reaction, he "shrugged his shoulders and 
said this shows how carefully one must proceed in negotiations as 
delicate as these." (41)
On March 17 (St. Patrick's Day), 1948, the Treaty of Brussels 
was signed under the auspices of Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
The U.K., France, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg pledged 
themselves to a fifty-year treaty guaranteeing joint military
action in the event of any of the signatory powers being attacked 
in Europe. That in the event of aggression against any one, they 
pledged to give each other aid and assistance by all means in 
their power, military and otherwise. The treaty also provided for 
the closest economic, political and military co-operation 
between the five countries and the setting up of a permanent 
consultative council for quick action on mutual economic and 
defence problems.
The Commonwealth Relations Office apparently still hoped that
Eire might make a contribution to further Western European Union. 
The British Treasury advised Eric Machtig on March 18 that if 
so, "it may be that we should approach the problem not in the 
restricted sense of one of Anglo-Eire immediate relationships,
but rather within the frame-work of Western European Union."(42)
(41) NA D.840.20/11-2948
(42)PRO DO 130/88.Treasurty Chambers to Eric Machtig. 18.3.1948
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Following the signing of the Brussels Pact, President Truman 
jproclaimed his support to the Brussels pact. Addressing Congress 
he declared that Russia was trying ruthlessly to destroy the 
independence of all Europe, and called for a resumption of the 
American conscription law, universal training and speedy passage 
of the Marshall plan as "urgent steps towards securing peace and 
preventing war."(43)
Influenced by the contents of Truman's speech, the U.S. Senate, 
in June 1948, passed the Vandenberg resolution with an 
overwhelming sixty-four votes to four against. (1*) This meant 
that the Senate in effect authorised a commitment to a regional 
defence system but, with the proviso, that a declaration of war 
rested with Congress.(44)
(43) Irish Times. 18.3.48.
(44)John W.Young, Britain France and the Unitv of Europe 1945- 
51. p.100
(l*)The Vandenberg resolution advised the President that the 
Senate agreed that the US government should pursue "(a)The 
progressive development of regional and other collective 
arrangements for individual and collective self-defence in 
accordance with the purposes, principles and provisions of the UN 
Charter; (b) the association of the United States, by 
Constitutional process, with such regional and other collective 
|arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self help 
and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.”
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(B)
EIRE AND THE FORMATION OF NATO.
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On April 17 1948# a meeting of foreign ministers in Paris,
agreed to establish a London-based permanent Commission of 
Ambassadors to oversee and monitor the Brussels treaty. A 
permanent military committee was also established in London and 
the five foreign ministers greed to meet at least once every 
three months in each capital in turn.(l) Significantly in the 
middle of July 1948, the Canadian and American governments agreed 
to send military representatives to participate as "non-members" 
in the work of the committee. These meetings developed into the 
Washington Security Talks.(2) A working meeting of this body on 
July 26, 1948, considered the names of those countries which
might be included in a combined North-Atlantic- Western European 
security arrangement and also those countries in Europe and the 
Middle East whose security interests would be directly affected 
if they were not included in this security arrangement.(3) The 
criteria for the selection of countries, included their 
geographical position, the security contribution the country 
could make, any liability on a cost -benefit basis, the effect 
that inclusion or exclusion would have on the country's security, 
the importance of the country to the Brussels pact countries, to 
Canada and to the US and finally the possible attitude of a 
country towards participation in this security arrangement. This 
meeting of July 26, 1948 emphasised "the desirability of having
Norway, Denmark, Portugal ,Ireland and Iceland as full members of 
the NATO Pact.”(4) The meeting decided that /
(1)NA 840.20/10-2748
(2) Ibid
(3)Ibid
(4)NA 840 20/7-948.p2. quoted in Lundestad, G.: America
Scandinavia and the Cold war. 1945-49. p.101
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that "Eire should be included and is in a position to make a 
valuable contribution to the security arrangement.”(5)
It was possibly a similar belief in Eire's "strategic 
importance", bolstered by the prospect of, as described by
Frederick Boland, "high level" discussions with Generals in
Canada in July, 1948(6), that gave John Costello the confidence 
to state optimistically, in the Dail, on July 23 1948, "for the
first time since 1922, this Cabinet will, by its policy and its
actions, give some hope of bringing back to this country the six 
north-eastern counties of Ulster."(7) Continuing he added "the 
interests of Great Britain, the interests of the United States of 
America, the interests of Western Europe and the interests and 
maintenance of Christian principles require and demand that there 
should be a united Ireland to face the menacing situation which 
will possibly develop in the next few years." (8) Rugby later 
interpreted the speech as part of the "curious burst of 
optimism"(9) of the Irish government on Partition in the Summer
of 1948. He attributed the optimism to the improvement in Anglo
-Irish relations and the fact that Attlee and Sir Stafford 
Cripps were due to sign the trade agreement in Dublin at the end 
of July and speculation about an " approach to Eire from the 
United States on subject of Western Union." (10)
(5) NA 840.20/7-2748
(6) Bruce Arnold interview with Frederick Boland.Copy kindly lent 
by Dr.Noel Browne .Grateful acknowledgement for permission to 
quote to Bruce Arnold.
(7) D.D. Vol. 112. Col.1520. 23.7. 1948
{8) D.D. Vol. 112. Col.1521. 23.7.1948
(9)PRO FO 371. 79225. Rugby to CRO Telegram no 17. 10.2.1949.
;(10) PRO DO 35 3934. 24.7.1948. Tel.No. 71.
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By September 9, two days after John Costello's "announcement",
:the bargaining position of Eire had weakened to the extent that
ithe Washington security talks only considered that "it might well 
be desirable" to have Ireland as a full member of the NATO 
Pact.(11) More forcefully, the British representative at the 
Washington Security talks excluded Eire only referring to the 
I "desire of the UK, to include Norway and Portugal in the 
Pact."(12) Bringing hope to solving Partition by arbitration,
was the decision of this meeting that the NATO Treaty should
incorporate "an understanding to submit every controversy which 
may arise among the parties to methods of peaceful 
settlement."(13) It is possible to view this decision to exclude 
Eire by the British government, or more probably the British
Joint Chiefs of Staff, as having been prompting John Costello's 
"announcement" on September 7,1948. However, it is more probable, 
that the British government had already calculated that the 
strategic reliability of Northern Ireland was not worth bartering 
for an end to Eire's military neutrality and that Eire, if
included in NATO would use the charter which encouraged the
peaceful settlement of disputes between members to raise the
issue of Partition within the forum of NATO. Further study on the 
drafting of Article four(l*) of the charter dealing with respect 
for the "territorial integrity" might show that Britain 
was responsible for initiating that delimiting Article.
(11) FRUS 1948 Vol 3.p.241 quoted in Lundestad,G.: America 
Scandinavia and the Cold war. 1945-49. p.102 .
(12) NA 840. 20/4-2149 Lundestad,G.: America Scandinavia and the
Cold war. 1945-49. p.102.
(13) NA 840.20. 11-1348. Section Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes"10. Para 22.
(1*) See Appendix V
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A memorandum to the British cabinet in November 1948, pointed 
out that the Americans and Canadians wanted the participation of 
Norway and Denmark in the proposed pact and to a lesser extent 
the inclusion of Portugal, Iceland and Eire. In effect this 
meant that from America and Canada's point of view, Eire could 
participate, but was dispensable. However this Cabinet paper 
acknowledged that "if all or any of these countries prove willing 
to participate, it would be difficult to find good grounds for 
opposing their inclusion.” (14) This may have meant that Eire, if 
she expressed a willingness to participate, would have a good 
bargaining position on ending Partition. Reading between the 
lines, it could be argued that Eire's acceptance of participation 
in NATO would have presented Britain with the major difficulty 
of justifying her continued support towards the Unionists' 
position on Partition in Northern Ireland. Briefly, in 1948, 
the strategic importance of Eire was based on a cost benefit 
analysis of the political implications for Britain of withdrawing 
support for Partition for defence gains.
A report on Ireland's strategic position in March 1949 prepared 
by the CIA and agreed by the intelligence organisation of the 
Department of State, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force noted 
the "inconvenience of Irish neutrality/
(14)PRO Cab 129/30 p.100. CP(48)249. 2.11.1948. Cabinet Paper
entitled "North Atlantic Treaty and Western Union." Memorandum by 
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
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ineutrality during World War 11, and reckoned that the lack in 
heavy industry in Eire was compensated for by the "the importance 
of the availability of its territory, agricultural output" and 
noted its "potential manpower contribution". Overall the CIA 
report thought that Irish co-operation would be a positive 
"asset". Neutrality would probably again be tolerable under 
conditions of global warfare. However, because " hostile forces 
in Ireland would outflank the main defences of Great Britain, and 
because it could be used as a base for bombing North America, the 
denial of Ireland to an enemy is an unavoidable principle of 
United States security."(16)
The CIA report considered that in a war Irish neutrality would 
"probably be tolerable." With cold calculation, they stated that 
"it could become necessary to utilise Ireland for these purposes 
under conceivable circumstances of sustained aerial bombardment 
or hostile occupation of British ports". The CIA were rightly 
confident that "Ireland is already ideologically aligned with the 
West, is strongly Catholic and anti-Comraunist, and in spite of 
military weakness and the Partition issue, would probably not
remain neutral in an East-West war." (17) This Strategic decision 
was based on the report contained in the National Security
report of 1950. (18)
(15) Harry Truman Library, (HTL), President Secretary's file 
Box 256 CIA report. SR 48
(16)Ibid
(17)Ibid
(18) See NSC 83/1 A Report dated September 11,1950, to the
National Security Council by the Secretary of Defence on "The
Position of the United States With Respect To Irish Participation 
In NATO and MDAP." HTL. PSF Box 209 Truman Papers. see:
Fanning,R.: " The United States and Irish Participation in NATO:
'The Debate of 1950." Irish Studies in International
Affairs,Vol.1. Number 1.
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Dr. Noel Browne, former Minister for Health considers that the 
Americans were aware that they could have "taken" Ireland if they 
had wanted.(19) Supporting that deduction is a report from 
Consular official W. Moreland attached to the US Legation in 
Dublin, dated March 24,1948 which states, "a great many Irishmen 
|in responsible positions have made a point of telling Consul 
Parker and me that the United States could count on the full 
support of Ireland in any steps the United States might feel 
called upon to take against the Soviets." He continued; 
"Specifically, high Irish airport officials as well as local 
political leaders have said in effect that if the United States 
wishes to use the airport for military purposes they (the United 
States) may feel free to do so. No objection will be successfully 
raised."(20) It is possible that the strategic importance of 
Shannon(1*) to America and the possibility of Irish co-operation 
might explain why Shannon, despite a personal letter of protest 
from Winston Churchill to Roosevelt in January 1945,(21) was 
chosen as an international airport by the U.S. instead of a site 
in Northern Ireland .
The extent to which Eire's pro-western position was taken for 
granted is further evidenced in a CIA report dated February 1949, 
entitled "Effects of a US Foreign Military Aid Program." This 
report concluded that it "was beyond question that the Irish will
resist Soviet aggression and requires no encouragement."(22)The/
(19)Noel Browne Personal Interview 28.12.1988.
(20)HTL President Secretary's file , Box 256 SR 48 CIA report.
(21)NA FW 711. 41D27/1-2945 see also NA. 711.41D27/1-3045
(22) Washington Library of Congress,Microfilm.(ORE 41-49) 
published 24/2/1949 (HT Library) reference 1949 (81) 136B in 
declassified documents, catalogue Vol Vll, No 4, 1981.
(1*)Appendix VI map of "Strategic Position of Ireland on North 
Atlantic Air Routes."
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j?he report considered that "The Irish position would be rendered
maintenance of Irish internal security and political integrity. 
Denial of such aid to Ireland would be without appreciable 
effect. Denial of aid to the major signatories of the Atlantic 
Pact however would give Ireland reason for some concern."(23)
Following the American wish to "include" Eire in NATO, it was 
apparently decided that the United States should approach the 
Irish government with regard to its adherence to the pact and 
invite its views regarding the form and timing of an official 
approach. In reality the tentative enquiry made by the US State 
Department was based on Eire's expendability. It was proposed in 
the 1950, National Security Report, that the U.S. should avoid a 
discussion on a US-Ireland bilateral pact.(24) In advance of that 
policy being formalised the State Department emphasised that it 
was making the offer on behalf of all of the signatories to the 
proposed NATO pact.(25)
(24) HTL. PSF Box 209 Truman Papers . Draft Statement of policy 
proposed by the National Security Council, October 17, 1950, on 
"The Position of the United States Regarding Irish Membership in 
NATO and Military Assistance to Ireland Under a Bilateral 
Arrangement."
(25) NA.840. 20/2-949.See Memorandum of conversation by Director 
of the Office of European Affairs, John Hickerson, 9.2.1949. FRUS 
Vol. IV. p.90
secure by the pact and program with or without Irish 
participation. No US military aid is required for the
(23)Ibid
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EIRE'S
(C)
"REFUSAL" TO ACCEPT THE "INVITATION" TO JOIN NATO
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,1
On January 7, 1949, George Garrett, handed an 'aide memoire '
to Sean MacBride. This asked for the Irish government's views, 
"informally with regard to the issue of an official invitation to 
the Irish government to participate in the proposed North 
Atlantic treaty."(1) The mode of approach from the State 
Department implied a reluctance to take responsibility for "the 
invitation", and indeed they emphasised that it was a joint 
approach from the Brussels signatories.
The 'aide memoire' explained that the Brussels signatories 
requested the assistance of the US in strengthening their 
capacity to resist aggression, and that these talks lead toward 
the development of "concrete proposals for the North Atlantic 
security treaty". Continuing, the 'aide memoire' explained that " 
in these talks it was recommended, and the recommendation is now 
being considered by the seven governments now participating, that 
Ireland, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, and Portugal be consulted as 
to their willingness to consider participating as original 
signatories of the treaty, and if prepared in principle to do 
this, to participate in definitive drafting of its terms. The 
United States accepted the responsibility for extending such 
invitations at the appropriate time and for keeping the 
governments named generally informed in the meantime."
(1) Texts concerning Ireland's position in relation to the North 
Atlantic Treaty which was presented to both Houses of the 
Oireachtas by the Minister for External Affairs, published by the 
Stationery Office, Dublin. (P.No. 9934)From which all references 
concerning the exchange of Irish-American 'aide memoires' are 
taken.
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The Irish government's response was already ascertained. On 
February 2,1949, George Garrett reported to the Secretary of 
State, that Sean MacBride had told him that in his reply to the 
proposed 'aide memoire' he intended to "keep the door open so as 
not to make the answer entirely negative".(2) It would seem that 
Sean MacBride made the mistake of expecting to be courted by 
America.
Behind the scenes, discussions among diplomats had been taking 
place in London, Dublin and Washington. Miss Willis, an official 
of the US Embassy called to the Foreign Office to show officials 
there, three "top secret" telegrams from the US legation in 
Dublin to the State Department. The first telegram outlined the 
above conversation between George Garrett and Sean MacBride and 
the second telegram between Garrett and the conservative 
Archbishop of Dublin, John Me Quaid, that took place on January 
22, and the third a conversation between the US Charge d'Affaires 
and the Minister for Agriculture, James Dillon.(3)
(2)NA 840. 20/2-249.
(3)PRO FO 371. 79224 Report signed by E.M. Rose. 28.1.1949
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The conversations between Garrett and MacBride with regard to 
NATO clarified that Eire could not participate in the North 
Atlantic pact unless the Partition issue was solved in her
jfavour. This was because Irish politicians believed that anti- 
partitionists would feel that Eire was giving something to
Western Europe and America without getting anything in return and 
it would be considered foolish to have thrown away such a 
promising opportunity to bargain: If it did so then
its position would become impossible since it would be accused by 
the anti-partitionists in Ulster of letting them down. There was 
also a fear that Irish participation in the Pact without a 
solution to the Partition issue would cause a revolution in 
Ulster and presumably physical attacks on the Irish government.
Miss Willis's report mentioned that Archbishop McQuaid had 
emphasised to Garrett that MacBride's opinions were entirely 
his own. He himself felt that war was inevitable, that Eire could 
not stay out of it and that it would be unwise to let matters
drift.(4)
According to the report, "the Church's opinion on the issue would 
cut very little ice, as whenever in recent Irish history politics 
and the church have clashed, politics have always come out on 
top. Mr. MacBride had himself been excommunicated, as had Mr.de 
Valera on two occasions." "Politics" in this report probably 
referred strictly to the Civil War and Partition or else the 
report relied to heavily on a biased source.
CONTINUED/
(4)Ibid
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Similarly, the Minister for Agriculture, James Dillon, (who had 
spoken against Irish neutrality during World War 11 and as a 
result, resigned from being deputy leader of Fine Gael) endorsed 
Sean MacBride's view that Eire could not come into the Atlantic 
pact without a solution to the Partition question. The U.S. 
Minister emphasised that the opinions he had been given were 
purely personal, and, in the case of MacBride, "emotional”. He 
concluded that "these statements by Cabinet Ministers seem to 
indicate that the answer of Eire to the invitation to accede to 
the North Atlantic Pact will not be favourable." Written 
underneath this report in the Foreign Office file is the 
following unsigned comment :"I suppose so: but when I talked to
Mr MacBride in Paris, he seemed to admit that there might be a 
difference between the Atlantic Pact and the Council of Europe 
from the partition point of view. However, anybody who can argue 
on the lines indicated is capable of anything."(5)
(5) Ibid
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On February 7, 1949, the Foreign Office asked the State
Department if there was any "further news” about the attitude of 
the Irish government. Replying that same day, the State
Department forwarded a telegram marked "of particular secrecy 
and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed
on.” The State Department showed the Foreign Office a recent
telegram from the United States Minister in Dublin quoting 
MacBride as saying that, "there were prospects of favourable 
developments in the matter of partition, but that until this 
problem was settled, Eire could not participate in any defence 
pact of which the United Kingdom was a member." According to the 
Foreign Office, the State Department was as puzzled as they were 
by the reference to favourable developments in the matter of 
Partition. The telegram concluded that MacBride's "attitude ruled 
out any idea of pursuing the matter of Irish participation 
further at the present time."(6)
The Irish Cabinet on February 8, 1949, accepted the invitation
to join the Council of Europe and secondly, approved the reply 
of the Irish government to the "approach" to join NATO.(7) 
Accordingly the 'aide memoire' was handed to the U.S. Minister in 
Dublin, by the Minister for External Affairs on February 8, 
1949. (8)
(6)PRO FO 371 79224. No. 752/Z1187
(7)NASPO . Cab 2/10. G.C. 8.2.1949. See S.14291 for details of 
Council of Europe
(8)Texts concerning Ireland's position in relation to the North 
Atlantic Treaty.pub. Stationery Office, Dublin. (P.No. 9934)
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The 'aide memoire' used the opportunity to bring Partition to the 
forefront. Referring to the reasons for the formation of NATO, 
it stated: "The strength of the Irish nation's attachment to
these ideals is shown in the fact that Ireland, or rather that 
portion of Ireland which is under the control of the Irish
government, has remained, to a greater extent than any other
European state, immune from the spread of Communism."
Paragraph five of the 'aide memoire' stated bluntly that "... no 
Irish government, whatever its political views, could participate 
with Britain in a military alliance while this situation
continues, without running counter to the national sentiment of 
the Irish people. If it did, it would run the risk of having to 
face, in the event of a crisis, the likelihood of civil conflict 
within its own jurisdiction."
Referring to Partition, Paragraph 10 of the 'aide memoire' 
stated, "Now that the Republic of Ireland Act has removed the 
last constitutional limitation of Irish sovereignty, there is 
only one outstanding cause of friction and misunderstanding 
between Ireland and Britain the enforced partition of our
country."
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On February 9, 1949, Sean Nunan, the Irish Minister in
Washington, presented a copy of the Irish government's reply to 
the State Department. Nunan stayed for a meeting which included 
the State Department's Director of European Affairs,John D. 
Hickerson, and officials, Mr. Satterwaite and Mr. FalesrMr Nunan 
stated that he was "under instructions to state orally that he 
desired to impress upon us that this reply was not to be regarded 
as closing the door and that the Irish government desired United 
States mediation in the problem of partition."(9)
John D. Hickerson, director of the European Desk of the State 
Department, and one of the most influential architects of NATO, 
was aware that the intention of the Irish government's 'aide 
memoire' was to bring the issue of Partition to the forefront. He 
reported to the Secretary of State that he had explained that the 
Atlantic Pact was designed for security purposes and that it was 
not an appropriate means of settling problems of such long­
standing duration as the question of Partition in Ireland.(10) 
According to Hickerson, "I stated that I believed that the 
attitude of the United States would remain unchanged and that we 
felt we could not intervene in a question between our two very
good friends in as much as it was a question for them to settle 
between themselves." Nunan pointed out that the previous 
American attitude had to some extent been based upon the fact 
that Ireland was a member of the British Commonwealth and that
this situation no longer pertained. Hickerson replied that "our
views were not based entirely on the Ireland's position as a/
(9) NA .840. 20/2-949.See Memorandum of conversation. FRUS. 1949. 
Vol IV. p.90
(10)Ibid
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a member of the the Commonwealth and that we still felt that 
Partition was an issue to be settled by the two interested
parties." Hickerson side-stepped a confrontation by pointing out
to Nunan that the United States was speaking as only one of the
original signatories and that the 'aide-memoire' would be brought 
to the attention of the other participants.(11)
Several weeks later, on March 31 1949, Nunan was informed by
Hickerson that the 'aide memoire' had been brought to the
attention of the other governments concerned. However, "the 
State Department informed Mr. Nunan that it was not considered 
that the situation outlined in the Irish government's 'aide 
memoire' was connected in any way with membership in the North 
Atlantic Pact."(12)
An information bulletin similar in scope to a question de Valera 
asked Churchill at the end of the Second World War about how he 
would react in similar circumstances if Germany occupied six
strategic southern counties commanding the Dover Straits.(13) was 
issued by the Department of External Affairs. It explained "Why 
Ireland Cannot Join the Pact." It compared the island of 
Newfoundland with Ireland and asked "How could the military 
chiefs in either part of the divided island lay effective plans?"
The analogy was then used of Ireland being the weak link and the
chain could be strengthened "at a stroke, by the friendly assent 
of the British government to the unification of Ireland."(14) 
This bulletin shows that the Irish government overestimated the
post-war strategic importance of the twenty-six counties.
(11) Ibid
(12)NA 841 D.00/4-949
(13)Carroll,J.T.: Ireland in the War Years 1939-1945. p.164
(14)PRO 371.74190 contains Bulletin No. 8.issued by IDEA.
Nunan followed up his request for the US to mediate on Partition 
|by lobbying Senators, apparently informing them that high- 
ranking British officials would welcome mediation by the US. This 
tactic caused some diplomatic embarrassment in Anglo-American 
relations. Dean Acheson wrote to the American Ambassador in 
London, Lewis Douglas, " Although I appreciate that the Embassy 
has kept us informed of the official British position on 
partition, perhaps you could let me know whether there is any 
truth in the Senator's information."(15) The British government 
apparently controlled the Partition issue to the extent that 
they normally acted as the broker between America and Eire on 
the issue. Despite this control the State Department requested 
George Garrett, in response to the Irish government's attempts to 
get the U.S. to intervene on Partition, to "inquire of Bevin what 
the British position would be toward our mediation of the 
Partition problem and if he, as we suspect, reiterates the 
British view that they do not want us to mediate you tell 
MacBride when you see him that you have discussed the matter with 
Bevin, and the British government is opposed to our mediation, 
and that we have no intention of doing so."(16) There is no 
trace of a reply, but it can be assumed the reply was as 
envisaged by the State Department.
(15)NA 841 D.00/3-449 dated 4.3.1949
(16)NA 841 0.20/6-1049
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In response to the Irish government's attempts to persuade the 
U.S. government to intervene on Partition, the Under-Secretary of 
State at the Commonwealth Relations Office, Patrick Gordon-Walker 
told the State Department that "It is hoped that not many 
Americans and others will be impressed by Costello's suggestion 
that if partition were removed, Eire would join the Atlantic 
pact. In the first place, if the UK government were to declare 
partition ended (which it has no intention whatever of doing), 
the result would be civil war in Northern Ireland. Ireland would 
be convulsed by (the) bitter and bloody conflict which would 
ensue. In the second place, there is considerable reason to
believe Eire government would not make good on any such 
agreement." (17)
An official in the British embassy in Washington wrote to Gladwyn 
Jebb at the Foreign Office and referring to the exchange of US- 
Eire 'aide memoires', reported that " The Americans are remaining 
very calm on the question of Eire and so far there is no
disposition whatever to give Eire any encouragement in thinking
that they can use the North Atlantic pact as a means of
bargaining over Ulster."(18)
(17)NRC RG 84 Box 18. File 350 on "Partition."
(18)PRO FO 371 .79226 F.R. Hoyer to G. Webb ,16.2.1948. REF:G 
21/-/49
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Comments in the 'Observer' of February 13, 1949, serve as an
example of how the Irish government were losing the propaganda 
battle; An article commented, "well informed circles in London 
regard the High Commissioner's rather naive statement on the 
Atlantic Pact with a certain amused scepticism". Adding, "the 
phrase, the last grievance of the Irish nation would be ended is 
particularly appreciated. Every time Britain has been asked to 
make a concession she has been told that " the last grievance 
would be removed."(19)
It is worth noting that on Tuesday, March 8,194,(20) the British 
cabinet discussed Attlee's final memorandum on the the Ireland 
Bill,(21) and also a Cabinet Paper by the Chuter -Ede and Philip 
Noel-Baker on whether to lodge a complaint to the Irish 
government about their anti-partition campaign.(22) On the latter 
point, the Cabinet accepted the advice that any protest made in 
Dublin would be likely to be widely publicised in the United 
States," while any agitation aroused in the United States by the 
protest might conceivably make difficulties in connection with 
the pact."(23)
(19) Observer. 13.2.1949 quoted in NA 840.20/2-1549
(20)Cab 128/15 CM(49)18. 8.3.1949. pp.66-67
(21)Cab 129/33 CP(49)47. 4.3.1949 Memorandum on Ireland Bill
pp. 24-25
(22)Cab 129/33. Part 1. CP(49) 48. 26.2.1949. Memorandum on
Anti-Partition Campaign in Eire. p.27. Appendix B1 contains Lord 
rugby's comments on Anti-Partition campaign of 4.2.1949
(23) Cab 128/15 CM(49)18. 8.3.1949. pp.66-67
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In February 1949 the Irish government sent a copy of the reply 
to the invitation to join NATO to the Canadian government, with 
an appeal to them to take up the question of Partition with the 
United Kingdom government, and to make their good offices 
available with a view to bringing about a settlement.(24) This 
appeal to Canada shows a continuation of the Irish government's 
lack of awareness that Canadian foreign policy was entrenched 
in co-operating with NATO and the Commonwealth . On March 4, 
1949, David Johnson reported to Lester Pearson that the Canadian 
High Commissioner in London, Norman Robertson, told Sean MacBride
i
that the repeal of the External Relations Act combined with 
Eire's refusal to join Nato, now meant that " not only are the 
United Kingdom and Northern Ireland less disposed to discuss 
partition, but other North Atlantic countries, including Canada, 
have, for the first time, a strategic interest in maintaining 
partition."(25) In addition to these reasons it is probable that 
Britain did not want the issue of Partition raised at the newly 
formed United Nations because it was then a forum that 
institutionalised the idealistic concept of the equality of 
sovereign states.
(24) CDEA 50021-40 199(a) .. SUB 52 CHRON 52
(25) CDEA 50021-40 6939-40C/25/4.
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Further proof that there was no support from Canada for the 
Irish government came on March 11 1949, when David Johnson
jdelivered a reply to the Irish government's request to the 
Canadian government to intervene on the issue of Partition. 
Johnson spent one and a half hours explaining his government's 
position to MacBride. Johnson reported to Lester Pearson, that 
MacBride "fully understood Canada's view and gave no sign of any 
disappointment or annoyance with any part of your letter.” 
Johnson continued to state that "As Minister for External 
Affairs, he would like to sign the treaty, but as a realist he
i
i
said he must face the fact that government would fall if it 
announced its willingness to join the pact before any progress 
was made in ending partition." Continuing, he reported, "Mac 
Bride seems to think that the United Kingdom government may be 
favourably disposed towards discussing a solution of partition 
with Irish government, but would find it easier to do so if 
Canada took initiative in raising it." (26)
In Ireland, the reaction of the people to the refusal to join 
NATO was ambivalent, indeed not unlike the reaction to the 
"decision" to repeal the External Relations Act and later leave 
the Commonwealth. On March 21, 1949, George Garrett reported to
Dean Acheson some of the comments that had appeared in the Irish 
press since the publication of the text of the North Atlantic 
Treaty. He mentioned that the pro-Commonwealth 'Irish Times' 
reiterated their contention that Ireland had made a "serious 
mistake and that the Irish government's position did/
(26) CDEA 50021-40 ,199(a) .. SUB 52 CHRON 52
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did not reflect the true attitude of the people", while the 
'Irish Press' made no comment, and the "government controlled" 
'Irish Independent' carried a brief secondary editorial with 
perfunctory comment."(27)
On April 1, 1949, Garrett reported that those people in Eire who 
were in favour of joining the Atlantic Pact had stressed that 
Article 4 of the NATO Treaty might permit an attempt to settle 
the Partition question.(28) However, as reported by Garrett, this 
theory was contrary to MacBride's statement in the Dail on March 
29, in which he declared that article 4(1*) might in fact imply 
an acceptance that the "territorial integrity and political
independence" of the six counties are the concern of Great
Britain.(29) Garrett also reported: "Catholic^ hierarchy
especially disturbed. Wide sentiment in favour negotiations with 
US will result in devising face saving formula which will permit 
Irish participation." But Garrett, referring to MacBride's Dail 
statement on March 29, admitted that it was "not encouraging in 
this regard".(30)
(27)NA 840.20/3-2149
(28)NA 841. D WO /4-149
(29) D.D. Vol 114. Col.1743-44. 29.3.1949.
(30)NA 841. D WO /4-149.
(l*)See Appendix V ( articles 2 & 4 of NATO Treaty.)
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Sean MacBride visited the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson at 
2.30p.m. on April 11, 1949.(31) It is worth quoting the
inaccurate biographical brief on MacBride that Acheson received 
from John Hickerson, the Director of the Commonwealth Desk at the 
State Department. Hickerson cited Eire's refusal to join NATO and 
the repeal of the External Relations Act as the "most notable 
actions of the Irish government". He then gave a biographical 
outline of MacBride, stating inaccurately, "He became Chief of 
Staff of the outlawed Irish Republican Army after the conclusion 
of the Irish civil war and continued these activities until World 
War 11, when he split with the more radical wing of the 
organisation. He is considered one of the ablest lawyers, orators 
and political leaders in Ireland."(32) Excepting the last remark, 
this "misinformation" may have further undermined Sean MacBride's 
already near impossible diplomatic mission. At that meeting, 
MacBride explained to Acheson that Ireland was strongly in 
favour of the Atlantic pact and would have liked to join in 
signing it, but that no Irish government could have lasted two 
months had it done so .
Even after rejecting the NATO approach, Sean MacBride still hoped 
he would be able to negotiate a bilateral defence pact with 
America, hoping that as a quid pro-quo, Partition would end.(33) 
That strategy would have prevented the possibility of the feared 
"civil crisis" that might have occurred in Eire had the 
government joined NATO while partition remained.(34)
(31)Foreign Relations of U.S.(FRUS).Vol IV. p.292-3 meeting Dean 
Acheson and. Sean Macbriae. 11.4.1949. na.840.20/4-1149
(32) NA 841D.00/4-949
(33)Personal interview .Sean MacBride. 6.1.1987
(34) D.D. Vol. 115. Col. 3-4. 27.4.1949
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On May 17, 1949, there was a further meeting at the State
Department between George Garrett, Herbert P. Fales, British 
Commonwealth, Department of State, Sean MacBride, and Frederick 
Boland. The fact that Irish affairs were still being dealt with 
by the Commonwealth desk illustrates that the U.S. was following 
the British line. Sean MacBride asked why the State Department 
had not considered his proposal to discuss Partition or even 
inquired into the matter of Partition to see what could be done 
about it. MacBride was told that the memorandum was not 
considered as having been addressed to the Department but had 
been accepted by the U.S. acting on behalf of the participating 
powers. Even though Fales had not been present at the 
discussions by the participating powers which sent the Irish 
note he felt confident enough to state that the proposal had been 
considered and that the participating powers had felt that 
Partition was not a subject for discussion within the terms of 
the Atlantic pact because it was a co-operative effort to promote 
peace.(35) That curt dismissal of Irish objections should have 
ended the Irish government's hopes that the US would intervene 
with the British government on the issue of Partition.
However, MacBride persisted; eight days later Hickerson received 
a memorandum stating that Ireland could assist in a war 
effort.(36) He cited the case of Eire producing food (for the 
allies) in war would save valuable Atlantic shipping tonnage. As 
usual, MacBride took the opportunity to raise the issue of 
Partition and made the accusation that ECA grant aid to Northern 
Ireland helped to fortify Partition.
(35) NRC RG 84. Box 18. File 350. on Ireland, "Partition."
(36) FRUS Vol. Ill, pp.444-5. 25.5.1949
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On May 25, 1949 the Irish government despatched another 'aide
memoire' to the US government to protest at the"guarantee” clause 
in the UK "Ireland Bill". This clause stated that "in no event 
will Northern Ireland or any part thereof cease to be part of His 
Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom without the consent 
of the Parliament of Northern Ireland." The Irish government 
pointed out that the guarantee clause was a vindication of their 
refusal to sign the NATO pact. " It is now clear that , by 
adhering to the Treaty, Ireland would have been placed in the 
position of acknowledging Britain's territorial claims in 
Ireland, unless the other participating countries had been 
prepared to recognise that all questions relating to the 
territorial integrity and political independence of Ireland were 
solely matters for the Irish people."(37)
As noted by Laithwaite, the US replied without consulting the 
British government in advance to the effect that they did not 
study the British legislation and were unable to see any 
connection between it and the North Atlantic Treaty, or that it 
in any way alters the status of the area in question. (38) This 
disdainful reply emphasised the wish of the State Department to 
distance themselves from the issue of Partition.
(37)NA 840.20/5-2549
(38)PRO DO 35 3990
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On June 22, 1949 Sean Nunan visited the State Department and
explained that Sean MacBride had been requested in the Dail to 
publish a white paper containing the text of the communications 
on NATO and has promised to do so. Dean Acheson replied the same 
day and again distanced his government further from being seen as 
a possible ally of Ireland, by stating that, before agreeing to 
publication, they would first have to consult with several other 
NATO governments: Belgium, Canada, France, Luxemburg, the
! Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. (40) 
j
| Lord Rugby, recorded that as early as February 11, 1949,
i
Frederick Boland, had told told him that the Irish Government 
"would not take the initiative themselves" on publishing the 
'aide memoire'. (39) However, the Irish government fired its last 
futile bolt and published the correspondence concerning the 
exchange of correspondence over the NATO invitation to 
accede. While the aim of publication was primarily for domestic 
purposes, it may have had adverse repercussions for Eire in 
Europe. For example, a Department of State memorandum of a 
conversation with Mr. Wapler, Consul, at the French Embassy in 
Washington, records, "Mr Wapler explained that on general 
grounds of diplomatic procedure his government did not like the 
idea of publication of such material, but that their negative 
answer in this case had been motivated largely by the belief that 
the United States was itself averse to publication."(41)
(39)FO 371.79225. Z1425/G 74/48. Rugby to Archer .L.D. 11.2.1949
(40) NA D.840.20/6-1049
(41)NA D'.840.20/9-1349 13.9. 1949
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,By September 1950, the official American position was that the 
■United States would continue its policy of maintaining an 
attitude of readiness to welcome Ireland as a member of the NATO, 
but that it would leave the initiative to Ireland.(42) Further, 
it was decided to avoid discussion of bilateral arrangements for 
a military assistance program outside NATO.(43) For a change it 
was a Foreign Office report which spelt out bluntly the 
position of the Irish -American relationship: " The attitude ofl
i
the State Department has so far been that Eire can take it or 
leave it, and that partition has nothing to do with the 
case."(44)
(42)NRC Maryland PSF 209 NSC by US Secretary for Defence
(43)NA.(Military Records Division). NSC. 83/1 Oct 17.1950. report 
also available HTL PSF Box 209 . Truman Papers. See Fanning, 
R.:The United States and Irish Participation in NATO: the Debate 
of 1950. p.41
(44)PRO FO 371. 72295
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(D)
EPILOGUE TO NATO
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At the beginning of 1949 it was apparently widely accepted that 
there could be no neutrality in a war of ideologies. Siding with 
NATO in a war against Russia that might mean ultimate
annihilation for Eire would have been a logical choice of policy.
Fortunately Eire's official position was never tested. Earaon de
Valera admitting the difficulties of maintaining neutrality 
still supported the principle of refusing to join NATO while 
Partition remained.
There is an element of 'deja vu' about the Irish position vis-a- 
vis the Allies in the cold war. The following examples may serve 
as illustrations: The LORAN project was the acronym for a long
range electronic navigation radar system. This was developed 
during the Second World War and allowed long range radio
navigation using the North-East Atlantic chain of three stations 
located in Iceland, Faroes and Hebrides. All three stations were 
used widely by the US airforce, navy, long-range aircraft and 
naval vessels as well as Commercial aircraft and shipping. In 
addition, Belgium, Canada, France, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden 
and the UK used LORAN.(1*)(1)
(1*)Agreement on North Atlantic Ocean Weather Stations P.No. 9786 
Dublin Stationery Office
(l)IDFA File 304 Telegram dated 8.12.1948
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In December 1948, the Secretary of State, writing from the US 
London Embassy to the Department of External Affairs, pointed out 
that strategic considerations made the LORAN continuation 
essential from the U.S. standpoint but they expected opposition 
from the Soviet bloc, i.e., Finland , Poland, and the USSR at the 
International Telecommunications Conference. Only 15 countries 
including Eire (who did not intend to support the U.S.) were 
allowed to vote at the conference. The US considered that the 
loss of the Irish vote on which they had relied was "particularly 
disturbing". It was requested that the subject be discussed again 
at the highest diplomatic level and the Irish government urged to 
reconsider and send a representative to the conference. By 
December 8, 1948, in an apparent change of policy, the
prerequisite assurance was given by Sean MacBride.(2)
On November 3, 1948, Vinton Chapin reported to the Secretary of
State that a survey was to begin to study underwater gradients 
from six fathoms offshore opposite Gormanstown military air base 
in County Meath.(3) The area to be covered was between Dundalk 
and Dublin. Chapin attributed this initiative to the " British 
who will provide technicians with geological helicopter craft 
operated by U.S. colonel." He thought that the forest area north 
of Dublin would also be surveyed as would Wexford and Limerick. 
"One of three copies (of the) completed survey will remain in 
custody Irish government." Chapin reported that he was informed 
that the above arrangement was undertaken between Lt. General/
(3) NA 841D.20/11-348.
(4) Ibid
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General O.L. Roberts, GOC British Forces Northern Ireland with 
the Irish Chief of Staff, Me Kenna, (due to retire in
January,1949). At government level, the Minister of Defence Dr. 
Tom 0 ' Higgins cleared the survey. According to the US Legation 
report, the Irish Government "arranged to control the trend of 
the expected debate by having a loyal member of the coalition
plant a question. It was agreed by the British military that they
would allow the Irish to present the largest measure possible
with showing the British acting merely in an advisory
capacity."(5) On December 1, 1948, replying to a Dail question
from Peadar Cowan (not a loyal member of the government),
Minister of Defence, Dr. Tom 0 #Higgins replied "At our request,
a small party of British personnel arrived here recently with 
special technical equipment for the purpose of assisting us in 
completing a general photographic survey in coastal areas and 
also for the purpose of training a number of our officers and 
men in modern survey methods."(6)
(5)Ibid
(6)D .D. Vol. 113. Col. 747. 1.12.1948.
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Ten days later, Tom O'Higgins was quoted by the U.S. Consul in 
Belfast as stating that military alliance between Eire and 
other countries are utterly impossible while Eire is partitioned 
and that dual commands would make an all-Ireland defence scheme 
well nigh impossible. (7)
In practice, the post-war Allies had, at the least, benevolent 
defence co-operation from the Irish government. For example 
according to a report from Lt. General O.L. Roberts to the
i
Commonwealth Relations Office, in July 1949, Tom O'Higgins 
thanked him for "the assistance I had given the Irish Army during 
my time in command in Northern Ireland."(8) Perhaps of interest, 
if only to show the contrast of Irish domestic interests as 
against global defence concerns, it is worth quoting General 
Roberts, who reported that in his discussion with Dr. Tom 
O'Higgins on the issue of the possibility of a North-South 
compromise on Partition, "the only suggestion of compromise was 
that Eire might agree to dispense with compulsory teaching of 
Gaelic."(9)
Despite the tacit defence co-operation, once again, there were 
no tangible benefits for Ireland , particularly with regard to 
Partition.
(7) NA 841 E. 00/12-1348
(8)PRO DO.35 3940 From Lieut. Gen. O.L. Roberts 29.7.1949. to 
Lieut. Gen. Sir Gerald Templar, War Office
(9)Ibid
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CHAPTER XV 
UK "IRELAND ACT,1949"
(A)
BRITISH RESPONSE TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND BILL,1948
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This chapter examines the British government's response to the 
Republic of Ireland Bill,1948 and particularly, the contribution 
to that response of the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Sir 
Basil Brooke.
Attlee mentioned his intention of meeting Sir Basil Brooke, to 
| the Cabinet on 18 November, 1948.(1) Two days later, Sir Basil 
Brooke arrived at Chequers, to discuss the impact upon Northern 
Ireland of Eire leaving the Commonwealth.(2) That evening, Basil 
Brooke dined at Chequers and Attlee gave him a detailed briefing 
on the October and November discussions between the Commonwealth 
Ministers and the Irish Ministers, Sean MacBride and Patrick Me 
Gilligan.(3) Basil Brooke took advantage of the havoc in Anglo- 
Irish relations to ask the British government to consider several 
outstanding constitutional difficulties, vis-a-vis Northern 
Ireland, Eire, and mainland Britain.(4) These requests were 
intended to strengthen and enhance Northern Ireland's link with 
the United Kingdom.
(1) Cab 128/13 CM(48)74 p.144 (p.105)
(2)PRO Cab 128/13 CM(48)75 pp. 148-49(pp.111-112) Attlee gave an 
account about his meeting with Brooke to the Cabinet on 
22.11.1948.
(3) Ibid
(4) Ibid
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Attlee reported to the Cabinet on November 22 that he explained 
the formula arrived at in Paris to allow Eire to remain as a non- 
foreign state and Basil Brooke ’had raised no objection and
indeed had agreed that in the circumstances no other course was 
open to them." (5) This may have been a reference to the
pressure from Commonwealth members who favoured accepting Eire 
as a non-foreign state.
! Basil Brooke explained to Attlee that the Government of Northern 
Ireland's major fear focused on the Irish Government's policy of
! ending Partition. He presented the proposition that Nationalist
■ Catholics from Eire might cross over the border to take up
temporary residence in the six counties in order to "outvote" the 
Unionists at elections for the Westminster Parliament.(6)
Technically, since there was no residency qualification needed 
other than the requirement of an address in the six counties for 
the Westminster elections, the use of an overnight address in 
Northern Ireland could qualify citizens of Eire to exercise the 
franchise in Northern Ireland at the elections for Westminster. 
Theoretically, an influx of organised Nationalist votes could
have resulted in more Nationalists than Unionists being returned 
to Westminster. Such a result would have highlighted the 
Partition issue and would have caused immense embarrassment to 
the Unionists. However, since there was a seven year residency
qualification for elections to the Northern Ireland Parliament, 
it was unlikely that this fear presented a serious constitutional 
threat to the continuation of Partition.
(5) PRO Cab 128/13 CM(48)75. p.148 (p.Ill) date 22.11.1948
(6) Ibid.
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Basil Brooke asked Attlee to impose a residential time 
requirement for Irish citizens resident in the U.K. similar to
i
i
the residency qualification that applied to Irish citizens who 
wanted to qualify for the franchise to vote in the Northern 
Ireland Parliament. Attlee's first reaction to this proposal was 
to explain the administrative difficulty in differentiating 
between Eire citizens and British subjects, at elections in 
Britain, and also of having different qualifications for voting 
in Britain and Northern Ireland for the Westminster Parliament. 
However, it was mentioned that even if the franchise 
qualification were not "pressed by Northern Ireland, it might be 
raised in relation to Great Britain by opposition parties in the 
Parliament at Westminster."(7) Attlee tried to re-assure Basil 
Brooke by telling him that he could state publicly that he had 
received an assurance on behalf of the United Kingdom Government 
"that the constitutional position of Northern Ireland would be 
safeguarded".(8) Attlee had in effect made this statement in the 
House of Commons on October 28, 1948.(9)
(7)Ibid
(8) H.C. Vol. 457. Col. 239. 28.10.1948
(9) PRO Cab 128/13 CM(48)75. p.148 (p.Ill) date 22.11.1948
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Following Attlee's meeting with Basil Brooke the Cabinet decided 
on November 22, 1948 to request the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman 
!Brook, to establish a committee to "consider what consequential 
^action might have to be taken" by the United Kingdom Government 
as a result of Eire's leaving the Commonwealth.(10) Following 
Basil Brook*s "approval",(11) the British Cabinet minutes record, 
"The way was now clear, therefore, to proceed with the further 
action approved by the Cabinet on 18th November."(12)
Sir Norman Brook formed a committee to act initially as a "go- 
between" in discussions between the Committee and officials of 
the Government of Northern Ireland. (13) This Committee, calling 
itself "The Working Party on Eire", consulted representatives of 
other departments when they needed clarification on specialist 
areas. These departments formally included the Commonwealth 
Relations Office , Foreign Office, Scottish Office, Board of 
Trade, the Treasury, and the Home Office. (14) There is no 
mention of the War Office, Ministry of Defence or the Admiralty, 
all of whom would have had an interest in Anglo-Irish relations.
(10)PRO Cab 128/13 CM(48)75. pp.148-49 date 22.11.1948
(11) PRO Cab 128/13 CM(48) 75. pl49(p.H2)
(12)As 10
(13)Cab 130/44.Gen 262. Meetings December 16,1948- January 
1,1949
(14) Ibid
394
Three days after the Cabinet meeting, Attlee was asked at 
question time whether the Republic of Ireland Bill would have any 
effect on the constitutional position on Northern Ireland. He 
reiterated his statement made on October 28 in the House of 
Commons that "the view of His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom has always been that no change should be made in the 
| constitutional status of Northern Ireland without Northern 
'Ireland's free agreement."(15)
The Northern Ireland Cabinet in December, 1948, decided to 
forward a formal list of points, "very much as proposed" by 
Basil Brooke to Attlee,(16) which they claimed might be affected 
by the introduction of the Republic of Ireland Act. The Northern 
Ireland Cabinet asked that Attlee's constitutional assurance be 
put into statutory form. This was a request that a guarantee be 
given to the constitutional position of Northern Ireland, 'vis-a- 
vis' its place as a part of the United Kingdom. The government of 
Northern Ireland had decided to ask that "any alteration in the 
law touching the status of Northern Ireland as a part of the 
United Kingdom or the relation of the Crown to the parliament of 
Northern Ireland shall require the assent of the parliament as 
well as of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.(17) These 
questions were referred to Norman Brook's Working Party on 
Eire.(18)
(15) H.C . Vol. 458. Col. 1419. 25.11.1948
(16) PRNOI Cab 4/771/9 ,Cabinet meeting of Dec. 8/9/1948 . Quoted 
in Fanning,R.: The Response of the London and Belfast Governments 
To The Declaration of the Republic of Ireland, 1948-49. 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. R.I.I.A. Winter 1981- 1982.p.105
(17)PRNOI Cab 4/769/11 Northern Ireland Cabinet Meeting Novemebr 
25.11.19848 Quoted in Fanning,R.: The Response of the London and 
Belfast Governments To The Declaration of the Republic of 
Ireland, 1948-49.R.I.I.A. p.105.
(18) PRO DO 35 3979. p.13. para 28.
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Interestingly, by the end of 1948, no firm legislation had been 
prepared to meet the expected inauguration of the Irish Republic 
jin mid-January,1949. On December 29, 1948, R.E. Taylor of the 
-British Cabinet Office wrote to the Private Secretary of Philip 
|Noel-Baker, advising him that the Legislative Committee would be 
jreviewing the legislative programme for the 1948/49 session on 18
i
January and asked him to advise by January 8, 1949, whether the
/’Republic of Ireland (Consequential Provisions) Bill” would be 
ready for consideration at that meeting. (19)
Sir Norman Brook's "Working Party on Eire” completed their 
report on January 1, 1949.(20) The report began by explaining
that legislation by the Westminster Parliament was necessary 
because British Statutes normally referred to Eire within the 
category of His Majesty's Dominions as opposed to "foreign". Now, 
since Eire was not to be considered foreign nor a member of the 
Commonwealth, it was necessary to clarify her status by 
legislation. Accordingly, the Working Party submitted the draft 
of a Bill intended to clarify Eire's status after leaving the 
Commonwealth as a non- foreign State. This was to be achieved by 
providing that the term, "His Majesty's Dominions would be 
construed as extending to Eire or to British ships or aircraft, 
if those references would have so extended had Eire remained part 
of His Majesty's Dominions." Arguably, this meant that if an 
airplane or ship belonging to Eire were attacked then it was to/
(19)PRO DO 35 3972 L.D. 29.12.1948. R.E. Taylor, Cabinet Office
(20)PRO Cab 129/ 32 Pt. 1. Sir Norman Brooks Working Party 
submitted a report to the Cabinet. CP(49)4, entitled "Ireland: 
Report of Working Party." dated 1.1.1949 . Minutes in Cab 
130/44.Gen 262 Meetings December 16,1948- January 1,1949.
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to be considered an attack upon a British vessel.(21) This might 
arguably be interpreted to mean that Eire was still a defence 
Iprotectorate of Britain.
jNorman Brook's Working Party recommended that Eire should not 
lhave any representation on Commonwealth committees. This meant
i
I that Eire would lose her representation on the Commonwealth 
Agricultural Committee, Sterling area Statistical Committee and
i
ithe Commonwealth Liaison Committee for the European Recovery 
Program. All departments were to be advised that where they 
control such committees, they should be warned that "they should
I
•not allow representatives of Eire to attend meetings as observers 
or to receive any special facilities or information”.(22) In 
effect, this meant that Eire would no longer benefit from the
i
information and co-operation from the Commonwealth 
Committees. Probably as retribution for John Costello's surprise 
"announcement", the Working Party recommended that "the Eire
I
government should not be consulted on the terms of the Bill but 
the general terms might be explained to them a few days before 
the introduction."(23)
(21) Ibid
(22) Ibid
(23) Ibid
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In December 1948, Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, asked that 
the Commonwealth Relations Office should continue to be 
responsible for Anglo-Irish Relations. Bevin feared that the 
change in the constitutional status of Eire might have the effect 
of creating in Great Britain an Irish vote which would be 
embarrassing to him in his conduct of foreign policy and he was 
anxious that the Foreign Office should not undertake any 
responsibility for Irish business. In Cabinet Attlee agreed and 
pointed out that the transfer of Irish affairs to the Foreign 
Office would be inconsistent with the Government's policy that
; Eire should not be regarded as a foreign country.(24) Norman
I
Brook's Working Party noted and accepted this decision.(25) 
Continuing the report offered the suggestion that all the 
political parties should make a pledge reaffirming Prime 
Minister Attlee's assurances on the constitutional position of 
Northern Ireland. Although there is no evidence that Norman 
Brook's Working Party was guided by Basil Brooke, the impression 
is that the advice on all-party consensus originated as an 
afterthought from Sir Basil Brooke. Sir Norman Brook's committee 
recommended that if this did not satisfy the government of 
Northern Ireland, then the proposed Bill should include "a formal 
affirmation that Northern Ireland would in no event cease to be 
part of the United Kingdom except at the request and with the 
consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland."(26)
(24)PRO Cab 128/13 CM (48)81 .p.176
(25)PRO Cab 130/44.Gen 262 Minutes of Meetings, December 16,1948- 
January 1,1949.
(26) PRO Cab 129/ 32 Pt. 1. Sir Norman Brook’s Working Party 
submitted a report to the Cabinet (CP. (49) 4) entitled "Ireland: 
Report of Working Party." dated 1.1.1949 .
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The Working Party gave several examples of the complications
which could arise over Eire's departure from the Commonwealth, 
such as the fact that state pensions were paid only "within His 
Majesty's dominions". As the law stood, payments could not
therefore be continued to persons resident in Eire after the 
Republic of Ireland Act was enacted. Another example was that 
services from British government departments were charged at a 
higher rate to foreign governments than to Commonwealth members. 
The Working Party had agreed with the provision under the
existing 1948 British nationality legislation that citizens of 
Eire resident in Britain would also be treated as British 
subjects. The report suggested generously that, since trade 
preferences to Eire were to be continued, so "all contract 
Departments should presumably be instructed to maintain any
preferential rates which have been granted in respect of supplies 
and services rendered to Eire." (27)
Ominously, the report recommended that the Bill should provide 
that "the six counties" be formally titled as "Ulster". However, 
the report did explain that that was a majority recommendation 
and that the "Representative of the Commonwealth Relations Office 
would prefer that the six counties should continue to be known as 
"Northern Ireland".(28) Possibly, the "representative of the 
Commonwealth Relations Office" who insisted that his dissenting 
view be registered may have been instrumental in persuading the 
committee to agree that the arguments against the change in title 
for the six counties should be put to Basil Brooke. The/
(27)Ibid
(28)Ibid
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The advice of Frank Newsara was that "if, after weighing these 
objections, the Northern Ireland Government still press this 
proposal, I do not see how this request can be refused."(29)
If the term "Ulster" were accepted, then the committee 
recommended that this term should replace "Ireland" in the King's 
title. The Irish government had already made it known that such 
i usage was inappropriate and would be against the interests of
I
!Northern Ireland government because the title "Ulster" would only 
ferment propaganda. Another possibly contentious issue was the 
report's recommendation that the National Services Act should
|
continue to be applied to Citizens of Eire.(30) Presumably this 
referred to Eire citizens resident in mainland Britain .
On the question of the status of the Bank of Ireland the report 
advised against accepting the financial proposals put forward by 
the Government of Northern Ireland because they "were 
inconsistent with existing law and international agreements and 
would not bring any financial benefits to Northern Ireland." The 
report further recommended the rejection of other financial 
proposals because they were "directed against the Bank of 
Ireland."(31)
(29)PRO Cab 130/44/ GEN 262/8. Memorandum on Change of Title 
dated 21.12 1948
(30) PRO Cab 129/ 32 Pt. 1. Sir Norman Brook's Working Party on 
Eire
(31)Ibid
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On January 6, United Kingdom Ministers met with Ministers from 
Northern Ireland for the first of three meetings to discuss 
Norman Brook's report.(32) The United Kingdom Government was 
represented by Attlee, Lord Jowitt, Philip Noel-Baker, Hartley 
Shawcross and Patrick Gordon Walker the Under Secretary of State 
at the Commonwealth Relations Office. Officials included 
Percival Liesching, (the new Permanent head of the Commonwealth 
Relations Office),(33) Frank Newsam, Secretary at the Home Office 
and E. Comptom representing the Treasury. The Government of 
Northern Ireland was represented by Basil Brooke, the Minister of 
Finance, J.M. Sinclair, Home Affairs J.E. Warnock and the 
Attorney General, Major L.E. Curran, Secretary to the Northern 
Irish Cabinet, Sir Robert Gransden, J.F. Calwell from the 
Ministry of Finance and William Scott and Sir John Rowlatt.(34) 
Lord Rugby reported in late December 1948, that the Stormont 
Government were under "continuous fire" from the Irish government 
and would seek to "use this opportunity to force Westminster into 
the open."(35) This was a reference to what became known as the 
constitutional "guarantee", which was eventually contained in the 
UK "Ireland Act, 1949."
(32)Cab 130/44 Gen 262 (M) 2nd meeting. 6.1.1949
(33)0'Brien,J.: Ireland's Departure From The British
Commonwealth. Round Table .306. p.190
(34) Cab 130/44 Gen 262 (M) 2nd Meeting)
(35)PRO FO 371. 76369. Copy Telegram to CRO. No. 142. 21.12.1948
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The agenda for this meeting was: 1/ Constitutional Safeguards for 
Northern Ireland. 2/ Titles of the North and South. 3/(A)
Boundary of Northern Ireland (B) The Irish Lights (C) Fishing
Rights in Lough Foyle. 4/ Extra-Territorial Powers. 5/
Qualification for the Westminster Franchise. 6/ Qualification of
I
Members of the Northern Ireland Parliament. 7/ Supreme Court. 8/ 
Financial Proposals. 9/ Defence of Northern Ireland. 10/ Draft 
Ireland Bill. 11/ Guidance for the Press.(36)
At this meeting Basil Brooke again requested a constitutional
assurance guaranteeing Northern Ireland's position within the
United Kingdom.(37) This request was along the lines suggested by 
the Cabinet of Northern Ireland.(38) Accordingly this meeting of 
British and Northern Ireland Government Ministers agreed that
there should be constitutional safeguards for Northern Ireland. 
It was agreed in principle :
"(1) That the Ireland Bill, if introduced into the Parliament at 
Westminster, should include a clause in the body of the Bill, 
affirming that in no event would Northern Ireland cease to be
part of the United Kingdom except with the consent of the 
Parliament of Northern Ireland.
(2) That, additionally, a provision should be inserted making it 
clear that Northern Ireland would also remain territorially 
intact: and that the legal draftsmen of the United Kingdom
Government and the Government of Northern Ireland should meet in 
order to concert an appropriate clause".(Writers emphasis)
(36) PRO Cab 130/44 .GEN 262. (M) 2. 6.1.1949.
(37)Ibid
(38)PRNOI Cab 4/771/9 Northern Ireland Cabinet Meeting 8-
9 .December,1948. Quoted in Fanning,R.: The Response of the
London and Belfast Governments.International Affairs p . 105.
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|The "appropriate clause" was not necessary; instead the words
i"or any part thereof" were later tagged on to clause 1. 1.(B) of
Ii
the "Ireland Bill"(41) so covering the suggestion contained in
(1) above. Those words covered the territory of Northern Ireland 
and arguably, in particular, the disputed waters of Lough Foyle. 
On the subject of the "Titles of the North and South" it was 
agreed that "(1) That statutory provision must be made in United 
Kingdom legislation for the use of the title "the Republic of 
Ireland" instead of "Eire", but that as far as possible, in less 
formal contexts, the phrase "the Irish Republic" should be used. 
Again Basil Brooke raised the tortuous question of the waters of 
Northern Ireland asking that an attempt should be made to to 
define the boundary between the "North and South in Lough Foyle 
and Carlingford lough." Not surprisingly, Attlee did not want 
this issue to be raised since it might lead to an International 
review of the boundary.
Next, Attlee asked for a 'quid pro quo' reduction in the Seven 
year residency qualification for local and general elections to 
Stormont in return for allowing the introduction of a three month 
residency qualification to enfranchise Electors in Northern 
Ireland voting for the Westminster elections.
(39)Government of Ireland Act,1949.Geo VI. no.41
(40)PRO Cab 130/44 .GEN 262. (M) 2. 6.1.1949.
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The issues concerning the "qualification of members of the 
Northern Ireland Parliament" and the transferring of power from 
ithe Lord Chancellor to the government of Northern Ireland to 
^appoint Supreme Court Judges were postponed for consideration by 
Attlee for a memorandum he was preparing. Similarly, so was the 
financial proposals which related to the discontinuation of the 
Dublin based Bank of Ireland's right to print sterling currency. 
At this meeting on January 6, Basil Brooke presented the 
proposition that in order to prevent the reorganisation of the 
Ulster Volunteers he required a public assurance from the 
British government that they would use troops to defend Northern 
Ireland against aggression, as readily as they would be used to!
defend any other part of the United Kingdom.(41) In order to put 
this "threat" from Eire in perspective it is worth noting that 
Irish army officers were then receiving training in Northern 
Ireland from the British army. Brooke suggested that such 
training "could more suitably take place elsewhere than in 
Northern Ireland Command".(42)
The meeting agreed that no "guidance" should be given to the 
press until after the Cabinet meeting of January 12.(43) The U.S. 
Minister to Ireland, George Garrett, reported to the State 
Department that the official press communique from this meeting 
mentioned that Attlee repeated the assurances he gave in the 
House of Commons in October and November that no change would be 
made in the constitutional relationship between Northern Ireland
without Northern Ireland's free agreement.(44)
(41)Ibid
(42)Ibid
(43)Ibid
(44)NA 841D.00/1-849
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jOn January 6 and 7, 1949, officials of the British and Irish
^Governments met to discuss the technical issues arising from the 
Paris discussions and the inauguration of the Republic of Ireland 
Act.(45) The principal purpose of the Anglo-Irish meeting of 
officials was to exchange information about the methods by which 
both governments would counteract the possible challenges by 
foreign governments to Eire's new status. On the Irish side, the 
Department of External Affairs was represented by, Frederick 
Boland (Secretary of the Department), Dr. Michael Rynne, (legal 
adviser) and Sheila Murphy (First Secretary). The Irish Attorney 
General was represented by Mr. Phillip O'Donoghue. The British 
side had four representatives from the Commonwealth Relations 
Office; Norman Archer, Mr. Dale, Neil Pritchard and Mr. O'Brien. 
Additionally there was Mr. Shackle from the Board of Trade , Mr. 
Brass and Mr. Vallat from the Home Office . Sir Eric Beckett 
represented the Foreign Office and chaired the meeting. This 
meeting agreed that if the new status of Eire was challenged, it 
should be argued that "the use of the constitutional formula was 
purely for descriptive purposes". (46)
(45) PRO DO 35 3991. report of meeting between United Kingdom and 
Eire officials on Thursday 6, January, 1949. See also DO 35 3903 
and DO 35 3970.
(46)Ibid
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The final Anglo-Irish meeting of officials was held in the early 
evening of January 7, 1949. Frederick Boland met with Sir
Percival Liesching , Sir Norman Brook, Norman Archer and Neil 
! Pritchard to discuss what was referred to as the " United Kingdom 
Bill". (47) Boland was under the impression that the Bill would 
contain two main clauses relating to Eire: firstly that Eire was
not to be regarded as a foreign country and secondly that 
statutes applying to "His Majesty's Dominions would continue to 
apply to Eire." Officials of the Commonwealth Relations Office 
were aware that the "United Kingdom Bill" would be introduced 
soon after the inauguration of the Republic of Ireland Act but 
did not venture that information to Boland.(48)
George Garrett, reported to the State Department that there was 
speculation that there might be tripartite talks whilst both 
northern and southern delegations were in London.(49)
Responding to the rumours about the talks between the Northern 
Ireland ministers and British ministers, the Irish Cabinet on 
January 7, 1949 approved the despatch of an 'aide memoire' to the 
British government.(50) The 'aide memoire' stated that it 
"trusts that nothing will be done, by legislation or otherwise, 
which could, in any way, be construed as prolonging or 
strengthening the undemocratic anomaly whereby our country has 
been partitioned against the overwhelming majority of the Irish 
people."(51) According to the Commonwealth Relations Office, "A
simple acknowledgement was returned to this communication."(52)
(47)PRO DO 130/104 Note of a meeting with Boland. 7.1.1949
(48)Ibid
(49)NA 841 D.00/1-649
(50)NASPO Cab 2/10. G.C. 5/59. 7.1.1949.
(51)IDFA 305/14/19.('aide memoire 'also in Cab 2/10. p.202.
(52)PRO DO 35 3979. p.16. Para 34.
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On January 10, 1949, John Dulanty called on Philip Noel-Baker to 
request clarification about press reports which stated that it 
was intended to restrict the movement of Eire citizens across the 
border, and that there would be restrictions on the exercise of 
the Westminster franchise in Northern Ireland.(53) Dulanty 
reported to the Department of External Affairs that he had been 
I to see Philip Noel-Baker and the purpose of his visit was to
j
discuss the 'aide memoire' of January 7.(54) According to Archer, 
Dulanty was informed that no measures had then been decided
!
! upon.(55) In fact, a week before Archer asked Rugby to ensure
i
| that the details of the proposed Bill be kept from the Irish 
| Government until shortly before its publication.(56)
(53)PRO DO 35 3972. Norman Archer report on meeting to Lord Rugby
10.1.1949
(54) IDFA 305/14/36 Report no 2 dated 10.1.1949
(55)As 54
(56)Ibid
(B)
BRITISH CABINET DISCUSS UK "IRELAND BILL"
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I.Following the meeting with officials and Ministers from the 
government of Northern Ireland, Attlee prepared a memorandum 
dated January 10,1949(1) for the Cabinet meeting of January 12, 
i19 4 9.(2) This memorandum incorporated modifications to the 
recommendations of Sir Norman Brook's Working Party.(3) These 
modifications were a direct result of conversations Attlee had 
with Ministers of the government of Northern Ireland on January 
6,1949. (4) The draft of the UK Ireland Bill,(originally entitled 
the Government of Ireland Bill) as prepared by Norman Brook's 
Working Party was attached to the Attlee memorandum.
Attlee's memorandum began by examining the Working Party's 
suggestion that the leaders of all the political parties should 
| join in a consensus to "reaffirm my assurance that no change 
| shall be made in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland 
without Northern Ireland's free agreement." Attlee now explained 
that a mere political consensus on this issue alone would not 
satisfy the government of Northern Ireland because they had 
pressed for "some form of statutory declaration and, further, 
have asked that this should be framed in terms which safeguard 
the territorial integrity of Northern Ireland."
(1)PRO Cab 129/32 CP (49) 5. p.37-39 10.1.1949
(2)PRO Cab 128/15 CM(49)1. p.3A 12.1.1949
(3) PRO 129/ 32 Pt. 1. Sir Norman Brook’s Working Party submitted 
a report to the Cabinet C.P.49) 4 entitled "Ireland: Report of 
Working Party." dated 1.1.1949
(4) PRO Cab 129/32 . CP (49) 5
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Attlee's memorandum pointed out that Eire's secession from the 
Commonwealth would necessitate legislation to accommodate Eire's 
new status as a foreign country. He recommended "that in this 
legislation Parliament should declare that Northern ireland 
remains part of His Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom 
and should affirm that in no event will Northern Ireland or any
j
part thereof cease to be part of His Majesty's dominions and of
!
the United Kingdom without the consent of the Parliament of 
Northern Ireland." Attlee reported that he had already put that 
' constitutional point to the government of Northern Ireland and 
they accepted that "Parliament cannot of course bind its 
successors; and a statutory provision on these lines could be 
repealed or modified by a subsequent Parliament."(5)
The third point on Attlee's memorandum concerned the "Defence of 
Northern Ireland." Attlee asked the Cabinet for their views on 
giving " a public assurance that, if need arose, British troops 
would be used to defend Northern Ireland against aggression, as 
they would be used to defend any other part of the United 
Kingdom."
(5) PRO Cab 129/32 CP(49)5. p.37
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The fourth point of Attlee's memorandum referred to "Titles". The 
majority of the working party had recommended that the title 
"Ulster" should apply to the six counties and the change be 
incorporated into the King's title. The Commonwealth Relations 
joffice recommended the title "Northern Ireland". Attlee reported
|that the government of Northern Ireland wanted the term "Eire"
i
to continue to be applied to the twenty six counties because they
j
feared that the use of the term "Ireland" might prejudice the 
issue of Partition. Attlee pointed out to the government of 
Northern Ireland that "it would be fruitless for us to try to
| secure international acceptance of the term 'Eire' as a title for
|
| the South" but promised to " make it clear in our legislation
l
| that the term 'Republic of Ireland' applied only to the territory
i
I which had been hitherto known as 'Eire' (i.e. the twenty six
i
I
counties); and that we should be careful in all official usage to 
refer to the South as ' the Republic of Ireland' or 'the Irish 
Republic' - reserving 'Ireland' as a geographical description of
i
I
the island as a whole. In colloquial usage it would no doubt be 
possible to mark the distinction by speaking of 'Southern 
Ireland' and 'Northern Ireland'." Attlee reported that the 
government of Northern Ireland agreed to accept this formula 
despite its geographical absurdities, apparently because Attlee 
promised to recommend substituting "Northern Ireland" for 
"Ireland" in the King's title.
The fifth point in Attlee's memorandum related to Lough Foyle 
which, interestingly, was placed under the heading of "Boundary 
of Northern Ireland." Attlee reported that it would be possible 
to solve the problem of poaching on Lough Foyle by establishing 
j a  public fishery under the control of a joint board operating on 
behalf of the two governments. Point seven of Attlee's memorandum 
;allowed for "Extra territorial powers " by enlarging the powers 
of the Parliament and Government of Northern Ireland to operate 
in concert with the Eire Government for specified schemes 
extending "athwart the boundary," including the "conservation of 
fish".(6) It was under this authority that the Irish government 
and the government of Northern Ireland established the Foyle 
Fisheries commission in 1951 to allow the joint control of 
fisheries on Lough Foyle without impinging on each staters 
declared legal claims jurisdiction over Lough Foyle.
The sixth point related to the government of Northern Ireland's 
request that control over the Northern Ireland lighthouses should 
be transferred from the Irish government controlled Irish Lights 
Commission. Attlee's response was instead to suggest that " the 
most important practical objective was to secure that reliable 
people were employed in the Irish lighthouses". Accordingly 
Attlee recommended that the Commonwealth Relations Office , after 
consultation with the Admiralty and Ministry of Transport, should 
submit to the Eire Government proposals for securing adequate 
representation of United Kingdom interests on the Irish Lights 
Commission.
(6)PRO Cab 129/32 CP(49)5 p.37
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jThe eight point of Attlee's memorandum related to the Westminster 
Franchise. This concerned the government of Northern Ireland's 
,fear that Eire citizens could get their names on the electoral 
register by paying a short visit to Northern Ireland and thereby 
outvote Unionists at the elections for Westminster. Attlee was 
worried that any restrictions on the Westminster franchise might 
raise the issue of gerrymandering, especially if it related to
I
differentiating between electoral qualifications within the U.K.. 
However, as a compromise, Attlee was agreeable to the imposition 
of a three month residency qualification in exchange for a 
reduction from a seven to a three year residency qualification
i
for the franchise for Northern Ireland's local and Stormont 
elections.
Point nine of Attlee's memorandum refused to allow the 
government of Northern Ireland the powers to legislate with 
regard to the qualification and disqualification of members of 
their Senate and House of Commons. Attlee may have feared this 
might have been used to enforce(1*) or extend the taking of an 
oath of allegiance to the Crown by candidates for municipal and 
imperial elections as was originally envisaged under clause 
seven of the Ireland Bill. Such an oath would have been anathema 
to Nationalists in Ireland and instead Attlee decided : "It
seemed to me that the Parliament at Westminster, in its capacity 
as trustee for the interests of minorities in Northern Ireland, 
should keep in its own hands the general power over this 
subject". Perhaps in an attempt to save face, the Northern 
Ireland Ministers then told Attlee that they only wanted power/
(1*)See H.C. Vol 464. Col 1952. 11.5.1949
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power to legislate in relation to the disqualification of members 
who accepted places of profit under the Crown or are concerned 
with Government contracts. Attlee then recommended to his Cabinet 
that they be given this limited power because it would not 
I "involve any derogation from our general responsibility for 
protecting the interests of minorities."
The tenth point of Attlee's memorandum related to the government 
of Northern Ireland's request to have power to legislate on all 
matters affecting the Supreme Court transferred to their 
Parliament. Attlee again refused this request admitting that he 
was aware that some of the argument put forward by the Northern 
I Ireland ministers had convinced him that in relation to the 
appointment of Supreme court judges "they would allow political 
.considerations to influence their appointments."
i
|Overall, Attlee's memorandum dealt mainly with the political
jaspects of Anglo-Irish relations while the Chancellor of the
i
|Exchequer held separate discussions with the Northern Ireland 
Minister of Finance on matters relating to the right of the 
Dublin based Bank of Ireland to issue bank notes. The government 
of Northern Ireland wanted legislative power to curtail the 
bank's role. Attlee now decided that any necessary legislation 
could be catered for in a separate Finance Bill and, as 
recommended by Norman Brook's Working Party should not be 
included in the "Ireland Bill."
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The Cabinet meeting on January 12 which considered Attlee's 
memorandum and Norman Brook's "Working party" report had to 
decide how far they might go to accommodate the requests of the 
Government of Northern Ireland. This Cabinet meeting of January 
12 operated under the belief that the Irish government were going 
to introduce the Republic of Ireland Bill, 1948, on January 21, 
11949.(7)
The Minister of Civil Aviation, Frank Pakenham, wrote to Attlee 
on the eve of the Cabinet meeting of January 12, thanking him for 
being allowed to attend. His letter stated that "any explicit
I;l'
guarantee of the territorial integrity of Northern Ireland would
!
| be, in my opinion, absolutely wrong." He ended his letter by 
pointing out, "The record of the Northern Irish Governments since
I
Northern Ireland was established in 1920 has revealed an attitudeI
| to freedom of speech, fair delimitation of constituencyi
t
boundaries and to democracy generally which is quite out of 
keeping with our Labour ideas, and for that matter those of 
other British parties except the Communists. Any efforts on their 
part to obtain greater powers to deal with their own electoral 
arrangements should be studied with greatest caution."(8) 
Pakenham would appear to have been the sole voice at that
Cabinet meeting which advocated Ireland's case and his input 
appears to have already been too late.
(7) PRO CAB 129/33 . CP(49) 47. p.24. 4.3.1949
(8) PRO PREM 8/1464 contains Frank Pakenham's (Lord 
Longford) two page letter to Attlee, dated 11.1.1949
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jThe Cabinet meeting of January 12 agreed that the proposed 
|Ireland Bill should contain a provision which would declare that 
"Northern Ireland would remain a part of His Majesty's Dominions 
and affirm that, in no event, would Northern Ireland or any part 
thereof cease to be part of His Majesty's Dominions and of the 
United Kingdom without the consent of the Parliament of Northern 
Ireland." What is described as "the general feeling of the 
Cabinet", which one suspects, means that Frank Pakenham was in a 
minority of one, was in favour of this statutory declaration.(9) 
Indeed, Frank Pakenham dissented, pointing out that in one third 
of the Northern Ireland state, there was a majority against 
Partition. He argued that if the issue of Partition ever came 
before an international court, the result could be a decree that 
two counties should be transferred to Eire. He argued that the 
right solution lay in the political unity of Ireland and the 
strategic unity of Ireland and the United Kingdom.(10)
(9)PRO Cab 128/15 CM(49)1. p.3A
(10)Ibid
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On the day before the Cabinet meeting of January 12, 1 9 4 9 ,  the
Permanent Head of the Commonwealth Relations Office, Sir 
Percival Liesching, advised that a statement saying British 
troops would be used to defend Northern Ireland "might be 
regarded as necessary to satisfy Sir Basil Brooke".(11) However,
the added that it "was not justifiable on account of any public
[
statement made hitherto to Eire Ministers in relation to the use
of force." Liesching believed that "our troops would be more
likely to be required to support the civil power in Northern 
Ireland against internal disturbances fostered from the South 
.rather than against 'aggression' from the South."(12) He
acknowledged the argument that unless the Unionists were given 
the declaration they requested, the revival of Loyalist para­
militaries on the offensive against the Nationalist anti­
partitionists could result in an outbreak of violence in Northern 
Ireland.(13)
The Cabinet meeting of January 12 justified granting the
"guarantee" by reminding themselves that the last war had "amply 
proved that Northern Ireland's continued adhesion to the United 
Kingdom was essential for her defence". Attlee, while expressing 
the "undesirability of giving an assurance" that British troops 
would be used against any aggression against Northern Ireland, 
secured the Cabinet's acquiescence to offering such a guarantee 
if "pressed". (14)
(11)PRO DO 35 3972. Report dated 11.1.1949
(12)Ibid
(13)Ibid
(14)PRO Cab 128/15 CM(49)1. 12.1.1949. p.3A
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The Cabinet noted that the majority of the Working Party on Eire 
recommended that Northern Ireland should be known as "Ulster” and 
that Eire should be known formally as the "Republic of Ireland"
;and "colloquially" as the "Irish Republic". Attlee, taking up the
I
minority position, put forward by a member of the Commonwealth 
Relations Office argued against such usage because it would cause 
offence among Irishmen in other parts of the Commonwealth and 
more logically "because three of the counties of Ulster were in 
the twenty six counties."(15) Lord Rugby supported this reasoning 
having reported in December 1948, "Northern Ireland is not Ulster 
and the designation is false and therefore erroneous", warning 
that the title "Ulster" would "give Eire immense satisfaction and 
a new field for bitter propaganda".(16) Influenced by this 
reasoning, the British Cabinet agreed that the six-counties 
should be called Northern Ireland and the twenty six counties 
referred to in statutes as "the Republic of Ireland" but in 
official usage as the "Irish Republic".(17) Interestingly, in 
September 1946, de Valera agreed orally that Anglo-Irish 
agreements should be in two versions, the UK document using 
"Eire" and the Irish document using "Ireland".(18)
The Cabinet meeting did not mention the strategic implications of 
Lough Foyle, but instead agreed perfunctorily that it would be 
inadvisable to raise with the Government of Eire "any questions 
which might provoke legal arguments about the boundary between
the North and the South."(19)
(15)Ibid
(16) PRO FO 371. 76369. Telegram No. 142. 21.12. 1949
(17) PRO Cab 128/15 CM(49)1. p.3A
(18) PRO FO.372/4857. T20715/101/165.Note on Treaty Formalities 
22.10.1946.Machtig to Sir John Maffey
(19) PRO Cab 128/15 CM(49)1 pp.3-3A
418
|The British cabinet^ aware of its role as custodian of the
I
Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland, had reservations about 
extending further powers to Northern Ireland in "matters which 
might more properly be dealt with by the United Kingdom".(20) 
That may have been a reference to the government of Northern 
Ireland's request to appoint judges of the Supreme Court.
However, the Cabinet did agree to extend on a limited basis,
extra-territorial powers designed to allow the Northern Ireland 
government to conclude a treaty with Eire on the Lough Foyle 
dispute. This was arranged under clause six of the draft of the 
Ireland Bill. (21)
Attlee agreed to Basil Brooke's request to have a residence
qualification applied in Northern Ireland for the Westminster 
elections, being aware that in most states of the Commonwealth, 
voters had to be British subjects and that there was a residence 
qualification. As a 'quid pro quo' Attlee was asked by the
Cabinet meeting to request the Government of Northern Ireland to 
reduce their franchise residence qualification for local 
elections from seven to five years. In return the British 
government would agree to the introduction of a three month 
residence qualification for the exercise in Northern Ireland of 
the Westminster franchise. This was designed to prevent the 
possibility of citizens of Eire crossing the border to establish 
nominal residency. The Cabinet decided to discuss with the Irish 
government the question of securing representation of "United 
Kingdom" interests on the Irish Lights Commission.(22)
(20)Ibid
(21)Ibid
(22)Ibid
419
The outcome of the Cabinet meeting of January 12, 1949, was that
the draft of the Ireland Bill was to be subject to further 
consideration of two clauses and a recommendation that clause 
seven of the Bill, which related to the taking of an oath of 
allegiance to the Crown by candidates for municipal and imperial 
; elections, be deleted. Clause five, which dealt with the name
i
!
| "Ulster" was to be reconsidered, as was clause six which dealt 
'with the residency qualification asked or by the government of 
Northern Ireland.(23) Most importantly, the meeting approved "in 
principle" to introduce legislation to clarify the position of 
Eire as a non-foreign state, with particular reference to 
citizenship rights and obligations(24) and that in order to 
reassure Basil Brooke the reprinted draft of the Ireland Bill 
should first be forwarded in confidence to the Government of 
Northern Ireland.(25)
While the Working Party had recommended that Eire should be 
removed from membership of Commonwealth Committees to mark the 
change in status,(26) the Cabinet took note of the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer's wish to retain Irish membership of the 
Commonwealth Sterling Area Statistical Committee.(27) This was to 
be of importance the following day when the Working Party 
discussed the outcome of the Cabinet meeting of January 12.
(23) Ibid
(24) Ibid
(25) Ibid
(26).PRO. PRO 129/ 32 Pt. 1. (CP. (49) 4) entitled "Ireland: 
Report of Working Party." dated 1.1.1949 .
(27) PRO Cab 128/15 CM(49)1. pp.3-3A
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At 9.45a.m. the following morning , January 13, 1949, a committee 
meeting was held in Sir Norman Brook's rooms to discuss the 
outcome of the Cabinet meeting. The composition of this committee 
was a nucleus of Norman Brook's Working Party. It was attended by 
W.S. Murrie from the Home Office and Norman Archer from the 
Commonwealth Relations Office and chaired by Sir Norman Brook.
Sir Norman Brook informed the committee that Sir Basil Brooke's
position now was that he was prepared to accept the omission of 
Clause seven which proposed an oath of allegiance and accept 
that the term "Ulster" was inappropriate. However, he still 
demanded the franchise qualification without a 'quid-pro-quo' 
reduction in the residency qualification for the elections to 
Stormont. The meeting agreed that Norman Brook should approach 
Attlee "with a view to including provision for a three months 
residence qualification for the Westminster franchise."(28) There 
is an impression from reading the minutes to this meeting that 
Sir Norman Brook was in contact with Sir Basil Brooke. In 
contrast to the treatment of the government of Northern Ireland, 
Norman Brook's meeting on January 13 repeated the advice 
contained in the Working Party report that the "Ireland Bill" 
should not be shown to the Irish government until "immediately 
before its publication in this country".(29)
(28)PRO DO 35 3972. Note of a meeting held in Sir Norman Brook's
rooms on Saturday 13.1.1949.
(29)Ibid
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As already referred to, Norman Brook's Working Party had 
recommended removing Eire from membership of Commonwealth 
Committees including the Sterling Area Statistical Committee. 
However, because of the mutual benefits, and presumably also in 
deference to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's anxiety to retain 
Eire as a member of the Commonwealth Statistical Committee, (as 
expressed at the meeting of the Cabinet on January 12, 1949,) (30) 
this committee meeting of January 13, now agreed that the 
Commonwealth Relations Office should consult with the Treasury 
about how Eire "could be brought back in the ambit of the 
Committee, with the status of an observer, and how she could 
continue, in practice, to render her regular reports." A similar 
plan was to be applied to the Committee for the European 
Reconstruction Programme.(31) The committee concluded that Sir 
Basil Brooke's request to again visit London should be availed of 
with an invitation from Attlee to discuss the two outstanding 
questions of the franchise and the new title to be applied to the 
Republic of Ireland. (32)
(30) PRO Cab 128/15 CM(49)1. 12.1.1949
(31) PRO DO 35 3972. Note of a meeting held in Sir Norman
Brook's rooms on Saturday 13.1.1949
(32) Ibid
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Following his meeting with Attlee on January 6, Basil Brooke 
then wrote to him on January 11, requesting the introduction of a 
; residency qualification for the franchise for the Westminster 
elections held in Northern Ireland and also that the Ireland Bill 
should describe Eire as the "the Irish Republic" instead of "the 
| Republic of Ireland".(33) Shortly after sending that letter, 
Basil Brooke requested another meeting with Attlee to press the 
proposal outlined in his letter to him of January 11. As 
I recommended by Norman Brook , Attlee, together with Home
j
iSecretary, Chuter-Ede, met with Basil Brooke and the Secretary
I
I to the Northern Ireland Cabinet, Sir Robert Granden to discuss 
the two outstanding points, namely the question of the title 
"Ulster" and the franchise qualification.(34) On the eve of this 
meeting Norman Brook sided with Basil Brooke and advised Attlee, 
"You will be discussing with the Home Secretary tonight what your 
ultimate position on this should be. My own feeling, if I may 
express it, is that you would be well advised to go forward with 
this proposal, even though Sir Basil Brooke is not in the end 
able to offer any quid pro quo. For -(a) It was the general 
feeling of the Cabinet that there was a good case on merits for 
imposing a three months' residence qualification for the exercise 
in Northern Ireland of the Westminster franchise."(35)
(33) PRO PREM 8/1464 Extract from GR Norman Brooke to Attlee
17.1.1949
(34) PRO Cab 130/44 Gen 62 (M) 3rd Meeting 18/1/1949
(35)PREM 8/1464 G.R. 17.1.1949
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At the meeting on January 18, 1949, Attlee first addressed the
two points made by Basil Brooke in his letter addressed to him of 
January 11.(36) Basil Brooke was afraid that the British 
government by "conferring on the twenty-six counties the title 
'Republic of Ireland', would appear to give countenance to Mr 
Costello's claim that his government were entitled to
jurisdiction over the whole of the island." Brooke reminded 
Attlee that when in 1937 the Irish Free State adopted the title
"Eire” with its English translation of "Ireland, "a sustained
effort had been required in order to ensure standard usage of
'Eire' for all United Kingdom purposes; but this term was now in
common use, not only by Government Departments, but also by the 
B.B.C. and the Press. All this work would now have to be done all 
over again." In reply Attlee told Brooke that in official 
usage, the title "Irish Republic" would be used but that he could 
not interfere with a title by which the Irish Government
described itself.
Next, Brooke argued that if he was not conceded the franchise 
qualification or the title "Ulster" his colleagues might press 
him to put forward the demand that Northern Ireland should be 
given dominion status.(37) According to Basil Brooke this would 
have allowed the Northern Ireland Parliament full power to do all 
that it thought necessary for the protection of the North. It is 
likely that Basil Brooke was only using this possibility as a
bargaining tactic since the six counties were economically
dependent on a substantial subsidy from Westminster. (38)/
(36) PRO Cab 130/44 Gen 62 (M) 3rd Meeting 18/1/1949
(37)Ibid
(38) See O 'Nuallain, Labhras. Finances of Partition.
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Westminster/ Interestingly, Home Secretary, James Chuter-Ede 
responded to this threat by raising defence considerations
! offering the compensatory bait that at present Northern Ireland 
"was for defence purposes , as much a part of the United Kingdom
| as Kent or Sussex " but like other dominions she would have "an 
independent right to decide whether or not they should assist the 
others in any war in which they might be engaged."(39) On the
i
point of title Attlee agreed to reconsider whether the title 
"Irish Republic" could be used in the Ireland Bill.(40) Attlee
inow conceded the three month qualification for the Westminster
I
! franchise with the proviso that there was a corresponding
i
reduction of the residency qualification for the Stormont and 
local elections from seven to five years. Basil Brooke argued 
that it would be politically impossible to put this proposal 
before his Parliament, particularly at a time when they felt more
vulnerable because of Eire's change in status. Attlee accepted
the reasonableness of this argument and with the concurrence of
Chuter-Ede agreed to recommend to his colleagues that a three
months residence qualification should be introduced, to qualify 
for the Westminster franchise in Northern Ireland.(41)
(39)Ibid
(40)Ibid
(41)Ibid
425
On the issue of qualifications for parliamentary candidates, 
Attlee refused to allow the Parliament of Northern Ireland power 
to legislate with regard to disqualification of members of the 
Senate and Parliament and Basil agreed not to press the
;proposal.(42) However Chuter-Ede did agree to transfer to the
!
Northern Ireland government, the Lord Chancellor's jurisdiction
|
over matters affecting the Supreme Court in Northern 
Ireland.(43) At this meeting Basil Brooke again asked Attlee to 
raise the the matter of Lough Foyle with the Government of Eire. 
Brooke wanted a treaty between the U.K. Government and the 
Irish Government which would provide for Lough Foyle and
I
Carlingford Lough to be freely open "to all shipping in peace and 
war". Brooke also asked Attlee for a written assurance that the
I
United Kingdom fully recognised that it was in their interests to 
preserve and protect free access for British shipping to 
Londonderry and Newry. Attlee told Brooke that he would 
consider this point.(44)
(42)Ibid
(43)Ibid
(44)Ibid
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According to E.R Colwyn of the Home Office, Norman Brook later 
made it clear to Francis Graham-Harrison, an official at 10
Downing Street, that the proposal for a (navigation) treaty could 
not be pursued but promised "to consider whether he could give 
Sir Basil Brooke a written assurance (for his own information and
not for publication) to the effect that the United Kingdom
Government fully recognised that it was in their interests to 
preserve free access for British shipping to Londonderry and 
Newry and that, if need arose, they would do their utmost to 
secure this."(45)
The following miscellaneous points were covered at the meeting of 
January 18. The British government agreed that after the "Ireland 
Bill" had been passed they would negotiate with the "Eire 
authorities" to secure representation of UK officials on the
i
jIrish Lights Commission. A draft clause giving powers to the
j
government of Northern Ireland to conclude "Extra -territorial" 
agreements was still under consideration. Finally, the British 
government refused to "volunteer any public assurance" regarding 
the defence of Northern Ireland but if the question arose were 
prepared to say that "if need arose, Northern Ireland would be 
defended against aggression just like any other part of the 
United Kingdom".(46)
(45) PRO PREM 8/1222 L.D. 21.2.1949 From E.R. Colwyn to Francis 
Graham-Harrison ,Prime Ministers Office.
(46) Cab 130/44. 262 M 3rd. meeting. 18.1.1949
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Basil Brooke maintained pressure on the British government. 
During his meeting with Attlee on January 18, Brooke had claimed 
that he must "say something to his people" not later than 
■January 20.(47) Attlee with tongue in cheek, referring to the 
guarantee in the draft of the Ireland Bill, is quoted as advising 
Basil Brooke that "it would be a breach of Parliamentary 
'privilege if Sir Basil Brooke disclosed before its publication 
anything which implied that he had knowledge of its contents. He
j
must therefore confine himself on January 20 to general 
assurances that his conversations with United Kingdom Ministers
l
had been satisfactory."(48)
I
I
|
It is interesting to see how the contentious issue of ownership 
of Lough Foyle and the broader issue of ownership of the waters 
of Northern Ireland surfaced in these discussions. Accordingly, 
before looking at the events surrounding Basil Brooke's final 
meeting with Attlee on January 27, to press his proposals on the 
question of title and the franchise, the remainder of the chapter 
will argue briefly the contentious point that the the problem of 
Lough Foyle was dealt with in the context of the constitutional 
guarantee.
(47)PRO Cab 130/44 262(M)3 quoted in Fanning,R.: The response of 
the London and Belfast Governments to the declaration of the 
Republic of Ireland, 1948-49. International Affairs R.I.I .A.
p.112
(48) PRO Cab 130/44 262(M)3
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Before the Attlee- Brooke discussions on January 18, the Horae 
joffice had already consulted several other departments about 
issuing a private assurance that Lough Foyle would be protected 
against the Irish government's territorial and jurisdictional 
claim to ownership of the Lough. The Commonwealth Relations 
^Office, the Admiralty and the Ministry of Transport had no 
objections. The Foreign Office, however, thought it unwise, 
albeit privately, to "imply that the United Kingdom government 
claimed that the whole of Lough Foyle was in the County of 
Londonderry and would, if necessary, violate Eire's neutrality in 
Carlingford Lough."(49) Home Office official, E.R. Colwyn 
concurred with this view and wrote: "we think that the proper
course is not to give a specific assurance about access for
i
shipping but to meet the request by reiterating the broad 
assurance that the United Kingdom Government will guarantee the 
territorial integrity and constitutional position of Northern 
Ireland." The Home Office suggested that Attlee could then answer 
Basil Brooke on this point when forwarding a copy of the 
"Ireland Bill" with a broad assurance that the United Kingdom 
Government "will guarantee the territorial integrity and 
constitutional position of Northern Ireland." (50)
(49)PRO FO 371 76369 Frank Newsam correspondence with Sir Eric 
Beckett 1.2.1949
(50) PRO PREM 8/1222 L.D. 21.2.1949 From E.R. Colwyn to Francis 
Graham-Harrison ,Prime Ministers Office.
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In order to avoid giving a specific assurance about access to 
Lough Foyle and the less important Carlingford Lough, the British 
Government, as agreed with the Ministers from Northern Ireland at 
the meeting on January 6, had already instructed the legal 
draughtsmen of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland to 
"concert an appropriate clause": The "appropriate clause" was to
be "a broad statement of principles with as little detail as 
possible".(51) The clause was drafted and emerged as part of the 
"guarantee" clause in the Ireland Act, containing the contentious 
phrase "or any part thereof". That phrase was interpreted by Sean 
MacBride as a gratuitous reference to the nationalist areas in 
the six counties.(52) The Irish Department of External Affairs 
did not appear to consider that part of the guarantee was a 
military, as opposed to a political or legal decision, or that 
the term additionally provided cover for the U.K. claim to
i
[jurisdiction over the waters of Lough Foyle and correspondingly 
|the Chiefs of Staffs requirement for access to the deep water 
base in Lough Foyle.(53)
Sean MacBride, while trying to find out the reason for the 
"guarantee", received contradictory answers from Bevin and Philip 
Noel-Baker, who themselves did not know if the guarantee was a 
political or legal requirement. Philip Noel-Baker is quoted by 
Sean MacBride as stating "Ernie was quite wrong. It was not 
because of any legal considerations that we decided to include 
these provisions. Our decision was prompted purely by political
considerations."(54)
(51)PRO Cab 130/44 262(M)2. 6.1.1949
(52)IDFA 305/14/36 L.D. 15.5.1949
(53)PRO DEFE .5.9. COS(48)214.
(54)IDFA 305/25 letter, Sean MacBride to John Dulanty 15.5.1949
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(C)
EVENTS INFLUENCING THE FORMULATION OF THE IRELAND BILL, JANUARY- 
MARCH, 1949
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Two days after the meeting with Sir Basil Brooke and his 
Ministers on January 18,(1) Philip Noel-Baker informed Attlee 
that the Irish Government could not grant the franchise to 
British citizens resident in Eire because it would have required 
[an amendment to the constitution which would have entailed a 
divisive referendum.(2) Although the Paris discussions had 
apparently agreed on reciprocal Irish-Commonwealth nationality 
rights, Norman Brook pointed out that by continuing to allow Eire 
citizens the franchise, this would maintain the status quo, and 
thus contribute towards maintaining that Eire was non-foreign. 
Attlee added his comments to this minute: " Yes, but this puts
the Eire Government out of court.” (3)
On January 20, 1949, Sir Basil Brooke announced that there would
be a general election in Northern Ireland on 10 February . This 
was designed to show the strength of the Unionist support to 
remain within the United Kingdom and in effect, it was "virtually 
a referendum on the border.” (4)
Incredibly, as late as January 20, 1949, the British government
had not received any word about a deferral of the expected date 
(i.e. on January 21, 1949) . on which the Republic of Ireland 
Act, 1948, would be inaugurated. Attlee in a later memorandum 
used the phrase ” at the last moment”,(5) to describe this sudden 
change of date, giving the impression that the Irish government, 
in a whim, postponed the date for the inauguration of the 
Republic. Indeed it was not/
(1)Cab 130/44. Gen 62 (M) 3rd Meeting 18.1.1949
(2)PRO PREM 8/1464 serial No. 4/49 19.1.1949
(3)Ibid.
(4)Buckland, P. A History of Northern Ireland. p.88
(5)PRO CAB 129/33 CP(49)47. 4.3.1949
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not until January 22, that Rugby was able to inform the 
Commonwealth Relations Office that the inauguration had been 
deferred "possibly" until April 18.(6) The British cabinet now 
decided to delay their "consequential" legislation until after 
the Easter recess so that according to Attlee "it should be 
abundantly clear that it is the Eire government themselves who, 
by their own action, have taken Eire out of the Commonwealth."
(7) The impact of this lack of consultation may have compounded 
the Cabinet's willingness to comply with Basil Brooke's requests 
to strengthen Northern Ireland's links with the United Kingdom. 
In view of the fact that the Irish government did not bother to
!
inform the British government of even the date of the intended 
introduction of the Republic of Ireland Act, it is somewhat
I
iironic that after the introduction of the UK "Ireland Bill", the 
Irish government information bureau later claimed that there was 
a clear understanding that the British and Irish Governments 
would consult each other prior to taking any steps which might 
affect Anglo-Irish relations.(8)
CONTINUED/
(6)PRO DO 35 3979. p.17 para 37
(7)PRO PREM 8/ 1464 extract from Cabinet Meeting on 21.1.1949
(8)PRO DO 35 3973. see also Sunday Independent. 20.5.1949
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Basil Brooke was worried by the postponement of the introduction 
of the "Ireland Bill". On January 27 he again met with Attlee, 
Chuter-Ede, Philip Noel-Baker, Percival Liesching and Norman 
Brook to discuss the UK "Ireland Bill".(9) During this meeting, 
Attlee explained that the reason for deferring the introduction 
of the Ireland Bill, until after the enactment of the Republic of 
Ireland Act,1949, was so as not to "thrust out" Eire from the
I
Commonwealth, but still could not offer a definite date for the
j
publication of the Bill because, "It was not yet certain that the 
Republic of Ireland Act, would be brought into operation on 18 
April." At this meeting, Attlee agreed do his "utmost to preserve
i
jthe right of access to Londonderry and Newry". Additionally the 
minutes for this meeting record that on January 27, the Home 
Office, prepared a letter requesting Attlee to reassure Basil
i
Brooke by giving him a constitutional assurance on maintaining 
Northern Ireland's position in the United Kingdom, statutory 
status.(10)
As a result of this meeting on February 7, Basil Brooke stated in 
a speech that the status of Northern Ireland was to be 
"maintained, retained and reserved as never before."(11) Three 
days later, the Irish High Commissioner in London, John Dulanty, 
called on Philip Noel- Baker, to ask the meaning of those words. 
Noel-Baker explained that the position of Northern Ireland was 
"maintained, retained and reserved" by the agreements of 1921 and 
1925 and by the recent pronouncements of Prime Minister Attlee./
(9) PRO Cab 130/44 Gen 262 (17) 4 th. Meeting Minute 5. 
27/1/1949.
(10) Ibid
(11) Irish Times. 8.2.1949
t
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Lttlee. Significantly Noel-Baker avoided giving any notice of 
:he intended legislation regarding the "guarantee" by saying that 
* final draft of the Bill was not ready.(12)
.^t the end of February 1949, Lord Rugby agreed with the stance of 
reaffirming the status of Northern Ireland in what he described 
s " the Government of Ireland Bill", because he thought it would 
De a "definite step in the direction of making Irish nationalists 
realise that their view and technique... justified by past
experience  that it is only necessary to worry and harry the
British long enough for them to throw up the job and clear out... 
po longer applies."(13)
rhe leaders of all the political parties in Eire assisted the 
anti-partition Nationalist candidates in the election in "the 
pix north -eastern counties". According to the historian, Patrick
Buckland, "never before had the minority been so well organised
both in the number of candidates put forward."(14) Anti­
partition candidates won 11 seats with 106,459 votes, while the 
Unionist s won 37 seats with 234,202 votes. The crude equation
w a s  that it took 9,678 votes to win an anti-partition seat and
||6, 330 votes to win a Unionist seat. The Irish government chose 
jFebruary 12, (15) the day the election results were known, to 
nnounce publicly that the Republic of Ireland Act, 1949, wouldr
jcome into operation on Easter Monday, April 18, 1949, the
^anniversary of the 1916 uprising.
(12) IDFA 305/14/36 LAD. 10.1.1949 report no.2
(11)PRO Cab 129/33 Appendix 1. "The anti-Partition Campaign in 
Eire." Note by Lord Rugby dated 4.2.1949. p.31
(13) Buckland,P.: A History of Northern Ireland, p .88
(14) Ibid
(15) The Annual Register. Ed. I.S. Macadam Pub Longmans, 1950
Basil Brooke, having obtained the assurance on the constitutional 
guarantee from Attlee, prepared to consolidate his gains further, 
and turn the tables on the Irish government's anti-partition 
campaign . Brooke wrote to Attlee on February 18, pointing out 
the possibility that the government of Eire would support the 
I.R.A. to stir up civil disturbances in Northern Ireland. Basil 
Brooke quoted aggressive " utterances" from John Costello to 
substantiate his claim that "the South are now getting weapons 
into their hands which they would 'use ruthlessly' so long as the 
'evil' of Partition remains in Ireland." In this letter, Brooke 
asked Attlee to make a public declaration condemning Eire's 
"interference in the affairs of Northern Ireland", and to 
publicly re-assure the citizens "in this part of the United 
Kingdom that they have no grounds for apprehension." (16)
On March 16, 1949, Basil Brooke followed up his letter to
Attlee and wrote to the Home Secretary, Chuter-Ede, expressing 
his belief that "the Irish government were not in control of the 
IRA." He reported that public drilling was continuing on the
border and that it looked to him that there were going to be
"Irish Government inspired forays into Northern Ireland." Brooke 
claimed that he feared that a "Sudeten" type situation would 
develop.(17) Chuter-Ede passed on this letter for the advice of 
the Minister of War, Emanuel Shinwell.(18)
(16)PRO PREM 8/ 1222 Pt.2. L.D. 18.2.1949
(17)PRO PREM 8/ 1222 Pt.2. L.D. 16.3.1949
(18)PRO PREM 8/ 1222 Pt.2. L.D. 29.3.1949
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Attlee delayed for over a month before replying to Basil Brooke's 
letter of February 18. In his reply Attlee echoed Rugby and 
Norman Brook's Working Party and wrote: "I feel that the most
!
effective action that we can take is to make a clear and firm 
statement on the subject of partition in the proceedings in this 
Bill". (19) In response to Basil Brooke's letter of March 16, to
Chuter-Ede,(20) Emanuel Shinwell advised Chuter -Ede that the War
Office had considered the matter and were keeping in close 
contact with the General Officer commanding Northern Ireland , 
and that, "plans are being made to send regular reinforcements to 
Northern Ireland should the occasion demand."(21)
The Irish government was aware of the rumours about the proposed 
Ireland Bill, and made some efforts to intervene with the British 
government. Sean MacBride visited London from February, 24-26 
primarily to deliver a lecture to the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs at Chatham House . While in London he spoke 
to several British government ministers.
(19)PRO PREM 8/1222 Pt. 2. L.D. 21.3.1949
(20)PRO PREM 8/1222 Pt. 2. L.D. 16.3.1949
(21)PRO PREM 8/1222 Pt. 2. L.D. 29.3.1949
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According to George Garrett, Sean MacBride put the following 
idea to Bevin; that Partition could be examined within the
framework of the Atlantic pact, with Canada taking the lead 
of pressurising Northern Ireland. The official records show that 
he was rebuffed by Bevin.(22) However, it is possible that Mac
Bride received, or at least believed that he received, some
reassurance from British ministers on the possibility of a re­
examination of Partition. Before returning to Dublin, MacBride 
held a press conference where he put forward a federal solution
for the problem of Northern Ireland and highlighted the fact 
that Eire would be prepared to play its part in international 
affairs if Partition were ended.(23) At this point in time,( as 
referred to in the Chapter on NATO), the Irish government was 
trying to manoeuvre the U.S. into acting as a mediator on the 
partition issue.(24)
(22)PRO PREM 8/1464
(23)NA 841 D. 00(W)/3-449
(24)NA 841 D..00/3-449
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(D)
BRITISH GOVERNMENT RESPOND IN DETAIL TO BASIL BROOKE'S PROPOSALS
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Following his talks with Basil Brooke on January 27, 1949, (1)
Attlee updated his memorandum of January 10(2) and presented a 
memorandum dated March 4(3) to the Cabinet meeting of March 8.(4) 
This memorandum updated the developments which had taken place 
since the Cabinet considered a provisional draft of the Ireland 
Bill on January 12.(5) The Bill as prepared contained clauses 
which formally recognised the title of "Republic of Ireland", 
although it was understood that in official usage the description 
"Irish Republic" was to be employed. Additionally, the revised 
Bill proposed imposing a three months residence qualification for 
the exercise of the Westminster franchise in Northern Ireland.(6)
Attlee's memorandum, despite the upset to the parliamentary 
timetable, suggested that the Ireland Bill should be delayed 
until after the enactment of the Republic of Ireland Act. 
Additionally, he recommended that because Canada and Pakistan 
were not prepared to introduce corresponding legislation that the 
Bill should not include any provision for a change in the King's 
Title regarding incorporating the new name for the six 
counties.(7)
(1)PRO Cab 130/44 Gen 262(M) 4th.meeting
(2)PRO Cab 129/32 CP(49)5 10.1.1949
(3)PRO Cab 129/33 CP(49)47 4.3.1949. pp.24-25
(4)PRO Cab 128/15 CM(49)18 8.3.1949. pp.66-67
(5)PRO CAB 129/33 CP(49)47 4.3.1949 pp.24-25
(6)Ibid
(7)Ibid
(pp.98-101)
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At 9.55a.m. on March 8, 1949, the day the British cabinet
considered for the last time Attlee's memorandum about the 
contents of the Ireland Bill, the Commonwealth Relations Office 
sent a telegram to Lord Rugby informing him that it had been 
suggested to Attlee that the date chosen for the inauguration of 
the Republic Act would "cause great resentment" in "this 
country". (8) They wondered if Costello could be persuaded to 
choose another date, suggesting the anniversary of the opening 
of Grattan's Parliament on March 17. Attlee personally asked 
Rugby to request the Irish government to transfer the date 
because he thought "they cannot properly appreciate the reaction 
which will follow in the United Kingdom and in Northern 
Ireland". (9) Attlee hoped "that they might be willing to make 
this last concession to you before you leave."(10) At 3.10p.m., 
the Commonwealth Relations Office received Rugby's reply: "I
should make the approach suggested with great reluctance". This 
was because he expected that he would probably fail in any 
attempt to have the date altered, as the date had been "carefully 
selected by the present Government in order that the opposition 
cannot treat the Republic of Ireland Act as a party measure and 
are forced into the open to celebrate it. It is one political 
move to dish the opposition."(11)
(8) PRO PREM 8/1464 Telegram No.52
(9) Ibid
(10)Ibid
(11) PRO PREM 8/1464 Telegram No.30
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Interestingly, in view of the British government use of the press 
following the Chequer talks in October, 1948, Philip Noel-Baker 
wrote to Attlee suggesting that "there might be advantage in 
stimulating our own press to emphasise in their comment that in 
choosing the 18th April the Eire government had been motivated by 
consideration of party politics" but he himself believed "it is 
impossible even so to regard the move as other than an anti- 
British gesture."(12)
The Cabinet meeting of March 8 decided against adopting the
formal usage of the term "Ulster". However, the Cabinet did agree 
to substitute the term "Northern Ireland" for "Ireland" in the 
King's title.(13) As recommended by Attlee the draft of the Bill 
did not in fact contain this change due to the difficulty in
gaining the consent of Canada and Pakistan who were having their 
own constitutional difficulties.(14)
(12)PRO PREM 8/1464.Norman Brook to Attlee. LAD. 10.3.1949 Serial 
No. 23/49
(13)PRO Cab 128/15 CM(49)18. 8.3.1949. pp.66-67 (pp.98-101)
(14)PRO DO 35 3979 .pl7. para 38
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In addition to discussing the Ireland Bill, the British cabinet 
on March 8, 1949, also discussed two memorandums on the Irish
; government's anti-partition campaign. The first by Philip Noel- 
! Baker entitled "the anti-partition campaign which is being 
fostered by the Eire Government."(15) The second was a joint 
memorandum by Noel-Baker and Chuter -Ede discussing a suggestion 
that the British government should protest to the Irish 
government about their anti-Partition campaign and also make a 
public statement condemning Eire's interference in the affairs of 
'Northern Ireland. (16)
j
! Chuter-Ede questioned the effectiveness of forwarding such an
i
| 'aide memoire' to the Irish government suggesting instead that
i
the assurance in the form of the "guarantee" to the North in 
support of the previous ministerial statements would be a
sufficient palliative to the government of Northern Ireland.(17) 
At this Cabinet meeting there was "a general agreement " among 
ministers that in debates on the Ireland Bill the Government 
should "take a clear and firm line in support of
partition.”(18)The Cabinet approved the Ireland Bill 
incorporating the "guarantee" clause, and suggested that it 
should be introduced after the inaugeration of the Republic of 
Ireland Act.(19)
(15)PRO Cab 129/33 CP (49) 45
(16)PRO Cab 129/33 CP (49) 48
(17)PRO Cab 128/15 CM (49) 18. pp.66-67 (pp.98-101)
(18) Ibid
(19) Ibid
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At the end of March 1 9 4 9 , Basil Brooke in spite the "guarantee" 
contained in the Ireland Bill and the other concessions achieved,
wrote to Attlee stating that he was "most disappointed" that the
title "Irish Republic" could not be officially used. He hoped
"that on further reflection you may be able to see your way to
meet our wishes". As a last resort, he asked that "a clear 
instruction would be issued to all departments to use the terra 
Irish Republic."(20)
One of the most notable aspects about the British cabinet 
discussions which lead to the Ireland Act is the hastiness under 
which they took place. The government of Northern Ireland made 
full use of the Irish Government's lack of co-operation towards 
the British government. The attitude of the Irish government 
provoked the British government and allowed the Northern Ireland 
government to do its worst. For example, the Irish government 
apparently did not bother to inform the British Government of the 
postponement of the inauguration of the Republic of Ireland Act 
from January 21 to April 18. Noticeably, when the delay does take 
place, Basil Brooke reinforces his pressure on the British 
government fearing they might react favourably toward the Irish 
government for delaying in order to assist the British government 
to prepare the necessary consequential legislation.
The following chapter will examine the progress of the Ireland 
Bill through the House of Commons and the Irish government's 
response to the Bill.
(20)PRO PREM 8/1222 Pt.2. L.D. 30.3.1949
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(E)
IRISH GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO THE "GUARANTEE"
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On April 29, 1949, the Commonwealth Relations Office sent a
telegram to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, the United Kingdom
representative to (as was then officially recognised) the
Republic of Ireland.(1) It asked him to "communicate” on May 2, 
a summary of the officially entitled, "Ireland Bill" to the
Government of the Republic of Ireland. The Ireland Bill was due
to be introduced in the House of Commons on May 3,1949. (2)
At 9.40a.m. on May 2, the Commonwealth Relations Office 
I telegrammed summaries of the Bill to the governments of Canada,
I Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, India,
i
| Pakistan, and Ceylon. (3) According to Herbert Morrison the
I
Dominions were not consulted in advance about the guarantee 
because " I am sure they would not expect to be consulted".(4)
At four-thirty on the afternoon of May 2, Gilbert Laithwaite 
presented a summary of the Ireland Bill to Frederick Boland.(5) 
An accompanying letter was addressed to the Acting Minister of 
External Affairs, Dr. Noel Browne. The letter advised the
Minister that the Ireland Bill would be laid on the table of the
House of Commons the following day, and "that the provisions of 
the Bill must be regarded as secret until it has been laid before 
the House, and my Government have therefore asked me to explain 
the information in the enclosed summary is communicated to you in 
the strictest confidence pending the publication of the Bill on 
the afternoon of the 3rd May." (6)
(1)PRO DO 35 3979. Telegram No. 73. 29.4.1949
(3)PRO DO 35 3979. p.21. para 48. X2638/62
(4)H .C . Debates Vol. 464. Col. 1957. 11.5.1949 .Quoted in, A.C. 
Hepburn.The Conflict of Nationality in Modern Ireland. p.171.
(5) NASPO S14528 Annex
(6) IDFA 305/14/36
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After presenting the summary of the Bill,(1*) Laithwaite returned 
to his office. At six o' clock that evening he telegrammed the
| Commonwealth Relations Office with a report of his visit;
;
Frederick Boland, after being handed the summary of the Bill, 
perhaps with unintentional irony, told Laithwaite that "his 
Government were grateful for this advance information" but 
warned that there "would be considerable criticism" about the 
guarantee.(7) John Costello was attending a funeral in the 
country and did not receive a copy until half past one on the 
afternoon of May 3.(8)
The summary of the Ireland Bill recognised that from April
18,1949, Eire ceased to be part of His Majesty's Dominions,
declared that Northern Ireland remained part of His Majesty's
Dominions and of the United Kingdom and would not cease to be 
part of them without the consent of the Parliament of Northern 
Ireland and recognised that in future Eire would be known as the 
"Republic of Ireland". The Bill provided that although the 
Republic of Ireland was not part of His Majesty's Dominions it
was not to be a foreign country nor were its citizens to be
aliens for the purposes of any law in force in the/
(7) PRO DO 35 3973 Telegram No. 73. 2.5.1949.
(8) NASPO S14528 Annex 
(1*)Extract in appendix IV.
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the United Kingdom or its colonial territories. Interestingly, 
|the Bill also stated that the chief representative in the United
i
Kingdom of the Republic of Ireland, "whatever the style of his
office, would have the same privileges and exemptions as are
accorded to High Commissioners". That was designed to maintain 
the diplomatic status quo, and as a corollary the Republic's 
"non-foreigness" but it could also be interpreted as an 
expression of disapproval of the Republic's policy of upgrading 
representative's titles, where appropriate, to Ambassador. 
Continuing, the summary explained that it would preserve the
effect of the British Nationality Act, 1948.(1*) The Bill also
preserved the effect of any act in confirmation of past 
agreements between the United Kingdom and Eire. The Bill then 
provided that references in legislation passed up to the end
of 1949 to His Majesty's Dominions would continue to be 
interpreted as including the Republic of Ireland and similarly, 
that the phrases "British Ships" or " British Aircraft" would be 
"interpreted as including ships or aircraft belonging to Eire 
notwithstanding that the Republic is no longer part of His
Majesty's Dominions". Finally, the Bill introduced a residence 
qualification for electors in Northern Ireland for the 
Westminster Elections.(9)
(9) IDFA 305/14/16
(l*)British Nationality Act, 1948 (11&12 Geo 6. CH 56.
Mansergh,N. (Ed.): Documents and Speeches On British Commonwealth 
Affairs 1931-52, Voi li. pp. .949-968.In particular the retention 
of Sections 2,3 and 6 of the 1948 Nationality Act was emphasised 
so as to was to safeguard citizens of Eire born before January 
1,1949 who remained British subjects and were entitled to apply 
for British citizenship.
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The morning edition of the ' Irish Press' of May 3, 1949, reported 
on the rumour about the possibility of a clause relating to the 
six counties.(10) The 'Irish Independent' was better informed 
; and headlined their story "British Bill to perpetuate
i
Border."(11) The 'Irish Times' did not make any reference to the 
Bill or to the rumours.(12)
At 3 p.m. on May 3, 1949, Attlee introduced the "Ireland
Bill,1949" to the House of Commons. It was supported by Herbert 
Morrison, Mr. Chuter-Ede, Philip Noel-Baker, and Hartley 
Shawcross.(13) Introducing the Bill, Attlee stated that it was 
the intention of the Bill to "recognise and declare the 
constitutional position as to the part of Ireland heretofore 
known as Eire, and to make provision as to the name by which it 
may be known and the manner in which the law is to apply in 
relation to it; to declare and affirm the constitutional position 
and the territorial integrity of Northern Ireland and to amend, 
as respects the Parliament of the United Kingdom, the law 
relating to the qualifications of electors in constituencies in 
Northern Ireland; and for purposes connected with the matters 
aforesaid." (14)
(lO)Irish Press. 3.5.1949
(lliIrish Independent. 3.5.1949
(121 Irish Times . 3.5.1949
(13) H. C. Vol.464. Col. 836. 3.5.1949
(14) Ibid
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As was expected by the British government, the publication of 
the Bill raised an outcry throughout the twenty six counties.(15) 
The main issue that caused offence in Ireland was that this was 
the first time that the Parliament of Northern Ireland was given 
a veto over the political unification of the country. The Irish 
government considered that gerrymandering in Northern Ireland 
ensured that the composition of the Stormont Parliament did not 
reflect fairly the political views of the peoples of Northern 
Ireland.
Following the introduction of the Bill the three Irish national 
morning dailies carried leaders commenting on the Bill. The Pro- 
Commonwealth 'Irish Times' editorial blamed the Irish government 
for bringing the situation on themselves, while conceding that 
"in our wildest imaginings, however, we had not believed that 
Great Britain would be provoked into the playing of an active 
part in what ought to be a domestic issue between the two parts 
of our sundered nation".(16) The 'Irish Independent' complained 
that the "socialists are doing a bad day's work for the 
relationship between the Irish people and the British 
people."(17) The 'Irish Press' spoke in a similar vein, heading 
their leader "An affront." (18)
(15) PRO DO 35 3973
(16)Irish Times. 4.5.1949
(17^Irish Independent . 4.5.1949 
(18ilrish Press. 4.5.1949
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In contrast to the Irish national dailies, the three quality 
British morning dailies, The 'Times',(19) 'Telegraph'(20) and 
'Manchester Guardian'(21) gave the Bill favourable and prominent 
mention and referred to the "guarantee" approvingly.
This was not so much British jingoism versus Irish nationalism, 
but rather a genuine fundamental difference in perception of the 
consequences of the "guarantee". In Ireland, the guarantee was 
seen as putting a stop to the "march of the nation", while in 
Britain the view as expressed by the Principal Secretary at the 
U.K. Representative^ Office in Dublin, Neil Pritchard, to 
Frederick Boland, was that it was "regarded as no more and no 
less than a clear and firm statement of what had always been the 
fundamental factor in the partition problem." Pritchard claimed 
that he "found difficulty" in understanding the Irish view, that 
the guarantee created a new situation "involving a fundamental 
and alarming change."(22)
CONTINUED/
(19>The Times. 4.5.1949
(20)The Telegraph. 4.5.1949
(21)Manchester Guardian'.4.5.1949
(22)PRO DO 35 3973
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Sean MacBride was in London from May 3-6, attending a meeting of 
Foreign Ministers to discuss the introduction of a constitution 
to establish the Council of Europe.(23) On May 4, 1949, Sean
MacBride issued a statement condemning the Ireland Bill, stating 
that the "gratuitous guarantee of 'territorial integrity' of a 
portion of our country can only be taken as an attempt to 
reinforce the unjust partition of our c o u n t r y (24)
Two days after the introduction of the Bill, Sean MacBride met 
Clement Attlee for three hours to discuss his government's 
objections to the Bill.(25) Frank Newsam (who reputedly was not 
sympathetic to the Republic of Ireland) briefed Attlee for the
meeting advising him to quote from the edition of the
'Manchester Guardian' which referred to the very generous 
treatment citizens of Eire resident in mainland Britain were
receiving, and that it would be in Irish interests not to make a
fuss over liability to military service of Irish citizens now 
resident in the U.K. Frank Newsam further advised Attlee to point 
out to MacBride that the anti-partition campaign would antagonise 
the British people and add further to the difficulties in 
carrying out the policy announced with regard to/
(23) CDEA 50021 -40
(24) IDFA 305/25
(25) D.D. Vol. 115. Col. 802. 10.5.1949
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to "non-foreigness", as agreed following the Paris talks and 
given recognition in the parliaments throughout the Commonwealth. 
Newsam also advised Attlee to remind MacBride that citizens 
of Eire received more privileges in the U.K. than did United 
Kingdom citizens in Eire. He cited the example whereby, despite 
the Irish government's apparent intention at Paris to 
reciprocate voting rights, citizens of the Republic of Ireland 
resident in Britain could vote in parliamentary elections, while 
the reverse did not apply.(26) Attlee was already aware of 
this.(27)
On May 5 Sean MacBride also attended a one hour meeting with 
Philip Noel-Baker and the British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin. 
According to the Commonwealth Relations Office report, MacBride 
informed the British ministers of the Irish government's angry 
opposition to the ’guarantee" clause in the Bill. MacBride
quoted de Valera who was saying that they were right back to 
1916.(28) Bevin explained that many people, including members of 
the British government, were in broad sympathy with the ideal of 
a united Ireland . However, he qualified this point by reminding 
MacBride that "without the help of the North, Hitler would
unquestionably have won the submarine war and the United Kingdom
would have been defeated." Continuing, Bevin stated that "as a 
reward for this loyalty and until the majority in the North 
decided otherwise the British people would oblige us to give them 
guarantees that they would not be coerced.’(29)
(26) PRO PREM 8. 1464
(27) PREM 8/1464. L.D. 19.1.1949. Serial No. 4/49
(28)PRO DO 35 3973 . CRO to U.K. Representative 9.5.1949 Telegram 
No. 79
(29)Ibid
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Sean MacBride's report to. the Department of External Affairs 
about the meeting concentrated on the gratuitousness of the 
"guarantee". He explained: "I pointed out that what should have
been obvious to a layman, that Partition was already legally in 
existence on the British statute book and it was unprecedented to
|
re-enact a law that was already valid." Bevin is reported by Mac 
Bride as stating "repeatedly and emphatically, I would never have 
agreed to the inclusion of the provisions about Partition were 
it not that we were told by our lawyers that they were absolutely 
essential."(30) This raises the question, regarding the extent 
I to which the British government's policy on Partition, was a 
rubber-stamping of the policy of the Chiefs of Staff, together 
with interested Government departments and individual 
personalities, including that of the Cabinet Secretary.
i
Sean MacBride reported to the Department of External Affairs that 
outside Bevin's room in the Foreign Office, Philip Noel-Baker 
took a different stance, explaining that the guarantee was a 
political necessity. MacBride replied curtly that a new Act was 
not needed everytime an anti-partition speech was made. Mac Bride 
stated that "someone is not being truthful-or, to be more 
charitable, someone has been misinformed. Whichever it is, it is 
just too bad that decisions having such profound repercussions 
should be taken so casually." MacBride, commenting on these 
conversations, reported to the Secretary of the Department of 
External Affairs about "the lack of understanding or even of 
interest of Anglo- Irish relationships is the same now as
always."(31)
(30)IDFA 305/ 14/36
(31) IDFA 305/14/36
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II
I
The reason for the "lack of understanding" was arguably due to 
the policy of clouding any input to the decision on the
"guarantee" by the British Joint Chiefs of Staff. As referred to 
in the previous chapter the phrase "or any part thereof" was 
interpreted in Ireland, exclusively as a reference to the
nationalist areas of Northern Ireland; it can additionally be 
interpreted as a broad reference to cover the disputed waters of 
Northern Ireland, which included the deep water berth of Lough 
Foyle which gives access to the strategic port of Londonderry.
That base, according to a Chiefs of Staff report (retained by
Ministry of Defence)(1*) dated December 18, 1948,: "(1) is a
naval base vital to the defence of the UK because of it s 
importance to the Atlantic convoys in time of war...(2) the 
usefulness of the port as a base depends on our having continued 
unrestricted use of the navigable channel....(3) It was 
undesirable that there should be any division of the waters
between Eire and the U.K. as a result of a decision by an
international court which did not give the UK the navigable 
channel." (32) This view coincided with the expressed wish of the
government of Northern Ireland that the UK government should
"preserve the right of access to Londonderry and Newry" for 
British naval ships.(33)
(32) PRO DEFE 5.9. COS(48)214 . 18.12.1948 .(1*)Retained by
Ministry of Defence 22.5.1980, re- applied for 10.5.1990.
(33) PRO Cab 130/44 Gen 262(M) 4th Meeting 27.1.1949.
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Sean MacBride was disappointed by the outcome of his meeting on 
May 5 with Bevin. MacBride is recorded as stating that, "the 
action of the British government in seeking to impose its will 
regarding the partitioning of our country is comparable with the 
action of Germany before the war and of Russia since the war, of 
seeking to impose their system of government in central 
Europe."(34)
On May 9, at a half- hour meeting between Attlee, Philip Noel- 
Baker and the Republic of Ireland's High Commissioner in London, 
John Dulanty, Noel-Baker told Dulanty that the Labour government 
had come under pressure and criticism due to the enactment of the 
Republic of Ireland Act. Additionally, Noel-Baker told Dulanty 
that the "Tories had rejoiced in the action of the Irish 
government because they said it provided a golden opportunity to 
make partition firm forever".(35) There was a rumour in Ireland 
that Attlee was pleased to use the guarantee as "a peace 
offering" to placate Winston Churchill, who was annoyed at India 
being "’allowed" to become a Republic. (36)
(34) PRO DO 35 3974 Rugby to CRO. Telegram No. 63. 8.5.1949
(35) IDFA 305/14/36
(36) Ibi.d
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In Ireland on May 5, 1949, Eamon de Valera wrote to John
Costello suggesting that the anti-partition subcommittee be
|
reconvened.(37) That committee was established at the beginning 
of 1949 to campaign against the February election in Northern 
Ireland. In time Costello's anti-partition campaign was to prove 
counter-productive in that it was de Valera who was enhanced by 
the campaign. De Valera's letter also asked Costello to make his 
intended response to the Ireland Bill before the Dail adjourned 
for the weekend.(38) Costello replied to de Valera that same day 
agreeing to de Valera's request to reconvene the anti-partition 
committee, and explained that he was deliberately delaying making 
a response until he had received a report from Sean 
MacBride.(39) According to George Garrett, Costello was saying 
privately, that he "wanted cool off before issuing 
(a) statement."(40)
On that same day the 'Irish Independent' reported that the Irish 
cabinet met for six hours to discuss their response to the 
Ireland Bill. (41) According to a report from the Canadian High 
Commission in Eire, the Cabinet met the following day for a five 
hour meeting which included a discussion on a report by Sean 
MacBride of his meeting with British Ministers.(42) There/
(37) NASPO S 14528 L.D. 5.5.1949.
(38)Ibid
(39) Ibid
(40)NA 841D. 00(W) /5-1149
(4liIrish Independent. 6.5.1949. NASPO. Cab 2/10 records show an 
evening cabinet meeting on Thursday/Friday 5-6 May, 1949 
beginning at 8.30p.m. and ending at 12.30.a.m.
(42)CDEA 50021-40
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I There followed another long meeting of the Cabinet on May 7, when 
they agreed that Sean MacBride should despatch an 'aide memoire' 
to the British Government.(43) The Cabinet also approved a 
recommendation from Costello that he should move a motion 
condemning the guarantee clause when the Dail resumed on May 
10. The decision to ask the all-party anti-partition committee to 
reconvene was made at that meeting.(44)
On May 7, 1949 Gilbert Laithwaite was presented with an 'aide
memoire' from the Irish Government.(45) The 'aide memoire' 
concentrated on the "guarantee clause". The gist of the 
"emphatic and solemn protest " was in effect a reiteration of the 
reasons contained in the Irish government's response to the USA 
invitation to join NATO. The 'aide-memoire' ended with an appeal 
"that, even at this late hour, steps may be taken by the British 
government" to prevent "a situation fraught with further 
difficulties and dangers". (46)
(43) NASPO Cab 2/10 .G.C. 5/90 .7.5.1949 .
(44) Ibid
(45) PRO DO 35 3973 Laithwaite to CRO. Telegram No. 70. Received
8.5.1949.
(46) Ibid
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Given the Irish government's attitude and relationship over the 
previous nine months towards Britain, Northern Ireland and NATO, 
it was perhaps naive of them to state in their 'aide memoire' 
that "the taking of such a step at a time when friendly co- 
joperation between democratic nations is of such vital importance 
makes it even more difficult to understand the reasons which have 
prompted it."(4 7)
In Dublin, Sean MacBride met Lord Rugby to discuss the British 
governments response to the Irish government's 'aide memoire' of 
May 7.(48) Referring to his earlier talk with Bevin, he expressed 
some surprise on receiving the British response. Lord Rugby 
reported Sean MacBride as asking "was there any likelihood of a 
further communication from a still higher level? Was I aware of 
what had passed between him and the Prime Minister and other 
Ministers?"(49) Judging from MacBride's apparent disappointment 
it is possible that he had in his meeting with Bevin on May 5(50) 
offered him what he considered was the trump card of bartering 
Irish "neutrality" for an end to Partition.
(47)NASPO 14528 Aide Memoire 7.5.1949
(48) PRO DO 35 3973. Rugby to CRO .Telegram No.74. 10.5.1949
(49) Ibid
(50)PRO DO 35 3973 . CRO to U.K. Representative 9.5.1949 Telegram 
No. 79
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A couple of months before in March 1949, Sean MacBride had 
jwritten an eight page letter opening in the familiar, "Dear
I
Ernie," and offered "a constructive line of approach to our
position in relation to the Atlantic Pact and Partition."(51) In 
reply Bevin suggested that he would see Sean MacBride when he 
(Bevin) returned from America. Sean MacBride was surprised when 
"instead, this unilateral bombshell was exploded, thus
bedevilling the possibility of a constructive solution", and Mac 
Bride was then left "wondering whether there is any genuine
desire to establish a good relationship and find a solution".(52) 
The British government aware, of American State Department
support replied to the Irish 'aide memoire' on May 10, 1949
somewhat superciliously, if not triumphantly; "The United Kingdom 
Government are at a loss to understand how they can legitimately 
be accused by the Government of the Irish Republic of impairing 
in any way the co-operation between democratic nations by their 
proposal". This 'aide memoire' side-stepped the thrust of the 
Irish 'aide memoire' by explaining their legal rights and
entitlement to legislate for a part of the United Kingdom. The 
'aide memoire' ended by emphasising that they were "satisfied
that no good would come were they to leave in doubt, the right of 
Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom so long as 
the majority of its people desire this."(53) This exchange was 
the start of a series of split level discourses aimed at each
other's respective domestic political interests.
(51)PRO DO 35 3974. L.D. 9.3.1949
(52)PRO DO 35 3974. CRO to UK Rep. in Dublin T. No.79. 10.5.1949
(53)PRO DO 35 3973. CRO to Laithwaite. Telegram no. 81.
10.5.1949. Contains copy of 'aide memoire' of 10.5.1949
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Following de Valera's request to Costello to reconvene the anti­
partition committee and the Irish cabinet's approval of the 
proposal on May 5, the Mansion House all party anti-partition 
committee met on May 9.(54) Representatives of the major parties 
attended including Costello, de Valera, Norton and MacBride. The 
'Irish Independent' described the purpose of the meeting "to 
secure a united national front at home and amongst the Irish race 
abroad so that the insulting and cynical plan upon which Britain 
had decided be known to the world, and appropriate action 
taken.” The meeting decided unanimously that there should be a 
public protest meeting in Dublin's main O'Connell Street at which 
all the leading figures from all the political parties would 
speak and also as a sign of unity. De Valera agreed to second
Costello's motion condemning the UK 'Ireland Act,1949,' in the
Dail.(55)
Introducing the motion in the Dail Costello quoted the Irish 
Parliamentarian, Henry Grattan: "Sir, I have entreated attendance 
on this day, that you might in the most public manner, deny the 
claim of the British Parliament to make law for Ireland and with 
one voice lift up your hand against it".(56) Costello resisted an 
amendment from Captain Peadar Cowan to include a mention of the 
1916 uprising and a pledge to "make this declaration effective by 
every means at our command".(57)
(54) Irish Independent. 10.5.1949
(55) Ibid
(56)D.D. Vol. 115. Col. 785-786. 10.5.1949
(5 7)D .D . Vol. 115. Col. 817. 10.5.1949
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During the course of his speech, John Costello threatened; "we 
can hit the British Government in their prestige and in their 
pride and in their pocket." (58) Laithwaite noted that that 
remark broke the silence by inducing applause amongst members of 
the Dail. (59) In reality, such sentiments, were known to be 
rhetorical rather than practical, for example, the Commonwealth 
Relations Office noted that the Minister of Agriculture, James 
Dillon, exempted existing trade agreements with Great Britain 
from Costello's remark. The Commonwealth Relations Office 
believed that "much that has happened in the Irish Republic 
during the last nine months arises not from practical 
difficulties or real convictions, but from essential weakness and 
opportunism of Mr Costello's coalition government."(60)
The next speaker was Eamon De Valera and he began by expressing 
his agreement with Costello's remarks and blamed the British 
government for attempting to confuse the responsibility for 
Partition by placing the onus for its ending onto the government 
of Northern Ireland. (61)
(58)D.D. Vol. 115. Col.807. 10.5.1949
(59) PRO DO 35 3973 Laithwaite to CRO . Telegram No. 75.
10.5.1949
(60)PRO DO 35 3973
(61) D.D. Vol. 115. Col. 808-817. 10.5 1949
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I Laithwaite was critical of the Irish political leader's emphasis 
on the "guarantee". He believed that they "ignored valuable 
concessions on citizenship privileges and trade which the Ireland 
Bill will continue".(62) That Laithwaite's opinion on the Irish 
government's response was perhaps unfair, is evidenced by a 
report from the Canadian Acting High Commissioner in Dublin, 
David M. Johnson : "Sir Gilbert Laithwaite thought that members
of the Dail and persons in the galleries were apathetic. One 
explanation would be apathy, another that the persons present 
were deeply moved."(63) Johnson added that when he met Costello
and MacBride on May 12, Costello had told him that "the British
government always make settlements with Ireland too late, and 
grants to force what it refuses to grant to political
negotiation. Young Nationalists in the north know all this and 
will be difficult to restrain."(64)
For more violent remarks Laithwaite resorted to quoting minor 
politicians from the chambers of Dublin Corporation. For example, 
he quoted Mr. E. Cooney as stating that the Fenian tradition was 
vindicated and "that nothing could be got from England except by 
force.” Similarly, Mr. J. Deasy was quoted as stating that "the 
sooner they made it known that they had sufficient military
strength, they would invade the North, the better".(65) This 
adverse if mild reaction in Ireland does not appear to have been 
even considered by any responsible British minister.
(62)PRO DO 35 3973 Telegram no. 75
(63)CDEA 50021-40 report no 106
(64) Ibid
(65)PRO DO 35 3973
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On May 11, 1949 Attlee introduced the second reading of the
Ireland Bill, the enactment of which as to apply retroactively 
to April 18, 1949. The second reading took place on May 11.
During this reading, Attlee expressed surprise at the protest 
from the Irish Government. He referred to the fact that his 
original statement in October 1948 "was received without 
protest."(66) Attlee argued that ,"I had to conclude that the
Government of Eire considered the cutting of the last tie which
united Eire and the British Commonwealth as a more important 
objective of policy than ending partition."(67) While this 
statement ignored the emotions attached to the problem
of Partition, it was nonetheless a logical deduction which 
unfortunately escaped many of the "Republican" politicians in the 
Republic of Ireland.
Attlee then turned Costello's phrase back on him, arguing that it 
was the Government of the Republic of Ireland, which had 
"tightened the ligature fastened around the body of Ireland",
pointing out that the British government recently took a decision 
to retain the Republic of India within the Commonwealth.(68) The 
implication was that the same would have applied to Eire.
(66)H .C . Vol. 464. Col. 1856. 11.5.1949
(67)H .C . Vol. 464. Col. 1858. 11.5.1949
(68)H .C . Col. 1858. Vol. 464. 11.5.1949
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It is possible that before making the "announcement", John 
Costello may have envisaged a "republic of Ireland" associated 
with the Commonwealth. That would have been a compromise that 
would have diluted the connection with the Commonwealth, assuaged 
the republicans in Clann-na-Poblachta and retained the loyalty of 
the Unionists in Fine Gael.
During the second reading , Anthony Eden ,on behalf of the 
Conservative Party, expressed support for the assurance to 
Northern Ireland. However, he added the reservation that such a 
parliamentary pledge was not binding for a government, "or 
indeed this Parliament." Eden, having made that constitutional 
point, reminded the Commons that the Conservative Party's policy 
was that "If union between North and Southern Ireland is to come 
about, it must do so not by force or by threats of force but by 
agreement and by parliamentary and democratic means."(69)
(69)H .C . Vol. 464. Col. 1867. 11.5. 1949
(F)
IRISH GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE PASSAGE OF THE UK "IRELAND 
ACT,1949"
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The Irish morning dailies, reporting on the second reading of 
the Ireland Bill, 1949, in the House of Commons, continued 
their criticism of the guarantee. However, the 'Irish Times', 
agreed with Attlee's comments and headlined their report " Irish 
decision made guarantee to the North inevitable." (1) Laithwaite 
referring to the Irish paper's criticisms, specified the 'Irish 
Press', which he called "de Valera's organ".(2) (That reference, 
despite its crudeness could be interpreted seriously given that, 
the same word 'organ' was chosen by de Valera to refer to the 
Crown in article 29.2 in the 1937 constitution.)
Feelings of anger were aroused throughout Ireland. This 
culminated in, according to a report in the 'Irish Times', the 
largest ever gathering of Irish people.(3) Crowds thronged 
O'Connell Street for a protest meeting on the evening of May 13. 
The meeting was addressed by leaders of all the political parties 
in the Republic of Ireland and the elected representatives of the 
nationalist population in Northern Ireland.
(1) Reported in the Irish Times 12.5. 1948
(2) PRO DO 35 3973. Laithwaite to CRO. Telegram no. 80.
13.5.1949
(3) Irish Times. 12.5.1949
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John Costello was first to speak; standing on a platform by 
the monument dedicated to Nationalist figure, Charles Stewart 
Parnell, Costello made a memorable and emotional speech.(4) 
Laithwaite described the tone of Costello's speech as 
"deplorable" and compared it to one of Hitler's harangues .(5) A 
few days later Frederick Boland explained to Laithwaite that 
"allowance had to be made for the Taoiseach's personality and 
nisi prius manner" adding that once the Ireland Bill was enacted, 
then the Irish government's agitation would decline.(6) 
Laithwaite considered that the substance of de Valera's speech, 
was "quiet and deliberate in delivery" and "comparatively calm 
and reasoned." (7) Interestingly, he considered that "MacBride's 
speech did not differ from Costello's. (8) Next to speak was the 
Tanaiste, William Norton. He appealed to fellow Labour 
parliamentarians in Britain, stating that he found it
"incomprehensible why a Labour Government in Britain in 1949
should seek to confirm the Tory imperialism and ascendancy which 
conceived and implemented by intrigue the partition of one of the 
oldest and most homogeneous nations in the world."(9) Laithwaite, 
in his report, accused Norton of "playing entirely to the rowdy 
elements."(10)
(4) RTE Library, reference file No. 57/68 Also RTE radio 
Documentary "The Republic of Ireland Act,1949. " broadcast
26.3.1989
(5) DO 35 3973. Laithwaite to CRO. Telegram No. 81. 14.5.1949
(6) Ibid
(7) Ibid
(8) Ibid
(9) Ibid
(10)Ibid
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By way of reply to Norton, a month later, the Lord President and 
Leader of the House of Commons, Herbert Morisson, speaking at the 
annual Labour Party conference declared "I think it would be 
most unwise for us to seek to involve the British Labour Party in 
the internal politics of Ireland and with great respect we would 
like Ireland not to interfere with our internal politics.M (11)
There is an impression that Laithwaite toned down his reports on 
the O'Connell Street demonstration so as to counteract the 
purpose of the demonstration, which was designed, to make the 
British government pay attention to the strength of feeling of 
Irish people over the issue of Partition. Laithwaite claimed that 
"the bulk of the crowd was mainly a sightseeing one who regarded 
the meeting as an additional amenity of the traditional Friday 
night out on a fine evening." He continued to argue that the 
size of the crowd was augmented by "the returning spectators from 
the 'Wolverhampton Wanderers' match and by public house patrons 
after closing-time". Laithwaite claimed that the O'Connell Street 
gathering was outflanked by a protest twelve days earlier over 
the imprisonment of Cardinal Mindszenty in Hungary. (12)
(11)PRO FO 371. 74190 . contains copy of Irish Information
Bulletin No. 5. issued by Department of External Relations
(12)DO 35. 3973 Telegram No 81. 14.5.1949
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The Canadian High Commissioner to Ireland, William Turgeon 
reported that " when the meeting broke up, the crowd went soberly 
home. A few of the more excitable spirits burnt a Union Jack in 
front of Trinity College, and then moved to the office of the 
United Kingdom Representative and made speeches demanding that 
Sir Gilbert should be sent home."(13) Interestingly, Laithwaite 
does not appear to have reported that particular commotion.
Laithwaite reported to Percival Liesching that he had spoken to 
Sean MacBride and Frederick Boland at the weekly tea party in 
Iveagh House, and complained to them about the "utterances" at 
the O'Connell Street meeting. According to the report, MacBride 
"ignored this remark" and complained that the surprise 
introduction of the Ireland Bill was a breach of the 
understanding at Paris where it was agreed that there would be 
advance information on matters affecting Anglo-Irish relations. 
Laithwaite replied that that the agreement applied only to 
"immediate action".(14) MacBride's criticism was then issued by 
the Government Information Bureau under the auspices of the 
Department of External Affairs. It claimed "a suggestion that 
there were no consultations between the British and Irish 
governments prior to the repeal of the External Relations Act and 
the introduction of the Republic of Ireland Act is not in 
accordance with the facts." This statement claimed that the 
British government reneged on "a clear understanding" reached at 
Chequers in October 1948 and in Paris in November to "consult/
(13) IDEA 50021-40
(14) PRO DO 35 3973
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consult concerning any steps which might be taken, consequential 
; upon the coming into operation of the Republic of Ireland Act.”
(15) Philip Noel- Baker took the stance that since it was British 
government policy not to discuss the question of Partition with 
the "government of Dublin", so this principle "therefore made 
nonsense of MacBride's claim that we were pledged to consult 
Dublin about clause 1.1(B) of the Government of Ireland 
Bill. "(16) He argued that the understanding achieved in Paris 
related only to the issuing of statements in the Dail and the 
Parliaments of Commonwealth which were designed to counteract 
any challenges to Eire's treatment as a non-foreign state.(17) 
The Irish government's response could be seen as hypocritical not 
just because of their own failure to consult the British 
government in advance about the "announcement" but also because 
in 1947 the previous Irish government made a formal complaint to 
the British government about an announcement made to the press, 
without prior consultation, about forthcoming Anglo-Irish trade 
discussions.(17)
(15> PRO DO 35 3973. Telegram no. 88. 23.5.1949. Laithwaite to
CRO
(16)» PRO DO 35 3973
(17)j NASPO S 14134
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On May 17, 1949, Frederick Boland wrote to Neil Pritchard,
and invited him to call on him as soon as he returned from his 
visit to England. Pritchard's report of his conversation with 
Boland is worth quoting in length because it shows an awareness 
of the practicalities of Anglo-Irish relations. Boland wanted to 
know what the reaction was in England to what he described as 
"the new situation". Pritchard explained that Anglo-Irish 
relations were "not to the forefront among people generally" but 
that the speeches by Irish leaders in the previous week had been 
"read in London with disappointment and regret". (18) Boland was 
pessimistic about the future of Anglo-Irish relations; at best, 
he thought, there would be a "serious deterioration" in 
relations. The threat of violence, he thought, might come, not 
from such organisations as 'Aiseirghe', (a small right wing 
Nationalist group, which was putting up posters calling for an 
armed march on the North), but rather that the likelihood of 
violence might come from "those who kept quiet". Boland thought 
that at worst, " there would grow up a general feeling that 
constitutional methods had been discredited and attempts at 
direct action should be, if not actually aided and abetted, at 
any rate regarded with sympathy." (19) Pritchard maintained the 
position that the fault in the deterioration in relations was "on 
this side of the channel", and that in response to British 
leader's attempts to keep Anglo-Irish relations "even and 
friendly", the Irish leaders responded by,/
(18) PRO DO 35 3973
(19) Ibid
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by, "instead of trying to moderate extremist opinion" they seemed 
instead "rather to be inciting it."(20) Perhaps surprisingly,in 
view of the Irish leaders’ reaction, Pritchard told Boland that 
Philip Noel-Baker had been "completely astonished and shocked", 
that some members of the Irish cabinet should view the guarantee 
as an act of vindictiveness by the United Kingdom 
Government."(21) This report certainly highlights what Pritchard 
referred to as "this disparity of viewpoint". (22)
The Irish government's response had little perceptible effect on 
the proceeding of the Bill. At the end of the second reading, in 
spite of a three line whip, twelve members of the Labour Party 
voted against the Bill.(23) There was an attempt to highlight 
the proposition that the Parliament of Northern Ireland was 
unrepresentative, and that the only fair means of determining the 
public opinion on a political issue was by means of a plebiscite. 
The Lord President, Herbert Morrison on behalf of the British 
government, resisted the proposal stating, "It has not been the 
custom of our country to settle things by referendum or 
plebiscite."(24)
(20)Ibid
(21)H.C. Vol. 464. Col. 1953. 11.5.1949
(22)PRO DO 35 3973
(23) H.C. Vol. 464. Col. 1963-4. 11.5.1949
(24)H .C . Vol. 464. Col. 1955 11.5.1949
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An amendment on May 16 deleting the clause containing this 
guarantee was defeated by 345 votes to 21.(25) An amendment 
proposed by Mr. Boyd-Carpenter, Mr. Pickthorn, Mr.Keeling, 
Lieutenant - Commander Gurney Braithwaite, Major Haughton, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Walter Smiles to substitute the title 
"Republic of Ireland" with the term "Irish Republic" was 
defeated by 227 to 79. (26) Altogether at the committee stage
there were fifteen amendments to substitute the term Irish 
Republic for Republic of Ireland throughout the Bill.(27) Attlee 
had already referred in his memorandum to calling the Republic of 
Ireland by some other name than that by which it claims to be 
known,(28) and during the second reading of the Bill, explained 
that "One cannot, in international relations, habitually refer to 
a country by some other name than that by which it claims to be 
known."(29)
The Canadian High Commissioner in London, Norman Robertson 
reported that during the course of the voting in the committee 
stage on May 16, 66 Labour members, opposed the Government.
Attlee wrote to each of the dissidents and called for the 
resignation of five Parliamentary Private Secretaries including 
Bob Meliish. According to his report on the passage of the Bill, 
Robertson reported stated that Attlee used the Irish issue to 
assert his authority on the Parliamentary Party on the eve of 
the Blackpool annual Labour Party conference.(30)
(25)DO 35 3973. Notes on Committee Stage. Amendments to Ireland 
Bill.
(26)Ibid
(27)Ibid
(28)PRO Cab 129/33 CP(49)48
(29)H .C . Vol. 464. Col 1862. 11.5.1949
(30) CDEA 50021-40
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Following the dissident vote a meeting of the British cabinet 
discussed the fact " that a small number of supporters” abstained 
from voting in the division because of Clause 1. 1(b).(31) The
Cabinet considered that this was because those members disagreed 
with the fairness of the electoral system in Northern Ireland. 
The Cabinet then discussed the possibility of ”satisfying 
themselves that the Northern Ireland Parliament was so
constituted as to reflect fairly the views of the electors”. 
Following a discussion, the general view of the Cabinet was that 
the United Kingdom Government would "be ill-advised to appear to 
be interesting themselves in this matter, which fell wholly 
within the jurisdiction of the Northern Ireland Government.” (32) 
Chuter-Ede, then raised the point that the government of the
Republic of Ireland was threatening to relax their vigilance in 
curtailing the manoeuvres of the Irish Republican Army. He argued 
that this increased the risk of an attack on Northern Ireland. 
Once again, the table was turned on the Irish Government when the 
Lord President queried whether it might be "expedient to seek an 
opportunity" during the course of the Ireland Bill, of giving the 
assurance that Northern Ireland would be defended by British 
troops against any aggression. (33)
(31) PRO CAB 128/115 CM (49)34 p.131 (p.23)
(32) Ibid
(33) PRO CAB 128/115 CM (49)34 p.131 (p.23)
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That worry of aggression may have been prompted by exaggerated
rumours in Ireland fuelled by such minor incidents as reported by 
'Irish Times' on May 18, 1949, which carried a front page
photograph with the 'Aiseirghe' poster "ARM NOW TO TAKE THE 
NORTH." In fact that was the most unconstitutional public
gesture of opposition to the Ireland Bill. George Garrett, 
reported that the Irish Gardai, acting on instructions, tore down 
the posters. He thought that the drilling on the border by the 
IRA may have been tolerated by the Government in order to allow 
extremists let off steam.(34) As with the 'Aiseirghe' posters, 
these threats at that time were mere rhetoric.
On May 21 Laithwaite reported to the Commonwealth Relations
Office that the Irish government and leaders of the Nationalists
in the North were showing a desire to moderate the activities 
of possible active extremists. He quoted Northern Nationalist 
representative, Eddie McAteer on May 17, in the Stormont 
Parliament: "I want you to understand and it is a message direct
from Dublin that no man in the six counties must take any action 
that is not directed and inspired by our own government in 
Dublin.” (35) Practical evidence of the official wish to dampen 
any unconstitutional action was made on May 20, when John 
Costello's Parliamentary Secretary, Liam Cosgrave ( later to 
become Taoiseach) stated the official government reaction. The/
(34) NA. 741. 41 D/5-1849
(35)PRO DO 35 3973 Telegram No. 86. 21.5.1949
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The statement declared, "However fierce our resentment against 
the Ireland Bill, as long as we have a Government duly elected by 
the people, no group or section has any right or authority to 
take action which has not the people's sanction behind it ...we 
must display a dignified restraint ....by our capacity for 
disciplined action we can show not only Britain , but the peoples 
of the democratic world, that right is on our side."(36)
Laithwaite was now confident enough to predict that the 
politicians would "tone down their speeches". Still he predicted 
that the anti-partition campaign which had been "deliberately 
fermented may have its effects on the less stable elements".(37) 
There is no record of Irish politicians or the Department of 
External Affairs "lobbying" backbenchers on the Ireland Bill. 
The Westminster Parliament seemed immune to the Irish 
rhetoric.The report stage (38) and third reading (39) and passing 
of the Ireland Bill were held on May 17,1949.(40) Chuter-Ede made 
the final speech which included the conciliatory words "if at any 
time the Republic of Ireland desires to re-enter the Commonwealth 
she will find that the door is open, that there will be a warm 
welcome, and that no questions about the past and recent events 
will be asked."(41)
(36)Ibid
(37)Ibid
(38) H.C. Vol. 465.Col. 345. 17.5.1949
(39) H.C. Vol. 465.Col. 348. 17.5.1949
(40) H.C. Vol. 465.Col. 392. 17.5.1949
(41) H.C. Vol. 464.Col. 392. 17.5.1949
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Following the passing of the Ireland Bill Attlee on May 18
presented his ministers with a memorandum,(42) advising them (as
suggested by Basil Brooke on January 27) (43) to ensure that
their departments "clearly understand the basis of Government
policy in respect of the new Irish Republic”. They were to ensure 
that the "Irish Republic” should not appear to be retaining any 
of these benefits of Commonwealth membership. Foremost was the 
reminder that "She" was to be excluded from information and 
assistance given as a matter of course to other Commonwealth 
members and could not attend as a member of any Commonwealth 
committee, although it was added that scientific information 
normally available to a friendly country should not be withheld. 
The memorandum advised that the Ministry of Defence should be 
asked before releasing any defence research material.(44) Attlee 
further advised that in order to avoid giving offence to Northern 
Ireland, the term "Irish Republic" should be used whenever
possible and the term "Ireland" should only be used as a 
geographic description of the island and "should never be used in 
official documents or correspondence in relation to the South. 
That the use of the term 'Eire' should be discontinued as a 
geographical description of the South, 'Southern Ireland' may be 
used as a alternative to 'the Irish Republic'."
CONTINUED/
(42) PRO CAB 129/35 CP(49)111. pp.5-6 18.5.1949
(43) PRO Cab 130. 44.Gen Mtg. 4. 262
(44) PRO CAB 129/35 CP(49)111. pp.5-6 18.5.1949
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Similarly, he advised that "the adjective 'Irish' should not 
normally be used, except in relation to the island as whole, 
suggesting that instead 'Irish Republican' or of the Irish 
Republic should be used." Attlee ended his memorandum advising 
that the Commonwealth Relations Office (as opposed to the Foreign 
Office) would continue to handle Anglo-Irish relations.(45)
In the House of Lords the former Lord Chancellor, Viscount 
Simon, highlighted a technical defect in the British Nationality 
Act which, in conjunction with the Ireland Act, might have 
deprived British citizens born in Northern Ireland on December 6, 
1922 of their citizenship. This was because Northern Ireland did 
not exercise its option to be excluded from the Irish Free State 
until December 7,1922 . Technically, all of Ireland was within 
the jurisdiction of the Irish Free State on December 6,1922. 
That amendment was approved by the Cabinet on May 30,(46) and 
the Ireland Bill received the Royal assent on June 2.(1*)
Following the enactment of the Ireland Act, Basil Brooke wrote a 
letter to Attlee congratulating him for his "admirable speech.... 
For dignity, clarity and firmness it seemed to me a model for 
parliamentary debates."(47)
(45) Ibid
(46) PRO Cab 128/15 CM(49)39. p.62
(47) PRO PREM 8/1464 .
(1*)The Ireland Act, 1949 (12 &13 Geo 6,Ch.41) Mansergh ,N.
(Ed.):Speeches and Documents on British Commonwealth Affairs.Vol 
11. pp.621-825
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(G)
IRISH OPPOSITION QUIETENS DOWN
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Following the passing of the Ireland Bill, Laithwaite reported on 
May 19: "The Partition agitation has developed considerably in
the last few days."(l) Complaining about the "tone" of Costello's 
speeches Laithwaite explained, "he had, I understand a 
considerable practice at the Bar, and particularly in jury cases. 
I am told that his technique in the speeches that he has made is 
completely reminiscent of his behaviour in court. His petulance, 
his refusal to see the arguments for the other side, his 
readiness to appeal to prejudice, his disposition to labour a 
weak point, his anxiety to play on the feelings of his audience, 
are all, it is said, part of his normal court manner."(2)
However, by the end of May 1949, Laithwaite reported that "this 
matter is becoming increasingly part of the internal political 
battle."(3) Indeed, the coalition were coming under increasing 
criticism about their handling of the repeal of the External 
Relations Act and of the lack of consultations and discussions 
before the "announcement". The political consensus in Ireland on 
the "guarantee" on Partition was dissolving. The debate was 
reduced to an argument as to whether the British government had 
been consulted in advance about the "decision" to repeal the 
External Relations Act. In effect, the opposition were making 
capital out of what appeared to be the incompetent handling of 
diplomatic relations by the government. The Fianna Fail 
opposition spokesman on Justice,/
(1)PRO Cab 129/35 Annex C. "Report from the United Kingdom 
Representative to the Republic of Ireland."
(2)Ibid
(3) PRO DO 35 3973 Telegram No. 90. 23.5.1949
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Justice,/ Gerald Boland, speaking at a Party convention, called 
for a change of Government. He blamed the Anglo-Irish diplomatic 
nadir on "short sighted incompetent leadership or to deliberate 
mischief making by the government". Sean Lemass was more 
circumspect; according to Laithwaite he had declared at a 
public meting on May 21, that while his party's support did not 
extend to, "trust the government's leadership even against
Partition," they would continue their policy of restraining their 
criticisms.(4)
On May 28 1949, the 'Irish Times' took up the issue about
consultation asking the question "on what date did the Irish
government decide to repeal the External Relations Act ?.If Mr. 
MacBride will answer this simple question, he will prevent all 
further dispute."(5) This publicity undermined the government in 
the debate over their claim that there had been advance
consultation with the British government about their "decision" 
to repeal the external Relations Act.
Interestingly, George Garrett reported that President Sean T. 
O'Kelly told Mrs. Garrett that "he blamed Costello directly for 
the mess we are now in ." According to Garrett's report, Sean 
T.O'Kelly added "Costello's political ineptitude was clearly 
seen in every phase leading up to the enactment of the Ireland 
Bill." (6)
(4) Ibid
(5) Irish Times. 28.5.1949
(6) NA 841D.00/6-3049
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By the end of May 1949 the Coalition's campaign against the
Ireland Bill was beginning to lose its impetus, stymied by the
policy, as advised by Laithwaite, of deliberate indifference from 
the British government.
At the beginning of June, David Johnson, reported that there was 
a "marked falling in public excitement over partition and the 
United Kingdom Bill." He too reported that the unity on the
Partition controversy was "beginning to break up".(7) The focus 
was on the criticism of the coalition with claims from the
Opposition that the Government had misled the people with their
optimistic references on Partition. On July 13, 1949, Sean
MacBride, speaking in the Dail expressed his disappointment that 
the US government would not intervene on Partition. MacBride 
who previously seemed to have unrealistic expectations of the US 
special relationship with Ireland, was now claiming that in 
relation to the State Department's refusal to intervene on
Partition, he was, " fully aware that that has always been the
attitude of the State Department."(8)
(7) DEA 50021-40
(8)D .D . Vol 117. Col. 854. 13.7.1949
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In order to put the case internationally, MacBride had hoped to 
establish his idea, first put to de Valera in 1945, of setting 
up an international news agency.(9)In June 1949, MacBride moved 
the second reading to establish an agency whose function was to 
counteract propaganda about Ireland.(10) Perhaps because of 
entrenched hostile vested interests from journalists, there were 
a large number of amendments, and the final stages were postponed 
until after the summer recess.(11) In effect, this postponement 
showed a lack of urgency and heralded the Coalition's first step 
down in the public relations battle against Partition.
Similarly, Costello was winding down his anti-partition demands 
to only demanding as a "first instalment", the return of 
counties Tyrone and Fermanagh.(12)
By August 1949, George Garrett reported that there was no 
responsible politician prepared to countenance any activity to do 
with Partition which might lead towards violence. Garrett 
believed the Coalition was recovering from the impact of the 
Ireland Act and were now co-operating with Britain on economic 
matters particularly relating to joint planning in the Sterling 
crisis. (13) That same month, Garrett reported that the 
Commonwealth Relations Office confirmed his own impression that 
Anglo-Irish relations were "remarkably calm" during the previous 
two months. Garrett attributed this to the fact that the furore 
over the UK Ireland Act had "died down".(14)
(9)D . D . Vol 117. Col. 844. 13.7.1949
(10)D.D. Vol 117. Col. 748. 13.7.1949
(11)DO 35 3940. Laithwaite to CRO Telegram no. 29.Supplement to 
OPDOM1 No. 9.18.7.1949
(12)Ibid
(13)NLA 84ID. 00/5-2249
(14) NiA 741D. 00/8-1049
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In August 1949, Sean MacBride attempted to raise the issue of 
partition internationally during a meeting of the Council of 
Europe.(15) While Sean MacBride is recorded as having "bewildered
delegates" about the inequities of Partition at the new Council
of Europe,(16) it should be stated that one Canadian diplomatic 
report recorded that, "In the Council of Europe the Irish 
delegates after getting partition out of their system, settled 
down and did effective work both in the assembly itself and in 
the various committees set up."(17)
At the end of August 1949, the government of Northern Ireland, 
possibly under pressure from the British government, revoked 
forty-one regulations that applied under the Special Powers 
Act. While the outlawing of the ownership and display of the 
Tricolour and the power to ban meetings and processions
continued, the orders revoked applied to the power of arbitrary
arrest, internment without trial, imposition of curfews, banning 
of newspapers and the closing of roads. This was regarded by the 
US Consul in Belfast as an important concession, especially with 
regard to the Republic's relations with Britain. (18)
(15)841 D. 00(W) /8-1949
(16)Keatinge,P., quotes one such report in : A Place Among the
Nations. p.113
(17)CDEA 50021-40 /10463-AB40/68/68/
(18)NA 841 E. 044/8-2949
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George Garrett reported to the State Department that in October 
1949 Eamon de Valera, Sean MacBride , William Norton, and Frank 
Aiken met in secret in Dublin's Mansion House under the auspices 
of the anti- partition committee. They agreed not to intervene in 
the British general election because they judged that that their 
attempts in interfering in the February elections in Northern 
Ireland were counterproductive. (19)
The Irish News Agency, when eventually established at the end of 
1949, was not used to promote the Partition issue.(20) In effect, 
the October 1949 meeting of the anti-partition campaign dealt the 
death knell to any further intervention against partition by the 
Irish government. George Garret judged that "such action was 
necessary in order to prevent unleashing violent elements".(21)
(19)NA 841 D.00/10-3149
(20)NASPO S 14544 File on establishment of the Irish News Agency.
(21)NA 841 D.00/10-3149
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CH:XVI 
CONCLUSION
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It should first be stated that prior consultation was an 
acknowledged standard of Anglo-Irish diplomatic and inter­
departmental behaviour. For example, a comparatively minor 
infringement of this established protocol in September, 1947, 
brought forth a memorandum from the Department of External 
Affairs, reminding the Taoiseach that "a recent important 
instance of failure on the part of the British authorities to 
consult us before making announcements on matters of very direct 
interest to this country" arose in the case of certain statements 
made by Mr. Strachey British Minister of food, in regard to
trade negotiations between Britain and Ireland."(1) The statement 
related to John Strachey disclosing that there would be trade 
talks with Eire in advance of an official joint announcement. 
Similarly, a memorandum approved by the last Cabinet meeting of 
the outgoing Fianna Fail government on February 17 1948,
contained proposals to establish an interdepartmental Anglo-Irish 
Standing Joint Committee on economic relations. Paragraph (b) of 
the terms of reference underlined the point that "It would be of
the highest importance that in all matters. whether brought to
the attention of the Committee or not, there should be complete 
co-operation between our own Departments in their dealings with 
British Departments and that each of our Departments should keep 
the other Irish departments concerned fully and continuously 
informed of such dealings." (2) More than any other Department, 
the Department of External Affairs expected to be responsible 
for the "announcement" would be expected to be already engaged in
the spirit of that proposal.
(1) NASPO S. 14134
(2) NASPO S. 14222 memo and Extract of Cabinet Minutes 17.2.1948
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"What is truth?" asked an editorial in the 'Irish Times', in May 
11949. (3) The question related to the various versions given out 
about the timing of the Irish cabinet's decision in relation to 
John Costello's "announcement" in Canada. The editorial 
| highlighted the fact that Fine Gael had fought the election, 
jtacitly, on retaining the Commonwealth link and the Government 
had no mandate to repeal the External Relations Act, reinforcing 
the point by citing the fact that Clann-na-Poblachta had failed
i
to obtain a mandate to repeal the Act. The editorial challenged 
Sean MacBride to answer the question, "On what date did the Irish 
government decide to repeal the External Relations Act?"(4)
The reason that the Irish government evaded answering that 
question honestly and in layman's language "lied" about the fact 
that there was no Cabinet decision may have been because the more 
vitriolic of Fine Gael's political opponents had stooped to the 
level of accusing John Costello of being drunk and of having made 
the "announcement" because he was offended by the "Roaring Meg" 
incident, at a dinner hosted by the Governor General. 
Unfortunately, once that muck was thrown it entered into popular 
and even intellectual folklore. It is understandable why it was 
feared that an admission that there was no Cabinet decision for 
the "announcement" might have given sustenance to this unfounded 
rumour. However, this personal attack on John Costello is 
unworthy of further comment especially since the thesis disproves 
the unfounded allegation and it is now best left in the murky 
political fields of the time.
(3) Irish Times 21.5.1949
(4) Ibid
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The fact that Clann-na-Poblachta, the only party that sought a 
mandate to repeal the External Relations Act "and such other
measures as are inconsistent with our status as an independent 
Republic," was refused (5) shows that this policy did not have 
overwhelming support. This is probably because the electorate 
would not have approved leaving the Commonwealth because of the 
risk of "material" losses. Electoral consideration may have been 
one of the reasons de Valera did not follow through his intention 
to refer to the Irish Free State as "Poblacht na h-Eireann"(Irish 
Republic) in the original draft of the External Relations Act,(6) 
or indeed in the 1937 Constitution.(7) Again, in February 1948, 
one of the reasons de Valera may have decided not to seek a
mandate to implement his own Bill to repeal the External
Relations Act,(8) was that he was aware that if he had moved to 
repeal the Act before the general election, political tactical 
considerations would probably have lead to the proposal being 
opposed by Fine Gael. ( Interestingly while the draft of de
Valera's Bill referred to the Republic, no mention was made 
leaving the Commonwealth).
(5)D .D . Vol.110. Col. 25 . 18.2.1948
(6) Draft dated 31.8. 1936: Franciscan, Archives,Private Papers 
of Eamon de Valera, Dun Mhuire, Killiney Co. Dublin. 
Reference.1029/5
(7)Bunreacht na hEireann (Constitution of Ireland) 1937. 
Government Publications Sale Office, G.P.O. Arcade, Dublin,!
(8)Cearbhall O'Dalaigh Papers. Department of Archive,U.C.D. 
Ref.P51/2A
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In an attempt to ensure that all of the multifarious events, 
circumstances, accidents and personalities connected with the
!
"announcement”, are covered, this conclusion will attempt to draw 
the most relevant strands together to form a cohesive 
understanding of the "announcement".
Allowing for instant decisions in foreign affairs, was John 
Costello justified, or was he acting 'ultra vires' in making the 
"announcement"? Given that Eire was a constitutional democracy 
with established cabinet procedures, the answer must be no: While 
there was Cabinet willingness, to remove the machinery procedures 
and formalities attached to the External Relations Act this did 
not amount to a cabinet decision to repeal the Act. Further there 
is no evidence to suggest that there was even Cabinet 
discussion, consensus or approval for repealing the External 
Relations Act and even less, to leave the Commonwealth. In fact, 
there is evidence to the contrary. The Cabinet decision of August 
10, 1948, to appoint a 'Charge d'Affaires' to Lisbon under the
machinery of the External Relations Act indicates, that only 
three weeks before John Costello made the "announcement", there 
was an implied decision by the Irish cabinet to continue using 
the procedures of the External Relations Act.(9)
(9) NASPO CAB 2/10 G.C. 5/30.10.8.1948
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The last Cabinet meeting which Costello attended before leaving 
for Canada in August, 1948,(10) approved his speech to the 
Canadian Bar Association. This included a reference to the 
External Relations Act being two-thirds defunct.(11) This 
indicates that the coalition Government were advancing marginally 
the direction of de Valera's original intention, contained in 
the first draft of his October 1947 Bill to repeal the External 
Relations Act.(1*) The draft of this Bill proposed that while 
continuing "to avail of the machinery of section 3(1) it would 
nevertheless be desirable to repeal the rest of the Act."(12) De 
Valera's "softly softly" approach would have increased the 
importance of the President in international affairs while 
retaining the King in an even more nominal, if not defunct 
position, to "act on behalf of Saorstat Eireann...as and when 
advised by the Executive Council so to do."(13)
This thesis has tried to reconcile the resulting confusion of
members of the coalition government over the "decision" by
attributing it mainly to a lack of attention by Cabinet members 
to the distinction between ignoring the machinery and formalities 
attached to the Act as opposed to the Act itself.
(10)NASPO CAB 2/10 G.C. 5/32. 18.8.1948
(11)Personal Interview Sean MacBride.6.1.1948
(12)Cearbhall O'Dalaigh Papers.UCD Department of Archives, P51/2A
(13)See-Appendix 1, Section 3(1) Executive Authority(External
Relations Act,1936
(1*)Section 1 (1) of the draft of "The Presidential
(International Powers and Functions) Bill, 1947." the 1947 Draft 
Bill stated that the appointment of diplomatic and consular 
representatives "shall be appointed on the authority of the 
Executive Council."
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Thirty and even forty years later, some officials and members of 
that Government, such as Sean MacBride, (14) Frederick 
Boland,(15) John Costello (16) and former Parliamentary Secretary 
to the Minister for Local Government and to the Minister for 
Defence, Brendan Corish(17) believe that there was a decision by 
the Cabinet to repeal the External Relations Act, prior to the 
"announcement”. John Costello maintained consistently that there 
had been a cabinet decision to repeal the External Relations Act 
prior to the "announcement".(18) However, in 1976 the former 
Minister of Health in that Government, Dr. Noel Browne, (several 
years in advance of Cabinet papers being made public) 
publicised the fact that there was in fact no such decision by 
the Cabinet .(19) Further that a "caucus" meeting of the cabinet 
was held in John Costello's home at which he offered his 
resignation. That meeting (but with reservations as to the 
attendance) has been verified, by former parliamentary secretary 
to John Costello and later Taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave.(20) Given 
the British government's reaction to John Costello's announcement 
as conveyed to him on October 7, 1948, it would have been more
surprising had he not offered his resignation.
(14)Personal interview with Sean MacBride 6.1.1987
(15)Bruce Arnold interview with Frederick Boland
(16)John Costello's personal memorandum of the events surrounding 
his visit to Canada. Kindly loaned by Hector Legge.
(17) Telephone interview with Brendan Corish 20.12.1988 
(181 Irish Times. 8.9.1967
(19)Browne,N. Against the Tide. P.130.
(20) Letter to author, January,1989, from Liam Cosgrave, former 
Parliamentary Secretary to John Costello, leader of Fine Gael, 
1965— 77 and Taoiseach, 1973-77.
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There is an impression from reading the original draft of John 
Costello's speech to the Canadian Bar Association that he
expected to be the chief luminary at their prestigious 
anniversary meeting. While the Association honoured John Costello 
with an honorary degree, he was only one of seventeen dignitaries 
to be so honoured, two of whom received higher awards.
The Governor General of Canada, Lord Alexander, caused offence to 
John Costello by placing the ornament "Roaring Meg" on John 
Costello's dinner table. The Canadian High Commissioner in
Dublin, William Turgeon, considered that Costello believed that 
the cannon was intended to recall to him the traditional 
challenge of the famous slogan: "The Walls of Derry and no
surrender".(18) To put it diplomatically Lord Alexander, as the 
representative of the Crown in Canada, with its diverse religious 
and ethnic composition should have been more discreet about 
displaying such an ornament in his official residence. The 
placing of the cannon on John Costello's dining table may have 
been intended to cause offence. However, it was most probably 
Lord Alexander's renegation on an agreement to toast the
President of Ireland at that dinner that caused most offence. The 
Irish government was, as a deliberate policy, arranging for 
toasts to be given to the President of Ireland.(1*) The refusal 
to grant a separate toast was in effect a refusal to acknowledge 
Eire as "separate" from the Commonwealth. John Costello did 
indeed, as later related to Sean T.O'Kelly, feel "sore about
things" at that point.(19)
(18) CDEA 50021-40/199(a) Report dated 7.12.1948
(19) PRO DO 35 3969
(1*)PRO DO 35 3969.See- Article "Toasting an External Relation." 
Ian MIc Cabe. Irish Times 4.9.1986
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The incident of "Roaring Meg" may have influenced John Costello 
emotionally with regard to the timing of the decision, but it is 
unlikely to have formed any significant part in his decision to 
allow the speculative headline in the 'Sunday Independent' to in 
effect lead the way. To rebut the misconception that John
| Costello made the "announcement" at that Saturday dinner party,
j
i t  s h o u l d  b e  r e m e m b e r e d  t h a t  t h e  " a n n o u n c e m e n t ” w a s  m a d e  the 
f o l l o w i n g  T u e s d a y  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  ' S u n d a y  I n d e p e n d e n t '  
h e a d l i n e  (20) a n d  a f t e r  s o m e  d e l i b e r a t i o n  .
Of more practical relevance to John Costello's decision to make
the "announcement” was the issue of the strategic importance of
Eire to the Western power's Cold War defence plans. Any
consideration of Partition at that time by Britain, Canada and
America was made against the background of the Berlin crisis.
When the threat of global warfare receded, credit went to the
united Western superpower structure. Partition had became
cemented within that "successful" superpower structure. Indeed
the territorial integrity of the borders of members of NATO was
formally drafted into article four(l*) of the NATO agreement.
In August 1948, Partition once again was a minor domestic problem
that was not allowed to interfere with strategic global plans. As
early as August 1948, the principal embryonic NATO powers
(America, Canada and Britain) agreed that Eire's membership among
others, was no longer in the category of desirable, ironically
perhaps because the western powers believed that in the event of/
(20) Sunday Independent headline, " EXTERNAL RELATIONS ACT TO 
GO”. 5.9.1948.
(1*) See appendix V
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of "a Soviet attack Ireland would ally themselves with the 
western powers”.(21) Although this decision was enunciated 
formally by the British Representative at the Washington Security 
Tails two days after John Costello's announcement,(22)it was not 
as a consequence of that "announcement"; on the contrary, the 
^announcement” may have been provoked by John Costello's awareness 
that that was already the defence position. By September 1948 
there was an obvious desire to exclude Eire from NATO but the 
participants went through the motions of extending an
"invitation” to Eire perhaps fearful that an acceptance would 
cause more trouble than the resultant benefits were worth. 
Costello while in Canada must have realised that Eire had no
bargaining position on Partition with regard to the formation of
NATO and that the expected movement on Partition would not 
materialise. Next best was an attack on the symbolic External 
Relations Act. The realisation that the Act would have to be at 
least amended may have prompted John Costello to give it the
'coup de grace'. The "announcement" meant that Costello regained 
his dignity and he could return home with some "gain" on
Partition to appease the Republican members of his government and 
outdo the impact of Eamon de Valera's anti-partition campaign. 
Despite Costello's explanation to Mackenzie King , that Fine Gael 
did not want Fianna Fail once again to reap the reward for
initiating a constitutional change in Anglo-Irish relations,(23) 
it would be a calumny to the reputation of John Costello to see 
his "announcement" primarily in terms of his party's advancement.
(21)Lundstead, Geir: America Scandinavia and the Cold War. P.327
(22)Ibid
(23)CDEA 50021-40. 199 Memorandum of Conversation 9.9.1948
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On the debacle of the "announcement" the last point should be
conceded to John Costello. In a letter of explanation to his 
Tanaiste, William Norton, written while in Canada, John Costello 
claimed that the announcement may have been "good tactics".(24) 
In late August,1948, Sir Norman Brook held individual 
discussions with Mackenzie King, Ben Chifley and Peter Fraser and 
obtained their agreement that if Eire repealed the External
Relations Act she "must be regarded as having severed the last 
constitutional link connecting Eire with the Commonwealth, and 
Eire must be treated as having ceased to be a member of the 
Commonwealth". (25) Norman Brook incorporating that consensus into 
a draft statement of general principles for discussion at the
October meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. The proposed 
statement if approved, would have had the effect of warning Eire
publicly of the consequences of repealing the Act. Such a
declaration by the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Meeting would 
have been raised to the status of a doctrine which would have, 
arguably, placed Eire under the sword of Damocles, reducing her 
to the status of a "dependent". There is no doubt(26) that John 
Costello was aware that the British government would have made
some such attempt to warn him off announcing the repeal of the 
External Relations Act. Following the 'fait accompli' 
"announcement", Brook explained the change in attitude of the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers as being due to the fact that the 
suggestion was at the time only a hypothetical question.(27)
(24) Irish Times. 3.1.1979.
(25) PRO PREM 8/1464 CPM(48)5
(26) Telephone interview with Professor Patrick Lynch. 26.3.1990
(27) as 25
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Given Sir Norman Brook's plan, and the Republican pressures from 
within his own government and from Fianna Fail, John Costello's 
'fait accompli' "announcement" may well have been 'good tactics' 
for the state and, as a by-product, for his party. But whether 
it was a logical choice of policy with regard to long term Anglo- 
Irish relations and more importantly for Irish citizens in Eire 
and throughout the member states of the Commonwealth will 
continue to be debated.
The treatment of India and Eire after they became Republics is 
indicative of the real, as opposed to the semantic relationship. 
In order to retain India and encourage Ceylon to remain within 
the Commonwealth, the unofficial criteria for "membership" of the 
Commonwealth was changed to that of recognition of the British 
Monarch's place in the Commonwealth as opposed to allegiance. 
(This was part of de Valera's Document no 2). (28) That sufficed 
to allow India to remain in the Commonwealth. A factor in that 
decision may have been India's strategic importance, especially 
to Australia (29) and the resultant example to Ceylon and Asiatic 
and African peoples. Perhaps of practical importance was that 
India showed a willingness to co-operate in evolving a new form 
of membership that prevented the dilution the unity of the 
Commonwealth into a two tier membership, divided by those who 
were or were not accepted into Commonwealth "family prayer" 
meetings on defence.
(28)Mitchell A.& 0 Snodaigh, P.(Eds.) Irish Political Documents 
1916-1949
(29) Lord Altrincham: Foreign Affairs .Vol 27 No 4. July 1949.
"India against the tide of Communism from the Far East."
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Eire would not even give a limited attribution to the Crown 
because according to John Costello in 1948 quoting Professor 
Wheare "it was difficult for those who regarded the Crown as the 
badge of servitude to accept it as the badge of freedom".(30) 
More tellingly Costello criticised the expectation of loyalty to 
Crown "when fidelity to the Catholic faith, the faith of the vast 
majority of our Irish people, was throughout the years regarded 
as dis-affection and disloyalty to the British Crown".(31)
It is probable that before arriving in Canada in August 1948, 
Costello hoped that the External Relations Act would be allowed 
to become defunct and Eire could become, like Burma, a Republic 
"associated" with the Commonwealth. That would have been a
compromise that while diluting the connection with the Crown
might have assuaged his coalition partners in Clann-na-
Poblachta and retained the loyalty of Unionists in Fine Gael.
Indeed, after making the announcement there is no evidence to 
suggest that Costello wanted to break the existing status quo 
'vis-a-vis' Eire's relationship with Commonwealth members. That 
came later. Australia, New Zealand, and to a lesser extent Canada 
wanted Eire to remain in the Commonwealth apparently on her own 
terms while Prime Minister Attlee only wanted some minimal "dues" 
for membership. There is the impression that that surmountable 
gap was widened; for example, by such conservative forces as/
(30) D.D.Vol.113 Col. 358 24.11.1948
(31) D.D. Vol. 113 Col. 359-60 24.11.1948
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as Norman Brook who advised the British government that, if the 
mere token of recognition of the Crown's position in the 
Commonwealth sufficed as the criteria or membership, then that 
would dilute the bond of Commonwealth membership.(32) Attlee 
over-simplified Costello's position when he stated, "Had he had 
the patience to wait he might have done as India did later. The 
result would have been more satisfactory than the rather 
illogical relationship between Britain and Eire which exists 
today."(33)
It is difficult to establish the feelings, as opposed to the 
official policy, of the post-war British Labour Party Government 
towards Ireland. A visit to the underground War Cabinet rooms in 
London allows one to empathise with the members of the Cabinet 
working there at that time towards neutral Eire. For example, a 
wall map prominently displayed in a control room was a constant 
reminder of Eire's neutrality. Ernest Bevin, when signing the 
Anglo-French Treaty in 1947, evokes the atmosphere in a speech he
(32) PRO Cab 134/118. CR(48)5. p.33. para 7
(33) Attlee.C.R. As it Happened, p.319 .see -Commonwealth 
Information pamphlet of address given by the Commonwealth 
Secretary General, Shridath S.Ramphal to the Irish Association's 
"Living Together", at Belfast City Hall. 9.6.1988.
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made about the retreat from Dunkirk : "I remember the vivid
night when Mr Churchill met all his Ministers, when the Chiefs of 
the Staff described to us the events in Belgium and Northern 
France, and when we were told that if we got 10 per cent of our
troops back we should be fortunate. We knew it was no use
arguing. The meeting broke up. Every Minister went back to his 
post to do his job.”(34) Perhaps it is fair to state that 
members of the British government carried forward feelings of
vexation over what has been referred to unfairly as "Ireland's 
uncompromising and sanctimonious neutrality,"(35) and as a result 
were grateful to Northern Ireland for her bases.
There is an impression that the Irish government failed to 
appreciate the vulnerability of Labour to criticism from the 
Conservative opposition about Britain's decline as a world power 
and the "disintegration" of the Empire; In a similar vein, 
the coalition failed to exploit the traditional sympathy on 
Partition that then existed in the British Labour Movement.(1*)
(34) Speech quoted in NA 741. 5111/3-2147 CS/A
(35)Quoted in, GuelfC^ International legitimacy, self
determination and Northern Ireland. Review of International 
Studies Vol 11 Number 11. January 1985
(l*)In December 1980 , former Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, Philip Noel Baker forwarded fellow Nobel Peace Prize 
winner, Sean MacBride, a copy of a letter which he had forwarded 
to the Manchester Guardian for publication: "First, the Hunger-
Strikers , with extraordinary courage and resolution are prepared 
to sacrifice their lives for a cause which they, and many others, 
believe to be just.
Second, the cause, the re-union of Ireland, must, in the long 
run, triumph. I lived through the events of the First World War 
and the following years, and my Father was a member of 
Parliament. I think very few of those who agreed to the 
arrangements for Ulster regarded those arrangement? as more than 
a temporary expedient to end the conflict then going on. They 
would have scouted the idea that the arrangements could last for 
60 years. (36)
(36) Copy of this letter, December, 1980 , in Private papers of 
Philip Noel-Baker, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge.
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The role of the media in publicising the "announcement” is worthy 
of examination. When Costello was informed about the 'Sunday 
Independent' headline he refused to comment publicly on it. He 
delayed for two days before making his announcement that the 
External Relations Act would be repealed. However, once John 
Costello made the "announcement" in Ottawa, the newspapers in 
Ireland copper-fastened the effect of his announcement. Headlined 
nationally, it was impossible for the Irish Government to 
rescind the announcement or alternatively to "ditch" Costello as 
leader of the government. The part the newspapers played in 
publicising John Costello's announcement is very important. A 
question that still remains unanswered is whether the newspapers 
were briefed in advance to expect an "announcement" or some major 
policy statement on Partition. For example, Costello had made 
broad hints in the Dail in July 1948 about an expected movement 
on Partition. It should be noted that Sean MacBride was a former 
journalist and adept at using the media for public relations 
purposes.
CONTINUED/
(37)Interview with Professor Patrick Lynch. 20.12.1988
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Of the two main parties Fine Gael was seen by the British
government as the party most suited to achieve evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary constitutional change.(38) That was the 
reason the British government could have understood more easily 
if Eamon de Valera (had he won the 1948 election) had carried out 
his threat to repeal the External Relations Act, and possibly 
even leave the Commonwealth. But they were neither expecting, 
nor prepared for such action from the leader of the Fine Gael 
party. Least of all did they expect a surprise public
announcement of such an intention .Certainly the "announcement" 
was a public affront to Britain and the "choice" of a
dominion,(1*) as the place to make it, added to the probability 
of a retributive response from Britain. This disappointment may 
have been one of the reasons for the harshness of the British 
government's response. By contrast the Commonwealth Relations 
Office eventually accepted the repeal as regularising the
previously anomalous situation.
CONTINUED/
(38) See Harkness, D. Northern Ireland since 1920.
(1*) I am grateful to Prof.Ronan Fanning for this point.
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By April 1949 Neil Pritchard was asking the Commonwealth
Relations Office for advice on Eire's participation on 
Commonwealth committees, in particular on the Sterling Area 
Statistical Committee and the Commonwealth Agricultural 
Bureau.(39) The official line was that the republic would have to 
resign from all Commonwealth Committees.(40) Attlee stated that 
with regard to the Republic's membership of Commonwealth
committees "it was clear that Eire could not continue to receive 
any of these facilities once she had ceased to be a member of the 
Commonwealth; and there would be advantage in making this clear 
in a public statement."(41) The reality was that soon after Eire 
left the Commonwealth an informal committee meeting chaired by
Sir Norman Brook agreed "that we should have to work out how Eire
should be brought back into the ambit of the sterling area 
committee, possibly with status of an observer."(42) Report 
entitled "Eire's membership of Commonwealth organisations and 
attendance at Commonwealth Conferences."
A similar situation as existed before was evolving . In general, 
the position was that the Commonwealth Relations Office wanted 
to be able to state in public that the Republic of Ireland was no 
longer a "member" of any Commonwealth committee, while 
facilitating those departments that wanted the Republic to 
continue to be in close touch with their committees "as an 
'observer' or some such title".(43) Similarly, officials from 
Irish government departments made it known that they were also
"anxious not to cut adrift" and by October 1949, relations had/
(40)Ibid
(41)Ibid
(42)Ibid
(43)Ibid
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had evolved so that there was no objection to the Republic of 
Ireland continuing an association with the Commonwealth 
Agricultural Bureau " provided that the term 'member' or even 
"associate member' is avoided." based on this "diluted 
"membership John Dulanty was bold enough to object paying the 
subscription of a " full member".(44)
The Foreign Office was not so generous in interpreting the spirit 
of the arrangement arrived at in Paris. A Foreign Office 
circular to its diplomats abroad advised, "the policy of treating 
the Irish Republic and Irish republican citizens as non-foreign 
applies only in this limited sphere, and there is nothing to 
suggest that representatives of the republic abroad should enjoy 
any special position vis-a-vis their colleagues representing the 
UK."(45) This note formally instructed Britain's diplomats to 
exclude Irish envoys from the established system of Commonwealth 
consultations.
With the benefit of hindsight Sean MacBride's diplomatic 
discussions with the State Department, especially in 
overestimating the strategic importance of Ireland to the United 
states, seem naively over- optimistic. Further examples are that 
in May, 1949, following discussions with Ernest Bevin, he was 
apparently disappointed that the "guarantee" clause in the 
Ireland Bill,1949, was not withdrawn,(46) and again in March 
1949, when he suggested that the Canadians might pressurise the/
(44)Ibid
(45)PRO FO 371. 91156 See Commonwealth Gatherings:Irish
Participation & circular No 064. 16.6.1949 which "embodies the
ruling of the Prime Minister about our relations with the Irish 
Republic."
(46) IDEA 305/14/36
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the government of Northern Ireland to end Partition. He assumed 
the Canadians would be sympathetic to a solution for Partition 
based on the model of Ontario-Quebec relationship in Canada.(47) 
This naivety is evident with regard to his failure to fully 
understand the sympathy of members of he Canadian government and 
such influential WASPish figures as John Hickerson, the director 
of European affairs at the State Department for the strategic 
contribution made by Northern Ireland. In relation to Canada, 
Sean MacBride and John Costello appear to have been caught in a 
1926 time warp when the Governor General of Canada, Lord Byng 
refused Mackenzie King his request to dissolve 
Parliament.(48)(1*) Despite a tolerant attitude from Canada for 
Eire's policy of neutrality during the war, Irish Ministers, 
MacBride and Costello do not appear to have appreciated that 
Canada had had become a staunch member of the Commonwealth. 
Indeed in Canada, the Commonwealth had become a focus for English 
speaking Canadians and externally against being overpowered 
culturally by her neighbour.(49)
(47) NA 841D.00 /3-449
(48)Governor General to Dominions Secretary L.Amery and reply. 
June 30.1926./July 1.1926.Documents On Canadian External 
Relations.Vol 4. 126-1930pp.10-11. Mac Greagor Dawson, R.: The 
Government of Canada . 4th ed.revised by Ward,N., University of 
Toronto press. 1967 p.154.see also Cole, Dacre.P. Our Forgotten 
Anniversary. Foreign Policy Review.
(49)Canada's Secretary of External Affairs, Lester Pearson, in
1953 stated "Outwardly and inwardly Canada has come of age , but
she has no desire to leave the Commonwealth." Mac Greagor Dawson 
R, : The Government of Canada 4th ed.revised by Ward,N.,
University of Toronto press. 1967 pp.55-56.
(1*) I am indebted to Dacre Cole, Dept. of External
Affairs,Ottawa, for bringing this point to my attention.
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This may have been due to poor advice from his staff or possibly 
that he distrusted Eire's Minister in Washington, Sean Nunan, 
(50) as he did de Valera's 'eminence grise', the Secretary of the 
Government, Maurice Moynihan, whom he excluded from Cabinet 
meetings.(51) One Canadian diplomat reported in 1951," MacBride 
runs the department off his own bat, with scant attention to his 
permanent officials at headquarters." (52)
A glimpse of the sharpness of the factors that may influence how 
decisions may be arrived at in the US Department of State is 
evidenced in an oral interview recorded with William John Kenny, 
Chief of the European Co-operation Assistance Mission in England, 
1949-50, (the administrative arm of the Marshall Plan): "I can
remember one time there was a chap, who I didn't particularly 
care for, who was our Ambassador to Ireland, and he sent an 
impassioned plea to Mr. Truman to get more money for Ireland. 
Well, Ireland didn't have a relatively high rate of priority on 
our program at that time as you can imagine, but Mr. Truman sent 
it over to me to answer. I wrote the Ambassador that the needs of 
Ireland had been seriously considered and I regretted that there 
were not available funds to increase the grant already made."(53)
(50)Sean Nunan acted as de Valera's secretary on his eighteen 
month fund raising trip to US in 1919-20 Bowman ,J. De Valera 
and the Ulster Question 1917-1973. P.192. See also; Cronin, S. 
The Me Garritv Papers.pp.73-93.
(51)Fanning, Ronan. Independent Ireland.p.167
(52) CDEA File 50021-40 REF 484-B/33/82 L.D. 22.2.1951
(53)HTL, Oral interview with William John Kenny by R.D. Me Kinzie 
and T.A. Wilson. 29.11.1971
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The grant of Marshall Aid was made in the form of a loan through 
the European Recovery Program to Eire. In June 1948, Eire became 
the first country to sign a bilateral agreement with the US under 
the provision of the Foreign Assistance Act,(54) under which 86 
million dollars was made available to Ireland.(55)
Upon the formal ending of Marshall Aid in 1952 the Republic of 
Ireland refused to sign a mutual defence agreement and 
accordingly were informed by the US embassy that, "it has no 
alternative under this legislation but to suspend the assistance 
being received by the Irish Government under the Economic Co­
operation Agreement."(56)
Despite this sanction it is worth noting that in April, 1953, in 
reply to a request from the US Embassy in Dublin, to place U.S. 
Air Force officers at Shannon Airport during a navigation test 
for a "system of defence”, the Irish Cabinet agreed that, "in 
view of the importance to this country of maintaining trans- 
Atlantic air communications during a future emergency, the 
Minister feels that it would not be in our interest to refuse 
this American request, any more than it would be in our interest 
to decline to permit routing officers to operate here as they 
did, in fact, during the last emergency."(57)
(54) FRUS Vol 111 ,1948 p.459
(55)Carrigan, J.E. (Chief, special ECA Mission in Ireland, 
'Marshall Aid In Ireland' . Christus Rex .1949.P.118
(56)NASPO S 1523A
(57) NASPO S 10325. Extract Cabinet meeting 14.4.1953. G.C. 6.172
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Arguably, the repeal of the External Relations Act was welcomed 
by the government of Northern Ireland as an "own goal". 
Additionally, when Fine Gael headed the coalition, the fears held 
by the political Unionist moderates in the North were reduced. 
Those fears returned with a renewed strength when the External 
Relations Act was repealed. As a result, any friendliness among 
the moderates who in turn might influence and contain extremists 
in the North was lost. George Garrett, believed that those same 
moderates wanted to ensure that their trust might not be 
misplaced again. Garrett thought that Partition was reinforced 
largely through the mishandling of Anglo-Irish relations by the 
Coalition government.(58)
The Ireland Act gave the government of Northern Ireland the 
opportunity to ensure that constitutional relations between the 
partitioned island were "tidied up". This operation included 
Basil Brooke's important requirement for a guarantee that Lough 
Foyle and Carlingford Lough would be available for access to 
British naval shipping in time of war. By giving a "guarantee" 
that Partition would not end, at least not without (as opposed to 
with) the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland, the 
British government assuaged the Unionists in Northern Ireland and 
doubly secured Northern Ireland as a loyal defence base. Forty 
years later, the part that the British Chiefs of Staff 
contributed to ensuring that their defence needs would be 
protected, especially in Lough Foyle, needs further 
clarification.
(58) NA 841D.00/3-449 March 4, 1949
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The reaction of the Irish government to the UK Ireland Act,1949, 
was rhetorical rather than practical. The emotions of the 
populace were deliberately raised by the politicians, as for 
example during the mass meeting in Dublin's O'Connell St. This 
was futile, other than as a jingoistic attempt to prove further 
the strength of their Republicanism. In retrospect this street 
demonstration could be interpreted as a wailing ritual that 
recognised the Irish government's powerlessness to unhinge 
Partition. Criticism was dampened when it was seen perhaps too 
late that their criticism of the British government was 
supporting that element in Ireland that would see the political 
protests as sanctioning violence means to end Partition.
There may have been more practical reasons for the Irish 
government's dropping their anti-partition campaign. Professor 
Nicholas Mansergh views the anti-partition campaign as being a 
barrier to Irish unity while worsening community relations in the 
North.(59)
(59) Boyce G. From War to Neutrality ,Anglo -Irish Relations 
1921-50 .British Journal of International Studies Vol 5 Number 1. 
April 1979, quotes Mansergh, N. Survey of British Commonwealth 
Affairs PP. 286-7
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It is interesting that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers were so 
supportive of Eire when gathered together, yet raised no 
opposition either before or after to the guarantee clause in the 
"Ireland Act". This may have been because they were subject to 
individual diplomatic pressure, or that their Cabinets, removed 
from the affray, were less supportive. This seems to have been 
the case with New Zealand and especially Canada. In Australia 
there is an impression of mounting criticism from the 
conservative opposition toward the Australian Labour government's 
overall foreign policy towards the Commonwealth and America.
Lord Rugby feared that the Irish government, particularly if de 
Valera were in power, would use the Council of Europe as an 
international forum for the anti-partition campaign, Laithwaite 
in contrast questioned whether there was any "solid interest" in 
the Republic in the Council of Europe's work (60) or whether it 
was being used "as a sounding board for Partition". Laithwaite 
quoted Sean MacBride as stating at a Council meeting in August 
1949 "that there were two major international questions in 
Western Europe - Germany and Partition".(61) In contrast, the 
chief of the E.C.A. mission in Dublin publicly acclaimed Sean 
MacBride for the "leading part" he played in the O.E.E.C. , while 
David Johnson noted that in recommending the statute of the 
Council of Europe MacBride expressed the hope that it would 
"evolve rapidly into a more closely knit body that will lead us 
to a federated States of Europe."(62)
(60)FO 371. 76372 report 1950.p.4.para 15,"International Affairs"
(61)Ibid
(62)CDEA 50021- 40 10463-AB-40/68/68
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Such international forums were comparatively new and included 
wide "ex-colonial" membership and the British government were 
anxious to avoid the raising of the issue of Partition, 
especially at the U.N. where the principal of the equality of 
sovereign states was then being taken seriously. Indeed, respect 
for the future sovereignty of the Republic of Ireland may have 
been the paradoxical reason why Britain did not want to return 
her loyal bases in Northern Ireland. Without those bases, Britain 
may have feared the prospect of having to breach UN principles 
and invade Ireland to use bases to protect herself against an 
enemy.
George Garrett, in May 1949, reported that Irish leaders believed 
that the possibility of international criticism from Strasburg 
may have been the reason that the British government persuaded 
Stormont to repeal some 41 of the "anti-democratic” regulations 
under the Special Powers Act which operated in Northern 
Ireland.(63) The result of such pressure about the abuse of civil 
liberties, provided for in the Special Powers Act in Northern 
Ireland, had been made prominent by the British Council for Civil 
Liberties over twenty years earlier.(64) There is no evidence to 
suggest that the Irish government were aware that rescinding the 
anti-partition campaign would result in, or even more unlikely, 
produce a 7quid pro quo' agreement to amend the Special Powers 
Act. Certainly, the amendments to the Special Powers Act removed 
some nationalist grievances and was a step/
(63) NA 841D.00(W)/9-249
(64) Report of Commission appointed by National Council for Civil 
Liberties Pamphlet Pub..1936 In N.L.I. Reference IR 320 p.116
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step towards improving community relations for the people of
Northern Ireland. Perhaps, some of the nationalist s>grievances 
could have been removed with the legal assistance of the Irish
government a couple of decades before.
Putting the "announcement’1 in perspective from the point of view 
of domestic politics it should be noted that the difficulties 
over the "Mother and Child" health scheme was the real reason 
why the coalition eventually fell.(65) The scheme was part of the 
194 7 Health Act amended and approved by the coalition government. 
This scheme provided health education, gynaecological treatment 
and pre-natal instruction to all mothers and children under the
age of sixteen without having to undergo the means test. The
medical profession and the Catholic Hierarchy combined in 
interpreting the absence of a means test as removing 
responsibility from parents. In reality the Irish Medical 
Association feared a drop in income for its members while the 
Hierarchy believed that the scheme might be interpreted to 
include provision for birth control and abortion. The government 
deferred to the Hierarchy and withdrew their support for the 
scheme. Dr. Noel Browne objected and was asked by his Party 
leader, Sean MacBride, to resign. To the chagrin of the 
"establishment" he released the Church/State correspondence on 
the issues. The correspondence showed the powerful position 
claimed by and allowed to the Catholic Hierarchy in the 
"Republic". Authority was claimed in all areas which might have a 
moral or social aspect.
(65) See, Whyte,J.: Church and State in Modern Ireland.
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The coalition were forced to call a general election in June 
1951. The technical reason was because Dr. Noel Browne and 
hitherto fellow party members, Noel Hartnet
and Peadar Cowan declared their intention to vote with the 
opposition party Fianna Fail in order to defeat the government on 
a vote to approve the estimates for the Department , of 
Agriculture.(66)
The June 1951 general election was fought on internal 
issues, predominantly that of personalities. Except for John 
Costello's attempts to justify leaving the Commonwealth, foreign 
affairs, including defence, were not seen as major electoral 
issues. The election resulted in Fianna Fail increasing its 
strength by just one vote. On June 13,1951, Eamon de Valera was 
elected Taoiseach by 69 votes to Fine Gael's 40. Perhaps not too 
surprisingly, Fine Gael emerged united, strengthening its size 
with an an increase of /v t /v s . Dail seats. Despite Fianna 
Fail's slim majority, the British government were advised by the 
Commonwealth Liaison Office of the Foreign Office to look forward 
to a more stable and robust government.(67)
Clann-na-Poblachta was devastated as a party, receiving only two 
seats. A total of seventeen independents were elected. Noel 
Browne as an independent supported Fianna Fail as did another 
former member of Clann-na-Poblachta/Peadar Cowan.
Even with this small majority, the Fianna Fail 
government functioned stably .
(66)Lvsaaht.D.R.The Republic of Ireland.Mercier Press 1970. p.145
(67) PRO FO 371 91167.Commonwealth Liaison Dept.file B 
61/24.Parliamentary Situation in Republic of Ireland." Telegram 
From Laithwaite No.71. 20.6.1951
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Interestingly, the very same numerical result could have been 
attained by the threatened small change of allegiance of four 
votes within the coalition and it was that very result which, 
despite the continual dissension within the coalition, also 
united it. Indeed, Anglo-Irish diplomatic relations aside, 
tribute must be paid to John Costello's ability in keeping such 
diverse interests together.
As a final ironic twist, not totally unexpected given the debacle 
as a whole, it is interesting to consider that, according to the 
journal, 'Irish Jurist', the Republic of Ireland Act did not 
necessarily mean the state was a Republic. Indeed, it would need 
a constitutional amendment to make it so, since it was clearly 
defined as an independent sovereign state. Additionally, the 
Journal stated pedantically that the Republic of Ireland Act did 
not mean that the Republic "left the Commonwealth since there was 
no formal machinery to define membership."(68)
Vinton Chapin, thought the repeal of the External Relations Act 
was a "probable miscalculation and misinterpretation of public 
interest in general, and of the influence of the Dominions and in 
the United States of those of Irish blood in particular, 
opportunism on the international stage has misfired."(69)
(68) The Irish Jurist. 1948 Vol XIV. pp.54-59
(69) NA 841 D.00/3-449
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Finally, in September 1950, the Canadian High Commissioner in 
Dublin, William Turgeon, in a personal and confidential letter 
to Lester Pearson, included the following passage:
"Mr. MacBride's message to you is to the following effect: he
says that, in his opinion, the leading statesmen of the United 
States and of Britain are not measuring up to the tasks devolving 
upon them in the present world crisis. This he concludes, is due 
in the first place to a real lack of ability in those concerned,
and moreover to the fact that they are restricted in their
freedom of broad-visioned action by the immediate material 
ambitions of their respective countries and by the political
interests of the administrations for which they speak and act.
So, he thinks, mistakes are being made now which will affect 
mankind adversely for a long period."(70)
Sean MacBride's criticisms could equally be projected onto the 
Coalition government's handling of the aftermath of John 
Costello's "announcement".
(70) CDEA 50021-40 L.D. 14.9.1950 on paper headed ROYAL 
COMMISSION ON TRANSPORTATION.
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APPENDIX 1
THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY (EXTERNAL RELATIONS) ACT, 1936.
ACT OF THE OIREACHTAS OF SAORSTAT ElREANN TO MAKE PROVISION FOR 
THE EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY IN RELATION TO CERTAIN 
MATTERS IN THE DOMAIN OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS (No. 58 OF 1936) 
12.12.1936
Be it enacted by the Oireachtas of Saorstat Eireann as follows
1. (1) The diplomatic representatives of Saorstat Eireann in
other countries shall be appointed on the authority of the
Executive Council.
(11) The consular representatives of Saorstat Eireann in other
countries shall be appointed by or on the authority of the
Executive Council.
2. Every international agreement concluded on behalf of Saorstat 
Eireann shall be concluded by or on the authority of the
Executive Council.
3. (1) It is hereby declared and enacted that, so long as
Saorstat Eireann is associated with the following nations, that 
is to say, Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, and 
South Africa, and so long as the King recognised by those nations 
as the symbol of their co-operation continues to act on behalf 
of each of those nations ( on the advice of the several 
Governments thereof) for the purposes of the appointment of 
diplomatic and consular representatives and the conclusion of 
international agreements, the King so recognised may, and is 
hereby authorised to , act on behalf of Saorstat Eireann for the 
like purposes as and when advised by the Executive Council so to 
do.
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APPENDIX 11 . (The draft of Eamon de Valera's repeal Bill)
The Presidential (International Powers and Functions) Act,1948.
An Act to make provision in accordance with the Constitution for
the exercise by the President of Ireland of powers and functions
in the domain of international affairs and for other matters
connected with the matter aforesaid.
Be it enacted by the Oireachtas as follows
1. The President shall represent the Republic in its external
relations, receive and accredit ambassadors, accord recognition 
to foreign consuls, appoint the consular representatives of the 
Republic abroad, and conclude state treaties.
2. The Executive Authority (external Relations ) Act, 1936 (No. 
58 of 1936) is hereby repealed.
3. This Act may be cited as the Presidential (International 
Powers and Functions )Act, 1948.
Reference Cearbhall 0' Dalaigh Private Papers UCD archives. 
Reference P51/2A (6)
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APPENDIX 111
TEXT OF REPUBLIC OF IRELAND ACT, 1948.
Be it enacted by the Oireachtas as follows
1. The Executive Authority (External Relations) Act, 1936 (No. 58 
of 1936),is hereby repealed.
2. It is hereby declared that the description of the State shall 
be the Republic of Ireland.
3. The President , on the authority and on the advice of the 
Government may exercise the executive power or any executive 
function of the State in or in connection with its external 
relations.
4. This Act shall come into operation on such day as the 
Government may by order appoint.
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APPENDIX IV.
EXTRACTS FROM THE TEXT OF IRELAND ACT, 1949.
1.- (1) It is hereby recognised and declared that the part of
Ireland heretofore known as Eire ceased, as from the eighteenth 
day of April, nineteen hundred and forty nine, to be part of His 
Majesty's dominions.
(2)It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland remains part 
of His Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom and it is 
hereby affirmed that in no event will Northern Ireland or any 
part thereof cease to be part of His Majesty's dominions and of 
the United Kingdom without the consent of the Parliament of 
Northern Ireland.
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APPENDIX V
Articles 2 and 4 of the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
TREATY.)Reference .H.M.S.O. Cmd. 7657.
Article 2: The Parties will contribute toward the further
development of peaceful and friendly international relations by 
strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better 
understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are 
founded , and by promoting conditions of stability and well­
being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their
international economic policies and will encourage economic 
collaboration between any or all of them.
Article 4: The Parties will consult together whenever, in the
opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
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Appendix VI Strategic Position of Ireland on North Atlantic Air 
Routes . reference HTL Box 256. PSF File SR 48.
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APPENDIX VI1
The U.S. legation in Dublin forwarded personal profiles on 
prominent individuals in Ireland to the Division of Biographic 
Information of the State Department .(1) These included 
Government officials, political leaders, delegates to 
international conferences , business men, union leaders, judges, 
lawyers diplomatic and consul staff in Ireland and the Irish 
diplomatic and consular representatives being sent abroad. A 
separate division listed the members of the armed forces. The 
Division of Biographic Information of the State Department 
supplemented continuously the details on political views, 
influence, ability, character an personality education, views of 
America, of fellow Irishmen, names of close associates.
More specifically, details of " selected decision makers" were 
collected and forwarded to the division of biographic 
information so "that due weight may be given to the influence, 
ideas, and personalities of these persons when our foreign policy 
is being formed." This information was often a determining factor 
in forming foreign policy with regard to the countries concerned. 
In 1948 special interest was paid to the individuals attending 
conferences on ECA programmes. It was believed that such 
individuals could have "extraordinary influence on the course of 
events; and the department wants to have in the biographic files 
as much as possible about these persons."
(l)NRC RG 84. 10
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In Ireland, the staff of the US legation was too small to 
assign an officer to full time reporting and all officers of the 
legation were asked to contributor information on persons whom 
they knew or might get to know if information were required.
The unit issued work sheets expecting a constant flow of 
information which was eventually collated. Information could 
also be forwarded in the form of "memoranda, fragmentary notes or 
even verbally".
From that source the following details of some members of the 
Irish Coalition Cabinet emerged .Some notable personalities were 
excluded such as Patrick McGilligan.
John Costello Prime Minister aged 57 a barrister since 1914.He 
was Attorney General in the Government 1925-32 Cumman- Na- 
Gael. He was not involved in what the US legation refers to as 
"the Anglo-Irish war" . This was one of the reasons why he was 
considered to be a suitable rather than the best candidate for 
the Premiership. Elected to the Dail in 1933. Considered to be 
reducing income by accepting Premiership.
William Norton aged 47, main occupation was as secretary of the 
Post Office Workers Union. A deputy from 1926-7 and since 1932. 
Was regarded as a conservative labour leader who adhered to the 
role of his peers in the British Labour movement.
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Sean Mac Bride leader of Clann- na - Poblachta aged 43 qualified 
as a barrister in 1937 and became a senior counsel in 1944. 
Coincidentally in that year (1937) he decided that the new 
constitution of the 26 counties provided the stepping stones to 
achieve independence for the nation .He resigned his recently 
appointed position as chief of staff of the IRA, an organisation 
he had been a member of since his youth . He was seen by 
diplomats a gifted man expected to lead the state in the future . 
James Dillon , Independent; Minister for Agriculture. Age 46. 
Qualified as a barrister; deputy since 1932. Formerly a deputy 
leader of Fine Gael, but resigned over statement advocating 
neutrality at the Ard Fheis during World War 11 .
Noel C. Browne, Clann na Poblachta, Minister of health, aged 32 
physician specialist on Tuberculosis
Daniel Morrissey, age 46, Minister for Industry and Commerce. An 
auctioneer . Deputy since 1923 as a member of the Labour Party 
from which he resigned in 1923.
James Everett, Leader of the National labour party, reputed to 
have remarked to a reporter that he had taken the post of 
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs because there was not much work 
involved. The Third secretary of the American legation reported 
that "he is an opportunist union politician and is not expected 
to carry much weight in the new Government."
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General Richard J. Mulcahy, aged 64 , Minister of Education. 
Formerly Minister of Defence during the Civil War 1922-24. Leader 
of Fine Gael party.
General Sean Mac Eoin , Minister for Justice, aged 52, Fine Gael, 
a director of several companies . A hero of the fight against 
England and was active in the pro-treatite side during the civil 
war.
Dr. Thomas F. O'Higgins, Minister for Defence, Fine Gael. Dr. 0' 
Higgins was brother of Kevin O'Higgins who was murdered in 
1927. Chief medical officer of the Irish Army 1924-29
P. Blowick ,Minister of Lands and Fisheries. A farmer from the 
West of Ireland. Entered Dail in 1943 .
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Appendix Vlll Cover of dinner menu given by the Prime Minister 
of Canada in honour of John Costello at the Country Club , Ottawa 
on Tuesday September 7, containing the toast "The President of 
Ireland.1
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